TEXT: Murray Dahm
  Macedonian Phalangite 
  Persian Warrior
  Alexander confronts the Achaemenids, 334–331 bc
  VERSUS
  
  Macedonian Phalangite 
  Persian Warrior
  Murray Dahm
  Illustrated by Peter Dennis
  Alexander confronts the Achaemenids, 334–331 bc
  
  INTRODUCTION 
  4
  THE OPPOSING SIDES 
  8
  Army composition • Tactics • Recruitment and motivation • Organization and 
  command • Equipment and training
  THE GRANICUS 
  29
  334 bc
  ISSUS 
  42
  333 bc
  GAUGAMELA 
  56
  331 bc
  ANALYSIS 
  71
  Macedonian effectiveness • Persian effectiveness
  AFTERMATH 
  76
  BIBLIOGRAPHY 
  78
  INDEX 
  80
  
  4
  In August 334 bc, the 22-year-old Macedonian king, Alexander III (r. 336–
  323 bc), invaded the vast Achaemenid Persian Empire with an elite army of 
  some 30,000 veteran infantry and 5,000 cavalry. With this force Alexander 
  intended to conquer the immensity of the Persian Empire. This conquest 
  had been the dream of Alexander’s father, Philip II (r. 359–336 bc), who had 
  created a professional army of unsurpassed power and efficiency, combining 
  new infantry formations, weapons and tactics with a devastating and mobile 
  cavalry. The Macedonian phalanx was at the heart of this new army. It was 
  designed to be able to charge and manoeuvre to where it was needed on the 
  battlefield, and to absorb a great deal of punishment and thus provide time for 
  Introduction
  RIGHT
  Alexander’s father, Philip II 
  of Macedon, shown here in a 
  portrait bust, was more than 
  likely the man responsible 
  for the military reforms in 
  Macedon which created the 
  phalanx and the ‘hammer-
  and-anvil’ tactics which 
  Alexander implemented 
  so well. Philip’s reforms of 
  Macedonian infantry tactics 
  are apparent in his and his 
  son’s accomplishments. 
  (Ann Ronan Pictures/Print 
  Collector/Getty Images)
  FAR RIGHT
  A bronze gilt bust of 
  Alexander the Great, dating to 
  the 2nd century bc and now in 
  the National Roman Museum, 
  Rome. We are told by Plutarch 
  (Alexander 14.1) that the most 
  faithful likeness of Alexander 
  was made by Lysippus, 
  Alexander’s personal sculptor. 
  No Lysippus original has 
  ever been found, although in 
  2010 two men were arrested 
  in Greece for possession of 
  illegal antiquities and one of 
  the items in their collection 
  could be an original Alexander 
  portrait by Lysippus. (Prisma/
  UIG/Getty Images)
  
  5
  Alexander to get his cavalry into the right position for his hammer blow. All 
  phalangites knew they were vital to Alexander’s battlefield plans; hence they 
  were called the Pezhetarioi (Foot Companions), the parallel of Alexander’s 
  hetairoi (Companions) cavalry. The overwhelming importance of the phalanx 
  is implied in the great lengths taken to ensure that its flanks were secured, 
  usually protected by other close-order infantry units, lightly armed troops, or 
  even cavalry.
  Since the defeat of the Persian invasions of Greece in the Graeco-Persian 
  wars of 490–479 bc, Persia had continued to be a presence in Greek politics, 
  playing a vital role in the defeat of Athens in the Peloponnesian War in 
  404 bc, in later wars, and in Greek politics in general with the period of 
  Detail of the Alexander Mosaic 
  from Pompeii but now in 
  the National Archaeological 
  Museum, Naples, depicting 
  Alexander the Great. 
  Alexander was already an 
  accomplished commander 
  when he succeeded his 
  father Philip to the throne in 
  336 bc. In combat, Alexander 
  took his place at the head 
  of the hetairoi (Companions) 
  cavalry in most of his battles. 
  With this force he struck 
  the killing blow, charging 
  straight towards a vital weak 
  spot deliberately opened 
  up between an opponent’s 
  units or towards the enemy 
  commander. Alexander should 
  not be considered simply 
  a commander of cavalry, 
  however, and he did fight with 
  the infantry on occasion, such 
  as at Sagalassos in 333 bc 
  (Arrian 1.28.3), where the 
  terrain did not suit cavalry. 
  Several of Alexander’s 
  generals commanded the 
  infantry divisions and it was 
  the Macedonian phalanx, 
  the core of Alexander’s army, 
  which enabled him to achieve 
  his victories; it was the anvil to 
  his cavalry hammer, but it was 
  no inanimate block waiting 
  for the king’s cavalry to strike. 
  Alexander, his commanders 
  and the phalangites 
  themselves seem to have 
  realized the importance of the 
  role of the phalanx and taken 
  pride in it. (Photo12/UIG via 
  Getty Images)
  This group of artefacts from 
  the Oxus treasure, dating from 
  the 4th century bc and now in 
  the British Museum, includes 
  a gold votive plaque depicting 
  a Persian soldier. The sword, 
  trousers and tunic correspond 
  to depictions dating from 
  more than a century earlier. 
  (Universal History Archive/
  Getty Images)
  
  6
  the King’s Peace following 387 bc. The Persian army or spada which faced 
  Alexander’s forces had conquered and maintained the Persian Empire since 
  the 6th century bc. The flexibility of units within its armies to fight in their 
  own style also allowed the army to expand unhindered as the empire grew, the 
  troops of each new acquisition being incorporated into the army. Perhaps the 
  most famous element of the Persian forces was the king’s infantry bodyguard, 
  the 10,000-strong unit called the ‘Immortals’ or ‘Apple Bearers’. This unit 
  formed an elite bodyguard and also provided the kernel of the Persian infantry 
  formation when the king, Darius III (r. 336–332 bc), was present.
  The growing dominance of the northern Greek kingdom of Macedonia in 
  Greek politics began in the 350s, but reached its culmination when Philip’s 
  Macedonian army defeated an alliance of Greek city-states led by Athens 
  and Thebes at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 bc. Following that decisive 
  victory, Philip was the master of Greece and soon turned his attention to the 
  invasion of Persia, claiming that his intention was to avenge the desecration 
  of Greek temples by the Persians in 480 bc. Philip was assassinated in 336 bc 
  and this cut short invasion plans, but his son, Alexander, inherited the same 
  desires; securing his position in Greece, Alexander led his father’s army across 
  the Hellespont and into Persian territory in 334 bc. What transpired in the 
  decade that followed remains one of the most impressive military conquests 
  in the history of warfare.
  From the Granicus to Gaugamela, 334–331 bc
  Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Asia in the spring of 
  334 bc. Leaving his army, the Macedonian king visited Troy 
  to pay his respects to the tomb of Achilles before advancing 
  north-east along the coast. The Persian commanders met at 
  Zeleia and advanced to the Granicus River (modern-day Biga 
  Çay), where Alexander met and defeated them. Victory there 
  permitted Alexander to advance to Sardis and then to various 
  cities such as Ephesus where he installed democracies 
  and left members of his Companions as the commanders 
  of garrisons. Most cities welcomed him, although Miletus 
  and Halicarnassus had to be besieged. Alexander advanced 
  along the southern coast of Anatolia, even during midwinter 
  334/333 bc, as far as Phaselis in Lycia. From there he 
  advanced to Perge and then Side in Pamphylia.
  Having secured the coast, Alexander then headed inland 
  into Phrygia. He marched on Sagalassos and took the 
  surrender of the stronghold of Kelainai. From there he set 
  out for Gordion in Galatia, possibly for propaganda purposes 
  as much as anything else. At Gordion was the palace of 
  Gordios and legend related that whoever undid Gordios’ 
  knot would rule Asia. According to Arrian (2.3.7), Alexander 
  severed (or undid) the knot and then moved on to Ancyra in 
  Galatia and then to the Cilician Gates, the main pass through 
  the Taurus Mountains. The Persian defenders abandoned 
  their posts and allowed Alexander to advance from Anatolia 
  into Cilicia and towards the city of Tarsus.
  Alexander again secured the coast around Tarsus, taking 
  Soloi to the west before moving east towards Mallus. He 
  learned of Darius’ approach (depending on the source, at 
  Gordion, Tarsus or Mallus) and marched south. Darius had 
  come to a place named Sochoi, perhaps four days from 
  Mallus (but not securely identified). Alexander moved 
  through the Syrian Gates and down the Syrian coast before 
  learning that Darius had marched behind him to Issus 
  (crossing the mountains at the Amanic Gate). Alexander 
  turned back and met Darius in battle at the Pinarus River, 
  south of Issus. There Darius was defeated and the Persian 
  king fled back to Babylon to regroup and summon a new, 
  larger army.
  Alexander did not pursue Darius but continued along the 
  coast, securing it as far as Egypt and taking cities such as 
  Sidon, Tyre, Damascus and Gaza to secure his rear before 
  heading to Egypt in 332 bc. Returning from Egypt in the 
  spring of 331 bc, he retraced his steps to Gaza and then Tyre, 
  before marching inland to Damascus and then Thapsacus 
  (the location of which remains uncertain), crossing the 
  Euphrates River there. Alexander then marched on to the 
  Tigris River, perhaps drawn on by Persian forces which 
  withdrew before him, marching quickly to meet Darius at 
  Gaugamela, somewhere near the ancient city of Nineveh.
  
  7
  B l a c k  S e a
  M e d i t e r r a n e a n  S e a
  Aegean
  Sea
  ANATOLIA
  Damascus
  Cyprus
  Zeleia
  Soloi
  Side
  P A M P H Y L I A
  Perge
  Phaselis
  Xanthos
  Halicarnassus
  Mallus
  Sidon
  Sochoi (?)
  Thapsacus (?)
  Amanic
  Gate
  Sagalassos
  Kelainai
  Syrian Gates
  Cilician
  Gates
  Shrine of
  Ammon
  Tarsus
  Tyre
  Gaza
  Babylon
  Nineveh
  Gordion
  Ancyra
  Miletus
  Ephesus
  Sardis
  Sangarius
  Pinarus
  The Granicus (334 BC)
  Issus (333 BC)
  Euphrates
  Tigris
  Maeander
  Granicus
  Pella
  Thebes
  Sparta
  Troy
  Athens
  M A C E D O N I A
  TA U R U S
  M O U N TA I N S
  G A L AT I A
  P H R Y G I A
  C I L I C I A
  LY C I A
  S Y R I A
  M E S O P O T A M I A
  T H R A C E
  Crete
  Rhodes
  Gaugamela (331 BC)
  334 BC
  Alexander’s route
  333 BC
  332 BC
  331 BC
  E G Y P T
  N
  0
  200 miles
  0
  200km
  
  8
  ARMY COMPOSITION
  Macedonian
  The Macedonian army was made up of several troop types, mixing cavalry, 
  several types of infantry and lightly armed troops. The wealthy noble class 
  formed the army’s cavalry, the hetairoi, an elite unit and an important part of the 
  Macedonian hierarchy. Thus Macedon was already different to other Greek city-
  states which had focused their resources on heavy-infantry hoplites for several 
  centuries. Even the aristocracies of city-states such as Sparta, Thebes and Athens 
  fought as hoplite infantry. Macedon used hoplites, too, recruited as mercenaries 
  and who served alongside the elite infantry battalions, the hypaspists, who 
  may have been armed as hoplites. Macedonian armies also included specialist 
  lightly armed missile troops such as Cretan archers and Agrianian and Thracian 
  peltasts, as well as slingers and javelin-armed units. Macedonian cavalrymen 
  were armed with the xyston, a long spear used for both thrusting and throwing, 
  as well as javelins for throwing and the kopis, a longer sword for slashing; the 
  xiphos, a thrusting sword, was also used. There were other varieties of cavalry 
  available, both heavy and light. We know, for example, that the sarissophoroi or 
  lancers were armed with the sarissa, a feared long spear wielded with both hands 
  (such troops controlled their horses with their legs); the prodromoi cavalry also 
  carried sarissae. There were also units of cavalry such as the Thessalians and 
  Paeonians, who may have been armed in a manner according to their culture.
  The warriors who remained the most recognizably Macedonian soldiers, 
  however, were the phalangites. Each equipped with a sarissa, they made up 
  the core of the Macedonian infantry. They were organized into six taxeis 
  (battalions) of roughly 1,500 men each. This mode of fighting was probably 
  an innovation introduced by Philip, although it is possible it had its origins 
  with earlier Macedonian kings or in the reforms of the Athenian Iphicrates 
  The Opposing Sides
  
  9
  in the early 4th century bc. Each taxis was divided into six syntagmata (sub-
  units), each syntagma fielding 256 men and usually 16 ranks deep. Thus each 
  taxis was its own phalanx in miniature, with six sub-units. The 9,000 veteran 
  phalangites that made up the core of the Macedonian army were probably 
  the single most numerous troop type, but in order to operate effectively they 
  relied upon the other elements of Alexander’s forces to protect their flanks and 
  to deliver the hammer blow for which the phalanx could be the anvil.
  Plutarch (Alexander 15.1) provides a range for the size of Alexander’s army: 
  the lowest estimate puts its strength at 30,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry 
  and the highest at 43,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. Modern estimates 
  give Alexander additional cavalry. Diodorus’ even more in-depth breakdown 
  (17.17.3–5) puts the numbers of Macedonian infantry at 12,000 and the total 
  infantry contingent at 32,000, with 4,500 cavalry.
  Persian
  The army’s core remained the Persian infantry, made up of levies of troops 
  from the homelands of Persia and Media in Iran. Along with the same number 
  of cavalry, the famous 10,000-strong Immortals probably also represented the 
  permanent Persian army. The Persian Empire also employed Greek mercenary 
  hoplites, warriors whose fighting style had inflicted such telling defeats on the 
  Persian army in the 5th century bc, and were used by the Persians in increasing 
  numbers in the 4th century bc. The Persians had a strong cavalry arm and many 
  of the empire’s commanders are mentioned as commanding cavalry contingents 
  (Arrian 1.15.7–8; 1.16.3–4). Many of the Persian armies described to us in 
  the sources include a large number of units named for the nationality of their 
  contingents. It is most likely that these units, whether cavalry or infantry, fought 
  in the style of their nations and there seems to have been little effort to make 
  them conform to one style of fighting. In some cases these units are designated 
  as cavalry or infantry (sometimes both); sometimes they are specified as archers 
  ABOVE LEFT
  Alexander’s lightly armed 
  troops included peltasts, 
  missile troops who usually 
  carried several javelins 
  (palta, sing. palton) and a 
  small shield, somewhat 
  confusingly also called a 
  pelte, the same name as 
  the Macedonian phalangite 
  shield, although they were 
  different in appearance. This 
  Attic red-figure amphora of 
  the 5th century bc depicts 
  a Thracian peltast with a 
  pelte shield. The appearance 
  and fighting styles of the 
  Thracians changed little 
  between the 5th and 
  4th centuries bc. (Ashmolean 
  Museum/Heritage Images/
  Getty Images)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  A funerary stele in the Louvre 
  depicting a Macedonian 
  cavalryman. He wears a 
  typical Phrygian helmet and 
  linothorax armour, items his 
  infantry counterpart would 
  also have worn. There is 
  some debate among scholars 
  regarding the Macedonian 
  use of long thrusting spears 
  from horseback. (Tangopaso/
  Wikimedia/Public Domain)
  
  10
  Persian Immortals from 
  the Palace of Darius I 
  (r. 522–486 bc) at Susa, now 
  in the Louvre. Even though 
  this frieze was created in 
  the previous century, there 
  is no evidence that Persian 
  arms and armour changed 
  to any great degree in the 
  intervening period. It is 
  known as the frieze of the 
  archers, but each is armed 
  with a spear. The name 
  of the Immortals comes 
  from Herodotus (7.41.1 and 
  7.83.1), writing about the 
  Persian invasion of Greece in 
  480/479 bc. Herodotus tells 
  us of the elite units in the 
  Persian army accompanying 
  the king; the members of 
  these units had golden or 
  silver pomegranates (or 
  apples) on their spears 
  (presumably to signify their 
  rank). The historians of 
  Alexander, however, do not 
  mention the Immortals by 
  name and some include no 
  elite unit among the Persian 
  infantry. We are only told 
  of 30,000 mercenaries and 
  two units of 60,000 Persian 
  infantry – Cardaces – at 
  the battle of Issus (Arrian 
  2.8.5–8). Even so, there is 
  no reason to assume that 
  the unit ceased to exist, 
  and both Arrian (3.11.5; 
  3.13.1; 3.16.1) and Diodorus 
  (17.59.3) mention an elite 
  Persian unit at the battle of 
  Gaugamela which they call 
  the ‘Apple Bearers’. This 
  unit is reconcilable with the 
  Immortals. We are not told 
  the strength of this unit, but 
  it is clear that its members 
  form a royal guard, as they 
  flee with Darius. (Jebulon/
  Wikimedia/Public Domain)
  
  11
  or axe-men, but at other times they are simply named (Scythians, Indians or 
  Bactrians, for instance). We also have some exotic inclusions, such as the scythed 
  chariots and elephants included at Gaugamela.
  The Persian troop numbers mentioned in the sources are very often 
  excessively large, but this is an issue across all accounts of ancient battles. At the 
  Granicus, the commanders were 14 named satraps (provincial governors) from 
  the western provinces and other aristocrats but did not include the king himself. 
  According to Arrian (1.14.4), the Persian army at the Granicus was made up of 
  20,000 cavalry and slightly fewer foreign mercenaries; Diodorus (17.19.4) gives 
  a more likely higher total of 100,000 infantry (and has 10,000 cavalry). Even 
  though the Greek mercenary commander Memnon of Rhodes is named (Arrian 
  1.12.9), not all of the 20,000 mercenaries in Persian service would have been 
  Greek hoplites. Some would have been among the men supplied by each satrap, 
  especially if they could not fulfil their obligations with levies from their province 
  or holdings. The satraps at the Granicus and from other regions of Persia did 
  not have many Persian troops, however. The commanders at the Granicus 
  included several Persian nobles as well as Mithridates (Darius III’s son-in-law), 
  and so it is probable that they had some infantry levied in Persia. Levying such 
  men en masse, however, was reserved for the king’s army, for which the satraps 
  of Persia and Media were required to levy troops.
  When Darius’ army came up against Alexander at Issus and Gaugamela, 
  it came in full splendour. Arrian (2.8.8) and the Oxyrhynchus Historian 
  (fragment 44) give the strength of Darius’ army at Issus at 600,000 men, 
  Justin (11.9.1) and Diodorus (17.31.1) only slightly less at 400,000 (that 
  is just infantry; there were 100,000 cavalry too). There must have been a 
  veteran core of experienced Persian troops, perhaps the 10,000 members of 
  the Immortals. Other elements of the Persian levy from all over the empire 
  would probably also have had some military experience.
  FAR LEFT
  Detail of another Immortal 
  from Susa. Note the details 
  of dress and footwear, and 
  the combination of spear and 
  bow. No swords are shown 
  on these figures, and it is 
  possible that the rectangular 
  panels were armour rather 
  than just decoration. 
  Interestingly, the anecdotes 
  in Aelian (Varia Historia 9.3) 
  and Athenaeus (12.539.e–f) 
  that were probably taken 
  from Phylarchus’ Histories 
  provide the colours of Persian 
  uniforms: purple and yellow 
  for the Apple Bearers, 
  flame-coloured, dark blue 
  and scarlet for the archers, 
  and purple for the Susians. 
  Xenophon (Cyropaedia 8.3.3) 
  mentions purple, sable, 
  red and dark walnut-red. 
  (Pierre André/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 4.0)
  LEFT
  More guards from Darius’ 
  palace at Persepolis. The 
  reliefs of the guard seem to 
  match those we find in Susa 
  although details of uniform 
  (especially the different types 
  of helmets) and arms differ 
  slightly. All are armed with 
  spears and none wear any 
  discernible armour or swords. 
  When we look at the reliefs 
  at Susa and Persepolis we 
  see that the intricate patterns 
  and colours of each figure 
  may well have represented 
  that unit’s place of origin. The 
  depictions of headdress and 
  hairstyles may have aided 
  in distinguishing units from 
  one another. (Diego Delso, 
  delso.photo/Wikimedia/CC-
  BY-SA 4.0)
  
  12
  Macedonian lochagos
  This file leader of the Elimiotis 
  taxis, deployed on the right flank 
  of the Macedonian line, is 22 years 
  of age and clean-shaven, as per 
  Alexander’s advice not to give the 
  enemy something to grab hold of 
  (Polyaenus, Strategemata 4.3.2). 
  A veteran, he is keen, and leads 
  his file into battle. He is sweating 
  as he carries 27kg of kit.
  3
  10
  8
  1
  2
  
  13
  Weapons, dress and equipment
  He carries a sarissa (1), 5.5m long, with a long point and weighted 
  butt-spike. Sarissae were transported in halves and connected 
  before battle via a coupling device (2), only one of which survives. 
  This made transportation much easier and also meant that the 
  shafts were stronger and bent less in combat. Replacement of 
  broken halves was probably also easier; cornel wood was common 
  in Greece and in coastal Anatolia but not available in the inland 
  regions of the Persian Empire. Under his shield, on his left hip, he 
  wears a kopis (3), its scabbard carried on a baldric which crosses 
  diagonally over his right shoulder.
  He wears a linothorax (linen armour; 4) with pteruges (‘feathers’; 
  5) and under it an exomis (short tunic; 6). Front ranks of phalangites 
  were probably more heavily armoured than those in the middle of 
  the file; we even have some evidence of half-cuirasses which only 
  protected the front (Polyaenus 4.3.13). Phalangites had a variety of 
  kranos (helmet) styles to choose from; the Thracian helmet without a 
  plume shown here (7) seems to have been most common. This man 
  wears bronze greaves (8) to protect his shins and his feet are clad 
  in tough leather sandals (9). On his left forearm, held by a porpax 
  (‘handle’), is affixed his pelte (shield; 10), 45cm in diameter; an 
  ochane (neck strap; 11) aids in holding the shield in place. The shield 
  decoration shows the Macedonian eight-rayed star, the Macedonian 
  royal symbol.
  The Granicus, 334 bc
  5
  6
  9
  7
  11
  4
  
  14
  TACTICS
  Macedonian
  The mix of troop types fielded by the Macedonians seems to have permitted 
  Alexander to employ combined-arms tactics where cavalry and infantry or 
  cavalry and lightly armed troops coordinated their manoeuvres. In several 
  of Alexander’s battles, the cavalry, in combination with a single taxis of 
  the Macedonian phalanx, the hypaspists and sometimes other units, would 
  deliver the decisive blow, the hammer in ‘hammer-and-anvil’ tactics, with 
  the anvil being the phalanx. The phalanx was precisely drilled to be able to 
  adopt various formations and this gave it remarkable battlefield versatility. 
  The phalanx is sometimes described as a ‘pike-block’ with the inference that 
  it was unwieldy or immobile, but this was far from the case. It was indeed 
  immovable when it needed to be, to hold its ground, but it was also a highly 
  mobile and responsive formation when required. This manoeuvrability 
  is attested to in the vast number of drills each phalanx would have been 
  trained to carry out, contained in the Tactica manuals which describe 
  the formations and manoeuvres of the phalanx. These manuals were first 
  written either in Alexander’s lifetime or in the years immediately following 
  his death in 323 bc and at a time when the phalanx dominated the warfare 
  of his successors.
  The origins of the reforms to the Macedonian military system are 
  complex and still cause divisive arguments. The most common idea is that 
  Philip copied or adapted the reforms from the Thebans when he was a 
  hostage in the city of Thebes during the 360s, during the period of Theban 
  domination (after they had smashed the Spartans at the battle of Leuctra 
  in 371 bc). Philip was a teenager during this period, and so it is hard to 
  establish with certainty just how much he was influenced by all this reform. 
  There is also no evidence that the Thebans had adopted spears of greater 
  length than usual. What the Thebans had done, however, at Leuctra and 
  elsewhere, was adopt a formation up to 50 men deep (the mass this provided 
  was what had allowed them to succeed so spectacularly at Leuctra). Another 
  part of the Theban success at Leuctra and at the battle of Mantinea in 
  362 bc was the idea of drawing up their forces in echelon, and advancing 
  to battle on an oblique front. This was something that the design of the 
  Macedonian phalanx allowed for far more than did the traditional hoplite 
  phalanx (and something which, as we shall see, which Alexander executed at 
  This sketch of a bronze plaque 
  from Pergamon, probably 
  depicting a much later battle 
  (Magnesia in 190 bc) is one 
  of the very few depictions of 
  Macedonian or Hellenistic 
  phalangites in combat. Note 
  also the flag at the extreme 
  left, which may represent a 
  unit flag. Approximately the 
  front five ranks of the phalanx 
  extended their sarissa points 
  horizontally beyond the front 
  rank as the offensive front 
  of the phalanx. Behind them 
  the remaining ranks raised 
  their sarissae at a roughly 
  45-degree angle and the 
  rearmost ranks held them 
  vertically, in readiness (and 
  possibly to pass forward 
  when forward ranks’ shafts 
  broke in combat). The rear 
  ranks also added mass to 
  the phalanx’s advance. This 
  formation has often been 
  described as a ‘hedgehog’ 
  or ‘porcupine’ of spears and 
  it has always been assumed 
  that the raised sarissae of the 
  rear ranks disrupted enemy 
  missile fire. The low casualty 
  numbers in the phalanx 
  reported in all of the accounts 
  of Alexander’s battles may 
  reveal that the usefulness 
  of this aspect of the phalanx 
  has been underestimated. 
  (Alexander Conze/Wikimedia/
  Public Domain)
  
  15
  the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela). The idea (and effectiveness) of a deep 
  formation and one which could be drawn up in echelon may have struck 
  Philip while he was held in Thebes.
  It is debated whether the Athenian Iphicrates’ reforms were enacted 
  among light infantry/peltasts, or among the heavy, hoplite infantry. Diodorus 
  specifically states (15.44.2–3) that Iphicrates’ reforms were applied to the 
  hoplites. Interestingly, both the Theban and Iphicratean reforms resulted in 
  Athenian successes against Spartan hoplites and were, perhaps, designed with 
  that foe in mind. To the Greeks, the Spartans remained the most powerful 
  hoplite force in Greece until their defeat at Leuctra; they never recovered from 
  the loss of manpower they suffered during that battle. Recent scholarship has 
  explored the idea that the Spartans were not invincible, but for contemporary 
  Greeks in the 5th and 4th centuries bc, the Spartans were the superior hoplite 
  state even after Sparta suffered defeat. It was the loss of manpower at Leuctra 
  which rendered Sparta impotent. In many ways the humbling of Sparta, and 
  the success of Theban tactics in defeating the Spartans, facilitated the rise of 
  the Macedonian phalanx.
  There has been a tendency recently to divest Philip of responsibility for 
  the reforms to the Macedonian army despite both Diodorus (16.1.3–6) and 
  Arrian (7.9.2) giving him credit, as well as many modern military historians. 
  Philip’s ambition to make Macedon the dominant force in Greece may help 
  explain his adoption of two reforms (the length of the spear and the depth 
  of the formation) which would help to ensure his victory over traditional 
  hoplite forces. His vengeful destruction of the Thebans and their elite 
  Sacred Band at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 bc might also be explained 
  in this way (the pupil defeating the master). Whatever the source of his 
  inspiration, it seems clear that Philip created an unprecedentedly powerful 
  Macedonian military machine which was different from anything that came 
  before it. No other reformer combined the length of spear with a massed 
  and deep formation.
  The Persians had been defeated by traditional hoplites using traditional 
  tactics and weapons in the 5th century bc and if Philip’s phalangites could 
  defeat such hoplites then, surely, his formations could defeat the enemies 
  the hoplites had bested. This idea may have provided the germ from which 
  Philip’s (and Alexander’s) plans for the conquest of Persia grew.
  Housed in the Istanbul 
  Archaeological Museum, 
  the Alexander Sarcophagus, 
  from the acropolis of Sidon, 
  Lebanon, offers remarkable 
  details of both Macedonian 
  and Persian dress. Even when 
  allowing for artistic licence, 
  it provides the historian with 
  much to ponder. This is a 
  reconstruction of how the 
  colours on the Alexander 
  Sarcophagus may have 
  appeared originally. Once 
  you have got past the vivid 
  hues, they do tally with what 
  we know from written and 
  other archaeological sources. 
  (ANA BELÉN CANTERO PAZ/
  Wikimedia/CC BY 2.0)
  
  16
  Persian dathapatis
  This ‘commander of ten’ from 
  an arstibara unit from Susa is 
  22 years old. A veteran of two 
  campaigns, he has reached the 
  first rank of promotion in the 
  Persian command structure. He 
  waits, fresh, at the battle of the 
  Granicus, eager because of his 
  promotion to impress his satapatis 
  (‘commander of a hundred’).
  3
  5
  7
  1
  
  17
  Weapons, dress and equipment
  He is armed with a spear (1) approximately 6 cubits (2.5m) in length; 
  the Persian spear was generally shorter than the typical hoplite spear, 
  also of 6 cubits, but the archaeological depictions of troops from Susa 
  show longer spears than those from Persepolis depicting Median 
  and Persian troops. He wears an akinaka (2) on his right hip, on a belt 
  cinched at his waist.
  He wears trousers (3) and a tunic (4) decorated with geometric 
  patterns to signify his Susian origins. The various hazaraba of the 
  Persian army seem to have been clothed in distinctive colours 
  which may have differentiated units or indicated their origins. 
  We have descriptions of purple and yellow for the Apple Bearers, 
  flame-coloured, dark blue and scarlet for the archers, and purple for 
  Susians. We also have descriptions of purple, sable, red and dark 
  walnut-red. These colours are borne out by the archaeological record.
  This man’s headdress (5) is typical and his hair is also dressed. 
  Helmets and headdress or hairstyle may also have differentiated 
  units; there are several distinct types of helmet depicted. He wears 
  soft leather shoes (6) and carries a rectangular wicker shield (7) 
  which reaches from ankle to neck and is approximately 90cm wide. A 
  further distinguishing feature may have been the geometric patterns 
  on clothing and shields we know from various depictions in art.
  The Granicus, 334 bc
  6
  2
  4
  
  18
  Persian
  We are not so lucky as to have treatises similar to the Tactica for the 
  Persian army. There is some evidence of Persian tactics within our sources, 
  but since they were writing in Greek or Latin, they may simply have used 
  terminology with which they were familiar. For example, at the battle of 
  the Granicus we find Mithridates charging with a cavalry wedge (Arrian 
  1.15.7). The term used by Arrian, embolon, is a Greek one, but may reflect 
  Persian practice.
  Persian infantry were predominantly divided into units of arstibara 
  (spearbearers) and archers, although in the archaeological record we see 
  spearmen who also each have a bow and quiver. Shields are much less 
  common in artistic depictions and men could not wield shields and bows 
  at the same time. It is possible that only the front man in a dathabam of 
  ten men carried a shield, while the remainder used their bows or spears 
  as required. The arstibara were, however, a specific unit. A single line of 
  shields behind which archers fired might help to explain the superiority 
  of the Macedonian phalanx against Persian formations and also the 
  disproportionately high Persian casualty numbers in battles against the 
  phalanx. For the most part the Persians seem to have relied upon missile 
  weapons – archery and javelins, used both on foot and from horseback – 
  to try to break their enemies. Where we have the information (such as for 
  Gaugamela) we also know whether each national contingent was made up of 
  archers or of other types of troops. It is likely that in battle, the Immortals 
  stood in front of the king (and not necessarily in the centre of the line as 
  it seems that Darius actually favoured a position on the left wing). We are 
  probably safe in assuming that such a polyglot force with different fighting 
  styles characterized the Persian armies at Issus and the Granicus. An author 
  such as Diodorus can imply variety in the Persian ranks without giving 
  much detail, mentioning how the commanders of the Persian army at the 
  Granicus brought in forces from far and wide.
  Unfortunately, sources such as Arrian usually provide very little detail 
  about the units attacked by Alexander’s army. For the most part Alexander’s 
  opponents are simply called infantry, cavalry or mercenaries. The exception 
  to this is in Arrian’s account of Gaugamela, in which he reports (3.11.3–7) 
  that he used a precise Persian order of battle found in one of his sources, 
  Aristobulus.
  Conversely, Arrian tells us (1.14.4) that at the Granicus the Persians had 
  20,000 cavalry drawn up in front of the infantry, who numbered slightly 
  less. Diodorus provides a little more detail – like Curtius Rufus, he probably 
  used Cleitarchus as a source – but his version of events at the Granicus 
  has not been favoured. Diodorus claims (17.19.4–5) there were 10,000 
  cavalry and 100,000 infantry; he names the cavalry contingents, and notes 
  that the infantry, though strong in number, remained behind the 10,000 
  cavalry, the latter force being deemed strong enough in number to defeat 
  the Macedonians. Diodorus has Memnon of Rhodes commanding a cavalry 
  contingent on the left flank. The idea of having the cavalry in the front rank 
  is an interesting one. At the Granicus the Persians certainly outnumbered 
  the Macedonians in cavalry, and so probably expected to be able to win with 
  that arm. At Issus, according to Curtius Rufus (3.11.1), Darius, aware of the 
  
  19
  strength of the Macedonian phalanx, decided to focus on a battle between 
  the rival cavalry forces.
  According to Arrian (2.8.5–10), at Issus the Persians employed a screen of 
  30,000 cavalry and 20,000 lightly armed troops so that the Persian infantry 
  could deploy in two 60,000-man blocks, one on either side of a contingent 
  of 30,000 Greek mercenaries. Arrian tells us (2.8.8) that 20,000 men were 
  posted on the mountainous terrain threatening Alexander’s right flank, and 
  that the deployment in depth of the ‘national regiments’ which made up 
  both light and heavy infantry rendered them ineffective behind the Greek 
  mercenaries and Persian infantry.
  At Gaugamela, for which Arrian follows a precise plan from Aristobulus, 
  he tells us (3.8.3–6; 3.11.3–7) of various different national contingents and 
  their fighting styles. According to this detailed listing, Darius had 40,000 
  cavalry and one million infantry (not to mention 200 scythed chariots and 
  15 elephants). The sheer variety of Darius’ contingents is dazzling. It is 
  worth noting, however, that several contingents probably fought in the 
  style of the Persian infantry. Arrian records (3.8.4–5) Albanians, Cadusians 
  and Sacesinians being aligned with Medes or Persians and Carians and 
  Sittacenians alongside Babylonians, and it stands to reason that these 
  troops fought in the same way. Other named contingents may also have 
  fought in a similar fashion to the Persian infantry. Our other sources for 
  these battles make it far from straightforward to piece together Darius’ 
  deployment, however.
  RECRUITMENT AND MOTIVATION
  Macedonian
  Each of the six taxeis of the phalanx was levied in a different part of 
  Macedon, which gave the personnel of each taxis cohesion. Each was 
  referred to by its territorial name, e.g. the taxis of Elimiotis, the taxis of 
  ABOVE LEFT
  A Persian archer from the 
  Alexander Sarcophagus. The 
  weapons, which would have 
  been made of wood and 
  metal, have all been lost. 
  Clear traces of paint on the 
  sarcophagus allow historians 
  to reconstruct what some of 
  the uniforms may have looked 
  like originally. (G.dallorto/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 2.5)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  A detail from the Alexander 
  Sarcophagus showing a 
  Macedonian stabbing a 
  fleeing Persian infantryman. 
  The Macedonians are nearly 
  all depicted heroically (that 
  is, naked); the figure at left is 
  marked out as Macedonian 
  by the Phrygian helmet (note 
  the cheek pieces) and cloak. 
  (G.dallorto/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 2.5 IT)
  
  20
  the Orestae and the Lyncestae, and the taxis of Stymphaeans. Macedonia 
  did not contain large numbers of cities and its peasants did not farm; they 
  generally tended their flocks and herds in the harsh mountain terrain, 
  meaning they were hardy and not tied to the land in the ways that other 
  Greek farmers were in the south. These circumstances meant that it was 
  much easier to recruit from the shepherds of the mountains and transform 
  them into a full-time army which was more professional than the forces 
  fielded by the Greeks, making it possible for Alexander to keep his forces 
  in the field for extended periods.
  The army with which Alexander invaded the Persian Empire 
  was already composed of veterans. It had served Philip and fought at 
  Chaeronea in 338 bc as well as fighting in Alexander’s campaigns in 
  Thrace and Illyria and against Thebes in 336 bc and 335 bc. Alexander’s 
  forces therefore embarked for Asia confident in their abilities and tactics. 
  In the Macedonians’ first encounter with the Persians at the Granicus 
  River and with each successive victory – especially at Issus and Gaugamela 
  where they faced the might of the Persian king’s army – their confidence 
  would grow until the esprit de corps of the ‘Macedonian phalanx’, the 
  Pezhertarioi, was unparalleled. The army was highly motivated from the 
  outset of Alexander’s invasion and they (quite remarkably) remained so 
  until 326 bc. New recruits (Epigonoi) arrived from Macedon to fill the 
  ranks, but in 324 bc, Alexander had an additional 30,000 recruits from 
  his new cities in Asia – all armed and trained in the Macedonian manner – 
  brought to him at Susa. The members of the phalanx were angry that they 
  were being replaced (Arrian 7.6.1–2; 7.8.2). A further 20,000 recruits, 
  Persians this time, arrived in 323 bc (Arrian 7.23.1–4).
  Persian
  Just like the Macedonian army, the core of the Persian forces consisted of 
  infantry, drawn either from the levies of the local satraps or from the Persian 
  homelands themselves. Each Persian noble was obligated to the king and 
  the population of the empire’s provinces was obligated to a particular noble. 
  Thus the king, or a noble, could call upon men to serve him militarily as 
  their obligations required. When Darius mustered his army in Babylon in 
  preparation for the battle of Issus, the satraps and others in turn gathered their 
  levies. Friends and family members Darius considered suitable were given 
  commands, while others were ordered to accompany him into battle in the 
  role of his personal staff (Diodorus 17.31.1).
  It is difficult to assess the motivation of the Persian infantrymen. Given 
  the defeats inflicted by Alexander, it would be easy to assume that, as levies, 
  they were not motivated to fight. There are examples of determined fighting 
  by Persian infantry, however, which belie the view that their motivation was 
  inferior to that of their Macedonian opponents. Darius’ commanders would 
  have wanted to provide the king with good service and no doubt had sound 
  men in their individual levies. Those men too would have wanted, to some 
  degree, to serve their lords well. We are told that the Immortals as a unit 
  always had a full complement of 10,000 men and that any casualties were 
  replaced from the ranks of the rest of the Persian army on a merit basis. 
  
  21
  It was therefore a great honour to be selected for promotion to this elite 
  unit. This movement of personnel between units suggests that there was 
  the opportunity for promotion and advancement within the Persian army 
  itself, and so we can say that there were highly motivated cadres throughout 
  the Persian forces.
  ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND
  Macedonian
  The Macedonian phalanx was organized by files (sing. dekas or lochos), each 
  of 16 men. This could be halved to eight or even doubled to 32 as and 
  when needed. Even greater depths are recorded, such as 120 men (Arrian 
  1.6.1). It would seem that on campaign, tents were organized by half-file and 
  contained eight men. Each file was commanded by a file leader, or lochagos 
  (there are several alternative names for each officer, which may reflect the 
  multi-period nature of the Tactica). The file leaders served in the front rank; 
  the second-in-command was the file closer, or ouragos, who was the 16th 
  An Attic red-figure plate 
  showing a Persian archer 
  on horseback from the 
  later 6th century bc. As can 
  be seen, the design and 
  decoration of the Persian’s 
  clothing look much as they 
  would have in the time of 
  Alexander. (Ashmolean 
  Museum/Heritage Images/
  Getty Images)
  
  22
  man. There were also half-file leaders and half-file closers. Above the rank of 
  file leader there were two-file leaders (who commanded 32 men), and four-
  file leaders (who commanded a tetrarchy of 64 men). A taxiarch commanded 
  two tetrarchies – that is, eight files of 128 men – and two tetrarchies made 
  up a syntagma of 16 files (256 men) commanded by a syntagmatarch. The 
  syntagma was the basic tactical unit of the phalanx, with two syntagmata 
  making up a pentakosiarchy (512 men), two pentakosiarchies making up a 
  chiliarchy (1,024 men), and so on. One of the criticisms of the Tactica is just 
  how mathematical they are (a ‘phalanx’ equalling 16,384 men in 1,024 files, 
  all divisible by 16). For Alexander’s phalanx of six taxeis, which is usually 
  thought to have had an approximate strength of 9,000–10,000 men, each 
  taxis probably contained six syntagmata of 256 men each (giving each taxis 
  1,536 men). The issue with numbers in our ancient sources is constant – they 
  are either too vague or too specific. In battle, casualties, illness and other 
  forms of absence would have meant that the army in the field never had a full 
  ‘mathematical’ complement, but could have continued to operate effectively 
  even if its strength was depleted.
  The command of Alexander’s six taxeis seems to have fallen to members 
  of the aristocracy from the same region in which the taxis was recruited. 
  For command at lower levels, the Tactica call for a meritocracy in which 
  the file leader and file closer were qualitatively superior to others in the file 
  (Aelian, Tactica 5.4). Given that command could be of as few as four men 
  within the phalanx, there were probably ample opportunities for promotion. 
  Individual men below the commander of a unit are very seldom named in 
  our sources. Arrian and our other sources do give quite precise details on the 
  drawing up of Alexander’s line for battle, giving the place of each battalion 
  of the phalanx as well as other units. Thus at the Granicus we know from 
  Arrian (1.14.2–3) that the phalanx was drawn up (right to left) with Perdiccas’ 
  taxis, then those of Coenus, Amyntas, Philip, Meleager and Craterus (who is 
  strangely named twice and in two locations, a mistake Arrian did not correct 
  although Craterus’ position on the left seems secure). The precise position of 
  each taxis in the battle line could be organized on a daily rotation, Arrian tells 
  us (1.28.3). Nevertheless, the order of the taxeis in the battle line seem to be 
  very similar for each battle and not dependent on any kind of daily rotation. 
  Thus at Issus the order of taxeis right to left was Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, 
  Ptolemy and Amyntas (Arrian 2.8.3–4). Craterus’ taxis is not mentioned 
  by Arrian, but we get the detail from Curtius (3.9.8) that Craterus was in 
  command of the left wing of infantry and his taxis was on the left at both 
  Granicus and Gaugamela. Thus it is most likely that his taxis was on the 
  left at Issus also. At Gaugamela the order was Coenus, Perdiccas, Meleager, 
  Polyperchon, Simmias (Amyntas’ brother) and Craterus (Arrian 3.11.9–10). 
  In all three battles the right flank of the Macedonian phalanx taxeis was 
  protected by the hypaspists and/or the Macedonian Royal Guard. Arrian’s 
  point about daily rotation was perhaps intended to avoid any issues within the 
  army of arguments about precedence or preferential treatment of individual 
  taxeis. In the traditional Greek hoplite phalanx the rightmost position was 
  the most prestigious, but there is no evidence to suggest that this remained so 
  in Macedonian armies. The Thebans had placed their elite troops on the left 
  flank and the Macedonian Royal Guard and hypaspists, technically, were the 
  
  23
  rightmost of the infantry, so it is possible that the phalanx had left such ideas 
  of precedence behind.
  Diodorus’ account of Gaugamela (17.57.2–3) includes details not only of 
  the battle line, but also of the territorial names of each of the divisions; so we 
  know, for instance, that one taxis was from the region of Elimiotis, another 
  from the area of Orestae and Lyncestae, and another consisted of the people 
  called Stymphaeans.
  Persian
  Some documents which discuss Persian organization have survived, although 
  often they are not specific for the time of Darius III, but rather for earlier 
  periods of the Achaemenid Persian Empire. That said, there is no reason to 
  assume that there were any radical changes in the organization of the Persian 
  military machine across the period. In this regard the source which is closest 
  in date and which provides the most information on the Persian army is in 
  fact Xenophon (in his Cyropaedia and Anabasis), but we must also use earlier 
  sources such as Herodotus in some cases. When we do have evidence from the 
  time of Alexander, however, the continuity of Persian military organization 
  is striking.
  The spada was organized into hazaraba of 1,000 men each, with each 
  hazarabam, led by a hazarapatis (‘commander of a thousand’), being further 
  divided into ten sataba. Each satabam, headed by a satapatis (‘commander 
  of a hundred’), was in turn divided into ten dathaba, each dathabam being 
  led by a dathapatis (‘commander of ten’). There is no reason to think that 
  ABOVE LEFT
  Bronze Macedonian Phrygian-
  style helmet in the National 
  Museum of History of 
  Moldova, Chisinau, Moldova. 
  This example lacks cheek 
  pieces but matches sculptural 
  depictions. (CristianChirita/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 3.0)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  Found in the village of Pletena 
  in south-western Bulgaria, 
  this Thracian helmet with 
  cheek pieces is now in the 
  National History Museum, 
  Sofia. Note the sarissa head 
  behind it. Alexander’s Greek 
  mercenary hoplites were 
  armed with the dory, the 
  traditional hoplite spear, plus 
  the xiphos (a thrusting sword) 
  or the kopis (a longer sword 
  for slashing). Carrying the 
  aspis, a round shield, and 
  wearing helmet, greaves and 
  cuirass, the hoplite would 
  have been more heavily 
  armoured than the phalangite. 
  (Ann Wuyts/Wikimedia/
  CC BY 2.0)
  
  24
  units which did not employ a strictly Persian fighting style were not also 
  organized into such divisions. Certainly, other contingents are named in corps 
  of thousands in the sources, and it may have been a requirement that Persian 
  senior commanders provided so many thousands of troops to fulfil their 
  obligations (such as the 14 named commanders at the Granicus).
  It may, therefore, be possible to suggest a file depth of ten men in Persian 
  units. Xenophon (Cyropaedia 2.1.22–26) provides Persian ranks, although in 
  their Greek equivalents, such as a chiliarch for the ‘commander of a thousand’. 
  (Confusingly, a chiliarch commanded 1,024 men in Macedonian armies, a 
  situation not necessarily helped by modern translations which use terms such 
  as ‘battalion’,’ brigade’ and ‘division’.) Xenophon also mentions a commander 
  of five and one of 50. Like the command for lines in the Macedonian phalanx, 
  there may have been other positions too, such as that which commanded the 
  rear of the file, the pascadathapatis, or rear dathapatis, similar to the file closer 
  of the Macedonian phalanx.
  Ten hazaraba formed a 10,000-man unit, the baivarabam (myriad in 
  Greek), commanded by a baivarapatis. Even in the basic Persian formation 
  Arrian gives us for Issus (2.8.5–8), it is possible to see that each 60,000-man 
  ‘wing’ of the Persian infantry consisted of 60 hazaraba or six baivaraba. Again, 
  the exact numerical symmetry of such numbers would not have been reflected 
  in reality and we do have records from Persepolis which show that a satabam 
  could fall below half-strength and consequently there would, presumably, be 
  fewer dathaba in each unit.
  There was, of course, one famous exception to units which would operate 
  below full strength: the baivarabam of the 10,000 Immortals. The golden-
  pomegranate units mentioned by Herodotus (7.40.1–41.2) each contained 
  1,000 men (equating to a hazarabam) and there were 9,000 men with silver 
  pomegranates (so presumably nine hazaraba). Neither Arrian nor Diodorus 
  provides a strength for this unit of Apple Bearers, but it could be a hazarabam 
  or baivarabam. We can be relatively sure that the pomegranates of Herodotus 
  and the apples of the Alexander historians are the same device, and when we 
  look at the reliefs from Persepolis and Susa, the reason for the confusion as to 
  what fruit these may depict becomes clear.
  Two relatively obscure sources may help, however. Following Heracleides 
  of Cumae, Athenaeus notes (Deipnosophistae 12.514b) that there were 1,000 
  Apple Bearers, all of whom were Persian by birth and selected from the 
  10,000-strong Immortals. Their name derived from the apple decoration 
  that adorned their spears, presumably as an indicator of rank. Heracleides 
  was probably writing around 350 bc, but there is reason to accept his 
  information for the time of Alexander. Polyaenus of Macedon records the 
  proceedings Alexander held for court cases among the Persians (Strategemata 
  3.24); in attendance were 500 Persian Apple Bearers and 500 Macedonian 
  Silver Shields, the equal split between them, and their organization into a 
  hazarabam of 1,000 men, intended to show Alexander’s status as king of 
  both the Macedonians and the Persians. Also outside the royal tent were 
  10,000 handsome and tall Persian infantrymen. With slight variations, this 
  description of their physical prowess occurs in Aelian (Varia Historia 9.3) 
  and Athenaeus (12.539.e–f). The source of this description is probably 
  book 23 of Phylarchus’ Histories, written in the 3rd century bc. All of this 
  
  25
  From the Hall of One Hundred 
  Columns at Persepolis, here 
  we have Darius III surrounded 
  by guards. In this column, 
  however, different arms 
  and armour are depicted. 
  (Bernard Gagnon/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 4.0)
  
  26
  is enough to suggest that Darius’ army probably did have an elite unit of 
  10,000 infantry (a baivarabam) and that from it 1,000 men were drawn to 
  be the hazarabam bodyguard of the king. The continuity of the description 
  of the Persian elite infantry between Herodotus (writing in the 450s and 
  440s, 120 years earlier) and the later sources means we can use such details 
  with care.
  EQUIPMENT AND TRAINING
  Macedonian
  The main armament and distinguishing feature of the Macedonian phalangite 
  was the sarissa, a long spear weighing approximately 7kg and made of cornel 
  wood, with a long-bladed point and a weighted butt-spike. The sarissa was 
  described as being between 10 cubits or 4.5m (Asclepiodotus, Tactica 5.1) and 
  16 cubits or 7.3m (Polyaenus, Strategemata 2.29.2) in length. (A cubit itself 
  varied from around 44cm to 53cm.) The source closest in date to Alexander 
  (Theophrastus, Historia Plantarum 3.12.2) states that the sarissa was 12 cubits 
  or 5.5m long.
  By contrast, the dory, the traditional hoplite spear, was on average about 
  6 cubits (2.5m) in length. It was still in use in Alexander and Darius’ armies, 
  with the Greek mercenaries fighting for the Persians and Alexander’s own 
  mercenary hoplites and perhaps his hypaspists. The spear is said to have been 
  doubled in length by Iphicrates as one of several reforms of the Athenian 
  infantry, including the introduction of the Thracian pelte shield after which 
  the lightly armed peltasts were universally named. It is unclear, however, 
  whether the spear length was doubled or increased by half. If we accept 
  Cornelius Nepos’ doubling of length to 12 cubits, we have a spear the same 
  length as the contemporary account of Alexander’s sarissae.
  The training, tactics and manoeuvres of the phalanx are outlined to us 
  in the surviving Tactica, manuals of drawing up, equipping and training 
  Macedonian or Hellenistic phalanxes. The remarkable thing about the three 
  This detail from the Alexander 
  Sarcophagus shows some 
  variation in shield design for 
  the Persian infantry. (Dave 
  Proffer/Wikimedia/CC BY 2.0)
  
  27
  surviving copies of these manuals (many others were also written, but are 
  lost) is that all were written in the Roman period, long after the Macedonian 
  phalanx had been superseded by the Roman legion, but it is entirely probable 
  that the Tactica can be used as practical handbooks which offer a great deal of 
  information about our historical narratives.
  The three surviving Tactica manuals are by Asclepiodotus (writing in 
  around 50 bc), Aelian (writing for Trajan’s Parthian War in ad 113) and 
  Arrian, the best and most famous Alexander historian, who wrote his Tactica 
  in ad 136/37, possibly after he had used similar tactics against the Alans in 
  ad 135. All three treatises provide a reliable insight into the organization, 
  training and equipping of the phalanx, even though they do present 
  information from all ages when the phalanx was in operation (thus they 
  provide various names for the units and their commanders).
  The Epigonoi that joined the Macedonian army in 324 bc had been 
  recruited in 327 bc; the three years of training gives some suggestion of how 
  long it took to train as a fully fledged phalangite, capable of performing all 
  the battlefield drill which would be required. When we read the accounts 
  of Alexander’s battles it is actually quite simple to match the manoeuvres 
  prescribed in the Tactica for various situations to what we are told happened 
  on the battlefield. At the very start of the Anabasis, Arrian records that 
  Alexander arrayed his phalanx and got its members to advance quickly 
  and wheel, then form a wedge (1.6.1–2). This had the desired effect of 
  dissuading the enemy from engaging and serves to illustrate that the drill of 
  Alexander’s phalanx was honed to a very impressive degree from the outset 
  of his invasion.
  Persian
  Each infantryman was armed with either a spear and bow or a spear and 
  shield. The 10,000 Immortals were armed with spears and were thus a 
  unit of arstibara (spearbearers), although they are depicted at Persepolis 
  with bows and quivers too. We do not know if each unit had designated 
  spearmen and archers, or whether individual soldiers switched between the 
  two roles as required, but the dual function seems more likely. The ‘archer 
  pair’ (one man with a bow and another with a shield) is also a possibility. 
  The Persian warrior also wore a sword, usually on his right hip, on a waist 
  belt. Surviving depictions show the akinaka, a dagger or short sword, in a 
  wooden scabbard; the swords which survive in the archaeological record 
  reveal that they remained of the same design for several centuries. We also 
  know of units armed with axes. Depictions show a variety of bows, as well 
  as variations in the style of quivers and bow cases, and even the manner in 
  which these were carried. Composite, recurve and asymmetrical bows are 
  depicted in art, as well as more simple self-bows. It is probable that the 
  various cultures from which the Persian army were raised kept the bow type 
  typical of their nationality.
  We do not know what proportion of men carried shields in a unit, but 
  the archaeological record identifies various types, including large rectangular 
  wicker shields, rectangular shields with curved tops, circular hoplite aspis 
  shields, and round or oval shields with scallops cut into the sides.
  
  28
  Many of the depictions of Persian soldiers do not show armour, only 
  trousers, tunics and robes, but Persian armour encompassed padded tunics, 
  armoured plates and armour which copied the linothorax armour of the 
  Greeks. It is possible that some geometric decoration on the depictions of 
  Persian trousers and tunics was intended to represent armour. The various 
  hazaraba in the Persian army seem to have been clothed in distinctive colours; 
  among those identified are purple and yellow (Apple Bearers), flame, dark 
  blue and scarlet (archers) and purple (Susians). Other colours identified 
  include sable, red and dark walnut-red.
  The sources reveal that the Persian cavalry also consisted of spearmen, 
  javelin-men and archers. The Parthian shot – involving the warrior turning 
  in the saddle and shooting behind him – was already in use in the period of 
  Alexander’s conquests. The sources also feature more heavily armed cavalry; 
  two-handed lances were used and some cavalry had shields, usually round, 
  although smaller square wicker shields are also known.
  RIGHT
  A detail from the Alexander 
  Sarcophagus showing a 
  Macedonian in linothorax 
  armour; note the shield, 
  scabbard and traces of a 
  baldric. The Persians around 
  him are dressed in trousers 
  and tunics; none has a sword, 
  but several have shields and 
  bows. (Soerfm/Wikimedia/
  Public Domain)
  FAR RIGHT
  The gold rings decorating the 
  ears of these Persian soldiers 
  can be made out clearly. We 
  do not know if decoration 
  was banned in other units; 
  our sources only tell us that 
  the guards units were highly 
  decorated. (Diego Delso, 
  delso.photo/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 4.0)
  A detail from the Alexander 
  Sarcophagus showing 
  Alexander (in his lion-head 
  helmet) engaging a Persian 
  cavalryman and infantryman. 
  Note that the Persians 
  are dressed the same as 
  one another in tunic and 
  trousers. As with the details 
  on the Alexander Mosaic, 
  it seems that the artist 
  deliberately mixed infantry 
  and cavalry figures (and this 
  coincides with the historical 
  narratives we possess). 
  (Ronald Slabke/Wikimedia/CC 
  BY-SA 3.0)
  
  29
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Persia in the spring of 334 bc. He had 
  already sent an advance guard across two years earlier to establish a foothold 
  on the Asian continent under his father’s reliable commander Parmenion. 
  Parmenion was stalwart and determined, but he lacked imagination and flair. 
  Alexander’s advance guard did its job, although Parmenion encountered expert 
  and determined resistance from Memnon of Rhodes, a Greek mercenary 
  commander in the employ of the Persians.
  Alexander entered Persia with an army of veterans rather than young, 
  inexperienced men. They had campaigned in Greece and further afield under 
  Alexander’s father Philip and they had fought in Thrace and Greece under 
  Alexander himself. Alexander had spent the previous two years ensuring that 
  Greece and Thrace were pliant and loyal. This had involved the harsh step of 
  razing the city of Thebes to the ground for daring to contemplate throwing 
  off the Macedonian yoke. It was a highly effective strategy, and ensured that 
  Greece was kept in line for the most part during Alexander’s ten-year absence 
  during the conquest of Persia.
  It might be argued that Philip had honed his army, with its anvil and 
  hammer of phalanx and elite cavalry, with Persian conquest in mind. Philip 
  had devised a style of warfare which could defeat the hoplite phalanx; a 
  style that had itself defeated the Persians. What is more, the satraps of 
  Persia (and even Persia’s kings) had begun using Greek mercenary hoplite 
  forces in large numbers in their armies. By developing a formation which 
  could effectively deal with both, Philip had tipped the balance in his 
  favour. Alexander therefore had a finely tuned and well-drilled phalanx in 
  addition to a combination of other units such as the hypaspists, his own 
  The Granicus
  334 bc
  
  30
  mercenary Greek hoplites and specialized lightly armed troops (Agrianian 
  and Thracian peltasts who were mostly armed with javelins, Cretan archers 
  and others) amounting to 30,000–43,000 men. Leading the elite cavalry 
  arm made up of Macedon’s young nobles was Alexander himself with 1,800 
  Macedonian cavalry as well as cavalry contingents from Thessaly and other 
  parts of Greece.
  Alexander’s arrival was not a surprise to the Persian satraps of western 
  Anatolia. Alexander’s father Philip had made his intention of invading Persia 
  plain and his pretext for undertaking it was to punish Persia for desecrating 
  Greek temples as long ago as 480–479 bc. Soon after Philip’s assassination in 
  336 bc, Alexander set about putting his father’s plans in place. Thebes had 
  a longstanding reputation for colluding with the Persians (a practice known 
  as medism), and it could be argued that Alexander’s extreme punishment of 
  Thebes was partly meted out for this collusion. The punishment of Thebes 
  should also have sent a clear message to the Persian satraps if not to the Persian 
  king himself; but it was a message that was largely ignored in Persia. The 
  satraps may have raised their levies, but they did not go on the offensive or 
  try to expel Parmenion and his force with any energy. It is possible that the 
  satraps may have thought that Parmenion’s expedition was going to be the 
  extent of Macedonian incursions, but they did little to stop Parmenion save 
  employing Memnon of Rhodes to thwart him. Parmenion had been Philip’s 
  second-in-command, leading the left wing of the Macedonian army (a role 
  he would fulfil for Alexander at the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela) while his 
  king led the right. Despite his experience, however, Parmenion showed he was 
  no Alexander and awaited his king’s arrival.
  Strangely, after such inaction against Parmenion, the satraps wasted no 
  time in preparing to meet Alexander in battle once he and his army had 
  crossed the Hellespont. They summoned their levies and met for a council 
  of war at the city of Zeleia (Arrian 1.12.8). We are given the names of 14 
  commanders among the Persians, ranging from the satraps immediately 
  affected or threatened to wealthy Persian landowners, as well as Memnon of 
  Rhodes. Alexander moved quickly, and Arrian records (2.11.3–5) all the places 
  he reached and rivers he crossed within 20 days of setting out. Even if he was 
  determined to wreak havoc on the Persians (and he was clearly confident in 
  his ability to do so), Alexander had other agendas too. He travelled to Troy, 
  The pediment of the 
  Panther hunt scene from the 
  Alexander Sarcophagus. The 
  figures on the right depict a 
  Persian spearman attacking 
  a crouching phalangite. The 
  Persian is wearing a cuirass 
  and carries a round shield. 
  He may be a member of the 
  Cardaces (Persian infantryman 
  equipped as hoplites). On 
  the left a crouching Persian 
  wearing tunic and trousers 
  is being attacked by a 
  Macedonian infantryman and 
  a cavalryman. (DEA PICTURE 
  LIBRARY/De Agostini/Getty 
  Images)
  
  31
  where he is reputed to have placed a wreath on the tomb of Achilles. From 
  there he continued his rapid march.
  According to Arrian (1.12.9), Memnon counselled his employers to avoid 
  facing the new Macedonian king in open battle because his army included a 
  greater force of infantry. Memnon and his brother had been exiles in Pella, 
  capital of Macedon, in the 350s and 340s, and had seen Alexander as a young 
  teen. We can only speculate about the insights into Alexander’s character 
  and potential that Memnon’s stay in Pella may have afforded him. Memnon 
  advocated the employment of a scorched-earth policy ahead of Alexander’s 
  troops, denying the invader fodder by burning crops. He warned that the 14 
  assembled Persian leaders, including himself, could not assemble the numbers 
  of troops necessary to outnumber Alexander’s infantry. Memnon’s advice was 
  ignored, however, and the Persian commanders sided with Arsites, satrap of 
  Hellespontine Phrygia, in whose territory Alexander’s force was present at 
  this time. Alexander was marching along the northern coast of Anatolia and 
  advancing towards the Granicus River. Arrian tells us (1.14.4) that the Persian 
  army was made up of 20,000 cavalry and almost the same number of foreign 
  mercenaries.
  The Persians advanced from Zeleia and took up a defensive position on 
  the far side of the Granicus. Plutarch (Alexander 16.3) refers to unnamed 
  Macedonian officers expressing reticence about attacking in the month 
  of Daesius (our May–June), a month during which Macedonian kings 
  traditionally did not take the field; but surely Alexander intended to ignore 
  such a convention by invading Asia in precisely that month. Plutarch has 
  Parmenion express concern about attacking at too late an hour, instead 
  advising that they camp for the night where they stood and attack at dawn. 
  According to Arrian (1.13.6), Alexander rejected Parmenion’s advice and 
  began to deploy, saying that he would be ashamed if, having crossed into 
  Asia, he was to be stopped by a little stream.
  Although this image shows 
  Median court dignitaries, 
  note the sword worn on the 
  right hip by the second figure 
  from the right; he also wears 
  a bow and quiver on his left 
  hip. (Ziegler175/Wikimedia/
  CC0 1.0)
  
  32
  Battlefield environment
  In the maps opposite we accept Diodorus’ location of the battle 
  across the river on the Persian side as well as his greater number 
  of Persian infantry. The details of the battle are combined from 
  all three accounts: Arrian’s attack in echelon and the defeat of 
  the infantry after the cavalry have been driven from the field. The 
  discrepancy in casualty numbers common to all the sources can be 
  more easily explained if Diodorus’ version of events is accepted.
  The best candidate for the Granicus, the river known today 
  as the Biga Çay, lies just north of the town of Biga and flows 
  roughly north–south into the Black Sea. Another possible 
  candidate is the tributary of the Biga Çay, the Dimetoka. 
  According to Plutarch (Alexander 16.2), the river alarmed the 
  Macedonians because of its depth and the steep, cliff-like 
  banks on each side which meant the Macedonians would have 
  to scramble out in the face of fierce Persian opposition. Plutarch 
  also states (Alexander 16.4) that the Granicus was swift-
  flowing, sweeping men off their feet mid-stream. According to 
  Parmenion in Arrian’s account (1.13.4), the river was very deep.
  It was late in the day when the Macedonians arrived at the 
  Granicus. The topography allowed the Persians to dominate the 
  eastern side of the river and deny the Macedonians the ability to 
  cross over to the Persian side easily. According to Arrian (1.15.2), 
  the Persians rained down missiles on the Macedonian cavalry. The 
  Macedonian taxeis, on the Macedonian right, chose this moment 
  to start their advance and crossed the river relatively easily before 
  engaging the Persian infantry. Diodorus says that Alexander’s army 
  crossed the river in the morning, but his account (17.19.3) implies 
  that this was done at a more favourable part of the river.
  1 The Macedonian army crosses the Granicus early 
  in the day and deploys on the Persian side of the river. 
  The Macedonians draw up their line (right to left): the 
  Companion Cavalry (A); archers and Agrianian javelin-men 
  (B); sarissophoroi (lancer cavalry armed with sarissae) and 
  Paeonian cavalry (C); Socrates’ squadron of Companion cavalry 
  (D); the Companion Foot Guards (E); the six phalanx taxeis of 
  Perdiccas (F), Coenus (G), Amyntas son of Andromenes (H), 
  Philip (I), Meleager (J) and Craterus (K); Thracian peltasts 
  (L); Allied cavalry (M); and, on the extreme left wing, the 
  Thessalian cavalry under Parmenion (N). Opposite them, 
  the Persians draw up their 20,000 cavalry in front of their 
  infantry (O), who number approximately 100,000. The Persian 
  cavalry are drawn up (left to right): Memnon of Rhodes (P) 
  and Arsames (Q), each with 1,000 cavalry; Arsites, with 1,000 
  Paphlagonians (R); Spithridates, with 1,000 Hyrcanians (S); 
  1,000 cavalry from other nations (T); 2,000 Bactrians (U); 2,000 
  cavalry under Rheomithres (V); and 1,000 Median cavalry (W).
  2 Alexander orders Amyntas son of Arrhabaeus forward 
  with Socrates’ squadron of Companion cavalry, Paeonian 
  cavalry and one taxis of infantry (that of Perdiccas) before 
  leading the remaining right-wing cavalry in an oblique charge. 
  This charge is met by volleys of Persian missile fire. The troops 
  on the Persian right wing charge into Parmenion’s cavalry on 
  the Macedonian left wing.
  3 The Persians meet Alexander’s charge with volleys of 
  missile fire (both javelins and arrows). Only through sheer 
  determination was Alexander able to push his charge through. 
  The Macedonian cavalry then engage the Persian cavalry and 
  force them to withdraw.
  4 The Macedonian phalanx advances obliquely from the right. 
  The phalangites engage with the larger body of Persian infantry, 
  who can only engage with the units on the Macedonian right.
  5 Parmenion’s cavalry advance on the left.
  6 The Persian infantry break and flee, leaving only the Greek 
  mercenaries who withdraw to a small hill, but are surrounded 
  by the returning Macedonian cavalry, who destroy them.
  The Granicus, 334 bc
  The best candidate for the 
  Granicus, the river known 
  today as the Biga Çay. Today 
  the Biga Çay is neither deep 
  nor swift, although its flow 
  is different today than it 
  was in antiquity. (Danbury/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 3.0)
  
  33
  Granicus
  THE GRANICUS – OPENING MOVES
  H
  W
  V
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  M
  N
  J
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  L
  F
  E
  D C
  B
  A
  N
  Granicus
  THE GRANICUS – CRUX AND CLOSE
  H
  W
  V
  U
  T
  S
  R
  Q
  P
  O
  G
  I
  M
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  J
  K
  L
  F
  E
  D C
  B
  A
  N
  1
  2
  3
  6
  4
  5
  
  34
  INTO COMBAT
  Reconstructing the battle of Granicus is complicated by the fact that the 
  surviving narratives (Arrian and Diodorus especially) offer very different 
  versions of the battle. According to Arrian (1.14.6–7), following the 
  discussion with Parmenion, Alexander immediately launched his attack. 
  First to enter the river were the prodromoi (horse guards) and the Paeonians, 
  commanded by Amyntas, along with one taxis of infantry and Socrates’ 
  squadron of Companion cavalry commanded by Ptolemy son of Philip. 
  Amyntas and Socrates’ attack was conducted by cavalry supported by 1,500 
  infantry – either the hypaspists or the rightmost taxis of the phalanx (that of 
  Perdiccas). If the hypaspists were armed as hoplites, then the greater length 
  of the sarissa made it more likely that the phalangites would be chosen for 
  the attack. Alexander then led his right wing of cavalry across the river. The 
  Persians were waiting across the river, their cavalry in front, and Alexander’s 
  predominantly cavalry force immediately came under sustained missile 
  fire from the Persian cavalry stationed on the far bank, much of it in the 
  form of javelins. According to Arrian (1.14.7), the entire Macedonian line 
  advanced across the river obliquely from the right, in the direction in which 
  they were being pulled by the river’s current, while the initial Macedonian 
  cavalry attack was engaged with the Persian cavalry. By doing so, Alexander 
  ensured that these troops offered enough of a threat to the Persians on the 
  opposite river bank that they could not all move to attack Alexander as 
  he emerged from the river lest they leave the path open for the remaining 
  Macedonian forces to cross, or come under attack themselves from the 
  unengaged Macedonian troops.
  Alexander’s cavalry sought to push their way out of the river, but the 
  Persian cavalry attempted to push back and keep the Macedonians in 
  the water. The men of the Macedonian vanguard came off worst in their 
  initial encounter and fell back on Alexander as he advanced. Alexander, 
  therefore, led the Macedonian right wing (with these remnants of the 
  vanguard attack) and charged into the Persian commanders. Alexander’s 
  men, using cornel-wood lances against short javelins, were eventually able 
  to get the best of this encounter and push the Persians back from the river 
  bank (Arrian 1.15.5).
  Arrian provides anecdotes of Alexander’s individual combat (1.15.6–8), 
  noting how his lance broke, but that he fought on with the broken shaft. 
  Alexander grabbed the lance of one of his companions and slew Mithridates, 
  Darius’ son-in-law, with a thrust to the face. A Persian commander, 
  Rhoesaces, then rode at Alexander and stuck his helmet with his sword. This 
  strike sheared off part of Alexander’s crest, but the helmet parried the blow. 
  Alexander hurled Rhoesaces to the ground and stabbed him through the chest 
  with his lance. As he was doing so, another Persian commander, Spithridates, 
  aimed a sword-cut at Alexander, but the Macedonian king was saved by 
  Cleitus, who cut off Spithridates’ arm at the shoulder.
  The Persian cavalry were pushed back by the Macedonian cavalry who had 
  been joined by lightly armed troops (the Agrianians and peltasts). The Persian 
  cavalry broke and Alexander turned his attention to the mercenary infantry, 
  numbering almost 20,000, who stood where they had first been drawn up. 
  
  35
  Alexander brought his phalanx and cavalry down on them, massacring all 
  except 2,000, who were taken prisoner (Arrian 1.16.2). These prisoners 
  included a body of Athenians, who were kept captive for some time in a bid 
  to keep the city of Athens compliant to Macedonian rule.
  Arrian’s narrative is exciting but, when compared to the other sources for 
  the battle, several problems emerge. In his account of the battle, Plutarch 
  argues that Alexander’s attack was even more rash (Alexander 16.3–4). Thus, 
  there is no mention of a vanguard, only Alexander charging into the river 
  and persisting until he had forged a crossing. (It pays to remember that both 
  Plutarch and Arrian used Aristobulus as a source, because the differences 
  between the two accounts cannot be easily explained by the use of different 
  sources.) Other aspects of Plutarch’s account, such as Alexander’s helmet 
  being struck and the attacks by Spithridates and Rhoesaces, suggest a 
  close adherence to the same source, although Plutarch (16.8–11) includes 
  Alexander’s breastplate being punctured (Alexander remained unwounded); 
  Spithridates and Rhoesaces attack together in Plutarch, but it is Rhoesaces’ 
  axe which strikes Alexander’s helmet. Cleitus again kills Spithridates, 
  this time running him through with a spear (Rhoesaces is killed by 
  Alexander’s sword).
  Plutarch’s account (Alexander 16.12–13, 14) records that the Persian 
  infantry were intermingled with the cavalry along the river bank to oppose the 
  Macedonians. Having crossed the river, the Macedonian phalanx engaged the 
  Persian infantry forces. The Persian infantry soon fled the battlefield, but the 
  Greek mercenaries stood their ground and accounted for most of the losses 
  suffered by the Macedonian phalanx in the battle. The desperate mercenaries 
  asked for quarter, but this was refused.
  Our other sources for the battle make gaining a clear picture more 
  difficult. Justin (11.6.10) states that the battle took place in the plains 
  of Adrasteia rather than at the Granicus, and so did not involve a river 
  crossing at all. He also tells us that the Persians numbered 600,000 
  men. This number, though suspiciously large, is repeated by Justin and 
  recurs in Plutarch and Arrian’s accounts of the battle of Issus. The rest of 
  Justin’s brief account is not particularly useful and may be relatively safely 
  discounted.
  ABOVE LEFT
  Here we see different types 
  of Persian helmet, dress 
  and kit next to each other 
  on the relief on the stairs 
  of the Apadna in the Palace 
  of Darius at Persepolis. The 
  rounded design is Median, 
  while the fluted design is 
  Persian. Note also here that 
  the two bow designs are 
  different; the two types of 
  arrow appear to differ in 
  length. (Taranis-iuppiter/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 3.0)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  Currently in the British 
  Museum, this Athenian vase 
  shows a Persian cavalryman 
  facing a (naked) Greek hoplite. 
  It dates between 340 bc and 
  260 bc and shows that Persian 
  attire had not changed from 
  the period of the Greek and 
  Persian wars in 480 bc. It 
  also reinforces the idea that 
  the attire of Persian infantry 
  and cavalry did not differ. 
  The designs of the tunic, 
  trousers and headgear also 
  correspond to those on the 
  Alexander Sarcophagus, even 
  if the geometric designs are 
  no longer visible on the latter. 
  (Author’s Collection)
  
  36
  By contrast, Diodorus’ account (17.19–21) offers much which is different, 
  but represents a more cohesive story of the battle. His account of the battle is 
  the longest that survives and bolsters the case for more attention being shown 
  to his version of events. According to Diodorus, when Alexander reached the 
  Granicus, the Persians were deployed on the high ground on the opposite 
  bank. There is no reference to the advice of Parmenion or the other objections 
  to battle; Diodorus simply states that Alexander and his forces crossed the 
  river at dawn, before the Persians could challenge the advance (17.19.3). 
  Alexander must therefore have camped for the night (just as Parmenion in 
  Arrian’s account suggested he should).
  Arrian and Plutarch’s battle takes place late in the day, Diodorus’ at 
  dawn. Diodorus states that the Persians deployed their cavalry in front of 
  the Macedonian infantry (17.19.3). We are given a detailed deployment 
  of the Persian cavalry left to right – Memnon and Arsamenes on the left 
  wing, followed by Arsites, then Spithrobates. (Arsamenes is the same 
  man as Arrian’s ‘Arsames’, and Spithrobates is Arrian’s ‘Spithridates’.) The 
  Persian centre was occupied by various national contingents and the right 
  wing was composed of 1,000 Medes, 2,000 Bactrians and 2,000 more 
  cavalry under Rheomithres, who is named by Arrian before the battle 
  (1.12.8), but takes no part in Arrian’s battle account. Diodorus tells 
  us that the Persian forces were composed of more than 10,000 cavalry 
  and at least 100,000 infantry (17.19.4). Given that Diodorus provides 
  numbers for 5,000 cavalry, if 1,000 cavalrymen are assigned to each of the 
  remaining named units – that is, a hazabaram for each – we arrive at the 
  figure of 10,000 cavalry he mentions. This interpretation would include 
  1,000 mercenary cavalry under Memnon, 1,000 cavalry commanded by 
  Arsames/Arsamenes, 1,000 Paphlagonians commanded by Arsites, 1,000 
  Hyrcanians under Spithrobates, and 1,000 cavalry from other nations. 
  According to Diodorus, the infantry (as in Arrian) were posted behind the 
  cavalry and did not advance, the 10,000 cavalry being deemed sufficient 
  to defeat Alexander’s forces (17.19.5).
  Perdiccas
  Perdiccas, the son of Orontes, was a Macedonian 
  nobleman approximately the same age as Alexander 
  who would prove to be one of Alexander’s best infantry 
  commanders and one of the king’s most trusted 
  companions. Perdiccas was from the region of Orestis 
  in western Macedonia and, as such, he was appointed 
  commander of one of the six taxeis of the Macedonian 
  phalanx: that drawn from men of Orestae and Lyncestae. 
  Perdiccas commanded that taxis at the Granicus where 
  he held the rightmost position in the Macedonian 
  phalanx. When Alexander ordered Amyntas forward 
  with the Companions and Paeonian cavalry, Perdiccas’ 
  taxis went with them and formed the infantry arm of 
  the charge into the Persian lines. Perdiccas and his 
  taxis therefore bore the brunt of the infantry fighting 
  at the Granicus until they were eventually joined by 
  the remainder of the phalanx taxeis advancing forward 
  from the right. The majority of the Macedonian infantry 
  casualties (although low in number) were probably 
  suffered by Perdiccas’ taxis.
  Perdiccas would lead the same taxis at Issus and 
  Gaugamela. Perdiccas had proven himself prior to the 
  Persian expedition in fighting against Thebes in 335 bc 
  and he went on to fight in all of Alexander’s campaigns. 
  In 324 bc he was appointed to succeed Hephaestion as 
  commander of the Companion cavalry, proof of his close 
  relationship to Alexander. Shortly before Alexander died 
  in 323 bc, he gave Perdiccas his ring, thus indicating that 
  he had appointed Perdiccas as his successor. Perdiccas 
  soon fell out with the other infantry commanders, 
  however, and was assassinated in 321 bc.
  
  37
  In Diodorus’ account, Alexander leads the right wing against the Persian 
  left wing where his deeds of personal valour are recorded. These too accord, 
  in the main, with the accounts of Arrian and Plutarch, although there are 
  differences. There is no vanguard attack in Diodorus as there is in Arrian (but 
  not Plutarch). Diodorus has Spithrobates charge Alexander at the head of a 
  group of Persian cavalry. Diodorus calls Spithrobates (not Mithridates) the 
  son-in-law of Darius, but the encounter is the same one as Arrian’s account 
  of Mithridates’ demise. Diodorus’ account has a javelin hurled at Alexander 
  which pierces his shield and breastplate (as in Plutarch), but Alexander thrusts 
  his spear at his attacker’s chest and breaks the shaft (as in Arrian). Spithrobates 
  draws his sword and attacks Alexander, but Alexander thrusts his lance into 
  his attacker’s face and kills him (as in Arrian). Rhoesaces then brings his sword 
  down on Alexander’s helmet (as in Arrian) although in Diodorus’ account the 
  blow splits Alexander’s helmet and inflicts a scalp wound (17.20.6). Cleitus 
  then kills Rhoesaces, by cutting off his arm (a detail from Arrian).
  At the Granicus, the way Arrian and Plutarch describe it, Alexander was 
  abandoning nearly all that was proven to work in the Macedonian military 
  machine and trying to achieve a victory with the hammer alone. That is a 
  highly unlikely scenario. Alexander simply did not have enough cavalry with 
  which to affect such tactics, especially if he was charging a force superior in 
  numbers. His thirteen squadrons (Plutarch’s figure) would only amount to 
  about 2,500 men (with 200 men per cavalry squadron), yet he was charging 
  20,000 Persian cavalry. Alexander only had 4,000 cavalry in total and even 
  if he was charging only the leftmost Persian units, he was still outnumbered. 
  If we accept Alexander’s cavalry charge in Diodorus’ account, however, we 
  restore the norms of the proven Macedonian tactics to the battle of the 
  Granicus. According to Diodorus, Alexander was charging the left wing of 
  a force of only 10,000 cavalry in total and so the numbers may have been 
  more even. Diodorus states (17.21.4) that even though Alexander’s personal 
  conduct at the Granicus earned him the palm for bravery, the Thessalian 
  cavalry on the Macedonian left wing earned a great reputation for valour.
  Arsames
  A Persian nobleman appointed by Darius as Satrap of 
  Cilicia, Arsames was one of the Persian commanders 
  present at the Granicus. He is the first-named 
  commander in Arrian’s account and this might suggest 
  seniority. Along with Memnon of Rhodes with his cavalry 
  force, Arsames commanded his cavalry contingent on 
  the Persian left wing. These Persian cavalry units met 
  the first charge of the cavalry on the Macedonian right 
  and, according to the sources, inflicted heavy losses on 
  those units until they were joined by Alexander himself. 
  Alexander directed his attack at the Persian commanders 
  and eight were killed. Arsames was one of the few 
  Persian commanders to escape alive and he fled back to 
  Tarsus, the capital of his satrapy.
  Arsames then enacted a scorched-earth policy, 
  burning and destroying the crops of his satrapy, but 
  was surprised by the speed of Alexander’s advance. 
  According to Arrian, Arsames posted strong defences at 
  the Cilician Gates, but the defenders abandoned their 
  posts at Alexander’s approach. Curtius Rufus contends, 
  however, that the Cilician Gates were never intended 
  to be defended. Both accounts suggest that Arsames’ 
  plan was to draw Alexander on, into Cilicia, where 
  forage and stores had been destroyed. Arsames possibly 
  intended to plunder Tarsus, but was caught off-guard by 
  Alexander rushing forces to the city; Arsames left Tarsus 
  untouched and fled to Darius in Syria (who was perhaps 
  already at Sochoi, having already begun his march to 
  face Alexander). Arsames fought in Darius’ army at Issus 
  in 333 bc and died there; he is named first in the list of 
  casualties.
  
  38
  The reasons for relating Alexander’s charge on the Macedonian right in 
  both Arrian and Plutarch’s accounts seem to be to make him appear reckless 
  and impetuous. While it is true that in all his battles Alexander placed himself 
  in danger and at the forefront of the Macedonian forces, his charges were not 
  reckless or impetuous, but considered and well planned to create and then 
  exploit a gap or weakening in the Persian line; and, what is more, they were 
  part of a known battle plan. Alexander’s entire invasion would have come to 
  an end had he fallen at the Granicus. Of course, that was always going to be 
  a risk the Macedonian king ran with his style of leadership in leading cavalry 
  charges from the front, but it is an aspect of his behaviour which is perhaps 
  overemphasized by Arrian and Plutarch.
  Alexander did indeed lead from the front and was inordinately brave, that 
  is clear, but the solid reliability of the Macedonian military machine was built 
  on the dependability of the phalanx in both attack and defence. Alexander 
  is highly unlikely to have engaged in a battle at the Granicus where those 
  aspects of the phalanx could not be used because the phalangites’ formation 
  was necessarily disrupted or not brought to bear.
  It also seems unlikely that Alexander would have had his infantry move 
  into the river if that advance would have immediately been disrupted by the 
  terrain into which they were heading. This would have completely nullified 
  the effectiveness of the phalangites, who fought best in formation. It is 
  therefore highly unlikely that Alexander sent his phalanx into unfavourable 
  terrain which would disrupt its formation; and all in the teeth of Persian 
  missiles. The phalangites may have been sent forward to absorb Persian missile 
  fire but a figure of just nine casualties (Plutarch, Alexander 16.15) would seem 
  to make this highly unlikely (that or the phalanx’s upraised spears disrupted 
  Persian javelins and arrows to a greater extent than has ever been recognized).
  According to both Plutarch and Diodorus, the Macedonian phalanx did 
  clash with the Persian infantry, but it is difficult to assess exactly how many 
  taxeis of the phalanx came into contact with the Persian infantry – certainly 
  the rightmost (Perdiccas’) taxis did. The others, even in echelon would have 
  maintained contact with those to their right to protect their flanks.
  Plutarch records that the Persian infantry were intermingled with the 
  cavalry along the river bank to oppose the Macedonians. Having crossed 
  the river, the Macedonian phalanx engaged the Persian infantry forces. The 
  Persian infantry soon fled the battlefield, but the Greek mercenaries stood 
  their ground and, according to Plutarch (Alexander 16.12–13, 14), accounted 
  for most of the losses suffered by the phalanx in the battle.
  If we combine Arrian’s oblique phalanx attack with Diodorus’ account of 
  the Granicus, Alexander is revealed to have maximized the effectiveness of 
  his smaller numbers of infantry. The larger Persian forces could not afford 
  to advance against the Macedonians because they risked being attacked 
  themselves and of creating a gap in their own line which the left wing of 
  Macedonian cavalry could immediately exploit. In Arrian (1.16.2) the 
  Macedonian phalanx was only brought against the Greek mercenaries; the 
  rest of the Persian cavalry had already fled. Arrian’s account would mean most 
  of Alexander’s phalanx was squandered, unable to attack and therefore the 
  battle (as described) was mainly a cavalry one. Diodorus tells us that with the 
  Persian cavalry commanders slain, the Persian cavalry fled the scene, leaving 
  
  39
  the opposing infantry forces to do battle. The Persian infantry, deeply affected 
  by the rout of their cavalry counterparts, soon fled likewise (17.21.5).
  The scale of the Macedonian victory at the Granicus is made more 
  probable if Alexander’s entire army was indeed brought to bear on a 
  numerically superior force. Plutarch does not mention the numbers of Persian 
  infantry but records that 20,000 of them were killed. Arrian mentions that 
  the Persians only had foreign mercenaries and that they numbered slightly 
  less than 20,000. It would seem highly unlikely that the Persians would 
  decide to engage the Macedonians when they were outnumbered in infantry. 
  Even if they were intending to decide the battle in a cavalry engagement, the 
  threat of the Macedonian infantry (and the fact that the Persians seem to 
  have been aware of the Macedonian phalanx’s fearsome reputation) make it 
  unlikely they would do so when their numbers were only evenly matched. We 
  should reject Arrian’s number of less than 20,000 Persian infantry. Likewise, 
  Justin’s figure of 600,000 seems too many. Diodorus’ 100,000 is within the 
  proportion by which the Persians outnumbered the Macedonians at both 
  Issus and Guagamela; even if we cannot accept the number itself, we should 
  be confident that the Persians outnumbered the Macedonians in the number 
  of infantry and cavalry. The presence of overwhelming Persian infantry would 
  have meant that the satraps outnumbered Alexander and were therefore 
  confident of victory. They would have expected such a large army to put up 
  a much better resistance to Alexander’s infantry, which numbered, at most, 
  40,000 foot soldiers of all types.
  If we accept Diodorus’ account, an oblique Macedonian advance on their 
  right would not have allowed the majority of the 100,000 Persian infantry 
  to get into combat with the Macedonian line until the Macedonian right 
  Although badly damaged, this 
  relief from Persepolis does 
  show the left and right sides 
  of the same kind of troops 
  wearing distinctive clothing, 
  helmets and equipment. It 
  is probable that the levies 
  from Persia and Media were 
  similarly armed and dressed. 
  (Diego Delso, delso.photo/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 4.0)
  
  40
  wing was victorious. Like Plutarch and Arrian, Diodorus also has Alexander 
  opposed in the main by the Persian cavalry arm which deployed in front of 
  the infantry. The Persian infantry were then engaged after their cavalry had 
  been bested. We know from Diodorus (17.19.4) that there were cavalry from 
  Bactria, Hyrcania, Paphlagonia, Cappadocia and most importantly, Media. 
  Other places of origin are unnamed, but these cavalry contingents spanned 
  the Persian Empire and represented the men the satraps present could levy.
  While there certainly were foreign mercenaries present at the Granicus, the 
  Persian recruiting system would have meant that the 14 named commanders 
  brought levies of troops from their homelands and estates as well. We should 
  also expect that the Persian commanders would have provided more than just 
  over 1,000 infantry each. Diodorus’ higher number of infantry seems a more 
  likely scenario, each satrap bringing slightly more than 7,000 infantry (and 
  perhaps 1,000 cavalry). If we consider that each satrap and noble would be 
  required to bring a number of hazarabam of 1,000 men, the breakdown of 
  large numbers of Persian infantry is easier to envisage. The more powerful 
  nobles and satraps could have brought more than the lesser ones. What is 
  more, the sources of the Persian infantry would have been widespread and 
  would have represented the territories and estates from which the nobles and 
  satraps could raise or hire troops.
  The casualty numbers recorded by the various sources offer another 
  conundrum, although they may also help us to establish a more likely course 
  of events of the battle. Arrian (1.16.4) tells us that the Macedonians lost 25 
  There were several types of 
  helmet used in Macedonian 
  phalanxes. The most 
  ubiquitous was the Phrygian 
  or Thracian helmet. A simpler 
  helmet was the Pilos, shown 
  here in the centre of the 
  bottom row; it was modelled 
  after the simple felt hat 
  (although this is an ornate 
  example of that type). The 
  leftmost helmet on the bottom 
  row is a Chalcidian helmet, a 
  style which was also worn. 
  Top left is an Illyrian helmet; 
  ornate examples of this type 
  have survived. Next to that 
  is a Corinthian helmet, a 
  type more associated with 
  the classical hoplite of the 
  5th century bc, but probably 
  still used by some hoplites 
  in the time of Alexander. 
  (MisterPlus65/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 4.0)
  
  41
  Companion cavalry in the first charge, 60 more cavalry and approximately 
  30 infantry later. Plutarch (Alexander 16.15) quotes Aristobulus as saying 
  there were only 34 Macedonian dead, nine of whom were infantrymen 
  (the remaining 25 accords with Arrian’s number of the Companions who 
  fell). Justin (11.6.12) tells us that nine infantry and 120 cavalry fell on the 
  Macedonian side; his numbers agree partially with the other sources. Diodorus 
  does not specify the Macedonian casualty numbers.
  It is hard to reconcile the low Macedonian casualty numbers recorded by 
  Arrian and Plutarch with the ferocity of the hail of missiles into which both 
  authors have Alexander charge. By contrast, Persian casualties across all sources 
  are noted as having been very high. Arrian (1.16.2) records that 1,000 Persian 
  cavalry and almost 18,000 infantry perished (his infantry number is just less 
  than the 20,000 cavalry, and only 2,000 infantry were taken prisoner). Plutarch 
  (Alexander 16.15) reports 2,500 Persian cavalry and 20,000 infantry were killed. 
  It is noteworthy that Plutarch has more infantry casualties than Arrian has 
  infantry present at the battle. Diodorus (17.21.6) records 2,000 Persian cavalry 
  and 10,000 infantry dead, along with 20,000 prisoners. The low numbers 
  of Macedonian casualties do not accord with the hard fighting mentioned 
  by Arrian and Plutarch, but they do seem to fit with Diodorus’ account of 
  Alexander crossing the Granicus at dawn before the Persians could deploy and 
  fighting the battle on the Persian side of the river. Diodorus’ relatively low figure 
  of 10,000 Persian infantry casualties does, however, make sense if the Persian 
  infantry fled soon after being engaged by the Macedonians. The numbers of 
  Persian casualties are always unbelievably high, no doubt to awe readers with 
  the overwhelming and crushing nature of Alexander’s victories.
  A detail from the Alexander 
  Mosaic showing Darius’ 
  cavalry. The decoration here 
  agrees with that depicted at 
  Susa, but may also denote 
  armour panels on the arms. 
  (DEA/G. NIMATALLAH/
  De Agostini/Getty Images)
  
  42
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  After the battle at the Granicus River, Alexander appointed new satraps to 
  replace Darius’ men, kept existing taxes and tributes in place and absolved 
  various peoples and cities from blame for opposing him. Thereafter, the cities 
  of Asia Minor, including Sardis, surrendered to him; only Halicarnassus and 
  Miletus resisted and had to be taken by siege. Alexander installed a democracy 
  in Ephesus and more and more cities came over to his cause.
  In all of these actions the men of the Macedonian phalanx played a 
  variety of roles, such as undermining the wall of Myndus during the siege 
  of Halicarnassus in 334 bc (Arrian 1.20.6). Arrian tells a story (1.21.1–4) 
  of how, during that siege, two drunk and unnamed Macedonian phalangites 
  from Perdiccas’ taxis decided to attack the wall of Halicarnassus to show how 
  brave they were. The two phalangites killed the defenders who sallied forth 
  from the walls and were joined by more men from their taxis. The fighting 
  escalated and Arrian posits that the Macedonians came close to capturing 
  Halicarnassus, which fell only days later.
  Pressing on despite the onset of winter, Alexander continued to assault 
  those places which did not surrender to him en route to Phrygia. In early 
  333 bc, he advanced to Gordion in Phrygia, and there he received a fresh levy 
  of 3,000 phalangites, 300 cavalry and 200 Thessalians (Arrian 1.29.4). These 
  must have been to replace casualties and garrisons, because although there 
  were enough men to form two new taxeis, in the battle arrays to come, only the 
  usual six taxeis are named. From Gordion, Alexander pressed on into Galatia, 
  Cappadocia and to the Cilician Gates (the main pass through the Taurus 
  Mountains), the cities of Tarsus and Soloi in Cilicia, and then on to Mallus in 
  Anatolia. At Mallus (or earlier), Alexander received word that Darius’ forces 
  Issus
  333 bc
  
  43
  were in the field, perhaps four days’ march away at Sochoi in Syria.
  The Persian defeat at the Granicus and the loss of so many of the ruling 
  class posed major problems for Darius. Without defeating Alexander himself, 
  the Persian king could not hope to re-impose his will on those territories 
  which had surrendered to the Macedonian king. Having fled to Miletus after 
  the Granicus, Memnon of Rhodes, Alexander’s most capable opponent, was 
  appointed by Darius to command the entire fleet and Asiatic coast. Memnon 
  attempted to wrest the course of the war back in Darius’ favour, not by meeting 
  Alexander in battle, but by conquering Aegean islands in Alexander’s rear. 
  This policy was in keeping with that which Memnon had suggested before the 
  Granicus; he managed to seize Chios and cities on Lesbos, but died in August 
  333 bc, in the course of besieging Mytilene. Memnon’s son, Pharnabazus, 
  continued his father’s policy and the mercenaries were summoned by Darius 
  to return to the interior.
  It took Darius the better part of a year to send word of his intention to 
  oppose Alexander, gather his army at Babylon and march against the invader, 
  the battle of Issus occurring in early November 333 bc. Diodorus (17.30.7) 
  suggests that Darius put all his hopes in Memnon, but he cannot have 
  summoned his army and put it into the field between August and November 
  333 bc (although several sources refer to the ‘rushed’ mustering of his army). 
  It must always have been the Persian plan that Darius would eventually face 
  the Macedonians in person.
  According to Diodorus (17.31.2) and Justin (11.9.1), Darius had 400,000 
  infantry and 100,000 cavalry. Plutarch (Alexander 18.6) and Arrian (2.8.8) list 
  an army of 600,000 men. Curtius (3.2.3–9) gives a precise breakdown of the 
  forces involved: 70,000 Persian infantry and 30,000 Persian cavalry; 50,000 
  infantry and 10,000 cavalry from Media; 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry 
  from Armenia; plus 2,000 axe-armed Barcanian cavalry and 10,000 similarly 
  The Cilician Gates, through 
  which Alexander’s army had 
  to march to reach Issus. 
  Locations such as this would 
  have made the perfect place 
  for the Persians to ambush 
  Alexander, but Darius did not 
  do this. It would not be until 
  after Gaugamela in 331 bc 
  that Ariobarzanes, one of 
  the last resisting satraps, 
  would defend the Persian 
  Gates, holding Alexander 
  up for a month. (Teogomez/
  Wikimedia/Public Domain)
  
  44
  armed infantry; 6,000 Hyrcanian cavalry; 40,000 Derbices infantry and 2,000 
  cavalry; and 8,000 Caspii infantry and 200 cavalry. Other contingents gave 
  1,000 cavalry and 2,000 infantry and 30,000 Greek mercenaries. Curtius’ 
  numbers add up to 308,200 soldiers at Darius’ disposal. The 70,000 Persian 
  infantry in Curtius’ breakdown of Darius’ forces would represent the 10,000 
  Immortals and six baivaraba of Persian levies. There seems no way that such 
  numbers could have been supported logistically, but the ancient sources are 
  full of such immense hordes.
  Darius certainly seems to have been confident of victory. His destination 
  at Sochoi, where he awaited Alexander, was chosen because it was an open 
  plain large enough for his army to deploy fully and where his cavalry could 
  manoeuvre freely. According to Arrian (2.6.3, 2.6.6), Darius was advised 
  by a Macedonian deserter not to leave such an ideal location – advice 
  Darius ignored.
  Our sources differ as to when and where Alexander knew of Darius’ 
  approach: Arrian (2.7.2) tells us it was late, Justin (11.8.1) tells us it was at 
  Gordion, while others tell us it was at Tarsus. Alexander fell ill at Tarsus and it 
  may have been this delay which encouraged Darius to move; Arrian (2.6.6–7) 
  states that by moving his position, thereby choosing a field less than ideal for 
  the Persian cavalry, Darius handed Asia to the Macedonians, and that destiny 
  was at play. In the event, Darius marched his army to Issus via the Amanic 
  Gate, a mountain pass, moving undetected behind Alexander’s line of march 
  (Arrian 2.7.1). By cutting off Alexander’s march into Syria, however, Darius 
  brought about the battle the Persians wanted.
  Most of our sources tell of Darius occupying Issus, Alexander having to 
  turn back to face him and the armies meeting at the Pinarus River. Darius 
  had fortified accessible sections of the banks of the Pinarus, which tells us 
  this could not have been some haphazard plan. There is some confusion, in 
  that Diodorus (17.33.1) has Alexander occupy Issus and Darius, thinking 
  Alexander would not meet him in battle on a plain clearly to Darius’ 
  advantage, march towards him. Most commentators reject Diodorus’ version 
  of the battle, yet his account seems to provide the best description of the 
  topography of the battlefield.
  FAR RIGHT
  A detail from the Alexander 
  Mosaic (see page 54) 
  depicting Darius III 
  at the battle of Issus. 
  (DIRECTMEDIA/Wikimedia/
  Public Domain)
  RIGHT
  A detail of Persian soldiers 
  from Persepolis. These 
  soldiers are armed with 
  spears, but also have round 
  shields with scallops on 
  either side. It is possible that 
  these scallops facilitated 
  spear thrusts. Depictions of 
  men with shields are rarer 
  than those without them at 
  Persepolis, and we know from 
  other sources that there was 
  a variety of shield types. The 
  ratio of troops in a unit which 
  bore shields to those who 
  (perhaps) did not is unknown. 
  (Diego Delso, delso.photo/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 4.0)
  OPPOSITE
  A close-up of a Persian soldier 
  from Persepolis. He wears 
  one of the headwear types 
  encountered in depictions 
  of Persian troops. He is 
  traditionally armed with 
  spear, quiver and bow. We 
  are told that the height of 
  the Persian spear was less 
  than that carried by a Greek 
  hoplite (2.5m), but that does 
  not seem to be the case here. 
  (Diego Delso, delso.photo/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 4.0)
  
  45
  
  46
  Battlefield environment
  The Payas River in southern Turkey is the most likely candidate 
  for the Pinarus River of the battle. It sits on a plain which, at its 
  southern end, is very narrow. Alexander deployed into this area 
  in a very crowded array and advanced northwards towards the 
  Pinarus. As the plain extends northwards, towards the mouth 
  of the river, it widens out; this allowed Alexander to deploy his 
  line across the entire plain, from the foothills to the coast. It 
  was early November and so perhaps cold, but the Macedonians 
  spent the greater part of the morning advancing to the Persian 
  position. At the widest part of the plain, on the northern bank of 
  the Pinarus River, the Persians deployed. This was perhaps as 
  much as 4km wide, but still not enough room for the Persians 
  to deploy fully or manoeuvre. Further to the north, where the 
  plain is wider still, Darius had abandoned a position where his 
  army could deploy fully and where his cavalry could manoeuvre 
  freely. To this day, the Payas River is neither deep nor wide. The 
  palisades erected by the Persians on its northern bank formed a 
  further obstacle to the Macedonian infantry facing Persian and 
  Greek mercenaries.
  1 Alexander emerges on to the plain at a narrow point and 
  must draw up his army in deep formation with the cavalry 
  behind. The Persians hold their position behind palisades on the 
  far banks of the Pinarus River, arrayed (right to left): Nabarzanes, 
  with cavalry and 20,000 slingers and archers (A); Thimodes, 
  with 30,000 Greek mercenaries (B); Aristomedes, with 20,000 
  ‘barbarian infantry’ (C); Darius, with 3,000 cavalry and 40,000 
  infantry (D); and Median and Hyrcanian cavalry (E). A reserve 
  of infantry (F) is located behind these deployments and 6,000 
  light javelin-men and slingers form a skirmish line (G) in front 
  of the Persian line. Darius takes position behind his infantry on 
  the left wing. A small Persian contingent (H) occupies a hill on 
  Alexander’s side of the Pinarus to threaten his flank.
  2 As Alexander advances towards the Persians he is able to 
  deploy his phalanx to its normal depth (16 men rather than 32) 
  and position his cavalry on the wings. Alexander’s deployment 
  is as follows (right to left): Thessalian (I) and Macedonian 
  (J) cavalry; Nicanor and the royal guard and the foot-guard/
  hypaspists (K); the phalanx, including the taxeis of Coenus (L), 
  Perdiccas (M), Meleager (N), Ptolemy (O), Amyntas (P) and 
  Craterus (Q); and the Peloponnesian cavalry on the left wing (R). 
  Screening the phalanx are lightly armed troops and archers (S). 
  Behind the phalanx is a line of mercenaries (T), there to protect 
  the phalanx’s flanks and plug gaps in the line as required. This 
  deployment stretches from the foothills to the sea.
  3 As Alexander advances, Darius reinforces his right 
  wing with more cavalry. Seeing this, Alexander sends the 
  Thessalian cavalry to reinforce his own left wing. A unit of 
  lightly armed troops and archers dislodge the Persian force on 
  the hill on the right flank of the Macedonian line.
  4 When the Macedonians come within arrow and javelin 
  range, the Persians unleash a hail of missiles, but these prove 
  ineffective against the phalanx. The Persian cavalry charges on 
  the right wing and engages the Peloponnesian and Thessalian 
  cavalry. Alexander charges with the Macedonian cavalry as 
  does Nicanor with the Royal Guards, the foot-guards and 
  Coenus’ taxis of the phalanx.
  5 Alexander’s phalanx advances obliquely into the river. The 
  centre and leftmost taxeis reach the river, but do not cross. On 
  the Macedonian right flank, Alexander’s charge is successful, 
  routing the Persian infantry and cavalry there. Darius flees.
  6 Alexander turns his charge towards the Greek 
  mercenaries commanded by Thimodes and Aristomedes on 
  the Persian right. They rout and the cavalry on the Persian right 
  also routs.
  7 Darius’ fleeing troops are pursued and cut down. Darius 
  escapes, but his camp is captured.
  Issus, 333 bc
  
  47
  L
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  LL
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  L
  ISSUS – OPENING MOVES
  N
  ISSUS – CRUX AND CLOSE
  N
  Pinarus
  A
  B
  C
  D
  Darius
  Alexander
  I
  I
  J
  J
  K
  Q
  Q
  L
  R
  R
  T
  T
  S
  M
  N
  O
  P
  K
  L
  M
  N
  O
  P
  E
  G
  H
  F
  B
  A
  C
  D
  E
  F
  Mediterranean Sea
  Mediterranean Sea
  Palisades
  Lightly armed troops
  1
  2
  3
  3
  3
  6
  6
  6
  6
  7
  4
  4
  4
  5
  5
  
  48
  INTO COMBAT
  We are fortunate in that, across our sources for the battle of Issus, we have 
  an order of battle for both sides, and we can be relatively confident in both. 
  Curtius tells us (3.9.1–6) how the Persians were arrayed. In front of the 
  Persian line were 6,000 light javelin-men and slingers in a skirmish line. On 
  the right wing were Nabarzanes, with cavalry and 20,000 slingers and archers, 
  and Thimodes (Memnon’s brother and Mentor’s son) with the 30,000 Greek 
  mercenaries. On the left wing were: Aristomedes the Thessalian, with 20,000 
  ‘barbarian infantry’; Darius, with 3,000 cavalry and 40,000 infantry (the 
  Immortals and three baivaraba of levies); and the Median and Hyrcanian 
  cavalry. Behind was a reserve of infantry. Given that Darius’ contingent 
  consisted of both cavalry and infantry, the Immortals were probably stationed 
  on the extreme left of the Persian infantry, next to Darius’ cavalry; the Persian 
  king would have taken position behind the Immortals.
  We can have some confidence in Curtius’ accounts of the Persian dispositions 
  because he and Arrian agree on the deployment of Alexander’s troops. Arrian 
  has Darius flee first in the battle (2.11.4) and offers little detail regarding the 
  Persian line, probably in order to deprive Darius of any credit for putting up 
  a fight. Arrian’s account of the Persian array (2.8.6) is less detailed than that 
  offered by Curtius: approximately 30,000 Greek mercenary hoplites opposing 
  the Macedonian phalanx, with 60,000 Cardaces on the flanks. Arrian goes on 
  to contend (2.8.8) that Darius’ arrangement of his light and heavy troops (by 
  nationality and behind the Greek mercenaries and the barbarians drawn up in 
  phalanx formation) was a deployment-in-depth that effectively rendered them 
  ‘useless’ in battle. The ‘useless’ depth should not be entertained, however, if we 
  accept that the plain widened out and that the Persians’ numerical advantage 
  would be nullified by such a deployment. Perhaps Arrian’s claim reflects a 
  misunderstanding on his part of the Persian reserve mentioned in Curtius. By 
  placing himself on the left wing, as Curtius tells it, Darius would have opposed 
  Alexander’s right wing; this would have won the Persian king some credit for 
  placing himself at the likely centre of the battle – credit which Arrian wants 
  to deny him. If we accept the validity of Darius’ stratagem to move his forces 
  behind Alexander’s march, though, then there is little reason to accept Arrian’s 
  negative judgement on Darius’ conduct at Issus.
  Curtius’ positioning of the Greek mercenaries on the Persian right wing 
  differs from the deployment details related by Arrian, who tells us (2.8.6) that 
  the mercenaries faced the Macedonian phalanx and were flanked by 60,000 
  Cardaces. Curtius states (3.9.2) that the mercenaries were the equal of the 
  Macedonian phalanx, but their position in the centre seems most unusual. 
  It is more likely that the Persian line consisted of a right wing of mercenaries 
  under Thimodes; then came 20,000 infantry under Aristomedes, then 
  40,000 infantry (including the Immortals) under Darius. The Persian centre 
  was therefore made up of Aristomedes’ troops and the rightmost units of 
  Darius’ infantry. To either side of these infantry dispositions were the cavalry 
  contingents. Thus the Persian line would have been made up of Cardaces 
  and Persian infantry, but the foot soldiers on the rightmost edge of the 
  Persian infantry formations and closest to the sea would have been the Greek 
  mercenaries – and they would still oppose the taxeis of Craterus and Amyntas.
  
  49
  Arrian (2.8.3–4) and Curtius (3.9.7–8) tell us that Alexander initially 
  placed his cavalry behind his infantry, and that the infantry spanned from the 
  foothills on the right flank to the sea on the left. The Macedonian infantry 
  were arrayed (right to left): Nicanor and the royal guard and the foot-guard/
  hypaspists; Coenus’ taxis of the phalanx; Perdiccas’ taxis; Meleager’s taxis; 
  Ptolemy’s taxis; Amyntas’ taxis; and Craterus’ taxis. Parmenion, in command 
  of the left wing, was ordered to leave no gap by the sea in order to avoid being 
  outflanked. Curtius tells us (3.9.8) that Alexander’s cavalry were organized 
  into wings behind the phalanx, with the Macedonians and Thessalians on the 
  right and the Peloponnesians on the left under Parmenion; this is borne out 
  in Arrian’s narrative (2.8.9). Screening the phalanx were slingers and archers.
  Arrian tells us (2.8.11) that Darius took up his position in the centre of 
  the Persian line. In Arrian’s array this would place him behind the Greek 
  mercenaries. This seems highly unlikely; instead, Darius would have taken 
  position behind his own troops – and the Immortals especially – regardless 
  of how formidable the mercenaries were considered to be. According to 
  Arrian, however, there were no traditionally equipped Persian infantry in the 
  front line, only mercenaries and Cardaces. In this respect Curtius’ account, 
  which places Darius’ position on the left wing, seems more plausible, and the 
  40,000 infantry of Darius would have been traditional Persian infantry. It is 
  interesting that Arrian does have 60,000 Persian infantry (Curtius’ 20,000 
  and 40,000) but odd that he insists they were all Cardaces.
  Curtius’ account of the beginning of the battle (3.9.12) notes how the 
  narrowness of the plain at the southern end limited the initial advance of the 
  Macedonian phalanx to a double depth of 32 men. Alexander advanced his 
  troops towards the Persians, who were arrayed on the far side of the Pinarus. As 
  the infantry moved northwards, the plain widened, which allowed Alexander to 
  manoeuvre the phalanx into the normal combat depth of 16 men, its progress 
  covered by the Macedonian king’s cavalry now deployed to the flanks. We can 
  envisage the number of manoeuvres this halving of the phalanx line would 
  have taken, but the phalangites would have been well prepared for all such 
  manoeuvres. Arrian (2.10.1) records that there were frequent halts during 
  Alexander’s advance; these must have been to redress the Macedonian line after 
  the multiple manoeuvres to bring it to its normal combat depth.
  As the phalanx advanced, Darius moved most of his cavalry to his right 
  wing, to oppose Parmenion’s cavalry on the Macedonian left; Alexander sent 
  the Thessalian cavalry to reinforce them. Arrian’s account reveals the care 
  Alexander took to protect his phalanx’s flanks; he moved two squadrons of 
  Companion cavalry to their right flank, and also detailed archers and lightly 
  armed troops to protect it. Alexander’s own mercenaries formed a second line 
  behind the phalanx. Darius had positioned some 20,000 troops on a hill on 
  Alexander’s right flank on the Macedonian side of the river, but these were 
  forced off by a sally of lightly armed troops and archers.
  The various elements of Darius’ army did not move from their initial 
  deployments on the Persian side of the Pinarus as Alexander advanced and 
  repositioned his troops. Darius’ men must have been confident in their 
  numbers, and the strength of their position and fortifications. Indeed, the 
  presence of the fortifications along the river bank would have made it counter-
  intuitive for the Persians to advance from their positions.
  Several coin types from 
  the reigns of Philip II and 
  Alexander the Great depict 
  Macedonian helmets, armour 
  and shield types. Note the 
  cheek pieces on the helmet. 
  (http://cgb.fr//Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 3.0)
  
  50
  
  51
  
  52
  Alexander continued his advance. Diodorus tells us (17.33.3–4) that when 
  the Macedonians came within missile range, the Persians unleashed such a 
  barrage that arrows and javelins collided with one another in the air, rendering 
  them ineffective; the Macedonians then raised their war-cry before advancing, 
  only to have the Persian reply come back from 500,000 throats. Curtius has 
  the same idea, but makes the Macedonian war-cry louder because it echoed 
  off the hillsides (3.10.1). It is unclear whether Alexander opened the battle 
  proper with a cavalry charge on the Macedonian right, or if the Persians 
  began the battle with their own cavalry charge towards the Macedonian left 
  flank. Given the reinforcement of the cavalry on the Persian right, the Persians 
  opening the battle would seem more likely, while their infantry remained 
  behind their palisades and waited for the Macedonian phalanx to enter the 
  river. The cavalry engagement on the Macedonian left was hard fought, with 
  neither side gaining the upper hand, but Alexander’s charge on the right drove 
  the Persians away once the two sides commenced hand-to-hand combat.
  The Macedonian cavalry charge on the right had, however, opened 
  up a gap on the right flank of the phalanx, which had entered the river to 
  oppose the infantry opposite them. Arrian’s account (2.10.5–6) has the Greek 
  mercenaries oppose the phalanx where it had been most severely disrupted, 
  and so he writes of the Greeks trying to push the Macedonians back into the 
  river. Given my contention that the Greek mercenaries were, in fact, on the 
  right wing of the Persian infantry force, the troops that would have come into 
  contact with the rightmost taxeis of the phalanx would have been the Persians 
  of Darius’ 40,000-strong contingent.
  Diodorus’ account (17.34.9) is not particularly helpful at this point, 
  stating that there was only a brief engagement between the Persian infantry 
  and the Macedonian phalanx and explaining that when the Persian cavalry 
  The armies at Issus
  The Macedonian phalanx has advanced northwards across 
  the Pinarus River on the plain south of Issus (near modern-day 
  Karşi in southern Turkey on the Mediterranean coast). Darius 
  and his army stand on the northern bank of the Pinarus behind 
  the palisades they have built on the easily accessible stretches 
  of their river bank. Both armies fill the plain from the foothills 
  to the sea. The men of the Macedonian phalanx have crossed 
  the knee-deep river, knowing that they will have to pull down 
  the palisades before they can come to grips with the Persian 
  infantry beyond. The thousands of Persian infantry launch a 
  steady hail of missiles, javelins and arrows into the Macedonian 
  ranks. The Macedonians advance in echelon from the right. 
  Each taxis is made up of 1,500 men, 16 ranks deep and 96 files 
  across (the taxis is further divided into sub-units (syntagmata) 
  of 256 men). The whole phalanx is composed of 9,000 men, 
  16 deep and 575 wide. Each man wields his sarissa, 5.5m 
  long. The front five ranks’ sarissa points extend towards the 
  enemy, the rest held in readiness to be used. Fortunately for the 
  Macedonians, the phalangites’ sarissae can hold the enemy 
  at bay while the front ranks pull the palisades down to allow 
  the whole unit to advance. The Macedonians are protected by 
  their shields and varieties of armour and helmets, but also by 
  their sarissae – the five ranks behind the front five hold their 
  sarissae at an angle and the six ranks behind them hold theirs 
  erect, offering protection against missiles. Arrows and javelins 
  are deflected by these raised spears and fall harmlessly into 
  the river. The flanks of this ‘pike-block’ are protected by hoplites 
  and lightly armed troops and cavalry beyond. The Persians 
  are confident in their numbers, position and defences; the 
  Macedonians – all veterans who have defeated the Persians 
  before – are determined. Behind the palisades, the Persian 
  troops wait, loosing arrows and javelins until they come face 
  to face and hand to hand with the Macedonians. Each Persian 
  troop has a thrusting spear and a rectangular wicker shield. 
  Most wear tunics and trousers, although some have padded 
  armour.
  
  53
  fled, the Persian infantry also routed. Despite the fierceness of this conflict, 
  Arrian records (2.10.7) that only 120 notable Macedonians fell as the phalanx 
  crossed the river. The taxeis of the Macedonian right wing were able to push 
  their way out of the river, thereby allowing Alexander’s next move, a swinging 
  charge into the rear of the Persian centre and left.
  In this reading of the battle, as the right taxeis of the phalanx fought 
  Persian rather than Greek mercenary troops, we should ask what the leftmost 
  elements of the phalanx were doing. They had to try to keep contact with 
  the cavalry who were engaged on the Macedonian left, but they also had to 
  stay in contact with the centre and right-hand elements of the phalanx. This 
  would most probably have brought them into the river to face the Greek 
  mercenaries stationed on the right wing of the Persian line and Aristomedes’ 
  infantry. Because our sources are silent on the activities of the leftmost taxeis, 
  we may perhaps conclude that there was a hard-fought stalemate between 
  the Macedonian phalanx in the river and the infantry manning the opposing 
  bank: Thimodes’ Greek mercenaries and the infantry of Aristomedes. Such 
  a reading certainly explains Alexander’s charge into the rear of the Greek 
  mercenaries, as a move to relieve the pressure on his phalanx.
  There was another explanation behind Alexander’s charge, however. 
  According to Diodorus (17.33.5), at the start of the battle, as soon as 
  Alexander identified Darius, he led a cavalry charge towards the Persian 
  king. This makes no sense if Darius was in the centre behind the (Greek) 
  mercenary infantry. It makes much more sense, however, if Darius was indeed 
  on the left wing of the Persian forces, because Alexander was leading the right 
  wing of his own cavalry and Darius was on the Persian left with his cavalry 
  and infantry. Diodorus’ account does not help in identifying the location of 
  Darius in the Persian battle line, but if the king was on the left wing it does 
  make some sense of the other accounts. According to Arrian (2.11.4), Darius 
  fled the scene in his chariot as soon as he saw that Alexander had separated 
  the Persian left wing from the rest of the Persian army. Darius’ flight makes 
  The Oxus Treasure chariot, 
  currently in the British 
  Museum. Darius’ chariot at 
  Issus and Gaugamela would 
  have resembled this and it 
  probably would have been a 
  visible target for the taxeis 
  of the Macedonian phalanx 
  which charged towards it 
  with Alexander during both 
  battles. Its design is borne out 
  in the Alexander Mosaic as 
  well. (Ealdgyth/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 3.0)
  
  54
  more sense if he was part of the routed left wing rather than still in the centre 
  and in possession of an army which outnumbered Alexander’s own. Even if 
  Alexander’s charge was not directly towards Darius – he would conduct just 
  such a charge at Gaugamela and so perhaps our sources have postulated a 
  similar move at Issus – it could still have resulted in Darius’ flight.
  In the accounts of Alexander’s charge towards Darius (which Arrian mentions 
  only late in his narrative) it seems that the charge included Macedonian infantry 
  – the foot-guard and possibly phalangites – as several aspects of the description 
  reflect their tactics. The Alexander Mosaic from Pompeii, which depicts the 
  battle of Issus and is based on an original 4th- or 3rd-century bc painting by 
  Philoxenus (Pliny Natural History 35.36.110), certainly does show the spears of 
  the Macedonian phalanx close by Darius as he flees. In what is one of the most 
  remarkable accounts of close combat in the ancient world, Curtius describes 
  (3.11.5–6) the bloodshed once swords were drawn and used in desperate 
  attempts to slay the enemy in front – the only way to win a chance to move 
  ahead. For the wounded, pushed forward by their own men from behind while 
  simultaneously being pushed back by the enemy in front, there was simply no 
  way to escape the brutality of close-quarter battle.
  According to Arrian (2.11.4), Darius fled from the centre when his left wing 
  was defeated; an action which seems both cowardly and inexplicable. Arrian 
  includes Alexander’s pursuit of the fleeing Darius only after he had charged into 
  the remaining mercenary infantry; he then recounts (2.11.6–7) that Alexander 
  had begun his pursuit as soon as he saw Darius fleeing, but turned back to defeat 
  the mercenaries and Persian cavalry. If the Macedonian phalanx was successful 
  on the right but being held by Aristomedes’ infantry and the Greek mercenaries 
  in the centre and left, then it was into these men that Alexander now charged as 
  they posed a threat to his phalanx. Parmenion’s cavalry on the left wing had held 
  the Persian charge (Arrian 2.11.2), but when Darius fled, the Persian troops 
  facing Parmenion also routed. We are told that Darius fled as far as possible in 
  Now in the National 
  Archaeological Museum, 
  Naples, the Alexander Mosaic 
  from the house of the Faun 
  in Pompeii may have been a 
  copy of an original painting 
  by Philoxenus. It clearly 
  shows the raised sarissae 
  of the Macedonians and 
  also reveals other details 
  of armour and dress of 
  both the Persians and the 
  Macedonians. Depicting the 
  flight of Darius at the battle 
  of Issus, with the sarissae 
  behind and Alexander 
  approaching from the left, 
  it conveys the combined-
  arms nature of Alexander’s 
  charge towards the Persian 
  king; Darius is shown being 
  almost surrounded before 
  he fled, rather than fleeing 
  immediately, as related by 
  Arrian. (Lucas/Wikimedia/CC 
  BY-SA 2.0)
  
  55
  his chariot, and then continued on horseback. Alexander continued his pursuit 
  until nightfall – or midnight, according to Diodorus (17.37.2).
  As with the Granicus, there is a glaring discrepancy between the reported 
  Persian and Macedonian casualties at Issus. Arrian provides us with an 
  anecdote of a ravine filled with Persian bodies and lists several prominent 
  Persian dead as well as 100,000 casualties, including over 10,000 cavalry 
  (2.11.8). This number is repeated in nearly all our sources; Plutarch (Alexander 
  20.10) and Curtius (3.11.27) make reference to the 110,000 Persian dead, as 
  does Diodorus (17.34.6). Only Justin (11.9.10) differs, stating that 61,000 
  Persian infantry were killed and 40,000 taken prisoner; 10,000 cavalry fell, 
  which means that Justin’s account still arrives at a total of 111,000.
  Justin and Curtius provide us with the disproportionate Macedonian 
  casualties of 504 wounded, with 32 infantry deaths, and 150 cavalry (Curtius 
  3.11.27). Justin (11.9.10) records 130 infantry and 150 cavalry deaths. These 
  numbers are unbelievable, prompting one incredulous editor, John Yardley, 
  to emend Curtius’ numbers to read 4,500 wounded and 302 missing, but 
  keeping the 150 cavalry deaths the same. Modern commentators may be 
  sceptical about the low Macedonian casualty figures reported, but it is 
  worth remembering that Alexander could not have hoped to continue with 
  his conquest had he sustained the higher numbers of casualties suggested; 
  the relatively low figure of 4,500 wounded would represent almost half of 
  Alexander’s total phalanx strength.
  Detail of a 4th-century bc 
  black-figure cup attributed to 
  the artist Oltos. Once again 
  we see that the details of 
  Persian dress and equipment 
  had not changed from the 
  5th century bc into the next 
  century. (DEA PICTURE 
  LIBRARY/De Agostini/Getty 
  Images)
  
  56
  BACKGROUND TO BATTLE
  After Issus, Alexander captured Darius’ camp, including the king’s mother, 
  wife and three children. Darius had sent his treasury to Damascus, but that 
  was soon captured too. The magnitude of the defeat inflicted on Darius at 
  Issus is hard to overstate – he had seemingly lost everything – yet he still 
  ruled an empire of almost immeasurable resources and capable of providing 
  him with an army larger than the one he had fielded at Issus. Arrian tells us 
  (2.13.1) that only 4,000 troops escaped with Darius, but many more must 
  have made their own way back to their homelands. It is also probable that 
  Darius’ reserve fled when their king did, and so he may have still retained 
  a substantial number of troops. The army which Darius would bring to 
  Gaugamela certainly included many troops from the same regions as the army 
  he had commanded at Issus.
  Darius did not simply rely on trying again with the troops he had at 
  Issus, however. He gathered more and more varieties of troops, including 200 
  scythed chariots and 15 elephants from India. He recruited troops from the 
  breadth of his (remaining) empire and from beyond it, making alliances with 
  various peoples and regimes in Scythia and India, which provided him with 
  both cavalry and infantry.
  Alexander did not pursue Darius back to the Persian homelands 
  immediately after Issus. Instead, he continued down the edge of the 
  Mediterranean, securing the coastal territories of what would become 
  his rear when he decided to march on Babylon and Susa. There were still 
  Persian commanders in the Aegean who could cause Alexander problems. 
  Alexander marched south, appointed satraps and received the surrender of 
  kings subject to Persia. Darius sent a letter demanding Alexander meet his 
  Gaugamela
  331 bc
  
  57
  envoys, but Alexander cited the wrongs done to Greece in the 5th century bc 
  in reply. Alexander was required to besiege Tyre, which refused to surrender 
  to him (Arrian 2.16.7–24.6). The siege of Tyre lasted from January to July 
  332 bc, but Alexander was eventually successful and enslaved 30,000 of the 
  population. He suffered several setbacks during the siege, but his persistence, 
  planning and determination sent a clear message to any other city which 
  might have considered resisting him. He also built a navy during the siege, 
  thus securing the sea coast of his new empire.
  Darius sent another envoy, this time offering Alexander half of his 
  empire, but Alexander refused. Gaza also required a siege, but was taken by 
  the Macedonians in October 332 bc – and as another message, Alexander 
  enslaved the women and children. Alexander next secured all of Egypt, which 
  welcomed him. He installed garrisons and also won over the Egyptians with 
  his attitude to their gods. He travelled to the Egyptian capital of Memphis 
  and undertook the long march to the Shrine of Ammon. In Egypt Alexander 
  received more reinforcements from Greece (Arrian 3.5.1), this implying a 
  constant communication between Alexander and Greece (and presumably 
  the rest of his garrisons). He was kept appraised of events in Greece, such as 
  a revolt of the Peloponnesians in 331 bc with which he had to deal (Arrian 
  3.6.3). He sent his Aegean fleet commander, Amphoterus, with assistance 
  from the Phoenicians and Cyprians, to suppress the revolt.
  Having secured the foundations of his power in Egypt, Alexander began 
  to march back the way he had come in the spring of 331 bc. He marched to 
  Phoenicia and then to Thapsacus on the Euphrates River, which he crossed 
  unopposed in late July even though Darius had appointed Mazaeus to guard 
  the crossing. Mazaeus fled as Alexander approached, possibly in order to draw 
  Alexander on further. Alexander marched north-east between the Euphrates 
  and the Tigris River, intending to cross the latter, and did not turn south-east 
  towards Babylon. Persian troops captured along this route advised Alexander 
  that Darius was waiting for him beyond the Tigris, intending to bar his 
  crossing. This seems to have been a deliberate ploy of Darius’ to let Alexander 
  A Persian chariot from 
  the Palace of Darius at 
  Persepolis. The scythed 
  chariots encountered by 
  the Macedonian phalanx 
  at Gaugamela would have 
  followed this design. 
  Mostafameraji/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 4.0)
  
  58
  know where he was, waiting for Alexander to come to him. The captives 
  also told Alexander that the Persian army was much larger than that at Issus, 
  information perhaps intended to intimidate Alexander (Arrian 3.7.1–4). 
  Alexander immediately made for the Tigris and found that Darius was not 
  opposing his crossing, nor was there any force there to fight the invaders. 
  Again, it seems likely that such ruses were intended to draw Alexander further 
  on, towards the ground Darius had already prepared for battle.
  There was an eclipse of the moon soon after the Tigris crossing, and 
  approximately eleven days before the battle of Gaugamela (Arrian 3.7.6; 
  Curtius 4.10.2; Plutarch, Alexander 31.8). This event has been dated to 
  20/21 Boedromion (September), but the exact date of the battle is still 
  debated. Placing the battle in the month of Pyanepsion (our October/
  November), Arrian tells us (3.9.2) that the armies advanced to within 10km 
  of each other, but could not see one another because of the intervening hills 
  (probably the foothills to the west or south-west of the battle site). Alexander 
  sighted the Persians, already in battle formation, from 5km away and camped 
  where he was for the night.
  Arrian tells us (3.11.1–2) that the Persians stayed in their battle array 
  overnight because they had no camp and feared a night attack – a course 
  of action Parmenion had suggested and which was supported by the other 
  generals, but which was rejected by Alexander (Arrian 3.10.1; Curtius 4.13.3–
  10). Diodorus states (17.56.1–2) that Alexander lay awake throughout much 
  of the night before the battle, working out how best to counter the superior 
  Persian numbers. We are told that Alexander fell asleep around sunrise and 
  could not be woken, thus causing a late start to Macedonian deployment. By 
  contrast, Plutarch (Alexander 32.1) tells us that Alexander slept more soundly 
  than usual. Curtius (4.13.22–25) portrays Alexander as being carefree and 
  confident, because he had devised a successful plan before falling asleep. There 
  are several factors in the battle narratives which follow that suggest just what 
  plans Alexander had devised.
  ABOVE LEFT
  The royal panoply of Philip II 
  from Aigai (modern-day 
  Vergina) in Greece, discovered 
  in 1977. We can see a 
  decorated Illyrian helmet 
  as well as swords and 
  (probably) cavalry spearheads. 
  (Rjdeadly/Wikimedia/
  CC BY-SA 4.0)
  ABOVE RIGHT
  This Boeotian helmet, of 
  the style usually worn 
  by Macedonian cavalry, 
  was found in the Tigris 
  River in Iran. Dated to the 
  4th century bc, it is now in 
  the Ashmolean Museum, 
  Oxford. (Ashmolean Museum/
  Heritage Images/Getty 
  Images)
  OPPOSITE
  A fine example of an 
  Illyrian helmet from Timis, 
  Romania, similar to that in 
  the Macedonian royal tomb 
  at Aigai. The decoration of 
  the cheek pieces can be 
  discerned. (CristianChirita/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 3.0)
  
  59
  
  60
  Battlefield environment
  Given what had happened at both the Granicus and Issus – 
  battles which involved the Persians putting their faith partially 
  in rivers for defence – Darius refrained from preventing 
  Alexander crossing either the Euphrates or the Tigris. The 
  field of Gaugamela, located north of the Tigris and north of 
  ancient Nineveh (modern-day Mosul), was chosen by Darius 
  as being ideal for his chariots and his vast numbers of cavalry 
  to outmanoeuvre and outflank the inferior numbers of the 
  Macedonians. Unlike at Issus, there would be no foothills or 
  sea to prevent Darius surrounding Alexander’s smaller force. A 
  vast plain was selected and especially prepared, being further 
  flattened and cleared of any debris that might hinder Darius’ 
  chariots and cavalry.
  The temperature would not have been sweltering in late 
  September, but conditions would have been warm and dusty. 
  The position chosen beyond the Tigris may also have been 
  to draw the Macedonians away from a nearby water supply. 
  Diodorus mentions Darius’ desire to have a battle near 
  Nineveh (17.53.4), which may have led to an identification 
  of the battlefield closer to the city. A battlefield further north 
  of Nineveh seems more likely, though, if Darius wanted the 
  Macedonians to be deprived of water.
  1 Fearing a night attack, the Persians await the Macedonians 
  in their battle array (left to right): Bessus’ Bactrian cavalry with the 
  Dahae and Arachosians (A); Persian contingents of mixed cavalry 
  and infantry (B); Susian and Cadusian infantry (C); Darius, with 
  his kinsmen and the Immortals (D) plus Indian troops, Carians 
  and Mardian archers (E) – either side of these infantry may 
  have been Greek mercenaries; Albanians and Sacesinians (F), 
  Topeirians (G); Hyrcanians (H); Mazaeus, with Parthyaeans and 
  Sacae (I); troops from Hollow Syria and Mesopotamia (J). Each 
  of these contingents included infantry and cavalry. Behind Darius 
  were troops from the Red Sea plus the Uxians, Babylonians and 
  Sittacenians (K). In front of the Persian left wing were Scythian 
  cavalry (L), 1,000 Bactrians (M) and 100 scythed chariots (N). In 
  front of Darius were 50 chariots and the 15 Indian elephants (O). 
  To the right of these were another 50 scythed chariots and the 
  Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry (P).
  2 Alexander advances with his troops in battle array, his 
  wings staggered obliquely back to avoid being outflanked. On the 
  Macedonian right are Menidas’ mercenary cavalry (Q), the ‘old 
  mercenaries’ (R) and lightly armed Agrianians and Macedonian 
  archers (S); in front of these are the Paeonians and lancers (T). 
  To their left, Alexander leads the Companions and the Royal 
  Squadron (U); lightly armed troops (V) are stationed in front of the 
  Companions, and to their left are Nicanor’s hypaspists (W). The 
  phalanx includes the taxeis of Coenus (X), Perdiccas (Y), Meleager 
  (Z), Polyperchon (AA), Philip or Simmias (BB) and Craterus (CC). 
  To their left are the Peloponnesian and Achaean cavalry (DD), then 
  those from Phthiotis and Malis (EE), the Locrians and Phocians 
  (FF) and the Thessalians (GG); to the left of the Thessalians is a 
  contingent of Cretan archers and Alexander’s Greek mercenaries 
  (HH). A second, rear, phalanx (II) made up of mercenaries could 
  plug gaps in the Macedonian line as they appeared.
  3 Alexander extends his cavalry and infantry to the right 
  as Bessus’ cavalry on the Persian left wing move to outflank 
  Alexander on the Macedonian right wing.
  4 The Persian scythed chariots charge the phalanx, but are 
  thwarted in various ways according to Alexander’s orders. The 
  Persian infantry move forward behind the chariots and engage 
  the phalanx.
  5 Menidas’ mercenary cavalry on the Macedonian right 
  wing counter-charge Bessus’ cavalry on the Persian left wing. 
  Meanwhile the cavalry of the Persian right wing charge 
  Parmenion’s cavalry of the Macedonian left wing, attempting 
  to outflank them.
  6 The Persian attempt to outflank the Macedonian right 
  wing creates a gap between the cavalry and infantry of the 
  Persian formation, exposing Darius’ position on the left of the 
  Persian infantry line. Alexander, leading the Companions and 
  accompanied by the hypaspists, charges for the gap.
  7 The Companions, and taxeis of the phalanx advancing 
  obliquely on the right, exert pressure on the infantry and 
  cavalry surrounding Darius. Possibly following a rumour of 
  Darius’ death, the troops of the Persian left wing crumple and 
  begin to flee. The cavalry on the Persian left is finally defeated 
  and flees the field.
  8 Darius exits the field accompanied by most of his wing, 
  pursued by Alexander, the Companions, the Macedonian 
  mercenary cavalry, the hypaspists and the phalanx.
  9 The phalanx’s advance has stretched the Macedonian line, 
  creating a gap between Simmias and Craterus’ taxeis. The 
  Indian and Persian cavalry break through the gap and make 
  their way on to the Macedonian baggage train.
  10 A section of the second line – the rear phalanx – turns 
  about and defeats the Persian and Indian cavalry among 
  the Macedonian baggage train. Parmenion sends word to 
  Alexander that he needs assistance on the Macedonian left 
  wing.
  11 Alexander turns back from his pursuit to assist Parmenion. 
  En route, the Macedonian king encounters and engages 
  fleeing enemy cavalry.
  12 Parmenion is finally victorious on the Macedonian left 
  wing. A general rout of all the Persian forces ensues.
  Gaugamela, 331 bc
  
  61
  GAUGAMELA – OPENING MOVES
  H
  W
  X
  Y
  Z
  AA
  BBCC
  X
  Y
  Z
  AA
  BB
  CC
  DD
  EE
  FF
  GG
  HH
  DD
  EE
  FF
  GG
  HH
  II
  II
  V
  V
  U
  T
  S
  R
  Q
  W
  U
  S
  R
  Q
  P
  O
  G
  I
  M
  N
  J
  I
  J
  K
  L
  F
  E
  D
  H
  G
  K
  F
  E
  D
  C
  B
  A
  M
  T
  L
  C
  B
  A
  N
  GAUGAMELA – CRUX AND CLOSE
  N
  Darius
  Lightly armed troops
  1
  12
  11
  10
  2
  3
  3
  6
  7
  7
  8
  9
  4
  5
  5
  
  62
  INTO COMBAT
  According to Arrian (3.11.3–7), on the Persian left wing (left to right) were: 
  the Bactrian cavalry with the Dahae and Arachosians; Persian contingents 
  of mixed cavalry and infantry; the Susian infantry and then the Cadusian 
  infantry. In the centre were Darius with his kinsmen and the Apple Bearers 
  (the 10,000 Immortals) along with the Indian troops, Carians and Mardian 
  archers; either side of Darius’s infantry were the Greek mercenaries, as they 
  were considered the only troops capable of standing up to the Macedonian 
  phalanx. On the right wing (left to right) were the Albanians and Sacesinians, 
  then the Topeirians and Hyrcanians, the Parthyaeans and Sacae (a Scythian 
  people), and finally troops from Hollow Syria and Mesopotamia. Behind 
  Darius were troops from the Uxians, Babylonians, the Red Sea and the 
  Sittacenians. In front of the Persian left wing were Scythian cavalry, 1,000 
  Bactrians and 100 scythed chariots. In front of Darius were 50 chariots 
  and the 15 Indian elephants. In advance of the Persian right wing (or, more 
  likely, on the right wing of the chariots) were another 50 scythed chariots 
  and the Armenian and Cappadocian cavalry. This array is very detailed, and 
  bewildering in its variety. Arrian also reports that his source, Aristobulus, 
  stated that the Persian battle array came from a captured document. Despite 
  a captured army list there is still exaggeration, however, with Arrian giving 
  us a total of 40,000 cavalry and one million infantry. The existence of Greek 
  mercenaries at Gaugamela is not borne out in the other sources; Diodorus and 
  Curtius do not mention any Greek mercenaries at all.
  Curtius (4.12.13) offers a much smaller Persian total of 45,000 cavalry 
  and 200,000 infantry; what is more, he gives us a different array, and yet in 
  some cases provides more details of numbers (4.12.6–11) than does Arrian. 
  Curtius (4.12.6–7) sets out a cavalry contingent, left to right, as follows: 
  1,000 Bactrians; 1,000 Dahae; 4,000 Arachosians and Susians; 100 scythed 
  chariots; 8,000 Bactrian cavalry; and 2,000 Massagetae. Curtius tells us that 
  Darius arranged for each nation’s cavalry contingent to be joined by infantry 
  of the same nation. In this deployment, Darius seems to have been copying 
  Alexander’s tactic of advancing with both cavalry and infantry as he had 
  done at the Granicus and at Issus (and as the Macedonian king would do at 
  Gaugamela too).
  To the right of these forces in the Persian line came the infantry of the 
  Persians, Mardians and Sogdians, then that of other nations; 50 chariots 
  followed that, and behind them were Indians and other men from the Red 
  Sea, followed by another group of scythed chariots and the mercenaries. To 
  their right came the lesser Armenians, Babylonians, Belitae, and men of the 
  Cossaean Mountains, the exiles from Euboea (who had been transplanted 
  from Greece in 490 bc), and then the Phrygians, Cataonians and Parthyaei, a 
  Scythian tribe. We are told much less detail of the Persian right wing, consisting 
  of Armenians, Cappadocians, Syrians and Medians plus 50 chariots. Indeed, 
  starting from the left wing where there is precise detail, Curtius’ account gets 
  less and less detailed the further along he goes, perhaps implying that his 
  source was stationed on the Macedonian right or on the Persian left itself. 
  There are similarities with Arrian’s array, but enough differences to cause some 
  historians concern.
  
  63
  While Diodorus gives us a precise Macedonian battle line, naming 
  commanders and the provincial origins of the phalanx (17.57.2–3), for the 
  Persians he simply states that they were organized into national contingents and 
  that Darius placed himself opposite Alexander (17.58.1). Diodorus states that 
  the Persian army at Gaugamela included 800,000 infantry and 200,000 cavalry, 
  and specifically mentions the 200 scythed chariots (17.53.2), describing their 
  curved blades and their effect as a terror-weapon. Justin (11.12.5) mentions 
  400,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry, while Plutarch (Alexander 31.1) has 
  one million men on the Persian side. The closest any of these sources comes to 
  satisfying the modern desire to reduce numbers to a reasonable total is Curtius. 
  Some modern commentators reduce these numbers further still; conversely, the 
  numbers for Alexander’s army are hardly ever questioned.
  Diodorus and Curtius both state that Darius placed himself opposite 
  Alexander in the initial deployment, rather than in the Persian centre 
  (Diodorus 17.58.1 and 17.59.2; Curtius 4.14.8). Modern accounts of the 
  battle usually reject this position and place Darius in the centre of his line. 
  There is, however, every reason to accept it – it is more than probable that 
  Darius placed himself on the left wing opposite Alexander at Issus, and 
  it was as much in the Persian king’s interests to come to grips and defeat 
  Alexander as it was for the Macedonian king to engage his opponent. If 
  Darius could kill or defeat Alexander, the invasion would end with him. 
  At Gaugamela, Darius was probably stationed on the left wing, behind his 
  Immortals who were stationed on the leftmost edge of the Persian infantry 
  formation.
  For the Macedonians, Diodorus provides us with some of the best 
  information we possess on the phalanx in his dispositions for Gaugamela 
  (17.57.2–3), not only listing the place of each taxis in the line, but also 
  naming the Macedonian province from which each was recruited. His 
  order of battle for the Macedonian right wing (right to left) is as follows: 
  the Royal Squadron and the eight squadrons of Companions; behind these 
  were stationed the hypaspists, led by Nicanor. Next to the hypaspists were 
  Coenus’ taxis from Elimiotis, Perdiccas’ taxis of the Orestae and the Lyncestae, 
  Meleager’s taxis, Polyperchon’s taxis of Stymphaeans, the taxis of Philip son of 
  Balacrus, and then Craterus’ taxis. Diodorus continues with a detailed cavalry 
  deployment (17.57.3–6): Peloponnesian and Achaean cavalry and then those 
  from Phthiotis and Malis, then the Locrians and Phocians followed by the 
  The pediment of the 
  Alexander Sarcophagus 
  provides more details of 
  Macedonian armour and 
  gives some idea of the variety 
  of colours of the exomis, 
  the Macedonian tunic. 
  (De Agostini Picture Library/
  De Agostini/Getty Images)
  
  64
  Thessalians; on the flank of the Thessalians were a contingent of Cretan 
  archers and Alexander’s Greek mercenaries.
  Curtius’ Macedonian array (4.13.26–29) corresponds to that of Diodorus, 
  although Curtius omits Meleager’s taxis. The Macedonian array set out by 
  Arrian (3.11.9–10) also echoes that of Diodorus, although Arrian provides 
  less detail about the Macedonian infantry; the only significant difference is 
  that Arrian has Simmias commanding the taxis which Diodorus ascribes to 
  Philip. However, Arrian has more detail on the commanders of each cavalry 
  squadron. Arrian also adds the detail that Alexander added a second line, a 
  rear phalanx, behind his infantry (as he had at Issus) so that his phalanx could 
  face both ways if it was surrounded; and given the vastness of the plain and 
  the overwhelming Persian numbers, this was a distinct possibility. In total 
  we are told (Arrian 3.12.5) that Alexander had 7,000 cavalry and 40,000 
  infantry and so even taking Curtius’ low numbers for Darius’ forces, he was 
  outnumbered 5:1.
  Archers and lightly armed troops were placed in front of the Macedonian 
  cavalry on the right wing and a division of mercenary cavalry was also 
  stationed there to counter any attempt to outflank the Macedonian line. 
  A similar formation was made on the left wing. At the very centre of the 
  Macedonian line and central to Alexander’s battle plan were the 9,000 men 
  of the phalanx.
  The purpose of these dispositions was to avoid the very real possibility 
  of the Macedonians being outflanked or even encircled. Diodorus (17.57.5) 
  mentions Alexander keeping his wings back so as not to be enveloped, this 
  tactic doubtless being among several the Macedonian king developed during 
  the night before the battle. The most exposed section of Alexander’s force then 
  was the phalanx itself, set at the point of what we can imagine as a giant ‘U’ 
  shape, with the foremost part of the curve closest to the Persians.
  It would seem that both armies began to advance towards each other at 
  the same moment, the attack heralded by the sound of trumpets and war-
  cries (Diodorus 17.58.1). Alexander began to move obliquely towards the 
  right with his Royal Squadron and Companions, possibly to get clear of the 
  ground that had been levelled for the chariots (Arrian 3.13.1; Curtius 4.15.1). 
  The Persian cavalry, as Alexander had expected, attempted to outflank this 
  move, and a fierce cavalry battle began on the extreme Macedonian right 
  flank, with the Macedonians eventually prevailing. Diodorus (17.58.2) has 
  the battle begin with a scythed-chariot charge towards the phalanx, while 
  Arrian (3.13.5) records the chariot charge occurring after the cavalry action 
  had begun.
  Diodorus tells us (17.58.3) that Alexander ordered the Macedonian 
  phalanx to lock shields (synaspizouses) as a defence against the Persian scythed 
  chariots. This was the tightest formation of the Macedonian phalanx drill 
  and one in which each man only occupied half a metre of space, meaning 
  the entire phalanx could condense into a front little more than 250m 
  wide. Alexander also told his men to beat their shields and thus frighten 
  the charioteers’ horses. When the chariots attacked, the men of the phalanx 
  locked shields as instructed and beat upon them. Several chariots shied away 
  and turned towards their own ranks, while others were channelled through 
  gaps opened up in each taxis by the men of the phalanx. Diodorus’ account 
  
  65
  conveys the remarkable training and drill of the Macedonian phalanx, as in 
  each case one syntagma would have to counter-march into the ranks of the 
  next and thus create the gap mentioned (thus in each taxis there would be 
  three gaps). His account also reveals another tactical solution (in addition to 
  locking shields) which Alexander had conceived during the night; the drill 
  for the manoeuvres themselves already existed, and it was simply a matter 
  of deciding which manoeuvres to order and when. Some chariots impaled 
  themselves on the spear-tips of the Macedonian ranks while others were 
  brought down with javelins and arrows by the lightly armed troops on the 
  phalanx’s flanks.
  The fact that Diodorus describes several Macedonian solutions to the 
  tactical challenges posed by the Persian chariots implies that the commanders 
  of each taxis may have deployed a different tactic against the chariots as they 
  saw fit, or that Alexander suggested several solutions. Arrian also tells us 
  (3.13.6) that the phalanx was ordered to create the gaps in their line where 
  the chariots attacked. Behind the chariots Darius’ infantry were advancing 
  towards the phalanx. Missiles rained down on the men of the phalanx and 
  the Persian Apple Bearers, Mardi and Cossaei, Indians and household troops 
  came against them (Diodorus 17.59.3–4).
  On the Persian right wing, Mazaeus sent a cavalry contingent to engage the 
  Macedonian left wing under the command of Parmenion. The overwhelming 
  Persian numbers should have made envelopment straightforward, but the 
  Macedonian cavalry on that wing, especially the Thessalians, managed to 
  withstand the Persian assault. On the Persian left wing their superior cavalry 
  numbers were telling and the Macedonians were forced back. Arrian’s account 
  (3.14.2) has the Persian attempts to outflank the extending Macedonian 
  right wing create a gap between the Persian cavalry and infantry: seeing this, 
  Alexander turned and led his Companion cavalry and the rightmost men of 
  the phalanx in a charge towards the gap and their quarry – Darius – with the 
  rest of the phalanx close behind.
  Two Persian spearmen 
  from the Palace of Darius 
  at Persepolis. The helmet 
  type shown here is one of 
  five different types worn by 
  Persian troops displayed in 
  the reliefs from the palace. 
  The meticulous care shown in 
  depicting the hair and beards 
  also seems to be borne 
  out in the sources that the 
  units of the Immortals wore 
  more jewellery than normal 
  units. (Keyvan Mahmudi/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 3.0)
  
  66
  
  67
  
  68
  In the ranks at Gaugamela
  Macedonian view: In the initial troop dispositions and 
  manoeuvres at Gaugamela, Alexander placed the phalanx at 
  the apex of a formation where both wings bent back to avoid 
  the very real possibility of the Macedonians being outflanked. 
  At the outset of the battle Alexander, with his cavalry, moved 
  towards the right, prompting the troops of the Persian left 
  flank to match his manoeuvre and even attempt to outflank 
  the Macedonian troops on the right. The phalangites’ superior 
  discipline and training allowed them to see off attacks by 
  Persian scythed chariots. Then, when a gap had been created 
  between the units on the Persian left, Alexander wheeled and 
  charged towards Darius through it, accompanied by the nearest 
  infantry and with the troops of the Macedonian phalanx close 
  behind. Here we see the phalanx close in on the Persians on 
  the left of their formation, those directly in front of their king, 
  namely the elite Persian Immortals. The Macedonians advance 
  just as Alexander makes his way towards Darius in his chariot. 
  The serried ranks of sarissae extend towards the lighter-
  armed Persian infantry. The variously helmeted and armoured 
  Macedonian phalangites of Coenus’ taxis from Elimiotis (the 
  rightmost syntagma of the phalanx) can see the progress of 
  their king towards Darius and they press their attack towards 
  the Immortals just as the Persians become aware of the threat 
  to Darius behind them.
  Persian view: The Persian Apple Bearers or Immortals 
  stand behind their wicker shields, spears poised to face the 
  advancing Macedonian phalanx. Selected from the bravest of 
  the Persians and armed in a similar fashion to the rest of the 
  Persian infantry, the Immortals have been stationed in front 
  of their king’s chariot and they stand at the left of the Persian 
  infantry formation. At the start of the battle Alexander moved 
  towards the Persian left and the Persian cavalry pursued him. 
  The archers within the Persian ranks kept up a steady rain of 
  arrows on the Macedonians, although the long spears of the 
  phalanx rendered the projectiles mostly ineffective. When a gap 
  formed between the Immortals and the other units to their left, 
  Alexander turned and charged for the gap and, at that point, the 
  Macedonian phalanx began its advance towards the units of the 
  Immortals. The Macedonians had already shown that their arms 
  and armour were superior to the Persians’, but the Immortals 
  stood ready to sacrifice their lives for their king. Their bravery 
  and resolve were disturbed by the unexpected commotion of 
  Alexander and his Companion cavalry, appearing behind them 
  and threatening Darius’ life. When Darius fled the battle, it was 
  the duty of the Immortals to exit with him and to protect him in 
  his flight – if they could.
  
  69
  Arrian (3.14.3) has the fearful Darius flee at this determined assault 
  by Alexander. Those reconstructions which place Darius in the centre of 
  the Persian line have Alexander’s charge travel too far. By placing Darius 
  on the left flank instead – which would locate the Persian king’s Immortals 
  in the leftmost part of the Persian infantry formation – Alexander’s charge 
  for the gap in the line and Darius’ flight resulted in a shorter charge and 
  one which could be supported by the Macedonian phalanx, something not 
  possible if the phalanx was facing the Persian mercenaries further to the 
  left. Diodorus, more convincingly (17.60.3), has Darius fight on until the 
  troops around him disintegrate on a false rumour that Darius himself has 
  fallen. (Diodorus’ anecdote of Alexander hurling a javelin and missing Darius 
  but hitting his charioteer – which set off the rumour of Darius’ death – is 
  dramatic, but probably fiction.)
  Darius’ flight caused a rout of the Persian left wing, with Alexander and 
  his cavalry setting off in pursuit of the fleeing troops. Given the size of the 
  Persian army, however, it is no surprise that the Persian right wing remained 
  ignorant of Darius’ fate. We gain further insight into the tactical methods of 
  the phalanx at this point, as Arrian records (3.14.4–5) that Simmias’ taxis of 
  the phalanx had to halt and fight where it was because the Macedonian left 
  was in difficulties owing to the Persian cavalry assault in that sector. A gap 
  developed between Simmias’ taxis and, presumably, Craterus’ taxis and was 
  exploited by a Persian and Indian cavalry charge. This taxis stopping and 
  fighting where it was also reinforces the idea that a single taxis of the phalanx 
  could operate independently as a 1,500-strong phalanx in miniature. The 
  Persian and Indian cavalry charge also made its way through the second line 
  of mercenaries behind the phalanx; this second line of infantry turned and 
  pursued the Persian and Indian cavalry, defeating them at the baggage train.
  This detail of the Alexander 
  Sarcophagus shows the 
  tunic, trousers and headgear 
  of two Persian soldiers and 
  a Macedonian cavalryman 
  with Boeotian helmet. Note 
  the shield with curve missing 
  and also the bow of the 
  archer above, which has been 
  sculpted in relief. (CM Dixon/
  Heritage Images/Getty 
  Images)
  
  70
  Meanwhile, the Persian cavalry on the right began to encircle Parmenion’s 
  cavalry wing on the Macedonian left. Parmenion sent a dispatch rider to 
  Alexander, calling him back from the pursuit of Darius to assist (Arrian 
  3.15.1; Diodorus 17.60.7). Plutarch states that Parmenion’s message was sent 
  when the baggage train was attacked and then repeated during the pursuit 
  (Alexander 32.5–6 and 33.10–11). Alexander turned and made his way back 
  to the Persian right wing, fighting fleeing Persian cavalry to get there. This 
  relieved the pressure and the Macedonians were victorious across the field. 
  According to Diodorus (17.60.8), the messengers did not find Alexander and 
  Parmenion fought on to win alone on the Macedonian left. Later tradition 
  seems to have robbed Parmenion of such credit at Gaugamela – all with regard 
  to Parmenion’s falling out with Alexander and his subsequent assassination 
  in 330 bc.
  The sources do not focus on the exploits of the phalanx at Gaugamela, 
  instead recounting the (more glamorous) feats of Alexander’s cavalry. 
  Nevertheless, it is clear that the Macedonian phalangites were involved from 
  the outset of the battle and that they were in the thick of the action for most 
  of it. They certainly held the centre of the Macedonian line against the Persian 
  infantry and withstood (for the most part) attacks from chariots and cavalry 
  too (we do not hear of the 15 elephants, which were captured after the battle). 
  The defensive capabilities of the Macedonian phalanx are made clear, as well 
  as its offensive power when called upon to attack.
  The reported casualties are once again disproportionate – Arrian (3.15.6) 
  has 100 men killed (and over 1,000 horses) among the Macedonians, these 
  casualties mostly being suffered during the pursuit of Darius, with the 
  Persians sustaining 300,000 casualties. Diodorus (17.61.3) records 90,000 
  Persian casualties and 500 Macedonians, with considerable numbers of 
  Macedonian wounded. Curtius (4.16.26) has only 300 Macedonian dead 
  and 40,000 Persians and the Oxyrhynchus Historian (1798) has 1,000 
  Macedonian infantry and 200 cavalry casualties, with 53,000 Persians. None 
  of these numbers is satisfying, but it is clear that the Macedonians had won 
  a remarkable victory.
  Now in the National 
  Archaeological Museum of 
  Florence, this sarcophagus 
  from Tarquinia in Italy and 
  dated to the 4th century bc 
  shows a warrior in typical 
  ‘Macedonian’ wear with 
  Phrygian helmet, linothorax 
  armour and greaves. (DEA/ 
  G. DAGLI ORTI/Getty Images)
  
  71
  MACEDONIAN EFFECTIVENESS
  The three battles explored in this study offer insights into the capabilities, 
  flexibility and versatility of the Macedonian phalanx. In these engagements, 
  however, the workings of the phalanx in our historical narratives are only 
  implied. We get details of deployment and then, if we are lucky, a mention 
  of the exploits of an individual taxis or the phalanx as a whole. Sometimes, 
  the phalanx is forgotten after battle is joined and our narratives concentrate 
  wholly on the exploits of the cavalry. Alexander and his commanders knew 
  that none of these exploits would have been possible without the phalanx 
  operating at the centre of the army, however. At the Hyphasis in 326 bc it 
  would be the phalangites who refused to march further east and it was they 
  who mutinied at Opis in 324 bc, their power clear in that Alexander could not 
  continue without them, no matter how many other types of troops he had.
  It is only from a later age that we gain any insights into the actual 
  manoeuvres of the phalanx, through the Tactica; these manuals suggest how 
  complex the manoeuvres of the phalanx could be. In the surviving sources 
  these manoeuvres seem to have been misunderstood – at Issus, the constant 
  stopping of the Macedonian line as it advanced must have been to redress itself 
  after, first, deploying in double depth and then spreading out as it advanced 
  northwards along the plain and redeploying to the normal depth of 16 men. 
  We get none of this in the historical narrative, just the stops and pauses. This 
  is not helped by the fact that Arrian, one of the authors of the three surviving 
  Tactica treatises, is the main source for the campaigns of Alexander and yet 
  he includes very little tactical insight. Certainly, he provides no more than 
  our other sources – and sometimes, I believe, Diodorus and Curtius are to 
  be preferred.
  Analysis
  
  72
  What this tactical consideration does allow 
  us, however, is the chance to marvel at what the 
  Macedonian phalanx achieved in all three of these 
  battles: it was able to move to and then hold a key 
  position, perform remarkable exploits and achieve 
  extraordinary results. In defence the phalanx was 
  indefatigable, an immovable mass of men and 
  sarissa points which could absorb pressure and 
  punishment for as long as was required. When 
  ordered to advance, however, the taxeis of the 
  phalanx became unstoppable; an inexorable mass 
  of disciplined armoured men and sarissae moving 
  forward and pressing toward their objective.
  In all three of the battles explored here, 
  Craterus’ taxis held the leftmost position and in 
  two, Craterus commanded the three taxeis of the 
  left wing of the infantry; Nicanor commanded 
  the right (Curtius 3.9.7). There is a remarkable 
  continuity in the command of the other taxeis of 
  the phalanx too, and only a slight shuffling of the 
  order in which they were deployed – Coenus was 
  on the right next to the hypaspists at Issus and 
  Gaugamela, the position Perdiccas had held at the 
  Granicus. At the Granicus the three remaining 
  taxeis were drawn up (right to left): Amyntas, 
  Philip, Meleager. We do not hear the fate of Philip, 
  the son of Amyntas, but for the remaining battles 
  he was replaced by Ptolemy. At Issus this order 
  was (right to left) Meleager, Ptolemy, Amyntas, 
  and at Gaugamela Meleager, Polyperchon and 
  Simmias; the usual commander, Amyntas, was 
  wounded, and was replaced by either his brother 
  or – Diodorus tells us (17.57.3) – by Philip, the son of Balacrus. The position 
  of this taxis with its new commander next to that of the experienced Craterus 
  might imply that it was there to have an eye kept on it.
  Alexander understood the value of the phalanx’s battlefield role. The gap 
  in the Persian line which the Macedonian king created and exploited at Issus 
  and Gaugamela was no doubt made by exploiting the fact that the phalanx 
  engaged and held the Persian infantry while the Macedonian cavalry, moving 
  to the right, created a weakening in the Persian line when Persian units 
  moved to cover the Macedonian rightwards manoeuvre; a weakening which 
  Alexander could exploit. Neither charge would have been possible if the 
  phalanx had not held the Persian infantry in place. If the phalangites had not 
  engaged, then the Persians would have been free to spread their line equally 
  to counter Alexander’s rightwards manoeuvre, but masses of 16-rank-deep 
  infantry armed with sarissae could not be ignored and the Persian infantry 
  had no choice but to engage the phalanx. Unfortunately for Darius, no matter 
  how brave the Persian infantry were, they proved to be no match for the 
  Macedonian phalanx.
  A funeral stele from Pella, 
  the Macedonian capital, 
  showing a Pilos helmet. Note 
  also the scabbard and spear 
  with butt-spike. The more 
  one reads of the exploits 
  of the Macedonian phalanx 
  and its component parts, the 
  more remarkable it becomes. 
  (DEA PICTURE LIBRARY/
  De Agostini/Getty Images)
  
  73
  PERSIAN EFFECTIVENESS
  The military system which had been an integral part of the Persian Empire since 
  its foundation failed to withstand the onslaught of the Macedonian invasion 
  in 334–331 bc. Although parts of the Persian Empire would continue to resist 
  Alexander’s forces and put up a stout defence against the Macedonian phalanx, 
  the battles of the Granicus, Issus and Gaugamela broke the back of the Persian 
  military system. We know that the Persian infantry were spearmen and archers 
  and that the various contingents of the empire were able to fight in their own 
  style. We can see this in the accounts of Alexander’s battles – particularly 
  Gaugamela, where Darius incorporated Indian and Scythian troops into his 
  armies alongside chariots and elephants. The continuity of units in the Persian 
  army is harder to assess, although the Immortals of Herodotus are surely the 
  same unit as the Apple Bearers of Arrian and other sources. The fighting style 
  of these men is never distinguished from other units of Persian and Median 
  infantry and so, since their ranks were filled with the best men from the levies 
  of Persia, they presumably fought in the same manner.
  This continuity of fighting style for at least two centuries might be seen as 
  stagnation, but the Persian military system showed that it could incorporate 
  change. After the wars of the 5th century bc, the Persians recognized the 
  qualities of Greek hoplites and the possibilities they offered and began 
  incorporating them into the empire’s armies. In many ways this was a 
  continuation of the policy of allowing units to fight in their own style, but 
  This stone wall relief at Dion, 
  Greece, shows a Macedonian 
  shield and muscled 
  cuirass with pteruges. It 
  is understandable that the 
  phalangites felt great chagrin 
  that they were being replaced 
  in 330 bc and 324 bc by 
  new (and non-Macedonian) 
  personnel. Alexander may 
  have thought that he was 
  rewarding them with a rich 
  retirement, but the esprit 
  de corps of the phalangites 
  was such that they felt they 
  should go on as they were, 
  as the men of Alexander’s 
  phalanx – men who could 
  not be replaced or forgotten. 
  (De Agostini/Archivo J. 
  Lange/Getty Images)
  
  74
  it also shows a recognition of the qualities of the hoplite. Mercenaries began 
  to be recruited, sometimes in large numbers. In all three battles examined 
  here the Persians used Greek mercenary hoplites, but the exact proportion 
  of the empire’s infantry made up by such men is difficult to assess because 
  the sources differ on how many there were, where they were in the line and 
  what they did. It does seem, however, that Greek mercenary hoplites put up 
  the toughest resistance to the phalanx and that the refused-flank advance 
  of the Macedonians was intended to delay or minimize contact with Greek 
  mercenary hoplites in the Persian lines. Alexander’s refusal to release hoplite 
  prisoners also suggests he was wary of their capabilities against him.
  Another factor in favour of the idea that the Persian military system 
  was capable of change was the adoption during the 4th century bc of the 
  Cardaces, men of the empire who were trained and equipped in the same 
  manner as Greek hoplites. The defeats inflicted on the Persians by the hoplites 
  of Greek city-states in the past had shown that this was a superior fighting 
  style and by adopting such units of their own, the Persians demonstrated that 
  their military system was capable of change.
  At the same time, however, Persian use of hoplites (and other innovations) 
  simply added another variant to the vast array of different types of fighting 
  styles within the Persian army. The tactics used against Alexander show no 
  This relief from the Wall of 
  Stairs from the Palace of 
  Darius at Persepolis portrays 
  a tribute procession. Various 
  types of soldiers and arms 
  (and shields) can be made out 
  among those offering tribute. 
  This is borne out in the army 
  lists in our sources which 
  reveal units from all over the 
  Persian Empire. The Persian 
  army proved unable to stop 
  the onslaught of a smaller, 
  more efficient and determined 
  Macedonian force. (Diego 
  Delso, delso.photo/
  Wikimedia/CC BY-SA 4.0)
  
  75
  advance in tactical thinking; Darius and his commanders simply sought to 
  overwhelm the smaller Macedonian force by weight of numbers (and missiles). 
  Surrounding the Macedonians was the initial idea at Issus – although the 
  eventual field of battle would not allow it – and so great efforts were made at 
  Gaugamela to ensure that the field of battle was to the Persians’ advantage. 
  The Persians proved incapable of formulating a plan to counter Alexander’s 
  winning tactic in all three battles – the creation of a gap in the Persian line into 
  which he could charge at the head of a combination of cavalry and infantry. 
  The superiority of the Macedonian cavalry and infantry when fighting at close 
  quarters was such that Darius’ men always lost such encounters, regardless of 
  Persian bravery.
  Another weakness of the Persian military system lay in the person of the 
  king; his survival was paramount and hence Darius fled (relatively early) at 
  both Issus and Gaugamela. The wealth of the Persian state was such that he 
  could always raise a replacement army to fight again. By contrast, Alexander 
  could not flee the battlefield as flight would mean the destruction of his army 
  and his invasion. He did not have the option to raise a replacement army. 
  He did, however, have the option to lead his army to victory from the front. 
  Unfortunately for the Persians, Gaugamela proved one defeat too many for 
  Darius and the Persian military system.
  
  76
  With victory at Gaugamela, Alexander won the Persian Empire. Darius was 
  pursued by Alexander to Arbela, but the Persian king had already moved 
  on. Alexander moved on from Gaugamela to capture Babylon and Susa, the 
  Persian capitals. Many of the satrapies of Darius submitted to Alexander 
  without resistance. Darius was kept on the run and pursued until July 330 bc, 
  when he was assassinated by Bessus, a member of his entourage, in Bactria. 
  Bessus and the last resisting Persian satraps such as Ariobarzanes were then 
  chased down by Alexander. Thereafter Alexander took Persepolis and pressed 
  on against various homelands of peoples who had been subject to the Persians 
  such as the Bactrians, Uxians, Scythians and Sogdians.
  The strengths of the Macedonian military system and Alexander’s 
  brilliance as a commander meant the Macedonians in effect conquered the 
  mighty Persian Empire in only four years. Alexander was still not satisfied, 
  however, and invaded India in 327 bc. The army which accompanied 
  him comprised the same veterans he had had with him from the start. In 
  326 bc, however, at the Hyphasis River in India, they refused to march 
  further east. Alexander reluctantly agreed to turn back and marched to 
  the sea. There he sent his army back to Persia and marched himself via 
  the Gedrosian desert, losing many men in the harsh terrain. Plutarch 
  (Alexander 66.4–6) estimates that barely one-quarter of Alexander’s men 
  returned from India. In 324 bc Alexander’s army mutinied at Opis, 
  thinking that they were being dismissed and replaced by the Epigonoi, a 
  new generation of phalangites.
  Alexander died in Babylon in June 323 bc, aged just 32. He had conquered 
  one of the largest empires ever known with the military machine and vision 
  he had inherited from his father and put to such effective use. On his death 
  his generals fell to squabbling and the empire was divided among them to 
  become the Successor States or Diadochi. The Macedonian phalanx which 
  had won Alexander his empire became the mainstay of each of these empires 
  Aftermath
  
  77
  (Antigonid, Seleucid and Ptolemaic) and they perpetuated its glory. Whereas 
  Alexander had shown himself capable of innovation on the battlefield and of 
  taking advantage of the flexibility inherent within the drill and manoeuvres 
  of the phalanx, however, his successors created larger and larger phalanxes 
  less and less capable of manoeuvre. Whereas Alexander had conquered the 
  Persian Empire with a phalanx of fewer than 10,000 men, by the succeeding 
  century there were phalanxes of 20,000 and 25,000 men. Still the phalanx 
  dominated the warfare of the former Persian Empire for almost two centuries. 
  Phalanx warfare gained a new lease on life in the 16th and 17th centuries, 
  when tacticians discovered the Tactica manuals, which proved ideal for the 
  new pike formations of that era.
  A Roman copy of a bust 
  of Alexander in the British 
  Museum. The appeal of 
  Alexander was such that he 
  continued to be the subject of 
  portrait busts and sculptures 
  long after his death and into 
  the Roman period. In 11 years 
  of continuous campaigning (a 
  remarkable achievement in 
  itself), Alexander never met 
  with defeat and his forces 
  encountered every kind of 
  terrain imaginable, from 
  scorching desert to snowy 
  mountains. They fought 
  battles of every kind against 
  all manner of opponents and 
  marched more than 32,000km. 
  Accounts describing 
  Alexander’s remarkable 
  exploits inspire awe and 
  disbelief in the modern 
  reader, as indeed they have 
  in readers across the ages. 
  (PHAS/UIG via Getty Images)
  
  78
  BIBLIOGRAPHY
  Ancient sources
  We are relatively fortunate in the number of surviving 
  sources for Alexander the Great. We have Arrian, 
  Diodorus, Plutarch, Curtius Rufus, Justin and others. In 
  some ways this is to be expected; Alexander was one of the 
  most famous individuals of antiquity. In other ways, 
  however, we are left to lament the lack of clarity (and in 
  some cases quality) of what has survived despite the 
  quantity. We have no Persian account of any of 
  Alexander’s conquests. There are sources which do not 
  survive (Justin’s work is an epitome of the work of 
  Pompeius Trogus, written in the 1st century bc) and some 
  anecdotes (in Strabo, Athenaeus, other works of Plutarch 
  and Polyaenus, for instance) which suggest an even larger 
  tradition which is now lost. There are omissions and 
  contradictions. Every one of our surviving sources was 
  written after the life of Alexander, some by hundreds of 
  years. Arrian, considered the best of the Alexander 
  historians, was writing in the middle of the 
  2nd century ad, from the perspective of the Roman world 
  but copying Greek models, almost 400 years after 
  Alexander’s death. Diodorus Siculus was writing a 
  universal history of the world (which ended with 
  Alexander’s death) in the 1st century bc and Quintus 
  Curtius Rufus was probably writing in the mid-
  1st century ad.
  In addition, all of our sources claim to be using 
  earlier material. Arrian opens his work (1.1.1) by laying 
  claim to the quality of his sources, Ptolemy, son of 
  Lagos, and Aristobulus. He refers to them often, but 
  even they diverge, in which cases Arrian chooses between 
  the two accounts. Diodorus and Curtius are often only 
  considered as good as their sources, but they name 
  Callisthenes, the official historian of Alexander’s 
  campaigns and so a good source (and one used much less 
  by Arrian). Therefore, my preferment, on occasion, of 
  the version in Diodorus and Curtius with regard to 
  several aspects of the battles discussed here is not simply 
  siding with a less reliable source.
  Ptolemy and Callisthenes were eyewitnesses and so 
  both are reliable (even when they obviously diverge). 
  Ptolemy, however, wrote his account late in life, around 
  285 bc, after founding the Hellenistic kingdom of 
  Ptolemaic Egypt. There were other eyewitnesses of 
  Alexander too, who get quoted by our historians and 
  elsewhere (such as Nearchus, Onesicritus, Chares of 
  Mytilene and Eumenes of Cardia, Alexander’s secretary). 
  Plutarch, despite the foibles of his moral biography 
  genre, also quotes letters (some consider them spurious) 
  and Diodorus mentions (18.4) the hypomnemata 
  (notebooks) of Alexander. Aristobulus was also an 
  eyewitness, but wrote after Alexander’s death and was 
  regarded, disparagingly, as a flatterer of Alexander. 
  Several of the later historians (including Diodorus and 
  Curtius) also used later writers such as Cleitarchus and 
  pseudo-Callisthenes, the so-called later vulgate tradition 
  (to which Diodorus and Curtius are attached – although, 
  I believe, in some cases wrongly).
  All of these sources concentrated on the highest 
  circles of Alexander and his commanders. Therefore they 
  usually do not deign to mention or name the common 
  phalangite. Added to these are the archaeological sources 
  which provide corroboration of events and persons, 
  perhaps the wording of a treaty, and also give us 
  important visual evidence of the material culture of the 
  Macedonian phalangite and the Persian infantryman. 
  Sorting out the surviving sources is complex in and of 
  itself and certainty cannot always be attained. We are 
  often left with different accounts, motivations and even 
  events and it is up to the historian to choose the one he 
  or she believes to offer the most likely explanation, as I 
  hope I have done convincingly.
  
  79
  Classical works
  Aelian, trans. A.M. Devine (1980). Tactica, in ‘Aelian’s 
  Manual of Hellenistic Military Tactics. A New 
  Translation from the Greek with an Introduction’, in 
  The Ancient World Vol. 19, pp. 31–64.
  Arrian, trans. P.A. Brunt (1976 & 1983). History of 
  Alexander in two volumes. Cambridge, MA & 
  London: Harvard University Press.
  Athenaeus, trans. C.B. Gulick (1933). The Deipnosophists 
  in 12 volumes (Vol. 5, books 11 and 12). Cambridge, 
  MA & London: Harvard University Press.
  Diodorus Siculus, trans. C. Bradford Welles (1963). 12 
  volumes (Vol. 8, books XVI.66–XVII). Cambridge, 
  MA & London: Harvard University Press.
  Justin, trans. J.C. Yardley (1994). Epitome of the Philippic 
  History of Pompeius Trogus. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.
  Oxyrhynchus Papyri (1898), ed. & trans. B. Grenfell & A. 
  Hunt. 15 volumes. London: Egypt Exploration Fund.
  Plutarch, trans. B. Perrin (1919). Plutarch’s Lives (Life of 
  Alexander) in 11 volumes (Vol. 7). Cambridge, MA 
  & London: Harvard University Press.
  Polyaenus, trans. P. Krentz & E.L. Wheeler (1994). 
  Stratagems of War in two volumes. Chicago, IL: Ares 
  Publishers.
  Quintus Curtius Rufus, trans. J.C. Rolfe (1946). History 
  of Alexander in two volumes. Cambridge, MA & 
  London: Harvard University Press.
  Xenophon, trans. W. Miller (1914). Cyropaedia in two 
  volumes. Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard 
  University Press.
  Modern works
  Adcock, F.E. (1957). The Greek and Macedonian Art of 
  War. Berkeley & Los Angeles, CA: University of 
  California Press.
  Ashley, J.R. (1998). The Macedonian Empire: The Era of 
  Warfare Under Philip II and Alexander the Great, 
  359-323 bc. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.
  Austin, M.M., ed. (1981). The Hellenistic World from 
  Alexander to the Roman Conquest. A Selection of 
  Ancient Sources in Translation. Cambridge: 
  Cambridge University Press.
  Bosworth, A.B. (1988). Conquest and Empire: The Reign 
  of Alexander the Great. Cambridge: Cambridge 
  University Press.
  Engels, Donald W. (1978). Alexander the Great and the 
  Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley & Los 
  Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
  Fuller, J.F.C. (1960). The Generalship of Alexander the 
  Great. London: Minerva Press.
  Green, Peter (1991). Alexander of Macedon, 356–323 
  B.C.: A Historical Biography. Berkeley & Los 
  Angeles, CA: University of California Press.
  Hammond, N.G.L. (1994). Alexander the Great: King, 
  Commander and Statesman. 3rd Edition. Park 
  Ridge, NJ: Noyes Press.
  Hammond, N.G.L. (1997). The Genius of Alexander the 
  Great. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North 
  Carolina Press.
  Karunanithy, D. (2013). The Macedonian War Machine 
  359-281 bc. Barnsley: Pen & Sword.
  Lane Fox, Robin (1974). Alexander the Great. London: 
  Longman.
  Martin, Thomas R. & Blackwell, Christopher (2012). 
  Alexander the Great: The story of an ancient life. 
  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  Tarn, W.W. (1948). Alexander the Great. 2 vols. 
  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  Tarn, W.W. (1975). Hellenistic Military and Naval 
  Developments. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
  Wilken, Ulrich, trans. G.C. Richards (1967). Alexander 
  the Great. New York, NY: Norton.
  Worthington, Ian (2014). By the Spear: Philip II, 
  Alexander the Great, and the Rise and Fall of the 
  Macedonian Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
  Gold discs from Philip II’s tomb at Aigai. We know from other 
  depictions that this motif appeared on Macedonian phalangite 
  shields. It is possible that Macedonian shield designs denoted 
  various units. (DEA Picture Library/De Agostini/Getty Images)
  
  80
  INDEX
  References to illustrations are shown in bold.
  Achaean cavalry  60, 61, 63
  Agrianian forces  5, 8, 30, 32,  33, 34, 60, 61
  Albanian forces  19, 60, 61, 62
  Alexander III, King of Macedon  4, 5, 77, 78
  as commander/tactician  5, 14–15, 38, 53, 
  54, 60, 61, 62, 64–65, 68, 75, 77: at 
  Gaugamela  54, 60, 61, 62, 64–65, 66–67, 
  68, 69, 72; at the Granicus  32, 33, 34, 35, 
  37–38, 41; at Issus  46, 52, 53, 54
  Amanic Gate  6, 7, 45
  Arachosian cavalry  60, 61, 62
  archers (Mac)  30, 32, 33, 46, 47, 49, 60, 61, 
  64; (Per)  9, 10, 17, 18, 19, 21, 27, 28, 46, 
  47, 48, 55, 66–67, 68, 69, 73
  Aristomedes  46, 48, 53, 54
  Armenian forces  43, 60, 61, 62
  Arsames  32, 33, 36, 37
  arstibara (spearbearers)  16, 17, 27
  Athens/Athenians  6, 7, 8, 26, 35
  Babylonian troops  19, 60, 61, 62
  Bactrian cavalry  11, 32, 33, 36, 40, 60, 61, 62, 76
  Barcanian forces  43, 45
  Bessus  60, 61, 76
  Cadusian infantry  19, 60, 61, 62
  Cappadocian cavalry  40, 43, 60, 61, 62
  Cardaces  10, 30, 48, 49, 74
  Carians  19, 60, 61, 62
  Cilicia/Cilician Gates  6, 7, 37, 42, 43
  clothing/dress (Mac)  50–51, 54, 63, 69; colours 
  used  63
  clothing dress (Per)  26, 28, 30, 35, 39, 50–51, 
  54, 69, 78; colours used  15, 16, 17, 17, 19, 
  21, 28, 55
  Companion cavalry (Mac)  5, 6, 8, 32, 33, 36, 
  40–41, 49, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 68
  Companion Foot Guards (Mac)  32, 33, 46, 47, 
  49, 54
  Cretan archers  8, 30, 60, 61, 64
  Dahae cavalry  60, 61, 62
  Darius III, King of Persia  6, 11, 23, 34, 37
  at Gaugamela  10, 19, 53, 57–58, 60, 61, 62, 
  63, 66–67, 65, 68, 69, 70, 75
  at Issus  18–19, 20, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 
  50–51, 53–54, 54–55, 54, 56, 75
  assassination of  76
  Gaugamela, battle of  6, 7, 56–58, 60, 62–65, 
  69–70, 75
  dispositions/strengths (Mac)  30, 36, 60, 61, 
  63–64, 68
  dispositions/strengths (Per)  10, 11, 18, 19, 
  56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66–67, 68, 
  69, 72, 73
  fighting/tactics (Mac)  54, 60, 61, 62, 64–65, 
  66–67, 68, 69, 70, 72; use of the phalanx/
  taxeis  14–15, 20, 22, 36, 53, 57, 60, 61, 
  63, 64–65, 66–67, 68, 69, 70, 72
  fighting/tactics (Per)  10, 60, 61, 64–65, 
  66–67, 68–69, 70, 75
  Granicus (the), battle of  6, 7, 11, 29–32, 34–41
  dispositions/strengths (Mac)  12, 13, 18, 29, 
  30, 31, 32, 33, 34–35, 36, 38, 39, 72
  dispositions/strengths (Per)  11, 16, 17, 18, 
  31, 32, 34–35, 36, 37, 38, 39–40
  fighting/tactics (Mac)  32, 33, 34, 36, 37–38, 
  41, 62; use of the phalanx/taxeis  14–15, 
  20, 22, 36, 38, 39, 72
  fighting/tactics (Per)  18, 36, 37, 38–39, 40
  Greek mercenary hoplites  8, 9, 10, 15
  Macedonian service  9, 10, 14, 22, 23, 26, 
  29–30, 50–51, 60, 61, 62
  Persian service  9, 11, 19, 26, 27, 29–30, 32, 
  33, 35, 38, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 
  60, 61, 62, 73–74, 75
  weapons of  17, 23, 26, 27, 34, 44
  Halicarnassus, siege of  6, 7, 42
  headgear/helmets (Mac)  9, 13, 19, 23, 34, 35, 
  37, 40, 49, 50–51, 58, 59, 66–67, 68, 69, 70, 
  72, 78; (Per)  11, 17, 21, 28, 31, 35, 39, 45, 
  65, 65, 69
  Hollow Syria, troops from  60, 61, 62
  hypaspists  8, 14, 22–23, 26, 29, 34, 46, 47, 49, 
  60, 61, 63, 72
  Hyrcanian cavalry  32, 33, 36, 40, 45, 46, 47, 
  48, 60, 61, 62
  Immortals (Apple Bearers)  6, 10, 10, 11, 11, 17, 
  18, 20–21, 24, 27, 28, 45, 48, 49, 60, 61, 62, 
  65, 66–67, 68, 69, 73
  Indian cavalry  11, 60, 61, 62, 65, 69, 73
  Issus, battle of  6, 7, 20, 42–44, 45, 48–49
  dispositions/strengths (Mac)  46, 47, 49, 50–51
  dispositions/strengths (Per)  10, 11, 18–19, 
  24, 35, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 
  50–51, 53, 54, 63
  fighting/tactics (Mac)  49, 50–51, 52, 53, 54, 
  54, 55, 71, 72; use of the phalanx  14–15, 
  20, 22, 36, 49, 50–51, 52, 53, 55, 71, 72
  fighting/tactics (Per)  24, 48, 50–51, 52, 
  53–54, 54–55, 54, 72, 75
  javelin-men  8, 28, 32, 33, 46, 47, 48
  javelins: (Mac)  8, 9, 9, 30, 65, 69; (Per)  18, 32, 
  34, 37, 38, 46, 50–51, 52
  lancer cavalry (Mac)  8, 32, 33, 60, 61
  Locrian cavalry 60, 61, 63
  Macedonian army
  battle arrays/tactics  4–5, 14–15, 36, 54, 54
  command structure/commanders  9, 12, 12, 
  13, 21–22, 65, 68
  composition/strength  4, 8–9
  mutiny of  76
  recruitment for  19–20
  Macedonian phalanx
  battle formations/tactics  14–15, 14, 22, 26–
  27, 29, 32, 33, 38, 42, 46, 47, 49, 60, 61, 
  64–65, 66–67, 68, 69, 71–72, 72: losses  
  14, 35, 36, 38, 53; power/superiority of  
  18, 39, 72; protection of  5, 9, 22, 46, 47, 
  49, 65; use as ‘pike-block’  14, 50–51
  command/organization of  8–9, 21–23, 24
  composition/strength  8–9, 14, 19, 21–22, 32, 
  33, 49, 55, 60, 61, 77: depth of  15, 21, 
  46, 49, 71; Epigonoi for  19, 20, 27, 73, 76
  dependability/experience of  20, 38
  importance of  4–5, 38, 71, 76–77
  training of  26–27
  see also phalangites
  Malian cavalry  60, 61, 63
  Mallus  6, 7, 42–43
  Mardian forces  60, 61, 62, 65
  Mazaeus  57, 60, 65
  Median forces  9, 11, 17, 31, 32, 33, 39, 40, 43, 
  46, 47, 48, 62, 73
  Memnon of Rhodes  11, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 
  36, 37, 43, 48
  Mesopotamian troops  60, 61, 62
  Miletus, siege of  6, 7, 42, 43
  Mithridates  11, 18, 34, 37
  Paeonian cavalry  8, 32, 33, 34, 36, 60, 61
  Paphlagonian cavalry  32, 33, 36, 40
  Parmenion  29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 36, 49, 54, 58, 
  60, 65, 70
  Parthyaean forces  60, 61, 62
  Peloponnesian cavalry  46, 47, 49, 60, 61, 63
  peltasts  8, 9, 9, 15, 26, 30, 32, 33, 34
  Persia, troop levies in  9, 11, 39
  Persian army (spada)  6
  battle arrays/tactics  6, 18–19, 58, 60, 62, 74–75
  command structure/commanders  16, 16, 
  17, 17, 23–24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 34, 36, 37, 
  40, 45, 48
  composition/strength  6, 9, 11, 23–24, 31, 32, 
  33, 35, 46, 47, 48, 62: variety of forces  6, 
  9, 18, 19, 26, 27, 29–30, 31, 32, 33, 36, 
  56, 63, 73, 74–75
  fighting styles  6, 9, 19, 73–74, 74–75
  troop levies  9, 11, 30, 48
  Persian troops  5, 11, 17, 19, 39, 44, 45, 65
  phalangites (Pezhetarioi)  5, 8, 15, 20, 73, 79
  armour/clothing/headgear  12, 13, 23
  formations/organization of  8, 9, 14, 38
  fresh levies for (Epigonoi)  42, 76
  mutiny of  71, 73, 76
  training/calibre of  27, 38, 49, 68
  weapons of  8, 12, 13, 26, 38, 39, 50–51, 54, 
  66–67, 68, 72
  see also Macedonian phalanx
  Philip II, King of Macedon  4, 5, 6, 8, 14, 15, 
  20, 29, 49, 58, 79
  Phocian/Phthiotis cavalry  60, 61, 63
  Phrygia/Phrygians  6, 7, 42, 62
  Rheomithres  32, 33, 36
  Rhoesaces  34, 35, 37
  Royal Guard (Mac)  22–23, 46, 47, 49
  Royal Squadron (Mac)  60, 61, 63, 64
  Sacae forces  60, 61, 62
  Sacesinian forces  19, 60, 61, 62
  satraps (provincial governors)  11, 20, 29–30, 
  31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43, 56
  Scythian cavalry  11, 60, 61, 62, 73, 76
  shields (Mac)  12, 28, 37, 49, 50–51, 64, 66–67, 
  68, 73, 79: aspis  23, 27; pelte  9, 12, 26
  shields (Per)  16, 18, 25, 26, 27, 28, 28, 30, 44, 
  50–51, 66–67, 68, 69
  Sittacenian troops  19, 60, 61, 62
  slingers: (Mac)  8, 49; (Per)  46, 47, 48
  Sogdian infantry  62, 76
  Sparta/Spartans  7, 8, 14, 15
  spearmen (Per)  27, 28, 65, 73
  spears (Mac)  9, 14, 15, 17, 37, 38, 54, 58, 65, 
  72: sarissa  8, 12, 14, 23, 26, 32, 34, 50–51, 
  54, 66–67, 68, 72; xyston  8
  spears (Per)  10, 11, 16, 17, 24, 25, 27, 28, 35, 
  35, 39, 44, 45, 50–51, 68
  Spithridates  32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37
  Susian infantry  16, 17, 28, 60, 61, 62
  swords (Mac)  35, 54, 58: kopis  8, 12, 23; 
  xiphos  8, 23
  swords (Per)  5, 31, 37, 54: akinaka  27
  Syria (Sochoi)  6, 7, 37, 43, 45
  Tarsus (Cilicia)  6, 7, 36, 37, 42
  taxeis (infantry bns)  34, 38, 43, 50–51, 52, 53, 
  64, 65, 69, 72
  commanders/(regions) of  19–20, 22, 23, 36, 
  38, 42, 63, 65, 72: Amyntas  22, 32, 33, 
  46, 47, 48, 49, 72; Coenus (Elimiotis)  
  12, 13, 19, 22, 23, 32, 33, 46, 47, 49, 
  60, 61, 63, 66–67, 68, 72; Craterus  22, 
  32, 33, 46, 47, 48, 49, 60, 61, 63, 69, 
  72; Meleager  22, 32, 33, 46, 47, 49, 60, 
  61, 63, 64, 72; Perdiccas (Orestae and 
  Lyncestae)  20, 22, 23, 32, 33, 34, 36, 38, 
  46, 47, 49, 60, 61, 63, 72; Philip  22, 32, 
  33, 60, 61, 63, 64, 69, 72; Polyperchon 
  (Stympheans)  20, 22, 23, 60, 61, 63, 72; 
  Ptolemy  22, 34, 46, 47, 49, 72
  composition/strength  8, 9, 14, 19, 22, 63
  Theban troops  14, 15, 22
  Thebes  6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 20, 29, 30, 36
  Thessalian cavalry  8, 30, 32, 33, 37, 42, 46, 47, 
  49, 60, 61, 64, 65
  Thimodes  46, 48, 53
  Thracian peltasts  8, 9, 26, 30, 32, 33
  Topeirian forces  60, 61, 62
  Troy  6, 7, 31
  Tyre, siege of  6, 7, 57
  Uxian troops  60, 61, 62, 76
  
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  Dedication
  For my girls: Rae, Eloise and Siena
  Acknowledgements
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SOURCE: textdata/thevault/Osprey System/Combat (CBT)/Osprey - CBT 040 - Macedonian Phalangite vs Persian Warrior.pdf