# Measurability and Computability

## Abstract

The conceptual relation between the measurability of quantum mechanical observables and the computability of numerical functions is re-examined. A new formulation is given for the notion of measurability with finite precision in order to reconcile the conflict alleged by M. A. Nielsen \[Phys. Rev. Lett. 79, 2915 (1997)\] that the measurability of a certain observable contradicts the Church-Turing thesis. It is argued that any function computable by a quantum algorithm is a recursive function obeying the Church-Turing thesis, whereas any observable can be measured in principle.

In the theory of quantum computing , the process of computation consists of the preparation of the computing machine, the unitary evolution, and the measurement so that the mathematical notion of computation is intrinsically related to the notion of measurement in quantum mechanics. Since the Church-Turing thesis  defines the notion of computable functions independent of the notion of measurement of quantum mechanical observables, it is an interesting problem to examine whether or not those two notions lead to a conflict. Recently, Nielsen  argued that the measurability of a certain quantum mechanical observable, called the halting observable, leads to the computability of a noncomputable function and concluded that either the Church-Turing thesis needs revision or that only a restricted class of observables may be realized, in principle, as measurements. The purpose of this Letter is to re-examine Nielsen’s argument and to establish a precise conceptual relation between the measurability of observables and the computability of functions.

It can be pointed out that Nielsen’s formulation of the measurability of observables does not respect sufficiently the fact that every measuring apparatus has only finite precision as long as it can be constructed in a laboratory or it is finitely realizable. A new formulation will be given for the measurability with finite precision from this point of view. The measurability of an observable is defined naturally based on this concept. Under this formulation, it is proved that the halting observable is measurable, contrary to Nielsen’s argument, without any contradiction with the Church-Turing thesis. Thus, Nielsen’s argument is not acceptable. It will be also argued that any function computable by a quantum algorithm is a computable function obeying the Church-Turing thesis from a proof theoretical point of view due to Church .

Using a noncomputable function $`h(x)`$, called the halting function , Nielsen has defined the halting observable $`\widehat{h}`$ by

$$\widehat{h}=\underset{x=0}{\overset{\mathrm{}}{}}h(x)|xx|,$$
(1)   
where $`\{|xx=0,1,\mathrm{}\}`$ is an orthonormal basis for the state space of some physical system. It is assumed that all the states $`|x`$ may be prepared, in principle.

His argument runs as follows. Suppose that it is possible to construct a measuring device to measure the observable $`\widehat{h}`$. Then one performs the following procedure: Construct the measuring apparatus to measure $`\widehat{h}`$, prepare the system in the state $`|x`$, and perform the measurement. With probability one the outcome of the measurement will be $`h(x)`$. This gives a procedure for computing the halting function. If one accept the Church-Turing thesis, this is not an acceptable conclusion, since the halting function is not computable.

Nielsen rephrases the measurability of an observable by the existence of a realizable measurement. However, every realizable measurement is limited with a finite precision and hence the correspondence between observables and measurements are not one-to-one; an observable can be measured with various precisions and a measuring apparatus measures many observables in a given error limit. It follows that the notion of measurability should respect correctly the fact that every realizable measurement has a finite precision.

We define the measurability of an observable as follows .

Suppose that a measuring apparatus operates on a system in states $`|\psi _i`$ with $`i=1,\mathrm{},N`$ where $`N`$ is an arbitrary finite integer and let $`a_i`$ be the experimentally determined average value of the outcomes of the apparatus in the state $`|\psi _i`$ with the error $`ϵ_i`$. We say that this measuring apparatus measures an observable $`A`$ (with its own error limit) if

$$|\psi _i|A|\psi _ia_i|<ϵ_i$$
(2)   
for all $`i=1,\mathrm{},N`$. If such a measuring apparatus exists, the observable $`A`$ is said to be measurable with precision $`\{(|\psi _i,ϵ_i)|i=1,\mathrm{},N\}`$. If this is the case for arbitrarily given $`\{(|\psi _i,ϵ_i)|i=1,\mathrm{},N\}`$, the observable $`A`$ is said to be measurable. Here, we assume that all $`|\psi _i`$ are chosen from the domain of $`A`$. 

Now, according to the above definition, we have the following

Theorem:  Let $`A_1,A_2,\mathrm{}`$ be a sequence of bounded measurable observables. If an observable $`A`$ is the limit of $`A_1,A_2,\mathrm{}`$ in the sense that we have

$$\underset{n\mathrm{}}{lim}\psi |A_n|\psi =\psi |A|\psi $$
(3)   
for all states $`|\psi `$ in the domain of $`A`$, then $`A`$ is measurable .

The proof runs as follows. For all $`i=1,\mathrm{},N`$, let $`|\psi _i`$ be an arbitrary state in the domain of $`A`$, let $`ϵ_i`$ be an arbitrary positive number. From (3) there is a number $`\nu `$ such that

$$|\psi _i|A_\nu |\psi _i\psi _i|A|\psi _i|<\frac{ϵ_i}{2}$$
(4)   
for all $`i=1,\mathrm{},N`$. Since $`A_\nu `$ is measurable, there exists a measuring apparatus with the average outcomes $`a_i`$ and the errors $`ϵ_i/2`$ in the states $`|\psi _i`$ satisfying

$$|\psi _i|A_\nu |\psi _ia_i|<\frac{ϵ_i}{2}.$$
(5)   
From (4) and (5) we have

$$|\psi _i|A|\psi _ia_i|<ϵ_i.$$
(6)   
It follows that the above measuring apparatus measures $`A`$ with precision $`\{(|\psi _i,ϵ_i)|i=1,\mathrm{},N\}`$. Since this precision is arbitrarily given, we conclude that $`A`$ is measurable.

Note that an observable on a finite dimensional state space may have a measuring apparatus with absolute precision if it is measurable, but it is not the case in general.

In order to prove the measurability of the halting observable, we shall first note that there is no conflict between the computability of functions essentially defined on a finite set and the measurability of corresponding observables.

For any natural number $`n`$ the truncated function $`h_n`$ is defined by

$$h_n(x)\{\begin{array}{cc}h(x)\hfill & \text{if }x<n\text{;}\hfill \\ 0\hfill & \text{if }xn\text{.}\hfill \end{array}$$
(7)   
Every integer-valued function defined on a finite set is computable, and hence the function $`h_n`$ is computable, since its computation consists of the decision of the inequality $`x<n`$ and computing the function $`h(x)`$ restricted to the finite set $`\{0,\mathrm{},n1\}`$. Thus, every $`h_n`$ is computable. Note that $`lim_n\mathrm{}h_n(x)=h(x)`$ whereas $`h`$ is not computable; the limit of a sequence of computable functions is not necessarily computable.

The corresponding truncated observable $`\widehat{h}_n`$ is given by

$$\widehat{h}_n=\underset{x=0}{\overset{n1}{}}h(x)|xx|.$$
(8)   
We can show the measurability of $`\widehat{h}_n`$ as follows. For any positive integer $`n`$, define an observable $`\widehat{N}_n`$ by

$$\widehat{N}_n=\underset{x=0}{\overset{n1}{}}x|xx|.$$
(9)   
Since it is assumed that every state $`|x`$ may be prepared, we can take it for granted that every observable $`|xx|`$ can be measured with arbitrary precision; otherwise, we cannot know that the state $`|x`$ can be prepared. It follows that finitely many observables $`|xx|`$ with $`x=0,\mathrm{},n1`$ can be measured simultaneously with arbitrary precision, and hence we can conclude that the observable $`\widehat{N}_n`$ is measurable.

In order to measure $`\widehat{h}_n`$, we need only to measure $`\widehat{N}_n`$ first and to send the outcome to a computing machine to compute the function $`h_n`$. Thus, the observable $`\widehat{h}_n`$ is measurable.

In order to show the measurability of $`\widehat{h}`$, it suffices to show that for any state $`|\psi `$ in the domain of $`\widehat{h}`$ we have

$$\underset{n\mathrm{}}{lim}\psi |\widehat{h}_n|\psi =\psi |\widehat{h}|\psi .$$
(10)   
By expanding $`|\psi =_{x=0}^{\mathrm{}}c_x|x`$, we have

$$|\psi |\widehat{h}|\psi \psi |\widehat{h}_n|\psi |\underset{x=n}{\overset{\mathrm{}}{}}|c_x|^20$$
(11)   
as $`n\mathrm{}`$ and hence (10) follows. Thus, we conclude that the halting observable $`\widehat{h}`$ is measurable.

Nielsen’s argument intrinsically concludes that there is no single measuring apparatus which measures $`\widehat{h}`$ with absolute precision under the Church-Turing thesis. However, this conclusion is not surprising because almost every observable of infinite rank has no single measuring apparatus to measure it with absolute precision.

In order to prepare for this point, Nielsen also gave another argument which takes approximate measurements into account. His second argument runs as follows. Suppose that it is possible to measure an observable $`\widehat{h}^{}`$ which is close to $`\widehat{h}`$. Preparing the system in the state $`|x`$ and measuring $`\widehat{h}^{}`$, a result in the range $`h(x)\pm \delta `$ is obtained with probability at least $`1ϵ`$, for some small $`ϵ`$ and $`\delta `$. Clearly, by performing measurements of this type many times it is possible to determine $`h(x)`$ with arbitrary high confidence. Thus, approximate measurements of $`\widehat{h}`$ give an algorithmic means for computing $`h(x)`$.

In Nielsen’s second argument, it is assumed that $`ϵ`$ and $`\delta `$ do not depend on $`x`$. However, if $`\delta `$ were dependent on $`x`$ and if $`\delta =\delta (x)`$ were not bounded in $`x`$, we could not conclude that the repetition of measurements of that type can determine $`h(x)`$. In most cases, a measuring apparatus realizable in the laboratory is a device for approximate measurement for which the measurement accuracy is dependent on and unbounded in the input states, so that the noise can be specified well only for the finite number of input states as formulated by (2). Hence the repeated use of that device cannot determine the true values for all input states $`|x`$. Thus, Nielsen’s second argument excludes more common type of approximate measurements.

In general, in order to approach the precise measurement of a given observable we need to use an infinite sequence of measuring apparatuses with more and more stringent precisions. Only if there is an algorithmic mean to produce the sequence of (mathematical models of) such measurements, the sequence of measurements with finite precision can incorporate with the quantum computation. For instance, the sequence of precise measurements of $`\widehat{h}_n`$ approaches the precise measurement of $`\widehat{h}`$, but there is no algorithmic mean to produce the sequence $`\widehat{h}_n`$; otherwise the halting function $`h`$ could be computable. Thus, even the infinite sequence of precise measurements of $`\widehat{h}_n`$ does not serve as an algorithmic mean for computing $`h(x)`$.

The difference between measurability and computability can be illustrated more clearly by measurements of physical constants where no essential distinction between quantum and classical measurements takes place. Physical constants can be regarded, if the unit system is fixed, as an observable of the simplest type such that every state is its eigenstate.

Every rational numbers can be represented as a ratio of two integers so that it can be measured with absolute precision by a finitary method. A real number is defined to be a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers $`a_1,a_2,\mathrm{}`$. Since every $`a_n`$ can be measured with absolute precision, it follows from Theorem that every real number is measurable.

On the other hand, a real number is computable if and only if the function $`na_n`$ from a natural number $`n`$ to the rational number $`a_n`$ is computable, where $`\{a_n\}`$ is a Cauchy sequence of rational numbers representing $`a`$. That is, every Cauchy sequence corresponds to a real number and every computable Cauchy sequence corresponds to a computable real number. Some irrational numbers such as $`\sqrt{2}`$, $`\pi `$, and $`e`$ have algorithms for producing sequences of irrational numbers converging them and hence they are computable .

Is the value of the Planck constant in the standard unit system computable? We know no algorithm to compute the Planck constant and we do not believe in such an algorithm. In fact, the cardinality of the set of computable numbers is countable infinite and has Lebesgue measure 0, so that an arbitrarily given real number from an interval is computable with probability 0. Thus, the Planck constant is measurable but almost surely not computable, since the given unit system is defined rather arbitrarily based on the circumference of the earth, for example.

According to the Church-Turing thesis, the computability is defined through computing machines which obey classical mechanics. Hence, it might be thought that quantum mechanical computing can circumvent the Church-Turing thesis.

Deutsch discussed this problem and concluded that the class of functions computable by quantum Turing machines is the class of recursive functions. However, his argument appears to be too restrictive to settle the problem. Since his argument is based on the equivalence between deterministic quantum Turing machines and reversible Turing machines , his argument excludes the probabilistic quantum algorithms such as Monte Carlo type algorithms and Las Vegas type algorithms.

In what follows, we shall argue that every quantum algorithm still does not contradict the Church-Turing thesis.

It is obvious that every recursive function is considered to be computable. Church  explained two reasons why the converse can be considered to be true. The first one of them cannot apply directly to quantum computing, since it assumes that every algorithm should be represented by a sequence of expressions. However, the second one is more general and runs as follows.

A function $`y=f(x)`$ of the natural numbers is said to be representable in a formal system including the arithmetic, if there is a formula $`\varphi (x,y)`$ in that system such that for any natural numbers $`m,n`$ and the symbols $`\mu ,\nu `$ in that system representing $`m,n`$ respectively, if $`m=f(n)`$ then the formula $`\varphi (\mu ,\nu )`$ is provable and if $`mf(n)`$ then the negation of $`\varphi (\mu ,\nu )`$ is provable. Then, it is well-known that if the system is consistent, the class of representable functions coincides with the class of recursive functions. Church mentioned this fact as one of two grounds of his thesis. Although the Church-Turing thesis does not define the notion of algorithm explicitly, the above fact suggests implicitly a condition that every algorithm should satisfy.

It is plausible that any quantum algorithm $`𝒬`$ is associated with a mathematical proof to justify that $`𝒬`$ computes some function $`f`$. Since a quantum algorithm depends on the theory of Hilbert spaces and operators, the proof may use theorems in much wider fields than pure arithmetic, but they can be formalized in the Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC), an axiomatic foundation of the current mathematics. Then, we require that any quantum algorithm can be expressed by a numeralwise provable formula in the following sense: By the formalization of the quantum algorithm $`𝒬`$ and its proof in ZFC we can construct a formula $`\varphi (x,y)`$ in ZFC such that if $`m=f(n)`$ then $`\varphi (\mu ,\nu )`$ is provable and if $`mf(n)`$ then the negation of $`\varphi (\mu ,\nu )`$ is provable . If this is the case, the function $`f`$ is representable by $`\varphi (x,y)`$ in ZFC so that $`f`$ is a recursive function. Thus, we can conclude that every function $`f`$ computable by a quantum algorithm is a recursive function. Nielsen’s procedure is proved to compute the halting function $`h`$, but the procedure cannot be expressed by a numeralwise provable formula, since $`h`$ is not representable unless ZFC is inconsistent. Hence, Nielsen’s procedure cannot be considered as a quantum algorithm .

Currently, quantum algorithms are represented by quantum Turing machines  or quantum circuit families . Since a quantum Turing machine has a tape with infinite length, it cannot be considered as a finitely realizable physical system, but as an infinite sequence of finitely realizable physical systems.

For a computing process using a quantum Turing machine to be a quantum algorithm, it is necessary that the quantum transition function, or the matrix elements of the time evolution unitary operator in the computational basis, has values in the computable complex numbers. In this case, every function computable by a quantum Turing machine is a recursive function.

On the other hand, quantum circuits have only a finite dimensional state space, and hence a quantum algorithm to compute a numerical function with arbitrarily large inputs is represented by a family $`\{𝒬_n\}`$ of quantum circuits of the arbitrary input length $`n`$. The computing performed by a quantum circuit family is a quantum algorithm if and only if the matrix elements $`x|U_n|x^{}`$ in the computational basis of the unitary operator $`U_n`$ representing each quantum circuit $`𝒬_n`$ are computable complex numbers computable in $`x,x^{},n`$. Such a quantum circuit family is called a uniform quantum circuit family . In this case, it can be concluded that every function computable by a uniform quantum circuit family is a recursive function. Shor’s algorithms for discrete logarithm and factorization are considered to be represented by uniform quantum circuit families .

Computer science treats two levels of computability: the computability defined by the Church-Turing thesis and the efficient computability formalized in the computational complexity theory. Accordingly, the physics of computing has the following four levels of reality of the physical entities.

(1) Experimental reality represented by finitely realizable objects such as rational numbers, finite dimensional rational matrices, and measuring devices.

(2) Efficiently computable reality represented by a polynomial time computable sequence of finitely realizable objects such as polynomial time computable real numbers, discrete Fourier transforms, and Shor’s algorithm.

(3) Computational reality represented by a constructive sequence of finitely realizable objects such as computable real numbers, quantum Turing machines, uniform quantum circuit families.

(4) Mathematical reality represented by a Cauchy sequence of finitely realizable objects such as real numbers, observables, and states.

Mathematics represents infinity by a finite length formula with a finitarily decidable grammar, because of the limitation of our ability of reading the formula. Physics has the same footing as mathematics in the experimental level by the limitation of our ability of reading the scale of the meter. Thus, physics also represents infinity by a finite length mathematical formula. According to this constraint, any computation of an infinite function and any observable of infinite rank have no experimental reality and need a help from the rules of the language. This justifies our requirement that a quantum algorithm can be expressed by a numeralwise provable formula in a formal language. From this, we have shown that any function computable by a quantum algorithm is a recursive function, whereas any observable is measurable .

I thank Horace Yuen for stimulating discussions on this paper.