# 1 Introduction

## 1 Introduction

In recent years, physics has been successful in providing several models to describe some collective behaviors in both human societies and social organisations . In particular, new light has been shed on democratic voting biases , decision making process , outbreak of cooperation , social impact , and power genesis in groups .

However such a new approach to social behavior is yet at its earlier stage. More work is needed as well more connexion with social data. At this stage, it is really the first ingrdients to what could become, in the near future, a new field of research by itself. At least it is our challenge.

It is also worth to state few words of caution, since dealing with social reality can often interfere with the reality itsel via biases in actual social representations. One contribution of this “sociophysics” would be indeed to take away social studies from political or philosophical beliefs, to place it on a more modelling frame without any religion like attitude.

In this paper we adress the question of coalition forming in the framework of country military alliances, using some basic concepts from the physics of spin glasses systems . Along this line, an earlier attempt from political sciences , used the physical concept of minimum energy. However this work was misleading  since it was based on a confusion between the two physically different spin glass models of Mattis and Edwards-Anderson . The model presented here, indeed involves the interplay between these two models.

The following of the paper is organised as follows. The second part contains the presentation of our model. Several features in the dynamics of bimodal coalitions are obtained. Within such a framework the one country viewpoint is studied in Section 3 showing up the frontiers of turning some local cooperation to conflict or the opposite still preserving the belonging to the same coalition. The setting up of world wide alliances is discussed in section 4. The cold war situation is then analysed in section 5. A new explanation is given in Section 6 to estern Europe instabilities following the Warsaw pact dissolution as well as to western Europe stability. Some hints are also obtained within the model on how to stabilize these eastern Europe instabilities giving the still existing Nato organisation. The model is then applied in Section 7 to describe the Chinese situation. The concept of “risky actor” is briefly introduced in Section 8. Last Section contains some concluding remarks.

## 2 Presentation of the model

We now address the problem of alignment between a group of $`N`$ countries . From historical, cultural and economic frames there exit bilateral propensities $`J_{i,j}`$ between any pair of countries $`i`$ and $`j`$ to either cooperation $`(J_{i,j}>0)`$, conflict $`(J_{i,j}<0)`$ or ignorance $`(J_{i,j}=0)`$. Each propensity $`J_{i,j}`$ depends solely on the pair $`(i,j)`$ itself and is positive, negative or zero. Propensities $`J_{i,j}`$ are somehow local since they don’t account for any global organization or net. Their intensities vary for each pair of countries to account for the various military and economic power of both pair actors. They are assumed to be symmetric, i.e., $`J_{ij}=J_{ji}`$.

From the well known saying “the enemy of an enemy is a friend” we postulate the existence of only two competing coalitions, like for instance western and eastern blocks during the so-called cold war. They are denoted respectively by A and B.

Each actor has then the choice to be in either one of two coalitions. A variable $`\eta _i`$ associated to each actor, where index i runs from 1 to N, states its actual belonging. It is $`\eta _i=+1`$ if actor $`i`$ belongs to alliance A while $`\eta _i=1`$ in case it is part of alliance B. From symmetry all A-members can turn to coalition B with a simultaneous flip of all B-members to coalition A.

Given a pair of actors $`(i,j)`$ their respective alignment is readily expressed through the product $`\eta _i\eta _j`$. The product is $`+1`$ when $`i`$ and $`j`$ belong to the same coalition and $`1`$ otherwise. The “cost” of exchange between a pair of countries is then measured by the quantity $`J_{ij}\eta _i\eta _j`$.

Here factorisation over $`i`$ and $`j`$ is not possible. Indeed we are dealing with competing given bonds or links. It is equivalent to random bond spin glasses as opposed to Mattis random site spin glasses .

Given a configuration $`X`$ of actors, for each nation $`i`$ we can measure the overall degree of conflict and cooperation with all others $`N1`$ countries, with the quantity,

$$E_i=\underset{j=1}{\overset{n}{}}J_{ij}\eta _j,$$
(1)   
where the summation is taken over all other countries including $`i`$ itself with $`J_{ii}0`$. The product $`\eta _iE_i`$ then evaluates the local “cost” associated with country $`i`$ choice. It is positive if $`i`$ goes along the tendancy produced by $`E_i`$ and negative otherwise. For a given configuration $`X`$, all country local “cost” sum up to a total “cost”,

$$E(X)=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i}{}\eta _iE_i,$$
(2)   
where the $`1/2`$ accounts for the double counting of pairs. This “cost” measures indeed the level of satisfactions of each country alliance choice. It can be recast as,

$$E(X)=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i,j}{\overset{n}{}}J_{ij}\eta _i\eta _j,$$
(3)   
where the sum runs over the $`n(n1)`$ pairs $`(i,j)`$. Eq.(3) is indeed the Hamiltonian of an Ising random bond magnetic system.

### 2.1 THE CHOSEN DYNAMICS

At this stage we postulate that the actual configuration is the one which minimizes the cost in each countiry choice. In order to favor two cooperating countries $`(G_{i,j}>0)`$ in the same alliance, we put a minus sign in from of the expression of Eq. (3), to get,

$$H=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i>j}{\overset{n}{}}J_{ij}\eta _i\eta _j.$$
(4)   
There exist by symmetry $`2^n/2`$ distinct sets of alliances since each country has 2 choices for coalition.

Starting from any initial configuration, the dynamics of the system is implemented by single actor coalition flips. An actor turns to the competing coalition only if the flip decreases its local cost. The system has reached its stable state once no more flip occurs. Given $`\{J_{ij}\}`$, the $`\{\eta _i\}`$ are thus obtained minimizing Eq. (4).

Since here the system stable configuration minimizes the “energy”, we are from the physical viewpoint, at the temperature $`\mathrm{`}\mathrm{`}T=0\mathrm{"}`$. Otherwise when $`\mathrm{`}\mathrm{`}T0\mathrm{"}`$ it is the free-energy which has to be minimized. In practise for a finite system the theory can tell which coalitions are possible and how many of them exist. But when several coalitions have the same energy, it is not possible to predict which one will be the actual one.

### 2.2 Frustration effect

The physical concept of frustration  is embodied in the model. For instance, in the case of three conflicting nations as Israel, Syria and Iraq, any possible alliance configuration leaves always someone unsatisfied.

To define this feture more precisely; let us attach respectively the labels 1, 2, 3 to each one of the three countries. In case we have equal and negative exchange interactions $`J_{12}=J_{13}=J_{23}=J`$ with $`J>0`$, the associated minimum of the energy (Eq. (4)) is equal to $`J`$. However this value of the minimum is realized for several possible and equivalent coalitions. Namely for countries (1, 2, 3) we can have respectively alignments (A, B, A), (B, A, A), (A, A, B), (B, A, B), (A, B, B), and (B, B, A). First 3 are identical to last 3 by symmetry since here what matters is which countries are together within the same coalition. The peculiar property is that the system never gets stable in just one configuration since it costs no energy to switch from one onto another. This case is an archetype of frustration. It means in particular the existence of several ground states with exactly the same energy.

Otherwise, for non equal interactions the system has one stable minimum and no frustration occurs within the physical meaning defined above. The fact that some interactions are not satisfied does not automatically imply frustration in above sense of multiple equivalent set of alliances.

## 3 A one country viewpoint

We now make this point more quantitative within the present formalism. Consider a given site $`i`$. Interactions with all others sites can be represented by a field,

$$h_i=\underset{j=1}{\overset{n}{}}J_{ij}\eta _j$$
(5)   
resulting in an energy contribution

$$E_i=\eta _ih_i,$$
(6)   
to the Hamiltonian $`H=\frac{1}{2}_{i=1}^nE_i`$. Eq. (10) is minimum for $`\eta _i`$ and $`h_i`$ having the same sign. For a given $`h_i`$ there exists always a well defined coalition except for $`h_i=0`$. In this case site $`i`$ is “neutral” since then both coalitions are identical with respect to its local “energy” which stays equal to zero. A neutral site will flip with probability $`\frac{1}{2}`$.

### 3.1 SHIFTING COALITION

The coupling $`\{J_{ij}\}`$ are given. Let us then assume there exists only one minimum. Once the system reaches its stable equilibrium it gets trapped and the energy is minimum. At the minimum the field $`h_i`$ can be calculated for each site $`i`$ since $`\{J_{ij}\}`$ are known as well as $`\{\eta _i\}`$.

First consider all sites which have the value -1. The existence of a unique non-degenerate minimum makes associated fields also negative. We then take one of these sites, e.g. $`k`$, and shift its value from -1 to +1 by simultaneously changing the sign of all its interactions $`\{J_{kl}\}`$ where $`l`$ runs from 1 to $`n`$ ($`J_{kk}=0`$). This transformation gives,

$$\eta _k=+1\mathrm{and}h_k>0,$$
(7)   
instead of,

$$\eta _k=1\mathrm{and}h_k<0,$$
(8)   
which means that actor $`k`$ has shifted from one coalition into the other one.

It is worth to emphazise that such systematic shift of propensities of actor $`k`$ has no effect on the others actors. Taking for instance actor $`l`$, its unique interaction with actor $`k`$ is through $`J_{kl}`$ which did change sign in the transformation. However as actor $`k`$ has also turn to the other coalition, the associated contribution $`J_{kl}\eta _k`$ to field $`h_l`$ of actor $`l`$ is unchanged.

The shift process is then repeated for each member of actor k former coalition. Once all shifts are completed there exits only one unique coalition. Everyone is cooperating with all others. The value of the energy minimum is unchanged in the process.

Above transformation demonstrates the $`\{J_{ij}\}`$ determine the stable configuration. It shows in particular that given any site configuration, it always exists a set of $`\{J_{ij}\}`$ which will give that configuration as the unique minimum of the associated energy. At this stage, what indeed matters are the propensity values.

Above gauge transformation shows what matters is the sign of field $`\{h_i\}`$ and not a given $`J_{ij}`$ value. A given set of field signs, positive and negative, may be realized through an extremely large spectrum of $`\{J_{ij}\}`$.

This very fact opens a way to explore some possible deviations from a national policy. For instance given the state of cooperation and conflict of a group of actors, it is possible to find out limits in which local pair propensities can be modified without inducing coalition shift. Some country can turn from cooperation to conflict or the opposite, without changing the belonging to a given alliance as long as the associated field sign is unchanged. It means that a given country could becomes hostile to some former allies, still staying in the same overall coalition. One illustration is given by german recognition of Croatia against the will of other european partners like France and England, without putting at stake its belonging to the European community. The Falklands war between England and Argentina is another example since both countries have strong american partnerships.

## 4 Setting up coalitions

From above analysis, countries were found to belong to some allianace without apriori macro-analysis at the regional or world level. Each country is adjusting to its best interest withg respect to countries with whom it interacts. However the setting up of global coalitions which are aimed to spread and organize economic and miulitaru exchanges produces an additional ingredient in each country choice.

Yet staying in the two coalition scheme, each country has an apriori natural choice. To account for this fact we introduced for each actor $`i`$, a variable $`ϵ_i`$. It is $`ϵ_i=+1`$ if actor would like to be in $`A`$, $`ϵ_i=1`$ in $`B`$ and $`ϵ_i=0`$ for no apriori. Such natural belonging is induced by cultural and political history.

Moreover we measure exchanges produced by these coalitions trough a set of additional pairwise propensities $`\{C_{i,j}\}`$. They are always positive since sharing resources, informations, weapons is basically profitable. Nevertheless a pair $`(i,j)`$ propensity to cooperation, conflict or ignorance is $`A_{i,j}ϵ_iϵ_jC_{i,j}`$ which can be positive, negative or zero. Now we do have a Mattis random site spin glasses .

Including both local and macro exchanges result in an overall pair propensity

$$O_{i,j}J_{i,j}+ϵ_iϵ_jC_{i,j},$$
(9)   
between two countries $`i`$ and $`j`$ with always $`J_{i,j}>0`$.

An additional variable $`\beta _i=\pm 1`$ is introduced to account for benefit from economic and military pressure attached to a given alignment. It is still $`\beta _i=+1`$ in favor of $`A`$, $`\beta _i=1`$ for $`B`$ and $`\beta _i=0`$ for no belonging. The amplitude of this economical and military interest is measured by a local positive field $`b_i`$ which also accounts for the country size and its importance. At this stage, the sets $`\{ϵ_i\}`$ and $`\{\beta _i\}`$ are independent.

Actual actor choices to cooperate or to conflict result from the given set of above quantites. The associated total cost is,

$$H=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i>j}{\overset{n}{}}\{J_{i,j}+ϵ_iϵ_jC_{ij}\}\eta _i\eta _j\underset{i}{\overset{n}{}}\beta _ib_i\eta _i.$$
(10)   
## 5 Cold war scenario

The cold war scenario means that the two existing world level coalitions generate much stonger couplings than purely bilateral ones, i.e., $`|J_{i,j}|<C_{i,j}`$ since to belong to a world level coalition produces more advantages than purely local unproper relationship. In others words local propensities were unactivated since overwhelmed by the two block trend. The overall system was very stable. We can thus take $`J_{i,j}=0`$. Moreover each actor must belong to a coalition, i. e., $`ϵ_i0`$ and $`\beta _i0`$. In that situation local propensities to cooperate or to conflict between two interacting countries result from their respective individual macro-level coalition belongings. the cold war energy is,

$$H_{CW}=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i>j}{\overset{n}{}}ϵ_iϵ_jJ_{ij}\eta _i\eta _j\underset{i}{\overset{n}{}}\beta _ib_i\eta _i.$$
(11)   
### 5.1 COHERENT TENDENCIES

We consider first the coherent tendency case in which cultural and economical trends go along the same coalition, i.e., $`\beta _i=ϵ_i`$. Then from Eq. (15) the minimum of $`H_{CW}`$ is unique with all country propensities satisfied. Each country chooses its coalition according to its natural belonging, i.e., $`\eta _i=ϵ_i`$. This result is readily proven via the variable change $`\tau ϵ_i\eta _i`$ which turns the energy to,

$$H_{CW1}=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i>j}{\overset{n}{}}J_{ij}\tau _i\tau _j\underset{i}{\overset{n}{}}b_i\tau _i,$$
(12)   
where $`C_{i,j}>0`$ are positive constants. Eq. (16) is a ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian in positive symmetry breaking fields $`b_i`$. Indeed it has one unique minimum with all $`\tau _i=+1`$.

The remarkable result here is that the existence of two apriori world level coalitions is identical to the case of a unique coalition with every actor in it. It shed light on the stability of the Cold War situation where each actor satisfies its proper relationship. Differences and conflicts appear to be part of an overall cooperation within this scenario. Both dynamics are exactly the same since what matters is the existence of a well defined stable configuration. However there exists a difference which is not relevant at this stage of the model since we assumed $`J_{i,j}=0`$. However in reality $`J_{i,j}0`$ making the existence of two coalitions to produce a lower “energy” than a unique coalition since then, more $`J_{i,j}`$ can be satisfied.

It worth to notice that field terms $`b_iϵ_i\eta _i`$ account for the difference in energy cost in breaking a pair proper relationship for respectively a large and a small country. Consider for instance two countries $`i`$ and $`j`$ with $`b_i=2b_j=2b_0`$. Associated pair energy is

$$H_{ij}J_{ij}ϵ_i\eta _iϵ_j\eta _j2b_0ϵ_i\eta _ib_0ϵ_j\eta _j.$$
(13)   
Conditions $`\eta _i=ϵ_i`$ and $`\eta _j=ϵ_j`$ give the minimum energy,

$$H_{ij}^m=J_{ij}2b_0b_0.$$
(14)   
¿From Eq. (18) it is easily seen that in case $`j`$ breaks proper alignment shifting to $`\eta _j=ϵ_j`$ the cost in energy is $`2J_{ij}+2b_0`$. In parallel when $`i`$ shifts to $`\eta _i=ϵ_i`$ the cost is higher with $`2J_{ij}+4b_0`$. Therfore the cost in energy is lower for a breaking from proper alignment by the small country ($`b_j=b_0`$) than by the large country ($`b_j=2b_0`$). In the real world, it is clearly not the same for instance for the US to be against Argentina than to Argentina to be against the US.

### 5.2 UNCOHERENT TENDENCIES

We now consider the uncoherent tendency case in which cultural and economical trends may go along opposite coalitions, i.e., $`\beta _iϵ_i`$. Using above variable change $`\tau ϵ_i\eta _i`$, the Hamiltonian becomes,

$$H_{CW2}=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i>j}{\overset{n}{}}J_{ij}\tau _i\tau _j\underset{i}{\overset{n}{}}\delta _ib_i\tau _i,$$
(15)   
where $`\delta _i\beta _iϵ_i`$ is given and equal to $`\pm 1`$. $`H_{CW2}`$ is formally identical to the ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian in random fields $`\pm b_i`$. However, here the fields are not random.

The local field term $`\delta _ib_i\tau _i`$ modifies the country field $`h_i`$ in Eq. (9) to $`h_i+\delta _ib_i`$ which now can happen to be zero. This change is qualitative since now there exists the possibility to have “neutrality”, i.e., zero local effective field coupled to the individual choice. Switzerland attitude during World war II may result from such a situation. Moreover countries which have opposite cultural and economical trends may now follow their economical interest against their cultural interest or vice versa. Two qualitatively different situations may occur.

* Unbalanced economical power: in this case we have $`_i^n\delta _ib_i0`$.

The symmetry is now broken in favor of one of the coalition. But still there exists only one minimum.
* Balanced economical power: in this case we have $`_i^n\delta _ib_i=0`$.

Symmetry is preserved and $`H_{CW2}`$ is identical to the ferromagnetic Ising Hamiltonian in random fields which has one unique minimum.

## 6 Unique world leader

Now we consider current world situation where the eastern block has disappeared. However it is worth to emphazise the western block is still active as before in this model. Within our notations, denoting $`A`$ the western alignment, we have still $`ϵ_i=+1`$ for countries which had $`ϵ_i=+1`$. On the opposite, countries which had $`ϵ_i=1`$ now turned to either $`ϵ_i=+1`$ or to $`ϵ_i=0`$.

Therefore above $`J_{i,j}=0`$ assumption based on inequality $`|J_{i,j}|<|ϵ_iϵ_j|C_{i,j}`$ no longer holds for each pair of countries. In particular propensity $`p_{i,j}`$ becomes equal to $`J_{i,j}`$ in respective cases where $`ϵ_i=0`$, $`ϵ_j=0`$ and $`ϵ_i=ϵ_j=0`$.

A new distribution of actors results from the collapse of one block. On the one hand $`A`$ coalition countries still determine their actual choices according to $`C_{i,j}`$. On the other hand former $`B`$ coaltion countries are now found to determine their choices according to competing links $`J_{i,j}`$ which did not automatically agree with former $`C_{i,j}`$. This subset of countries has turned from a Mattis random site spin glasses without frustration into a random bond spin glasses with frustration. In others world the former $`B`$ coalition subset has jumped from one stable minimum to a highly degenerated unstable landscape with many local minima. This property could be related to the fragmentation process where ethnic minorities and states shift rapidly allegiances back and forth while they were part of a stable structure just few years ago.

While the $`B`$ coalition world organization has disappeared, the $`A`$ coalition world organization did not change and is still active. It makes $`|J_{i,j}|<C_{i,j}`$ still valid for $`A`$ countries with $`ϵ_iϵ_j=+1`$. Associated countries thus maintain a stable relationship and avoid a fragmentation process. This result supports a posteriori arguments against the dissolution of Nato once Warsaw Pact was disolved.

Above situation could also shed some light on the european debate. It would mean european stability is a result in particular of the existence of european structures with economical reality. These structures produce associated propensities $`C_{i,j}`$ much stronger than local competing propensities $`J_{i,j}`$ which are still there. In other words european stability would indeed result from $`C_{i,j}>|J_{i,j}|`$ and not from either all $`J_{i,j}>0`$ or all $`J_{i,j}=0`$. An eventual setback of the european construction ($`ϵ_iϵ_jC_{i,j}=0`$) would then automatically yield a fragmentation process with activation of ancestral bilateral oppositions.

In this model, once a unique economical as well as military world level organisation exists, each country interest becomes to be part of it. We thus have $`\beta _i=+1`$ for each actor. There may be some exception like Cuba staying almost alone in former $`B`$ alignment, but this case will not be considered here. Associated Hamiltonian for the $`ϵ_i=0`$ subset actor is,

$$H_{UL}=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i>j}{\overset{n}{}}G_{ij}\eta _i\eta _j\underset{i}{\overset{n}{}}b_i\eta _i,$$
(16)   
which is formally equivalent to a random bond Hamiltonian in a field. At this stage $`\eta _i=+1`$ means to be part of $`A`$ coalition which is an international structure. On the opposite $`\eta _i=1`$ is to be in a non-existing $`B`$-coalition which really means to be outside of $`A`$.

For small field with respect to interaction the system may still exhibit physical-like frustration depending on the various $`J_{i,j}`$. In this case the system has many minima with the same energy. Perpetual instabilities thus occur in a desperate search for an impossible stability. Actors will flip continuously from one local alliance to the other. The dynamics we are refering to is an individual flip each time it decreases the energy. We also allow a flip with probabilty $`\frac{1}{2}`$ when local energy is unchanged.

It is worth to point out that only strong local fields may lift fragmentation by putting every actor in $`A`$-coalition. It can be achieved through economical help like for instance in Ukrainia. Another way is military $`A`$ enforcement like for instance in former Yugoslavia.

Our results point out that current debate over integrating former eastern countries within Nato is indeed relevant to oppose current fragmentation processes. Moreover it indicated that an integration would suppress actual instabilities by lifting frustration.

## 7 The case of China

China is an extremely huge country built up from several very large states. These state typical sizes are of the order or much larger than most other countries in the world. It is therefore interesting to analyse China stability within our model since it represents a case of simultaneous Cold war scenario and Unique world leader scenario.

There exists $`n`$ states which are all part of a unique coalition which is the chinese central state. Then all $`ϵ_i=+1`$ but $`\beta _i=\pm 1`$ since some states keep economical and military interest in the “union” $`(\beta _i=+1)`$ while capitalistic advanced rich states contribute more than their share to the “union” $`(\beta _i=1)`$. Associated Hamiltonian is,

$$H=\frac{1}{2}\underset{i>j}{\overset{n}{}}\{J_{i,j}+J_{ij}\}\eta _i\eta _j\underset{i}{\overset{n}{}}\beta _ib_i\eta _i,$$
(17)   
where $`C_{i,j}>0`$ and $`G_{ij}`$ is positive or negative depending on each pair of state $`(i,j)`$.

At this point China is one unified country which means in particular that $`C_{i,j}>|G_{ij}|`$ for all pair of states with negative $`G_{ij}`$. Therefore $`\eta _i=+1`$ for each state. Moreover it also implies $`b_i<q_iC_{i,j}`$ where $`q_i`$ is the number of states state $`i`$ interacts with. Within this model, three possible scenari can be oulined with respect to China stability.

1. China unity is preserved.

Rich states will go along their actual economic growth with the central power turning to a capitalistic oriented federative like structure. It means turning all $`ϵ_i`$ to $`1`$ with then $`\eta _i=ϵ_i`$. In parallel additional development of poor states is required in order to maintain condition $`C_{i,j}>|G_{ij}|`$ where some $`G_{ij}`$ are negative.
2. Some rich states break unity.

Central power is unchanged with the same political and economical orientation making heavier limitations over rich state development. At some point the condition $`b_i>q_iC_{i,j}`$ may be achieved for these states. These very states will then get a lower “energy” breaking down from chinese unity. They will shift to $`\eta _i=1`$ in their alignment with the rest of China which has $`\eta _j=+1`$.
3. China unity is lost with a fragmentation phenomenon.

In this case, opposition among various states becomes stronger than the central organisational cooperation with now $`C_{i,j}<|G_{ij}|`$ with some negative $`G_{ij}`$. The situation would become spin glass-like and China would then undergo a fragmentation process. Former China would become a highly unstable part of the world.

## 8 The risky actor driven dynamics

In principle actors are expected to follow their proper relationship, i.e., to minimize their local “energy”. In other words, actors follow normal and usual patterns of decision. But it is well known that in real life these expectations are sometimes violated. Then new situations are created with reversal of on going policies.

To account for such situations we introduce the risky actor. It is an actor who goes against his well defined interest. It is different from the frustrated actor which does not have a well defined interest. Up to now everything was done at $`\mathrm{`}\mathrm{`}T=0\mathrm{"}`$. However a risky actor chooses coalition associated to $`\eta _i=1`$, although its local field $`h_i`$ is positive. Therefore the existence of risky actors requires a $`T0`$ situation. The case of Rumania, having its own independent foreign policy, in former Warsaw Pact may be an illustration of risky actor behavior. Greece and Turkey in the Cyprus conflict may be another example.

Once $`T0`$, it is not the energy which has to be minimized but the free energy,

$$F=UTS,$$
(18)   
where U is the internal energy, now different from the Hamiltonian and equal to its thermal average and S is the entropy. To minimize the free energy means stability of a group of countries matters on respective size of each coalition but not, which actors are actually in these coalitions. At a fixed ”temperature” we thus can expect simultaneous shift of alliances from several countries as long as the size of the coalition is unchanged, without any modification in the relative strenghts. Egypt quitting soviet camp in the seventies and Afghanistan joining it may illustrate these non-destabilizing shifts.

Within the coalition frame temperature could be viewed as a way to account for some risky trend. It is not possible to know which particular actor will take a chance but it is reasonable to assume the existence of some number of risky actors. Temperature would thus be a way to account for some global level of risk taking.

Along ideas developped elsewhere  we can assume that a level of risky behavior is profitable for the system as a whole. It produces surprises which induce to reconsider some aspect of coalitions themselves. Recent danish refusal to the signing of Maastricht agreement on closer european unity may be viewed as an illustration of a risky actor. The net effect have been indeed to turn what seemed a trivial and apathetic administrative agreement into a deep and passionated debate among european countries with respect to european construction.

Above discussion shows implementation of $`T0`$ within the present approach of coalition should be rather fruitful. More elaboration is left for future work.

## 9 Conclusion

In this paper we have proposed a new way to understand the alliance forming phenomena. in particular it was shown that within our model the cold war stabilty was not the result of two opposite alliances but rather the existence of alliance induced exchange which neutralize the conflicting interactions within allies. It means that to have two alliances or jut one is qualitatively the same with respect to stability.

From this viewpoint the strong instabilies which resulted from the Warsow pact dissolution are given a simple explanation. Simultaneously some hints are obtained about possible policies to stabilize world nation relationships. Along this line, the importance of european construction was also underlined.

We have also given some ground to introduce non-rational behavior in country behaviors. especially with the notions of ”risky”, ”frustrated” or “neutral” actors. A ”risky” actor acts against his well defined interest while a ”frustrated” actor acts randomly since not having a well defined interest. .

At this stage, our model remains rather primitive. However it opens some new road to explore and to forecast international policies.

### Acknowledgments

I indebted to D. Stauffer for numerous comments and critical discussions on the manuscript.