# Causation and Physics

Abstract

Philosophical analyses of causation take many forms but one major difficulty they all aim to address is that of the spatio-temporal continuity between causes and their effects. Bertrand Russell in 1913 brought the problem to its most transparent form and made it a case against the notion of causation in physics. In this essay, I focus on this subject of causal continuity and its related issues in classical and quantum physics.

I. Introduction

II. Causal Connotations and David Hume’s Theory of Causation

III. Russell’s Objection to Hume’s Temporal Contiguity Thesis

IV. Causal Continuity and Recent Physicalist Accounts of Causation

V. Concluding Remarks

Acknowledgments

This essay is inspired by the kind invitation of the organizers, especially Professor Francesco de Martini, to speak at the III Adriatico Research Conference on Quantum Interferometry. I am indebted to my thesis advisor, Professor Nancy Cartwright for introducing me to this research and her constant inspiration. I am also thankful for the useful comments and encouragement received from Professors Miles Blencowe, Carl Hoefer, Drs. Joseph Berkovitz, Etienne Hofstetter and Makoto Itoh. Professor Yanhua Shih has suggested a number of important modifications for which I am very grateful, and for an important point brought to my attention by Professor Asher Peres during the discussion session that has opened new scope for my research, I extend to him my warm gratitude.

I. Introduction

Causation is an active area of philosophical research and it is one notion that is deeply entwined with the foundational aspects of both classical and quantum physics. One need not look far but only at the contributions to this volume that causation and its related concepts abound in physics today.

When asked, “What is Causation? What do we mean when we think that one object is the cause of another or one event causes another to happen?”, no doubt different connotations would immediately come to mind. And indeed we ought to ask “What are the connotations of causation?” These basic connotations, being largely empirical in character in the sense that they come from our experience and interactions with the physical world, generally receive different treatments by physicists and philosophers. The distinction is a matter of the difference in practice. Physicists accept these basic intuitions as facts about causation and physical theories are constructed to conform to these “conditions of causality”, which are not to be violated. A good example would be that of the “past-future” directed Minkowski light-cone structure defined in terms of “cause-effect” relations<sup>1</sup><sup>1</sup>1See for example, Taylor and Wheeler (1966), Spacetime Physics, p.39.. Philosophers, on the other hand, approach the subject from a different angle; they conduct conceptual analyses of these causal connotations and see whether they do make good logical sense or are infected with grave inconsistencies. With the advent of relativity theories, physics has added important items to the stock of causal facts. Perhaps the most significant one is that special relativity places a limit on the velocity of propagation of causal influences. For the serious philosophical minds, these results cannot afford to go unnoticed and it would indeed be of considerable interest to investigate the extent of the possible interplay between the findings from the respective disciplines.

With this motivation in mind, the plan of this essay is as follows. In part II, I shall consider a number of basic causal connotations and the various aspects that may be deduced from these considerations. We are then be placed in a position which leads naturally to a presentation of the main ideas of David Hume’s theory of causation. Hume’s theory is the start of the empiricist philosophical analysis that aims to capture our causal intuitions. The Humean account and its more modern variants collectively still represent the predominant philosophical view on causation. However, in a cleverly written paper in 1913, Bertrand Russell was able to show that the Humean view is not entirely free from inconsistencies given an important assumption on the nature of time. Russell’s argument will be examined carefully in Part III. Part IV focuses on the issue of causal continuity and the recent physicalist approaches to causation which attempt to resolve some of the more pressing difficulties associated with this issue. This will then be followed by a brief conclusion of the main points discussed and some speculative remarks in Part V.

To provide an overview of causation is well beyond the scope of this work but it is however my modest aim to bring into focus, in the following pages, some major philosophical worries on the subject which may be fairly regarded as one of the underlying puzzles encountered in the foundations of both classical and quantum physics.

II. Causal Connotations and David Hume’s Theory of Causation

When one event (or something<sup>2</sup><sup>2</sup>2What kind of entities does the causal relation relate is an important aspect of philosophical analyses of causation. Some argue that the “relata” should be events, while others insist that they may be facts, processes or states of affairs. However, as both Hume and Russell take events as the proper causal relata, we may therefore consider events in the present work.) is regarded as the cause of another, we have “postulated”<sup>3</sup><sup>3</sup>3Notice I have deliberately used the word “postulated” because it is only correct to remain philosophically neutral and avoid making undue assumptions from the outset. the existence of a special relation or connection between the two events. How special is it? We may want to emphasize the importance of such a connection by the expression that the event we have chosen to call the cause and the one that is called the effect are necessarily connected to each other so that had the cause not happened, the effect would not have happened either. Put slightly differently, this counterfactual mode of representation of the special connection refers to an element of necessity in the sense that given the cause, the effect “must” follow and any other situations just simply cannot and would not happen.

How then are we to discover this necessary connection, whatever it may be? One useful place to look is to start from our observations of how causes and effects behave generally. An obvious observation is that “causes precede their effects”; namely, causes occur earlier in time than their effects. One realises of course that not every pair of events happening at the same two respective instants of time are to be thought of as causes and effects. A concrete everyday example illustrates (Fig.1). Suppose we have two people, Angelo and Bianca, standing side-by-side in a room and Angelo who is nearer to the light switch turns it on and at the same moment in time, Bianca starts to sing. Even though both Angelo’s action and Bianca’s singing are both events happening prior to the lamp being lit up, we would deem it appropriate to attribute the cause of the lamp lighting to the switching action provided by Angelo but not to Bianca’s singing. Why? It is in part because a continuous physical connection is envisaged between the light switch and the lamp and there is in general no obvious and direct correlation between the processes of singing and the lamp lighting.

So temporal succession between two events alone is not a sufficient condition for causation. To place the matter in a more scientific perspective, consider the Minkowski lightcone in Fig.2. Events $`E_j`$ and $`E_k`$<sup>4</sup><sup>4</sup>4These are treated as simultaneous events - lying on the same hyperplane - but the argument would remain valid even if they do not. both lie in the future of the event $`E_i`$ and hence are causally connectible to $`E_i`$ since signals sent from $`E_j`$ can reach either $`E_j`$ or $`E_k`$. However, neither $`E_j`$ nor $`E_j`$ is necessarily connected to $`E_i`$ for there need not be an existing connection after all. Whether there is in fact an actual connection depends upon the existence of actual physical processes linking $`E_i`$ to $`E_j`$ and/or $`E_k`$. Therefore, temporal succession and the spatio-temporal continuity between the cause and effect provided by physical processes together seem necessary of causation.

Granted the physical connection between the light switch and the lamp, is this connection really necessary, in the sense that contrary situations are precluded from occurring? Unfortunately, the answer is in the negative. Although it takes an awfully short time for the electrical signal to travel from the light switch to the lamp, it is however always conceivable that an accident like a power cut may occur within this short time interval, as a result of which the lamp would fail to light up. It is therefore not necessarily the case that whenever the switch is turned on, the lamp must light up; this is only true if no other factors are to interfere.

Let us imagine instead the scenario where Bianca is the only person in the room and there is no light switch attached to the wall. We observe that when Bianca starts to sing the light comes on a split second later. On one mere instance of this observation, it would be reasonable to put it down as a case of sheer coincidence because we do not usually conceive of a possible (physical) connection between these two events. However, if such an observation is repeated many times and in each and every time, the same sequence obtains so that whenever Bianca starts to sing, the light comes on, then we would conclude that the occurrences of both events in close temporal succession are too regular to be discounted as pure chancy coincidences. And so from repeated observations of the regular succession of the two events, we find it proper and indeed justified to “infer” a special connection (Fig.3) between this pair of events and set out to search for the “hidden” mechanism that could have been responsible for giving rise to such a correlation.

The question remains: is such a connection we have so inferred upon repeated observations of regularities a necessary one? Although experience teaches us that frequent correlations are usually prima facie good indicators of causation, it is however well-known that correlations do not have to imply causation. Logic does not prohibit the apparent correlations we see as arising from pure chance. One may well imagine the world to be a chancy enterprise in such a way that “it so happens” that whenever $`E_1`$ occurs, $`E_2`$ follows later. Still, one may argue that quite unbeknown to us, there could exist some kind of a voice-recognition device which provides the physical connection between Bianca’s singing and the lighting up of the lamp. But what gives us the impression and prompts us to look for this “unknown device” in the first place? Nothing other than the constant conjunction of the two events of the singing and the lamp being lit - given the same cause, the same effect follows. Once again, such a physical connection is by no means necessary as for instance, a power cut may occur and tamper with the normal functioning of the device, thus rendering the succession of the two events unattainable.

Temporal succession of two events is not sufficient for causation. A case of causation is deemed to obtain when temporal succession is supplemented by the presence of a spatially and temporally continuous physical connection which provides the link between the two events in question. Similarly, the situation where the same cause has found to be followed by the same effect on a great number of occasions also gives us the feel of a causal correlation and induces us to look for an underlying connection. It is in this way that it is often thought that spatio-temporal continuous physical processes are essential for making sure that “the same cause is to be followed by the same effect”. Unforeseen circumstances may happen during the spatial and temporal course of this continuous physical process that frustrate the connection between the two events. Due to the absence of necessity, in the sense that unforeseen circumstances can always occur, it follows that there can never be any guarantee without fail that the same cause is to be followed by the same effect. This clearly indicates an incompatibility between these two causal connotations and that in reality, “the same cause is always followed by the same effect” is not warranted by spatio-temporal continuity. This is quite contrary to our ordinary way of thinking.

Spatially and temporally continuous physical processes, though they are by no means necessary connections (in a logical sense), do nevertheless impress upon us the idea of the existence of a causal relation. Such physical connections between two events may either be (i) direct or, (ii) indirect. In the latter case, we seek a third event $`C^{}`$ that existed in the overlap region of the respective past lightcones of the two events such that both events are direct consequences of $`C^{}`$. In this model, both events are effects of the common cause $`C^{}`$ (Fig.4). This illustrates nicely the appeal of hidden variable programs in the efforts to provide an explanation of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox. Special relativity rules out a direct physical connection between the two space-like separated measurement events. However, the existence of the remarkable correlations of the results of measurements calls urgently for an explanation. It is thus natural to look for possible common causes (hidden variables) in the past which may have given rise to these correlations. But, while such a procedure may satisfy one’s intellectual urge, logic permits a world in which these correlations are all there are; the empire of chance rules in such a manner that the correlations always obtain even without any underlying spatio-temporal continuous connection, be it direct or indirect. In fact, the significant achievement of Bell’s 1964 inequalities rests on their success in dispelling local hidden variable models in favour of quantum mechanics, as has since then been so forcibly confirmed by many sophisticated experiments.

In relation to the spatio-temporal continuity between causes and effects, another common connotation we have for causation is to suppose that a certain cause event has occurred but nevertheless the expected effect has somehow failed to materialize. Then we usually explain this by saying that other events must have got in-between them which inhibited the occurrence of the effect. In other words, the spatio-temporal continuity between the supposed cause and the supposed effect is disturbed. In order to diminish the opportunity for other events to get “in-between” and be mischievous, we want to make both the spatial and temporal intervals between the cause and the effect as short as possible. The shorter these intervals are, generally the smaller the probability for other factors to interfere. So, causes and effects are expected to be spatially and temporally close to each other, that is, they should exhibit a degree of spatio-temporal “nearness”. Remote factors are not immediate causes and it is in this way that causal continuity is to be so intimately bound up with the notion of locality. For events happening at vastly separated spacetime locations to be causally connected, we look for events to provide the intermediate links between these two spacetime locales; hence the idea of a “causal chain” to ensure causal continuity across spacetime regions.

The foregoing discussions now lead appropriately to the introduction of the major ideas of David Hume’s theory of causation, which exerted tremendous influence over the logical positivists and their contemporaries such as Bertrand Russell.

Hume maintains that there are two basic elements to human understanding that form the pillars to his philosophical system: impressions and ideas. Impressions correspond to all “lively signals” we receive from the physical world through our senses, like perceptions, sensations, feelings etc. Ideas, on the other hand, consist in the formation of a conception of impressions. The general principle he adopts for his philosophical analyses is that “all ideas originate from the association and combination of the different impressions”. That is to say, a certain idea we may have for something has to come from our experience through our senses.

Armed with this principle, he then asks from which impressions do we form the idea of cause-and-effect as some sort of a necessary connection? He is able to identify three such impressions from our empirical experience behaving like causes and effects. These are: “priority in time” of the cause , “constant conjunction” between the cause and effect and “contiguity” in space and time between the causes and effects. And these should be of some familiarity since they refer to none other than the three causal connotations we have considered in the above: causes precede their effects, given the same cause, the same effect follows and continuity respectively. But as we have already discussed, from these three properties and these three alone, one can never deduce the element of necessity. Hume argued that even though there may actually exist connections in the world which are necessary in some sense, beyond this the only real idea we can have of this connection is of the three properties above. Since these properties are not sufficient to entail necessity, philosophical prudence must now compel us to take a skeptical view of the idea of necessary connection between causes and effects.

Granted that our experience is incapable of furnishing us with the idea of a necessary causal connection, how are we able to associate the three impressions of causes and effects to arrive at the idea of a necessary connection between two events? Hume’s answer consists in the fact that after many instances of observing the behaviours of constant conjunction, priority in time and contiguity in time and space between the two events without exception, the mind has in the course grown accustomed to expect that a special connection does indeed exist between the two. This feeling of expectation then gives us the impression from which our idea of connection is copied. The idea is thus not from our experiences of the external world but comes rather from our own response to it. In a sense then the causal relation as a necessary connection is an idea “imposed” by the mind upon unfailing, successive observations of these regular behaviours of causes and effects. The three impressions of priority in time, constant conjunction and contiguity in time and space can never provide us with the idea of a necessary connection.

It must again be emphasized that it is never Hume’s intention to deny the existence of necessary connections in nature. Rather, that if the three impressions are all we have by way of the evidence for causal necessity, and since this evidence alone is not adequate for us to serve to reveal to us such an element of necessity, it would be more reasonable not to impose their existence on nature, leaving this instead as an open question. And Hume concludes<sup>5</sup><sup>5</sup>5David Hume, (1888), A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition (1978), with revised text and notes by P.H. Nidditch, Clarendon Press, Oxford. (THN),

“As to what may be said, that the operations of nature are independent of our thought and reasoning, I allow it; and accordingly have observed, that objects bear to each other the relations of contiguity and succession; that like objects may be observed in several instances to have like relations; and that all this is independent of, and antecedent to the operations of the understanding. But if we go any farther, and ascribe a power or necessary connection to these objects; this is what we can never observe in them, but must draw the idea from what we feel internally in contemplating them.” (THN, p.168-9)

III. Russell’s Objection to Hume’s Temporal Contiguity Thesis

In 1912, Russell made his presidential address<sup>6</sup><sup>6</sup>6Delivered on 4 November 1912. The ensuing essay was published in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 13 (1912-13) and reprinted in Russell, B. (1917), Mysticism and Logic, p.180-208, George Allen and Urwin. to the Aristotelian Society the occasion to cast doubt on the tenability of the Humean account of causation and to argue against the notion of cause in physics.

We have already taken pains to stress the inherent incompatibilities among the three causal impressions of priority in time, contiguity in space and time and constant conjunction. In particular, it has been indicated that given the absence of the ingredient of necessity, spatio-temporal continuity is not really capable of ensuring the constant conjunction of the causes and effects. The main reason for this is that even if there is a continuous spatio-temporal physical process connecting the cause and the effect, anything can still happen during the time interval when the causal influence is transmitted down the connection and this results in an uncertainty in the production of the effect. The light switch and the lamp in the last section form a good example. This is why events which are too removed from each other in both the spatial and temporal dimensions are not considered as reliable causes and effects.

An immediate solution would be to require that both the spatial and temporal distances between the two events be decreased to such an extent that they stand “adjacent” (or contiguous) to each other so that we may have the assurance that other factors cannot impose themselves and thwart the occurrence of the effect. But what exactly does one mean by two events being “adjacent” to each other when embedded in a background of spacetime continuum? The notion of spatial contiguity between two events is easily satisfied and in the limit it is met by the case where two events can occupy the same location when happening at different times. The notion of temporal contiguity is however more problematic since given that two events occur at the same spatial location with one after another, how are we to ensure that they are temporally contiguous to each other? So this problem reduces to one which concerns temporal contiguity and this is indeed the important issue addressed by Russell in his paper.

Russell’s argument begins with a statement of the temporal contiguity thesis (TC). The properties of priority in time and temporal contiguity between cause and effect can be summarised as follows:

TC: “Whenever the first event (cause) ceases to exist, the second comes into existence immediately after.”

To place TC in the correct perspective, Russell makes the major assumption that time is to be modeled as a mathematical continuum (MC) and is therefore considered as a dense series. A dense series has the distinctive feature that the notion of a “next point” does not make sense because between any two points there always exists others, no matter how close these two points are to each other. It is instructive to contrast the idea of a dense series such as the real number line with the discrete series of positive integers where the notion of consecutive (or “next”) members does take on a well-posed meaning. Having specified how the temporal continuum is to be represented, we now consider two point events $`c`$ and $`e`$ occurring at two respective instants of time $`t_1`$ and $`t_2`$ ($`t_1<t_2`$). Because time is a dense series, it follows that between any two instants (points) of time, there are always other instants (points) no matter how short we make the interval $`t_2t_1`$. That is, there is always a temporal gap between $`c`$ and $`e`$ and hence $`c`$ cannot be contiguous in time to $`e`$. Furthermore, this temporal gap provides ample opportunities for other events to creep in between $`c`$ and $`e`$ and to interfere. While these other factors may not prove harmful to the production of $`e`$ at $`t_2`$, they may however also behave otherwise and hinder the occurrence of $`e`$ (Fig.5). Under these circumstances, one cannot be certain that the same cause is always followed by the same effect since there can always be the chance of $`e`$ not occurring whenever there is to be this temporal gap between the two events.

In order to be rid of unsolicited factors, one must devise a means to ensure that the temporal gap is filled. An obvious way is to suppose the cause event as having a temporal dimension (Fig.6). The cause is now a static, unchanging event<sup>7</sup><sup>7</sup>7If a non-static, changing event such as one composed of a causal chain of discrete events as in Fig.5, then the problem of temporal gaps existing in-between these events within the causal chain remains., occupying the half-open interval, and is imagined to sit there from time $`t_1`$ to $`t_2`$, filling the temporal gap and all of a sudden, turns into $`e`$ at $`t_2`$. However, Russell objects strongly to such kinds of events: he argues that it is not at all logical why, being unchanging and sitting there complacently, $`c`$ has to turn into $`e`$ at $`t_2`$ and not at any other moments, say earlier at $`t_0`$ or later at $`t_3`$?

And so static, unchanging events are dismissed outright by Russell as an impossibility. Since these static, unchanging events which seem to be the only means by which the temporal gap can be occupied are not plausible, we must therefore draw the conclusion that there always exists a temporal gap between $`c`$ and $`e`$ so that $`c`$ cannot be contiguous to $`e`$. Our intuition about the temporal continuity of causes and effects comes under threat given the assumption of physical time as a mathematical continuum and constant conjunction cannot be guaranteed under such a circumstance. Russell has succeeded in showing that there exist tremendous tensions between our usual connotations of the causal relation.

VI. Causal Continuity and Recent Physicalist Accounts of Causation

Despite the difficulty brought to light by Russell’s critique of the Humean temporal contiguity thesis, one is, of course, allowed to argue that the major issue is really the definition of events as points occurring at discrete temporal instants within the temporal continuum. There is simply no place for the notion of discreteness with a temporal continuum. So, a more amicable approach would be to “superpose” a continuum of events - a continuous rope of events - upon this temporal continuum in the sense that we consider all the events that happen locally within this time interval. Here we focus more closely on the aspect of causal continuity by first considering this example from Elizabeth Anscombe<sup>8</sup><sup>8</sup>8Anscombe, E (1974), ”Times, Beginnings and Causes” in the Proceedings of the British Academy. Reprinted in G.E.M. Anscombe, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Mind, Collected Philosophical Papers Volume II, p.148-162. (1974, p.150): “Find an object here and ask how it comes to be there?” (Fig.7)

A causal explanation, says Anscombe, would be “it went along some path from A to B”. The locution “along some path” in fact entails more than the case where the object just turned up at location B after having been at A previously. It requires the object to occupy also all the intermediate positions between A and B. To satisfy constant conjunction, it is sufficient for the object to turn up at location B after having been at A some moments earlier and without having to assume the intermediate positions between the two locations. But this would not be deemed to be an adequate causal explanation. And to “explain causally”, a path has to be imposed to provide the connection between the two events of the object being at the two respective spacetime locations. For the purpose of explanation, it is therefore proper to consider spatio-temporal continuous connections when thinking about causation.

In physics, the notion of continuity is usually either represented by spatially and temporally continuous paths or by trajectories in phase space. These spacetime paths and phase space trajectories are in turn the solutions of differential and integral equations. Recalling the fact that while these differential and integral equations guarantee continuity, they however lack the crucial causal aspect of an explicit temporal order for cause and effect.

The pressing question which must now occupy us is how we may introduce a temporal order into a theory of causation which takes seriously the view that spatio- temporal continuous physical processes, as represented by the equations of physics, provide for us the appropriate causal connections.

We find a clue in the following consideration of the Minkowski lightcone (Fig.8),

Does it make sense to assign a temporal direction from the past to future as directing from the lower-half of the lightcone towards the upper-half and not vice versa? In other words, does it make any sense to provide the worldline as going through the worldpoints A , B with an arrow and to assert that B is before P and A after P? Einstein asks in 1949<sup>9</sup><sup>9</sup>9Einstein A (1949), “Reply to Criticisms” in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, p.687-688, The Library of Living Philosophers Volume VII, Edited by P.A. Schilpp, Open Court., “Is what remains of temporal connection between world-points in the theory of relativity an asymmetrical relation, or would one be just as much justified, from the physical point of view, to indicate the arrow in the opposite direction and to assert that A is before P, B after P?” Physics has a ready reply to this. The “temporal arrow” is secured by the observations of irreversible processes in nature despite the much advertised time- symmetrical character of the laws of physics. These processes are believed to be ultimately related to the growth of entropy in the universe. The “past-future” direction of the lightcone may equally well be defined in terms of either the direction of the cause-effect relation or that of irreversible processes. This suggests that the causal direction may indeed be identified with the direction of irreversible processes. Or put differently, a cause can be considered as an event which introduces a “change” which is irreversible.

The idea of a cause as an irreversible change forms the backbone of the physicalist theories of causation. Although there are variations amongst the theories of physical causation that have been put forward, they nevertheless share one basic underlying idea: causal continuity is guaranteed by the transmission of causal influences (objective physical quantities) along continuous space-time paths governed by physical laws. The “objective physical quantities” being transferred refer usually to either momentum or energy in the class of approaches subsumed under the title of “transference theories of causation”. A slightly more sophisticated version is the so-called “process-theory” of Wesley Salmon<sup>10</sup><sup>10</sup>10Salmon, W C (1984), Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World, Princeton University Press.; there it refers to the transmission of marks with the marks being changes that have resulted from irreversible physical interactions.

Interactions are responsible for bringing about or producing the irreversible changes. To cast this concept in a better context, consider the simple case of one mass in motion colliding with another which is initially at rest, subsequently setting the second into motion (Fig.9).

The same state of affairs can be described by two different causal stories. In the rest frame of m the moving mass M travelling with velocity v appears to be the earlier event - the cause which is responsible for the change of states of both masses. On the other hand, in the rest frame of M, the earlier event of m moving with velocity -v is now regarded as the cause giving rise to the subsequent change of motion of both masses. Hence, we find ourselves confronted by two different causal stories whose accuracies depend on the frame of reference in which the same state of affairs is viewed. The objective matter-of-fact is however that for all inertial frames of reference, the “collision” between M and m produces the subsequent “changes” of motion of each of the masses. It is important to realise that the collision occurs in all frames of reference and after which is to be followed by changes in motions of these masses. It is indeed by this very means that an objective temporal order may indeed be established. Because of this “causal interaction” between the masses M and m, their respective energies and momenta are correlatively modified accordingly. Both masses, having interacted, will carry the causally modified dynamical properties via their continuous spatio-temporal trajectories and may participate in further interactions (Fig.10).

This picture of causation, central to the physicalist approaches, must be modified when it is carried over to the quantum regime. There, the idea of a physical system following strict continuous trajectories has long evaporated and in its place stands instead a series of discrete points corresponding to specific measurement events performed on the system. The inherent probabilistic nature of the quantum world involving interference does not sanction any definite interpolation between these points. Measurement is after all a kind of interaction between the system and the measuring apparatus that brings about an irreversible change to both.

Even though one may now find the notion of continuity dubious in this domain, the concept of causal interaction survives seemingly unscathed in the face of probabilistic indeterminism. In-between measurements, the system is described by the continuous evolution of the wavefunction as governed by the Schrödinger equation. However, this continuous evolution refers only to a distribution of the different probabilities of obtaining various outcomes of the measurements of a certain dynamical observable. It does not represent an evolution of the successive dynamical values as “possessed” by the system in time as in the classical case. Quantum mechanically, the very act of measurements brings about irreversible changes of the state of a physical system and so interactions can be thought of as the cause as a result of which the probability distributions of the values of dynamical observables are altered. This is similar to the picture suggested independently by Rudolf Haag<sup>11</sup><sup>11</sup>11See, for example, Haag, R (1990), “Fundamental Irreversibility and the Concept of Events”, Commun. Math. Phys., 132, p.245-251. in a series of papers which take the view that in the regime of low density, quantum field theory describes a world where events are the collision processes between particles and the particles themselves provide the causal tie, i.e., the causal connection carrying the modified dynamical structure.

V. Concluding Remarks

Scientists seek causes for the purpose of providing scientific explanations. It is often regarded that effects follow necessarily from causes. Indeed, it is the major contribution of Hume’s theory of causation to show that this is where we err and the inference from causes to effects is not deductive but rather inductive in nature. This immediately calls into question the idea of a necessary connection which is thought to be the vital element of causal relations. Russell went further and showed that there clearly exist inconsistencies when we consider the causal relation as one between events happening at discrete temporal intervals superposed upon the temporal continuum.

Advocates of the class of the so-called physicalist approaches to causation provide a promising framework for a theory of physical causation in the face of Hume’s and Russell’s problems. The problematic “temporal gap” in Russell’s analysis is closed by the consideration of a continuum of events so that the temporal continuum can be matched by the spatio-temporal continuous character of physical processes. Causes, in these accounts, are interactions which bring about irreversible changes from which a causal order can be defined. This picture works well in the domain of classical physics and requires appropriate modifications when applied to the quantum regime.

Perhaps I should now leave the reader with the following thought. The most startling case for causation is that of spontaneous decay where an atom sits there for a while and then undergoes decay. These are conceived to be “uncaused” events by most philosophers because the time when the atom is to decay cannot be known with exactitude. Might the nucleus resemble Russell’s “static, unchanging” event<sup>12</sup><sup>12</sup>12It has been kindly pointed out to me by Professor Morton Rubin that the atom is not really “unchanging” in Russell’s sense: previous interactions with the vacuum must be present in order to ”prepare” the nucleus in an unstable state in the first place. However, I would argue that this does not weaken the thrust of Russell’s argument, namely that even given that we have a changing event, how might one explain how the atom comes to decide at which exact moment in time it should undergo decay?, sitting there for a period of time and suddenly undergoing decay? Recalling that the major assumption that Russell makes is that time is to be viewed as a mathematical continuum, it would be a most interesting investigation to see whether adopting instead a picture of time as discrete units will shed different light on this problem. Once again, this illustrates how deeply the notion of causation is connected with the very nature of space and time.