# Question
Title: Is there scientific evidence on the benefits of binaural beats?
When two coherent sounds with nearly similar frequencies are presented to each ear respectively with stereo headphones, the brain integrates the two signals and produces a sensation of a third sound called **binaural beat**.

I tried to google, but a lot looks like fake evidences and not having any scientific evidences. **What is the evidence for binaural beat music producing different cognitive and/or neural effects as compared to non-binaural beat music?**

# Answer
Since I was asked in **chat** about binaural beats, and have been posed this question a number of times before besides, I looked into the most recent literature using Google Scholar for the single term "binaural beats" and restricted my search to papers published between 2010-2015. For convenience, this is the definition of a binaural beat I will use.

> *When two coherent sounds with nearly similar frequencies are presented to each ear respectively with stereo headphones, the brain integrates the two signals and produces a sensation of a third sound called **binaural beat** (BB).* — Gao et al., 2014.

## State of the evidence

Broadly speaking, some research on binaural beats does exist, but the evidence presented in the studies I examined is by and large negative, inconclusive or statistically underpowered with respect to the efficacy of binaural beats' ability to improve cognition, and to whether it is even processed differently from acoustic beats at all.

Much of the research that does exist seems to be published in journals whose credibility I cannot vouch for, and this answer should therefore be taken for what it is: a cursory review of the best literature I could find, not as scientific fact.

> **Are binaural beats processed differently?**
>
> > *"The perceptions of binaural beats involve cortical activity that is not different than acoustic beats in distribution and in the effects of beat- and base frequency, indicating similar cortical processing."* — Pratt et al., 2010.
>
> **Do binaural beats entrain brain waves?**
>
> > *"We observed RP increase in theta and alpha bands and decrease in beta band during delta and alpha BB stimulations. RP decreased in beta band during theta BB, while RP decreased in theta band during beta BB. However, no clear brainwave entrainment effect was identified. Connectivity changes were detected following the variation of RP during BB stimulations. Our observation supports the hypothesis that BBs could affect functional brain connectivity, suggesting that the mechanism of BB–brain interaction is worth further study."* — Gao et al., 2014.
>
> **Do binaural beats induce a frequency following effect?**
>
> > *"Analysis of changes in broad-band and narrow-band amplitudes, and frequency showed no effect of binaural beat frequency eliciting a frequency following effect in the EEG."* — Vernon et al., 2011.

Note: RP = Relative Power; BB = Binaural Beats

## Concluding remarks

**What evidence exists is mixed and, at best, inconclusive.** Based on this, I will tentatively say that it appears the claims put forward by many commercial binaural beats companies, while theoretically plausible in some sense, **are not empirically supported in the literature.**

Therefore, the most prudent position for a **consumer** to adopt seems to be that **binaural beat music is as preferable, but no more preferable than acoustic beat music**. For researchers, of course, binaural beats remains theoretically interesting.

## References

* Gao, X., Cao, H., Ming, D., Qi, H., Wang, X., Wang, X., ... & Zhou, P. (2014). Analysis of EEG activity in response to binaural beats with different frequencies. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 94(3), 399-406.
* Pratt, H., Starr, A., Michalewski, H. J., Dimitrijevic, A., Bleich, N., & Mittelman, N. (2010). A comparison of auditory evoked potentials to acoustic beats and to binaural beats. Hearing research, 262(1), 34-44.
* Vernon, D., Peryer, G., Louch, J., & Shaw, M. (2014). Tracking EEG changes in response to alpha and beta binaural beats. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 93(1), 134-139.
> 28 votes

# Answer
There is very little controlled, modern research on binaural beats. I could only find one source, referenced below, from the late nineties (although there are a few other, more recent non-experimental "pilot studies"). According to their study, "presentation of beta-frequency binaural beats yielded more correct target detections and fewer false alarms than presentation of theta/delta frequency binaural beats. In addition, the beta-frequency beats were associated with less negative mood."

It should be noted, however, that this study is comparing performance with beta BB to performance with theta/delta BB, not performance with BB to performance without BB. (Apparently there was a condition with "pure tones", but it isn't mentioned in any of the analysis.)

Binaural Auditory Beats Affect Vigilance Performance and Mood. James D Lane, Stefan J Kasian, Justine E Owens, , Gail R Marsh. Physiology & Behavior Volume 63, Issue 2, January 1998, Pages 249–252. DOI: 10.1016/S0031-9384(97)00436-8
> 11 votes

# Answer
From "Binaural Auditory Beats Affect Vigilance Performance and Mood":

> Participants (n = 29) performed a 30-min visual vigilance task on three different days while listening to pink noise containing simple tones or binaural beats either in the beta range (16 and 24 Hz) or the theta/delta range (1.5 and 4 Hz). However, participants were kept blind to the presence of binaural beats to control expectation effects. Presentation of **beta-frequency binaural beats yielded more correct target detections** and fewer false alarms than presentation of theta/delta frequency binaural beats. In addition, the **beta-frequency beats were associated with less negative mood**. Results suggest that the presentation of binaural auditory beats can affect psychomotor performance and mood.

But I also found this: "Tracking EEG changes in response to alpha and beta binaural beats", saying

> Analysis of changes in broad-band and narrow-band amplitudes, and frequency showed no effect of binaural beat frequency eliciting a frequency following effect in the EEG.

And finally Analysis of EEG activity in response to binaural beats with different frequencies

> We observed Realtive Power (RP) increase in theta and alpha bands and decrease in beta band during delta and alpha Binraul Beats (BB) stimulations. RP decreased in beta band during theta BB, while RP decreased in theta band during beta BB. However, **no clear brainwave entrainment** effect was identified. **Connectivity changes were detected following the variation of RP during BB stimulations**. Our observation supports the hypothesis that **BBs could affect functional brain connectivity**, suggesting that the mechanism of BB–brain interaction is worth further study.

Another proof for effect of binaural beats is shown here

The Induced Rhythmic Oscillations of Neural Activity in the Human Brain

> The effects of different induced extremely low frequency (ELF) electromagnetic field, audio (binaural-beat), visual (light flashes) and combination of audio and visual rhythms at the various electroencephalographic (EEG) rhythms were investigated. These experimental findings suggest that EEG activity under exposure to EMF 0.174mT (8.33Hz) sinusoidal low intensity EMF exhibited **a substantial decrease in delta and theta bands** and prove that there is a slight transition from beta to alpha band from beta-alpha ratio calculations of the Energy Spectral Density. **During the visual and audio visual stimulation at alpha rhythms (i.e. 13-7.5Hz) a possible entrainment on overall EEG activity was elicited by substantial increase and decrease in spectral energy levels.**

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I'd like to add a reference about the scientific effects of binaural beats in the brain:

**Auditory Beats in the Brain**;

a transcript of the orginal paper by Gerald Oster, Scientific American, October 1973 (scanned original attached):

**Slow modulations called binaural beats are perceived when tones of different frequency are presented separately to each ear.**

*The sensation may show how certain sounds are processed in the brain. If two tuning forks of slightly different pitch are struck simultaneously, the resulting sound waxes and wanes periodically. The modulations are referred to as beats; their frequency is equal to the difference between the frequencies of the two original tones.*

*Binaural beats have been widely regarded as a mere curiosity. A recent textbook on hearing does not mention them at all. Yet the measurement of binaural beats can explain the processes by which sounds are located -- a crucial aspect of perception. It is possible that hormonally induced physiological behavior changes may be made apparent by measuring the binaural-beat spectrum.*

With the last sentence, Oster proposes an real application of binaural beats!

Additionally, the transcripter mentions the main points at the beginning of the pdf:

A few interesting things from the article to note:

1. Oster’s idea was to use the perception of binaural beats as a diagnostic tool because some people are unable to perceive and respond to them. Oster never mentions brainwaves or entrainment as a function of binaural beats. This is interesting since nearly every company advertising bina ural beats claims Oster invented binaural beat brainwave entrainment.
2. People with certain neurological conditions, or at certain times of the month (women), vary in their ability to perceive and respond to binaural beats. There is also a ge nder difference in the abilit y to process the beats.
3. Binaural beats only form if the two tones are separated by less than 26 Hz, 30 at most. This maximum declines as the carrier moves away from 440 Hz. Also, binaural beats wane completely past a carrier 1000 Hz.
4. According to Oster, the depth of binaural beats is very small (3dB). In a test comparison, monaural beats produced a much larger neural response. This seems to follow in line with the research done by David Seiver (Comptronic devices), Transparent Corp and others in regards to monaural and isochronic tones producing stronger entrainment.
> 5 votes

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Tags: cognitive-neuroscience, hearing, binaural-beats
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# Question
Title: If a human brain would be placed inside that of an animal: Could it talk?
**Assumption:** *Animals can't talk 'human' because of their small(er) brain.*

Perhaps a strange thought, but I was really wondering: If we could place a human brain inside that of an animal: Would we be able to speak 'human', instead of 'animal'?

# Answer
> 2 votes
Can dumb human beings speak? No. But can they communicate using *human language*? Of course!

Maybe this question can be answered if we stop thinking about "talking" as speaking our own native tongue.

### If a human level intelligence existed in a non-human body, it would certainly develop a language to communicate with other members of its species.

The fact that this language would very probably be unlike any human language we know is irrelevant. Morse code or just simple writing is totally unlike any spoken language we know, yet it is still language, only encoded in a different register.

But if we actually transplanted a human brain into a dolphin or bird or money, whould it speak? Sure. Many birds can mimic the sounds of human languages. And if the specific animal lacked the organs to voice human words, it would either develop a system of speech that fit its larynx or press the keys on a keyboard with its beak like Stephen Hawkings (who, while he cannot speak, is certainly capable of language and communication).

In short, it is not the body that enables a being to speak, but the linguistic faculty of its mind. A language that fits the body is easily created.

# Answer
> 5 votes
Part of what makes speech possible is a complex set of interactions between a number of different muscles that control aspects of producing speech sounds like airflow and mouth shape. Humans are unique in the complexity of the sounds that we can produce. Even if we granted the science-fiction that would be necessary to put a human brain into a chimpanzee and somehow managed to reconnect the analogous neural pathways to sensory organs and effectors, human speech wouldn't be possible because it requires a human body.

This Wikipedia page gives an overview of the biological developments that support speech.

# Answer
> 2 votes
This is a complicated question if you stop for a moment to think about it.

Evolution is a complicated process. Brains and other part of the bodies actually do not evolve distinctly from each other. We can say they co-evolved if you will... So how did humans get language? How did humans get speech? Did they acquire it together if not which first. There are theories, but as far as I am concerned there is not a widely accepted certain truth.

But brains are fairly plastic right? I mean if we don't go to too extreme and try to put a human brain in a cockroach like body put it in a reasonably similar body like a chimpanzee perhaps the plasticity may provide the required sensory motor functions for living. But can this chimp talk?

It fairly depends on what we understand by "talking". If we consider speech (as humans do) the answer may be NO. Because it took a lot of work for evolution to make us able to produce that many different sounds. (They even say even with the risk of chocking themselves, most of the other primates don't have the same problems) So failing to produce phonemes what body may not be able to use human languages vocally.At least common human languages... There are pople that use language by wistling you may want to check this out: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PgEmSb0cKBg

But we have fairly good evidence that language is not about speech. It isn't even about just communicating. If given enough time and environment even with the limited vocal ability I suspect that ability may be turned into a different kind of language (possibly with lesser number of phonemes and longer words) And also to look the things from another angle: Are we talking to each other when we communicate via instant messaging or texting. If it's a yes then yes the chimp could talk. If no, then, possibly no.

As I said earlier we can use language in fairly different ways. Even people lacking complete auditory input or vocal motor control can use language. For example chimp would not have any problems with using a sign language.

To sum up if we talk about language it is a more general concept then just speech and can be performed in various ways. And it is fairly independent from the properties of sensory or motor organs. A brain that has functioning language areas would find a way.

# Answer
> 0 votes
I'd expect that if you put a human brain into some other animal, and it was able to learn how to operate that body well enough to live, then it would eventually start to try to speak. It would have to re-learn how to produce the sounds like an infant would. However, it probably would never be able to speak as well as a human due to physical limitations of the vocal system. They might be able to squeak out some words, but they'd probably mostly rely on other means of communication, just like people with speech difficulties do.

Of course the subject wouldn't suddenly lose their ability to use and understand whatever human languages they knew before. They'd just have physical difficulty producing actual speech.

So to answer based on the assumption: the reason animals can't speak human languages is a combination of both lacking the mental capability to understand spoken language and the physical capability to produce speech.

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Tags: neuroscience, cognitive-neuroscience, animal-cognition
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# Question
Title: Can a depressed person experience the sense of happiness?
Has anyone every truly lost their sense of happiness or maybe love? I realize a negative condition like depression can make it seem like it is only possible for one to be sad. **Is it possible for depressed people to evoke the emotion of happiness within themselves?**

For example, can depressed people recall the feeling of happiness by remembering a time when they were happy or thinking of something they enjoy?

My understanding is that if happiness can be evoked even once then they haven't lost the sense of it and maybe they can be trained to evoke it whenever by focusing on what is positive instead of what is negative. Much harder than it sounds I realize, you have to first believe you CAN be happy but I guess I am just asking if anyone lost happiness permanently, maybe through brain damage, or was born without it.

# Answer
Depression is characterized by emotion dysregulation (e.g., Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014). This means that depressed patients have difficulties decreasing (downregulating) their negative affect and increasing (upregulating) their positive affect. This may be a consequence of cognitive distortions and deficits (Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014) as well as maladaptive emotion goals (e.g., the goal to increase/maintain negative affect; Millgram, Joormann, Huppert, & Tamir, 2015).

Many kinds of therapies seek to improve (directly or indirectly) the ways depressed patients regulate their emotions, including cognitive-behavioral therapy (Beck, 2011) and cognitive bias modification (Hallion & Ruscio, 2011), which includes *memory therapeutics* (e.g., aiding recall of positive autobiographical memories or reducing the impact of negative memories; Dalgleish & Werner-Seidler, 2014) and *attention training* (e.g., Papageorgiou & Wells, 2000).

These therapies are effective/efficacious at reducing the cognitive deficits associated with depression and thus facilitate more adaptive emotion regulation (i.e., less rumination, more positive reappraisal, more self-distancing). This leads to improved mood (decreased negative affect, increased positive affect; e.g., Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010).

**So, yes, depressed patients can experience happiness via establishment of more adaptive emotion regulation skills.** Moreover, positive affect is associated with activation of many different brain regions (Lindquist et al., 2015), which makes it unlikely that depressed patients have a total inability to experience happiness.

Interestingly, positive memory recall may not be effective for depressed patients as a short-term mood repair strategy. In fact, it may make them feel even worse (Joormann, Siemer, & Gotlib, 2007). Depressed patients may not find positive memories to be intrinsically rewarding, perhaps due to processing disfluency and/or dysfunctional reward circuitry (Chen, Takahashi, & Yang, 2015).
> 4 votes

# Answer
For "permanent" loss of experience of happiness or pleasure, check out the term Anhedonia

From my own understanding, a brain can shift between different states of mind. Depression is just one such state. I have a more detailed answer about states of mind here, but the important point is that states of mind color perception of past, present and future. Your life situation, relationships, bank account and job all stay the same, happiness just provides a different outlook on them.

Thinking happy thoughts in a depressed state would not be enough to change the state and experience happiness. **There are two ways I know of that can bring back the experience of joy, content or happiness** while feeling depressed:

* Having a prolonged (30 min) conversation about topics that are meaningful to you with a receptive audience (friend, therapist, or writing in a diary). The focus is on explaining the concepts to another person.
* Pharmacologically disrupting the state through the use of medications (long term) or drugs (short term)
> 3 votes

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Tags: emotion, abnormal-psychology, depression, positive-thinking
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# Question
Title: Is it possible to master two different typing keyboard layouts?
I am a good typist with qwerty keyboard, I came across other keyboard layouts (eg: Dvorak keyboard). I believe I will never be able to master these two typing layouts *simultaneously*.

Am I right? or is it possible to learn both and become a good typist (i.e type with decent speed without looking the keyboard).

The example in itself is trivial to me (I am happy with qwerty keyboards) but I wanted to understand what will happen when there is a serious overlap and contradiction with two methods and can human mind handle it or is it once set it's really set in situations like this?

If my mind can learn only one method when two contradicting and interfering methods are present, then I believe it's implications are very interesting.

There are real life examples which are similar to the keyboard example. They all have the following attributes. a) Two are more conflicting solutions for same problem b) Decisions must be automatic or made under tight time constraint (no time to think).

# Answer
**Observational points:** It would be straightforward to point to a person who has mastered more than one keyboard layout (e.g., some of the people here). So, yes, it is possible. From my own personal experience, I can point to my use of both Vim keyboard shortcuts for editing and regular OSX/Windows keyboard shortcuts. This is certainly possible.

But I'd prefer to focus on the scientific principles that underly such a capacity.

**Scientific principles:**

There are a number of scientific principles operating in this context.

* Negative and positive transfer
* Principles of task consistency and complexity

In general transfer of skill from one domain to another depends on the degree of consistency between the two skills. This is a broad concept. Certainly the mapping between inputs and outputs is a big part of this (i.e., key press and letter). But it could also include a range of broader conceptual and psychomotor routines. Thus, positive transfer occurs when you can take the skill on one task to improve your performance in another. Negative transfer occurs when your performance on one task suffers as a result of learning a different task. In general positive transfer is much more powerful than negative transfer.

### Applying these principles to converting from QWERTY to DVORAK

Let's say that you have a person who has learnt the QWERTY keyboard layout and can type 80 words per minute. They decide that they want to learn DVORAK. What would we expect from a skill acquisition perspective?

The new keyboard layout (DVORAK) shares many consistent cognitive and psychomotor elements with the original layout (QWERTY). The basic motor actions of pressing individual keys are identical. Many other cognitive skills around the concept of typing are also the same. However, the actual specific key-to-letter mappings will be new. Furthermore, learning to type involves building up specific motor patterns around common sequences of letters and some of these will also be new.

The net result will be that learning to efficiently use DVORAK should take a fair bit of time. However, the learning curve should be massively faster than learning how to touch type the first time. Thus, in a basic sense, the main limitation to learning to type using two keyboard layouts is that it just takes more time than to learn one layout. And generally, you will be better at one layout than the other, so why bother learning two layouts unless perhaps you are transitioning to a new layout for the long term.

Based on general principles of cognitive transfer, generally knowing QWERTY will make DVORAK easier to learn. So most of the transfer will be positive. It is likely that there will be some accidental applications of QWERTY when you are in DVORAK and vice versa. Such errors can be minimised if you can create stimuli in your task environment that clearly communicates the appropriate mapping (e.g., use it on particular computers). The general concept in skill acquisition is that a single stimulus-response pairing is easier to manage, but over time you will learn to apply contextual cues to choose the correct stimulus-response options.

Another general principle for psychomotor skills is that forgetting is slower and relearning is quicker than for a lot of cognitive skills (Rosenbaum et al, 2001). Thus, people are likely to be able to retain and get back up to speed on a previously learnt keyboard layout after a period of using a newer layout.

### References

If you're interested in reading more, you might want to check out some of Philip Ackerman's early work on skill acquisition where he talks about consistency and complexity.

There's also a large literature that has studied the cognitive psychology of learning to touch type.

* Ackerman, P. L. (1989). Within-task intercorrelations of skilled performance: Implications for predicting individual differences? A comment on Henry & Hulin, 1987.
* Ackerman, P. L. (1988). Determinants of individual differences during skill acquisition: cognitive abilities and information processing. Journal of experimental psychology: General, 117(3), 288.
* Rosenbaum, D. A., Carlson, R. A., & Gilmore, R. O. (2001). Acquisition of intellectual and perceptual-motor skills. Annual review of psychology, 52(1), 453-470.
* Yechiam, E., Erev, I., Yehene, V., and Gopher, D. (2004). Melioration and the transition from touch-typing training to everyday use. Human Factors, 45, 671-684.
> 12 votes

# Answer
The answer is yes, you can only use one at a time though since there is a transition time for your brain to recognize and switch between layouts internally.

I know this because I use two different keyboard layouts regularly, they're not as different as QWERTY and DVORAK, the biggest differences are on which buttons symbols are placed (e.g. where the ? and * and + and - and so on) are placed.

Everytime I use a keyboard, my brain defaults to what I have been using the most over the past days, but I can switch over to a different layout rather easily once I decide to do so.

However it's worth noting that this is actually as hard to learn as it sounds since there is as you said an overlap between keyboard layouts. But in my experience there is always a dominant layout, since a keyboard is a keyboard regardless of it's layout, you will sometimes instinctively press the wrong button in the less dominant layout(s).

But it is entirely possible, and you can definitely do it without any noticable changes in your typing speed, although you may type a little bit slower in a less known layout at first, as the muscle memory for it builds up your typing speed will probably end up relatively similar to the speed you can type in the layout that you already know.

In other words, if you see the need to do this, just do it. We are capable of it, and with training we can do it just as effectively as we can be fluent in two languages at the same time. The element our mind uses for this is pattern recognition, you're just changing the patterns, nothing more, the easiest comparison I can think of is inverted mouse/stick controls in video games, or if you flip your monitor upside down so that you have to invert your vertical mouse movements. It's gonna be really uncomfortable and hard at first, but you will eventually get it right.
> 3 votes

# Answer
In different guitar tunings the different strings have different tonal values, so to play the same tone, a guitarist has to press different strings at different frets. This is equivalent to pressing different keys on a computer keyboard to create the same letter. Playing a song well means that you don't have time to think and search for the appropriate string and fret to press, but have to play automatically. Yet guitarists can master and switch between different tunings.

If a guitarist can do this, a typist can do this as well.

There are other activities where different "codes" are "uttered" by the same anatomy, e.g. dancing different dances with the same legs, or speaking different languages with the same larynx, lips and tongue. Once you have internalized one system (one dance, one tuning, one language, one keyboard layout) and performing it has become automatic, you no longer "stumble" or "speak pidgin".
> 2 votes

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Tags: learning, motor
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# Question
Title: Hearing Loss and Potentially hearing more
I've been diagnosed since I was younger (2nd grade) with a hearing impairment. Basically the nerve hairs on my cochlea are burned and I don't pick up 70% of the frequencies around me in my right ear.

My question is **whether people can be born with a higher level of hearing**? Or does it stop at 100% hearing, like 20/20 vision?

# Answer
> 6 votes
**Short answer**
People with above-normal hearing exist.

**Background**
Normal hearing was defined as the average of a group of young healthy individuals. These normal hearing levels are currently used to express acoustic sensitivities. One commonly used way is to use decibels relative to this normal hearing level (dB NH). This scale is used in audiograms (Schnupp *et al*., 2012). When hearing senstivities are reduced by 20 dB or more it is regarded as diagnostic for hearing impairment (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Audiogram. Source: (Schnupp *et al*., 2012)

Statistical outliers always exist. In Fig. 2 is an audiogram showing above-normal hearing sensitivities in the low frequencies in the left ear and in the high frequencies in the right ear (Fig. 2).

Fig. 2. Audiograms showing normal hearing (solid lines) and noise-induced hearing loss (dotted lines) Source: Fraser University, CA.

**Reference**
Schnupp *et al*., Auditory Neuroscience, MIT Press 2012

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Tags: hearing, genetics
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# Question
Title: Difference between active and passive touch?
I am considering the role of whiskers in the development of the mouse brain, and came across the following: 'we found that the signals sent to the brain by the whiskers during active touch differ from those transmitted during passive touch'

But I can't seem to find what the difference between active and passive touch is...

Thank you for any help :)

# Answer
The difference is in whether the animal has voluntary control over the touch. If the animal touches another object by moving its body to initiate the touch, then the it is active touch. If the animal is touched without control over the movement (for example, a human experimenter grazing the whiskers with a finger), then the touch is passive.
> 4 votes

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Tags: sensation, brain-development, sensory-perception
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# Question
Title: Is modality-specific working memory capacity correlated within individuals?
The multi-component model of working memory posits different processes for phonological and visual working memory storage.

Working memory capacity can be measured in a variety of ways (see: How to reliably measure working memory capacity?), and we know that there is reliable individual variation on working memory capacity.

Is there a strong correlation of working memory capacity in different modalities within an individual? Put another way: If I have measured working memory capacity for an individual using a visual working memory task (like a Matrix span task), how reliably can I predict performance on a verbal working memory task for that individual?

# Answer
> 3 votes
How working memory breaks down, or even whether it is a valid construct at all, is still somewhat controversial. The evidence for domain-specific modalities is largely based on the (lack of otherwise expected) interference between them. Another line of evidence that could be used to validate this model is checking the correlations between them: A high correlation would argue for a domain-general working memory, while a low correlation would support domain-specific modalities. In practice, however, the value of examining correlations between working memory measures is confounded by a general capacity factor (eg, executive control), interaction with short-term memory, the possibility of any number of additional modalities (for example, visual vs. spatial), and the result of many years of assuming a unitary working memory construct resulting in a variety of measures that are validated against each other (ie, expected to correlate highly).

Nonetheless, just such a test was done by Alloway, Gathercole & Pickering (2006), who subjected over 700 primary school children to a battery of different working memory capacity measures. As expected, correlations between many of the measures were statistically significant, but importantly, not commensurate with either a simple domain-specific model, or a simple general model with WM/STM split. To answer your question, here is a table from the paper that summarizes some of the results (more detail here):

As you can see, the correlations, while nearly all significant at p\>.001, vary considerably. These results are consistent with similar studies that review several independent measures of working memory that nonetheless all tend to correlate well with cognitive factors such as general intelligence.

# Answer
> 3 votes
To add to Arnon's answer, modality-specific working memory capacity (WMC) does correlate within individuals, so in some cases, you could certainly predict one from the other. As long as dumb prediction is all you're interested in, why not?

The problem with making that prediction is that it's very difficult to interpret what it means in causal or practical terms. Recent findings suggest we can't just assume that the domain general contribution is equal across domains, as we've been doing, because the interference effects used to establish WMC subscales in the first place appear to actually be asymmetrical. A verbal WM load does decrease visual WM performance, but not vice versa (Morey et al., 2013). Predicting verbal WMC from visual WMC thus means something completely different from predicting visual WMC from verbal WMC! How to resolve this, or whether it can be resolved, to my knowledge remains an open question for multi-component WM research.

In summation, the relationship between modalities in the multi-component model is currently on shaky theoretical footing. If one measured working memory capacity for an individual using a visual working memory task (like a Matrix span task), one *could* semi-reliably predict performance on a verbal working memory task for that individual. Good luck figuring out what the result means, though, so maybe one *shouldn't*.

## References

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Tags: memory, working-memory
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# Question
Title: Can a person remember so much details as the guy in the Camus' Stranger?
In the book, while in prison, he lives his days by his memories, thinking of his room, his furniture, the beach, each time recalling more details, imagining walking past it and this recalling took a big enough part of the day to keep him busy.

> "And the more I thought about it, the more I dug out my memory things I had overlooked or forgotten. I realized then that a man who had lived only one day could easily live for a hundred years in prison. He would have enough memories to keep him from being bored."

I also read something saying that a person in a state of sensory deprivation, for example locked in dark, quite room, can remember a lot of things.

So how much truth is in the Camus's description and how much detail can a person generally remember about something he has seen a couple of times not really paying attention? If Camus was correct, if you do remember more than you can usually recall, then how do I recall at least half as much without being put in prison?

# Answer
Yes it is possible, it is possible in theory at least, but almost no one can do it.

When we see some things, we might not notice everything in front of us, but our subconsciousness usually does withtake these things which is how you can remember a scene and notice things you didn't notice before. However there is another version of this which is that our brains are master tools for filling in the gaps, so it's very easy to remember things wrongly, and see things in your memories that were never actually there, sort of like dreaming. You think it and it shows.

As far as I know there are two things required for this to be feasible.

1. Super efficient memory for remembering visuals, auditory experiences, and text/numbers/symbols. These can all be trained to an extent in individuals that aren't born with it as a natural talent. (look up memory competition champions, some of them have written books on effective memorization, like Dominic O'Brien for one, these things really work.)
2. Vivid visual imagination, you need your daydreams to be as real as your sleeping dreams, the only way I've even heard of to train this kind of skill is meditation, but even then there's no guarantee you will ever be able to do this if you can't already. There is a phenomena known as lucid dreaming, and to be able to vividly remember scenery on-demand, you need to be in that sort of state, it can be achieved through meditation, but not even every meditation master can do it.

But notice how I said vivid visual imagination and lucid dreaming state (or alternatively, hypnagogia). Becuase you are in such a state when you are vividly remembering things, it is highly likely that your brain will accidentally put things in your memories that weren't there before, and you can also do this at will just like in a lucid dream.

So is it possible? Yes, it technically is, but our memories, even the most efficient ones aren't 100%, every time we remember something, we're only remembering the last time we remembered it which is how information is lost over time, information which your brain can, and will replace with falsehoods to "fill in the gaps". Which is why two people who saw the same thing at the same time can remember it differently a few months or years after the event.

But as a sort of ironic twist, the more vivid your imagination is (and by vivid I don't just mean in the form of visual information, but also auditory, touch, smell, even taste) the more likely you are to have or be able to easily develop extremely good memory, so the two things I described are necessary for the kind of memory you described are interconnected.

But well, if you want such a great memory (which is completely off topic for this site, it's a personal productivity question) then like I said earlier, look up books written by memory champions like Dominic O'Brien, and you will find what you seek.
> 1 votes

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Tags: memory, long-term-memory
---


# Question
Title: Has the inverted spectrum thought experiment ever been conducted (and if not, why)?
The inverted spectrum thought experiment posits that you (the subject) wake up one morning to find that your colour spectrum (or some part of it anyway) has inverted. This experiment has important implications for the idea of "qualia". While we may not have a way to manipulate qualia directly, this experiment still seems like it would be valuable to conduct. In Daniel Dennett's version of the experiment - "alternative neurosurgery" - he points out that you wouldn't know if your optic nerve was messed with, or your memories, and I would extend this to any apparatus that inverts spectrum at any point along the sensory pathway.

I imagine that the technology to develop goggles (similar to the prism glasses, colour filters, distortion lenses, etc, used in perceptual adaptation experiments) that invert colour is available. However, I have not seen any reference to such an experiment being conducted. Has it? And if not, why not? Are there practical limitations?

It seems to me that the construct of qualia hinges on there being some property of experience that is independent of behaviour/function/physical state, and the subjective experience of colour is often touted as a perfect example of this, via the inverted spectrum experiment. So then the practicality of this experiment - whether or not an inversion of some kind is possible without a functional impact - is crucial. If the experiment cannot be conducted because no inversion exists that can be done without functional impact, then it would constitute a severe blow to qualia as independent of function, and conversely, if it can be done, and the effect shown to be independent of behaviour, then it would surely be a problem for functionalism... So why not try it?

# Answer
> 3 votes
I don't think inverted prism goggles would be a satisfactory way to empirically test the thought experiment. A key axiom of the argument is that there are no physical changes to our brains or bodies; only the qualia have changed. In a goggles design, there would be a clear physical locus of the change (and we might reasonably call this part of your body for the duration of the experiment), so the shift in qualia would have a clear physical basis.

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Tags: perception, consciousness, philosophy-of-mind, color
---


# Question
Title: Anti-psychotic medication withdrawal-induced psychosis
Can psychosis result from anti-psychotic medication withdrawal for a non-psychotic patient? That is, a patient that takes anti-psychotic medication for off label reasons, such as treatment-resistant depression, or insomnia.

# Answer
It depends on what you mean by psychosis.

Anti-psychotic medications effectively reduce the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (hallucinations, paranoia) at the expense of worsening the negative symptoms (rigidity, bradykinesia, cognitive slowing). Long-term use of antipsychotics, especially the older ones, can induce a Parkinson's-like syndrome.

These effects are not withdrawal so much as side effect of the medication.

Second generation antipsychotics are used as mood stabilizers in bipolar II and major depression. Post-marketing surveys of aripiperazole and the like have not bred rebound psychosis.

Use of dopamine agonists *is* associated with psychosis.
> 3 votes

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, clinical-psychology
---


title: Result of local stimulation in brain

text:
# Question
Title: Result of local stimulation in brain
What happens when we stimulate a brain in local regions? Some possibilities:

1. We may trigger an action without the subject's awareness of the action;
2. We can trigger an action in a subject, but we cannot trigger a subject's will to perform this action;
3. We can't trigger an action without awareness of subject;
4. We cannot trigger an action without awareness of subject to his own action;

What are the results??

What I felt is 2, 4 are correct options because when some BMI devices are used subject is forcefully made to make a move. Here we are not changing his will to move but he is aware that he is moving.

# Answer
You should check out the article on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neuroscience\_of\_free\_will#Other\_related\_phenomena

Though there is still some controversy surrounding some of the experiments, the overall evidence suggests that it's possible to trigger action without awareness, it's possible to manipulate the perception of intention (will) to action, and it's also possible to do both.

> In one study, directly stimulating the pre-SMA caused volunteers to report a feeling of intention, and sufficient stimulation of that same area caused physical movement.\[35\] In a similar study, it was found that people with no visual awareness of their body can have their limbs be made to move without having any awareness of this movement, by stimulating premotor brain regions.\[60\] When their parietal cortices were stimulated, they reported an urge (intention) to move a specific limb (that they wanted to do so). Furthermore, stronger stimulation of the parietal cortex resulted in the illusion of having moved without having done so.
> 3 votes

# Answer
**Short answer**
It depends.

**Background**
Because the answer to this question depends heavily on *which brain region* is stimulated, I will focus on the visual cortex. Electrodes implanted in the primary visual cortex (V1) can generate visual percepts (flashes of light, or *phosphenes*) in the blind. Specifically, cortical prosthetics placed on V1 can generate phosphenes in the blind, and have been successfully used to restore partial vision in the blind (Dobelle, 2000). The generation of phosphenes is then the 'action' you are referring to in your question.

However, it all depends on stimulation conditions whether phosphenes are actually generated; most notably the stimulus level (but also stimulus shape (waveform), stimulus duration etc.). Assuming there is above-threshold stimulation in the cortex, a noticeable phosphene will be evoked. So this would probably be categorized as ***option 2***. The triggering of a subject's "will" is probably very difficult, as triggering a voluntary choice by external stimulation has not been done at this time, as far as I know.

In case of a just-above threshold V1 activation, a subject may see a phosphene on one stimulation, but not the next. Blind folks often have spontaneous activity in their visual system, which makes them see spontaneous random patterns of light, or even complex scenes (Ayton *et al*., 2015). In this case, a phosphene may be generated, but go unnoticed by the subject, which boils down to ***option 1*** and proves ***option 3 and 4*** to be untrue.

So on the basis of the example scenario of a visual prosthetic for the blind, **options 1 and 2 are correct**, dependent on whether the stimulus is far above threshold, or just above it. **Options 3 and 4 are incorrect** as they are **incompatible** with the first two options.

My answer can be translated to a (hypothetical) cortical implant on the motor cortex in, e.g., people suffering from paralysis or motor dysfunction due to, e.g., stroke or trauma. Also, transcranial stimulation of the motor cortex is a good example, where intense stimuli generate limb movements that are seen and felt by the subject, but near-threshold stimuli may evoke movements that may go unnoticed due to spontaneous muscle movements.

<sub>**References**
**-** Ayton *et al. Ophthalmology* (in press)
**-** Dobelle *et al. ASAIO* (2000), **46**(1): 3-9</sub>
> 2 votes

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Tags: neuroscience
---


# Question
Title: How does the physical brain know about qualia?
Qualia are phenomenological (the subjective experience of the physical activity of the brain). But how does phenomenology feed back into the activity of the brain? That is, how can the physical brain detect that qualia are occurring inside of it and be able to report on it?

To clear up confusion:

1. Suppose that all things are physical and all behaviors can be explained physically through neurons.
2. Suppose that qualia exist and are phenomenological.

The question is, how do physical neurons "know" about qualia. This is similar to a mind-affecting-brain question, but subtly different:

1. There is no assumption about a "mind" existing
2. The causal relationship between qualia and physical brain is restricted to the physical brain's detection of qualia.

# Answer
Keep in mind that "qualia" is a philosophical construct whose purpose is largely to stimulate thought and discussion about subjective experience, definitions, and potential empirical implications. The construct may well turn out to be untenable, but either way, it ought to be useful for elucidating issues relating to "the hard problem".

Your question is a very good one, and has spurred much debate over the nature and meaning of qualia. Qualia are often regarded as somehow independent of physical properties, but yet as you point out, they clearly affect behaviour somehow. Here are some points to consider:

* One way out of the conundrum is to deny qualia as a useful construct. Critics of qualia address the issue of subjective experience without qualia in a variety of atlernative ways.
* Duality is another approach to qualia, but is not a commonly held view in science. A more subtle approach is epiphenomenalism, which is a type of dualism that denies qualia any causal role. However, as you've rightly pointed out, the mere fact that we are discussing qualia suggests that it does have a causal role.
* It has been suggested that qualia actually have 2 distinct aspects: An experience that is "ineffable" - cannot be described and does not have a causal role - and a knowledge of the experience that does have a causal role. While this approach minimizes (or at least constrains) the causal role of qualia, it does not entirely deny it.
* Functionalism is a common alternative to dualism that comes in many varieties, and several related approaches with similar postulates (eg, behaviorism, physicalism, and computationalism), suggest that qualia (if they are meaningful at all) supervene on physical systems - that is, they are a natural and direct property of them. In some interpretations, this makes qualia "independent" of phsyical systems only in the sense that they describe different properties than the cause and effect that we normally focus on, but not in the sense that they can possibly be separated from them as some other interpretations of qualia suggest. However, many thought experiments about qualia suggest a stronger independence, so therefore, not all varieties of functionalism are compatible with all interpretations of qualia.
* Another approach worth mentioning is representationalism, a view that sort of side-steps the cause-and-effect issue by defining qualia as indirect internal representations of external stimulus (objects). As there are so many varieties of representationalism, it is difficult to pin down what exactly this means for qualia's effect on the brain, but the general gist of it is that qualia are viewed as constructs of the mind that are representational (meaningful) rather than real (causal).
* Of course, another common response is that we just don't know, and may never know, as we simply don't have the intellectual capacity to understand - formally, cognitive closure.

There are lots of other approaches that attempt to address the question in yet other ways, but hopefully that's a good summary of the major categories anyway.
> 3 votes

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Tags: philosophy-of-mind, qualia
---


# Question
Title: Does self-compassion have negative consequences?
Self-compassion is often compared with self-esteem and it seems that self-compassion is more effective and positive than self-esteem. A lot of studies have shown that excessive levels of self-esteem might lead to narcissism or to believe that we are above average. However, I haven't heard negative aspects about self-compassion? Self-compassion is related to happiness, satisfaction and motivation but does it have any negative consequence? Thank you.

# Answer
> 1 votes
This is only my own experience, but for many years I had no self-esteem and did things that were harmful to myself. It wasn't until I started thinking objectively about myself as a child that I could be compassionate towards her that I began to feel better. She still lives within me, but the memories no longer rule me. I went on from there to myself at different ages, forgiving myself as I went along. Finally I started asking myself, "If you could, what would you want to do." After the answer to that I was able to realize some of the dreams that I'd thought were impossible for me. I'm not saying that I'm the perfect picture of mental health now, but am I certainly finding it easier to live with myself, and I am generally happier. I still need to take antidepressants to keep me on a level, but everything is better than I ever imagined it could be, even with medication. I never could afford the specialist, so I had to do my own. However, I don't think they could have done it better. I'm still working on it and I'm 71, but happy.

# Answer
> 1 votes
I know this is not a very scientific answer but as for most of the Social and mental properties the normal is determined by the Common properties of individuals are determined by the Common properties of individuals in society. There is, I suspect, a different level of self esteem acceptable in different social groups. The unusually high ones may possibly be punished by society.

My personal opinion is very high and very low levels of self esteem May hurt objectivity. But again, can this be considered a harm? I don't know that.

We may see examples of penalties of high self esteem in highly successful people. Even in our daily lives are can see examples of people of higher autority to claim to know things that they actually don't. Perhaps Adolf Hitler is a historical example of that.to know things that they actually don't.

We can see examples off his eeen in the scientfic world. The phenomenon known as Nobel disease shows brilliant scientists may also talk about things outside of their fields. More information at this link Nobel disease

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Tags: social-psychology, personality, behavior, psychology, self
---


# Question
Title: Why is the sound of fingernails on a chalkboard so intolerable?
I am curious as to what current research shows regarding why scraping noises such as fingernails on a chalkboard, a knife/fork scraping against a plate, metal grinding against metal or stone etc are so intolerable to humans. In doing some initial research for this I read the wikipedia article on Sound of fingernails scraping chalkboard (there's a wikipedia article on everything!) but I am looking for more references or updated research.

From the reading I have done, there seems to be two competing theories:

* The sound is reminiscent of the warning calls of primates and triggers an evolutionary response left over from an earlier age designed to protect us from predators
* The sound hits a resonante frequency of the inner ear which causes it to be particularly intolerable

To me personally the first theory makes very little sense. Hearing the warning calls of primates does not personally trigger anywhere near the same feelings of extreme frustration and irritability that I feel when I accidentally scrape my knife on my plate. Furthermore the feelings caused by the "nails on a chalkboard" sound do not at all trigger a fight-or-flight response or put me on edge as a loud noise or something that startles me does. If anything it is almost paralyzing, which seems counter to the evolutionary theory.

How accurate is the wikipedia article? Is there any newer / more widely accepted research available on what causes the sound of "fingernails on a chalkboard" to be so intensely awful to human beings?

# Answer
> 10 votes
My initial thoughts are that the sound produced a dissonant sound, that is (from the link):

> "An unstable tone combination is a dissonance; its tension demands an onward motion to a stable chord. Thus dissonant chords are 'active'; traditionally they have been considered harsh and have expressed pain, grief, and conflict."

—Roger Kamien (2008)

According to the article "Psychacoustics of a chilling sound", (Halpern et al. 1986), it is the low frequency components of the sound that cause the most discomfort. In their tests, removing the low frequency part in a digital simulation, made the sound a bit more bearable.

In the conclusion of the article, there is some support for the Wikipedia article that Josh Gitlin linked to in his question:

> the complex acoustic stimulus pictured in Figure I very closely resembles some of the spectrograms of warning cries emitted by macaque monkeys (Green, 1975). As another possibility, the signal may be similar to the vocalizations of some predator.

# Answer
> 6 votes
> Furthermore the feelings caused by the "nails on a chalkboard" sound do not at all trigger a fight-or-flight response or put me on edge as a loud noise or something that startles me does. If anything it is almost **paralyzing, which seems counter to the evolutionary theory.**

Yes, I agree, it seems to, however what about the fainting goats? We could have traits which aren't advantageous, yet we were able to survive in spite of them. Like the goats.

Even though it seems perfectly possible (though not logical) to be paralyzed by fear in response to a warning signal, I don't agree with the theory that the sound is indeed a warning signal.

In my experience with hearing fingernails on the chalkboard, its almost as if my teeth hurt. This leads me to believe it is not predators I'm fearing, but injury. It could be a fear by association produced from when I was very young and putting many different objects in my mouth. Some objects may have produced a similar sound and the sound was associated with pain. If you wish to survive in nature, its very important to have teeth, and injuring our teeth may be an especially important thing to avoid... not only if you expect to eat, but also attract a mate. A good smile is important.

In my search for references to back up my theory, I found this presentation, the author of which seems to agree with my assessment.

I also found at least one other person who claims to feel something in his teeth:

> I feel the discomfort in my teeth and have always assumed the screeching is at the right frequency to build up uncomfortable vibrations in the teeth.

That is actually a random comment (pages 11-20 in the comments section at the bottom) to this article.

I don't agree that the sounds would have enough acoutical power to vibrate the teeth. I think the pain is merely imagined. Of course, that's my opinion, for what its worth. Since the prevailing theory is predator-based and not tooth-injury-based, I wouldn't expect to find any studies on the matter.

In addition to the evidence presented so far, I have another reason to doubt the predator theory. If the sound mimics the cry of danger and the response is instinctual, then why don't we all have the response? Out of 3 people contributing to this question, 1 has admitted "this sound has no effect on me at all." This argues in favor of my "fear by association" theory.

# Answer
> 0 votes
Mine is the evolutionarily ancient tooth-damage avoidance-response 2003 speculation article, but if I have it right, then toothed animals in general should experience it, not just primates. Maybe it goes all the way down the entire chain to octopi, snails, clams, any organism which needs to avoid radular-destruction when carefully trying to eat algae from silicate surfaces.

2012 research showed human fMRI to horrid glass-scraping noises, response located in amygdala and mediated by auditory cortex. With fMRI we need not rely on subjective reports.

Heh, be first to test non-humans, we can crack the mystery and share the igNobel!

# Answer
> -1 votes
I don't understand why there's a bias to assuming that something that doesn't actually touch us can't cause pain. I assure you: the sound that Styrofoam makes is *enormously* painful to me. (And I grew up in the egg business, where I would have to plug my ears on a daily basis when my father or someone else had to do something with Styrofoam cartons. Ugh.)

We all have different tolerance levels for pain in other ways. The guys who go for Navy SEAL (or equivalent) training, or who play NFL football, clearly have a different tolerance for pain than I do. Why would anyone assume that this is different in terms of one's hearing?

The simplest answer is the best: some of us are caused *actual pain* when certain sounds are made, most likely because there are frequencies in the sound that we can perceive more or more clearly than others can. I'm an audiophile, and have lots of anecdotal evidence that I can hear higher-pitched sounds than my friends... my guess is that for those of us who have massively painful reactions to these sounds, our ears are genetically wired to be able to hear those frequencies far more clearly than those who aren't susceptible.

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Tags: evolution, sensation, psychoacoustics
---


# Question
Title: Is there a graph with extroversion-introversion score on one axis and IQ on the other?
I can't find one on Google Images.

# Answer
> 4 votes
Extraversion and IQ typically have zero correlation. In Bates and Rock (2004),we suggested that if the arousal value of the testing environment varies, this might induce a modest correlation with IQ (introverts doing best in silences, ambiverts with some noicse, and extraverts performing best under fairly loud white noise background. More basic measures like inspection time were unaffected.

Based on some followup queries, here's a graph of Extraversion against IQ-score in 597 adults from a normative sample in the United States: The MIDUS.

The plot shows the raw data points, and also a loess best fit curve: no relationship, even at the extremes.

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Tags: iq, extraversion, introversion, big-five
---


# Question
Title: Does motivation and interest correlate highly with IQ and can someone be smart but perform poorly in a particular field?
Suppose a person is considered intelligent based on his IQ score. For example, suppose Bob has a high IQ score and is very interested in pure mathematics. He would most probably excel in this field. Now suppose Bob hated biology. He can't bring himself to learn anything about this field. Does this mean that Bob is "not intelligent" in the field of biology and only intelligent in the field of pure mathematics?

In other words, does motivation and interest correlate highly with IQ? Somebody can be "smart" but still perform poorly in various fields?

# Answer
*I have to disagree with Arnon a bit and want to expand on some of his points. The following is not meant as an answer to the question but just an extended comment to Arnon's answer.*

### General intelligence vs multiple intelligences

There are theories of intelligence that posit a general intelligence which determins performance in all areas. According to these theories performance in different areas must be correlated. And there are theories which assume different "intelligences" (verbal, spatial etc.) and a possibly different performance in different areas.

**Intelligence vs talent**

There are psychologists that use the term "intelligence" for an equally high performance in all areas, and the term "talent" for high performance in only one area and relatively lower performance in all other areas. Example:

```
IQ profile of a highly intelligent individual
---------------------------------------------

 IQ   verbal   mathematical   spatial      etc.

130     x           x            x          x      <- high intelligence

120

110

100

 90

```

versus:

```
IQ profile of a talented individual
-----------------------------------

 IQ   verbal   mathematical   spatial      etc.

130                 x                              <- mathematical talent

120

110

100     x                        x          x      <- average intelligence

 90

```

### Fluid vs crystallized intelligence

Many theories assume two different aspects of intelligence: fluid intelligence, that is the potential or capacity for cognitive performance, and crystallized intelligence, that is the knowledge and learning an individual has acquired.

Depending on which theory you follow – general versus multiple intelligences, intelligence versus talent, fluid and/or crystallized intelligence –, your concept of what intelligence is will differ. Since the scholars creating IQ tests also have different opinions on this matter, their tests are (often extremely) differently constructed and test results from different tests often correlate only to a certain degree. That is, an individual scoring a high IQ in one test can have an average IQ according to another. Which is why, when reporting an IQ, you must also report the test with which it was measured, because otherwise the result is meaningless.

### Measurement error and confidence interval

IQ tests don't measure very exactly. There is always a certain measurement error involved. Beacause of this, psychologists always calculate a range of values (a confidence interval) in which the true value of the individual probably lies. The exact true intelligence is always unknown and can in fact differ widely from a given test result. Therefore serious psychologists do not put much faith in the IQ score (that is considered unprofessional and ignorant) but rather report wether the individual's intelligence is average, above average or below average. No current IQ test allows for a more accurate assessment. Repeating measurements (with different tests to avoid learning and on different days) can increase exactness.
> 8 votes

# Answer
Intelligence refers to a general cognitive capacity, it does not refer to knowledge in specific fields of study. This means that yes, it is possible to have high intelligence but have low knowledge / performance in a specific academic area.

Having said that, IQ tests are validated against academic performance \- that is to say, they are adjusted so as to have a high correlation with grades. Thus, on average, high IQ scores do mean success in school.

There are a variety of theories of multiple independent intelligences (mostly discredited), where one can be high performing in one area of intelligence but not another. However, intelligence is never broken down by academic field of study such as "biology" or "calculus", only by general cognitive capacity, such as "social" or "musical", so we might say someone is "not knowledgeable" in biology, but never "not intelligent" in it.
> 6 votes

# Answer
The question combines concepts of motivation, IQ, and effects of study over time.

There is a modest (r=.3) correlation between IQ and openness to experience, which makes brighter people also more interested in a range of topics.

In addition, higher IQ leads to learning about areas that an individual is not much motivated towards: This is why general vocabulary is the single best indicator of IQ: A bright person very interested in pure mathematics will become skilled in matrix algebra. But even if they dislike biology, they will be able to define many biological terms, explain the basics of ideas like the cell, know what DNA stands for etc. Even with little interest in, say, cars, they will be able to tell you what a "header" is.

Finally, Ray Cattell focussed on the topic you are most interested in, with his investment model of IQ. This distinguished fluid ability from the end result of study over a lifetime, which leads to crystallized knowledge (this also maintains value over time, while fluid ability declines with age).

Bob, in your example "invests" his time in studying math, and will develop a strong crystallized store of information compared to their knowledge and skill in biology.

This Bates and Shieles 2003 paper covers some of these things in a bit more detail.
> 2 votes

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Tags: intelligence, motivation, iq
---


# Question
Title: How should I report results of a likelihood ratio test?
I'm using likelihood ratio testing to assess whether a behavioral model is a better description of my data than a simpler (so called *restricted*) model.

How should results of such statistical tests be reported?

# Answer
> 5 votes
General reporting recommendations such as that of APA Manual apply. One should report exact p-value and an effect size along with its confidence interval. In the case of likelihood ratio test one should report the test's p-value and how much more likely the data is under model A than under model B.

Example: The data is 7.3, 95% CI \[6.8,8.1\] times more likely under Model A than under Model B. The hypothesis that the data is equally likely under the two models was rejected with p=0.006.

The above statements already indicate that likelihood ratio test does not tell you which

> model is a better description of my data

as the likelihood is $p(\mathrm{Data}|\mathrm{Model})$ and to learn which model is a better description of the data you need to compute $p(\mathrm{Model}|\mathrm{Data})$.

# Answer
> 3 votes
The likelihood ratio test is distributed as χ²with degrees of freedom = the change in degrees of freedom between the two models. So, to give an example dropping one parameter from a model, you would report it like this:

χ² (1) = 3.4, p = 0.065

---
Tags: statistics, publication-process, publication
---


# Question
Title: How to interpret intelligence test scores for an individual who has taken a test multiple times in quick succession?
**Specific context:** A test subject took the same Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices IQ test three times and first scored 115, then 107, and finally 143. The same test was taken three times within 3 and a half hours. Since all three scores are different and appear random, how can one asses these results? i.e. Assuming the individual did not cheat, what can be said about the intelligence of test subject?

More generally:

**How should one interpret intelligence test scores for an individual who has taken the same form of the same test multiple times in quick succession?**

# Answer
> 4 votes
### General points about practice effects

Intelligence tests differ in how much they are subject to practice effects.

Practice effects can also be distinguished:

* **Time between taking the test**: The shorter the timeframe the more likely you will see practice related improvement.
* **General practice on similar tests and similar items versus practice on the same set of items.** In general, practice effects will be greater where the items are identical between test sessions. Adaptive testing where items change each time should show fewer practice effects.
* **Whether feedback is present**. In general participants do not get feedback on what was or was not the right answer, but if they do receive such feedback, then practice effects will be much greater, especially for item specific transfer.

### Test-retest variation

Another general point is that intelligence tests have a level of reliability such that a score on a test is only an estimate of an individual's true standing on the latent trait being measured. So obviously, some variation between administrations would be expected purely based on the standard error of measurement.

That said, the general model of test-retest reliability assumes reasonably controlled testing conditions and a participant that is applying reasonable effort. When these conditions are not met, you could see much more variation:

* If a test taker applies minimal effort or is distracted, they may get a much lower score than their true level.
* If a test taker cheats in some way they may get a much higher score than their true level.

Issues of administration are more likely in an online environment particularly where there is either (a) no consequences for not applying full effort, or (b) an incentive to cheat.

### Interpreting scores of someone who has taken a test multiple times

In general, if you are trying to measure intelligence, you should administer the test once and that first measure would be the measure of their intelligence.

Test administrations that follow immediately afterwards would be contaminated by practice effects. Unless you have a very good understanding of how practice effects operate and how they can be controlled for, then it would be difficult to incorporate information from these subsequent administrations.

That said, if you had additional information that said that on the first administration the participant was not concentrating or fundamentally failed to understand the test, then you may wish to tentatively rely on the score from a different administration.

In addition, a pattern of scores that differ by three standard deviations (e.g., 100, 115, 145) may suggest either that the test has reliability issues or that something strange is happening for that particular individual that you want to look into.

---
Tags: measurement, experimental-psychology, intelligence, performance, iq
---


title: Combining unbiased hit rates

text:
# Question
Title: Combining unbiased hit rates
I am analysing data on an emotion perception task, where participants must decide if a given face is happy, sad, angry or fearful (essentially a forced choice between 4 options).

I am confident that I want to calculate an unbiased hit rate for each emotion (as in Wagner 1993). This takes a confusion matrix (toy example below):

```
        Happy    Sad    Angry   Fearful
Happy     4       1       0        1
Sad       0       3       2        1
Angry     0       0       6        0
Fearful   2       0       0        4

```

And the unbiased hit rate is then the correct answers squared, divided by the number of times that answer is used multiplied by the number of trials where that answer was correct. So in the above example:

```
Hu(Happy) = 4^2 / ((4+0+0+2)*6) = 16/36 = 0.444
Hu(Sad) = 9/24 = 0.375
Hu(Angry) = 36/48 = 0.75
Hu(Fearful) = 16/36 = 0.444

```

These are then converted with an arcsine tranformation on the square root for use as the dependent variable in regression.

However, I want to use this data to assess general ability at emotion recognition in faces - what is the correct way to combine the unbiased hit rates? That is, can I generate a single value that accounts for all off these, or should I run four separate analyses and examine the overlap in the results?

**Reference**

Wagner, H. L. (1993). On measuring performance in category judgment studies of nonverbal behavior. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior, 17(1), 3-28.

# Answer
> 4 votes
The purpose of unbiased hit rate is to avoid invalid conclusions in cases where subjects indiscriminately use one (or only few) response options. To give an example (responses in rows, stimuli in columns):

```
        Happy    Sad    Angry   Fearful
Happy     1       0       0        1
Sad       7       8       6        5
Angry     0       0       0        0
Fearful   2       0       0        1

```

Consider sad faces. The uncorrected and biased hit rate for sad faces is $h\_b(\mathrm{Sad})=8/8=1$. The unbiased hit rate is $h\_b(\mathrm{Sad})=8^2/(8 \cdot24)=1/3$. The latter estimate better corresponds to our intuition. The subject responds almost always $\mathrm{Sad}$ and should be assigned a score slightly better than a random performance ($=1/4$).

You are looking for a total score. By definition a total score will account for this kind of bias as it uses all elements of the confusion matrix. Hence, there is no point in looking for a unbiased total hit rate and there is no point in trying to combine the unbiased hit rates.

Wagner (1993) makes it clear on page 4 that the question regarding a total score is distinct and different from the one he is trying to answer with his unbiased hit rate. In a footnote 1 on pages 27-28 he mentions methods for computing the total score:

> There are numerous ways of examining overall performance in judgment studies. In psychophysics, the confusion matrix resulting from the method of absolute identification (as the type of judgment study discussed here is known) has been examined with the tools of information theory (see Baird & Noma, 1978, for a clear exposition of this). \[...\] Other examples of measures of accuracy for the whole matrix are Cohen's $\kappa$ (Cohen, 1960), and Rosenthal and Rubin's $\pi$ (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1989).

**Literature**

Baird, J. C., & Noma, E. J. (1978). Fundamentals of scaling and psychophysics. John Wiley & Sons.

Cohen, J. (1960). A coefficient of agreement for nominal scales. Educational and psychological measurement, 20(1), 37-46.

Rosenthal, R., & Rubin, D. B. (1989). Effect size estimation for one-sample multiple-choice-type data: Design, analysis, and meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 106(2), 332.

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Tags: emotion, methodology, categorisation, task-analysis
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# Question
Title: Brain's differences in introverts vs. extroverts
I know that introverts have a higher sensitivity to dopamine, for example. Are there are other chemical and neuronal differences?

# Answer
If you are interested in a subfacet of extraversion, i.e. agentic extraversion, a trait covering positive incentive motivation, positive emotionality, and social dominance (among others), I recommend Depue & Collins' paper *Neurobiology of the structure of personality: Dopamine, facilitation of incentive motivation, and extraversion*, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1999, as a starting point.

Furthermore, I'd point to papers such as Wacker, Chavanon, and Stemmler (2006): *Investigating the dopaminergic basis of extraversion in humans: a multilevel approach*, Journal of personality and social psychology, and related papers, which provide evidence concerning behavioral and electrophysiological indices of agentic extraversion sensitive to pharmacological interventions (DRD2 antagonist sulpiride).

These papers will, however, challenge your statement that introverts are more sensitive to dopamine. Just so you know.

On a more general level and as argued convincingly by Depue & Collins (1999) it is a more fruitful approach to study subfacets of personality traits, rather than broad traits such as broad extraversion. This is imaginable when considering that broad extraversion covers not only positive incentive motivation (likely related to dopaminergic neurotransmission) but also affiliative extraversion (feeling close to others etc., likely mediated by oxytocin). Thus, there is not necessarily an 'extravert' that shows high activity/levels/etc. of this or that specific neurobiological variable such as dopaminergic neurotransmission, because a person might also be considered an extravert (and score high on, let's say the Big Five Inventory Extraversion scale when experiencing tight bonds and affection for others, while he or she is not very agentically extraverted. However, it is more likely that you will measure certain levels of a specific neurobiological variable (such as dopamine-related measures) when studying a more specific and less "fuzzy" trait (such as agentic extraversion).
> 4 votes

# Answer
Introverts have higher cortical arousal than extroverts: http://io9.com/the-science-behind-extroversion-and-introversion-1282059791

> Several decades ago, German psychologist Hans Eysenck came up with a more biologically based model for E/I. According to Eysenck's theory, the behaviors of introverts and extroverts are due to differences in cortical arousal (the speed and amount of the brain's activity). Compared with extroverts, **introverts have naturally high cortical arousal**, and may process more information per second.
> 1 votes

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Tags: cognitive-neuroscience, introversion
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# Question
Title: Research on aversion to cognitive effort?
I was reading Danny K's recent book for fun (*Thinking Fast and Slow*, 2011), and he suggests briefly that some people's reliance on their intuitions (i.e., "System 1") might sometimes indicate a sort of aversion to cognitive effort (i.e., "System 2").

For example, if you give a participant "Joe" a tricky problem that has an intuitive but false answer, Joe might not think too hard about the question, so he'll just give his (false) intuition. In this case, Joe does not attempt elaborative processing or sustained cognitive effort (i.e., engaging System 2) because he has learned that this can be unpleasant and/or tiring. Thus he relies on his intuition and gets the question wrong.

While there are probably many alternative explanations for Joe's behavior, it seems that aversion to mental effort could be one. Is there any research exploring this idea? Or any research that frames it in another way (e.g., something to do with affective forecasting, learning, self-regulation)? Or am I totally making this up?

# Answer
Yes, if I understood your question correctly, there is a great deal of research in Social Psychology about humans being "cognitive misers". In layman's terms, it means that humans find mental effort aversive and hence tend to rely on heuristics, categories or mental shortcuts while making judgements or while making decisions.

The theory comes within the domain of Social Cognition, and it was first introduced by social psychologists Susan Fiske and Shelley E. Taylor. It challenges the assumption in traditional economics that holds consumers as rational decision makers, and as a consequence this theory has been influential in behavioral economics. Kahneman and Tversky's work on documenting human biases can be understood simply as an extension of human's inherent limitations in cognitive processing.

This theory is very useful in political science, where voter decisions are studied. Furthermore, it also explains social phenomenon such as stereotyping.

**Sources:**

Fiske, S.T., & Taylor, S.E. (1991). Social Cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-Hill. ISBN 0070211914.

Tversky, A.; Kahneman, D. (1974). "Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases". Science 185 (4157): 1124–1131. doi:10.1126/science.185.4157.1124. PMID 17835457.

Macrae, C. N., Milne, A. B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (1994). Stereotypes as energy-saving devices: A peek inside the cognitive toolbox. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 37–47. doi:10.1037/0022- 3514.66.1.37
> 9 votes

# Answer
From what I remember from this field, there's a long-standing debate on whether heuristics are "irrational"/"suboptimal" between D. Kahneman and G. Gigerenzer. The Gigerenzer's point of view has been well put in the wiki:

> Gigerenzer argues that heuristics are not irrational or always second-best to optimization, as the accuracy-effort trade-off view assumes, in which heuristics are seen as short-cuts that trade less effort for less accuracy. In contrast, his and associated researchers' studies have identified situations in which "less is more", that is, where heuristics make more accurate decisions with less effort. This contradicts the traditional view that more information is always better or at least can never hurt if it is free. Less-is-more effects have been shown experimentally, analytically, and by computer simulations

According to this view, people are not "cognitive misers" - they are just smart. See this chapter, for some introduction (you can find it online through Google Scholar):

Gigerenzer, G. (2004). Fast and Frugal Heuristics: The Tools of Bounded Rationality. In Blackwell Handbook of Judgment and Decision Making (pp. 62–88). doi:10.1002/9780470752937.ch4

PS. I haven't followed the debate for some time, so maybe now Kahneman and Gigerenzer have changed their view or came to some agreement.
> 5 votes

# Answer
There are many answers to this question, because this is an essential research topic of any dual process model (of which there are quit a lot). Most of them posit in some way that whether people rely on "System 1" or "System 2" (or whatever they are called in the respective flavor of the model) is some combination of **motivation** (Is person X motivated to think hard in situation Y?) and **ability** (Can Person X think hard in situation Y?).

To add to the other great answers, a few more examples:

From an interindividual differences perspective, there is the concept of **Need for Cognition** and an accompanying scale that measures "the tendency for an individual to engage in and enjoy thinking" (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116). People who are low in need for cognition are, for example, more likely to process persuasive messages in a heuristic way, also are more likely to fall prey to (at least some) cognitive biases such as halo effects or anchoring, and they stereotype more strongly (Petty et al., 2009).

Also stemming from persuasion research, there is the concept of **involvement**. In a nutshell, if people don't care so much about a topic (low motivation to think hard), they will be swayed more easily by heuristic cues (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984).

There is also the concept of **Ego Depletion**, which holds self-regulatory capacity ("willpower") is a limited resource (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). According to this model, hard thinking requires self-control. If your self-regulatory capacity has been depleted (because of other difficult tasks, such as suppressing emotions or resisting temptations), you will be less likely to perform well in such tasks.

More recent research suggests that people have different **beliefs about willpower** and whether the latter phenomenon will occur: Some people more strongly belief that willpower can be drained. It's those people who will suffer more from taxing tasks (Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010).

Finally (for this answer), there is a host of situational and dispositional variables that will affect whether people are able to engage in hard thinking. For example, people with **low working memory capacity** may be more susceptible to impulsive influences on their behavior. The same occurs for people who are put under **cognitive load**, are **intoxicated**, or under **time pressure** (for a review, see Hofmann & Strack, 2009).

**References**

Baumeister, R. F., Bratslavsky, E., Muraven, M., & Tice, D. M. (1998). Ego depletion: Is the active self a limited resource? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 74, 1252–1265. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1252

Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42, 116–131.

Hofmann, W., Friese, M., & Strack, F. (2009). Impulse and self-control from a dual-systems perspective. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 4, 162–176. doi:10.1111/j.1745-6924.2009.01116.x

Job, V., Dweck, C. S., & Walton, G. M. (2010). Ego depletion-Is it all in your head? Implicit theories about willpower affect self-regulation. Psychological Science. doi:10.1177/0956797610384745

Petty, R.E., Briñol, P., Loersch, C.; McCaslin, M.J. (2009). "Chapter 21. The Need for Cognition". In Leary, Mark R. & Hoyle, Rick H. Handbook of Individual Differences in Social behavior (pp. 318–329). New York: Guildford.

Petty, R. E., & Cacioppo, J. T. (1984). The effects of involvement on responses to argument quantity and quality: Central and peripheral routes to persuasion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 69–81. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.46.1.69
> 5 votes

# Answer
In addition to @UmerVakil's great answer that general preference for system 1 thinking is often associated with mental effort minimization, I'd like to add that the more modern view is that people switch back and forth (sometimes called "motivated tactician") for a variety of possible reasons, so the idea that people might learn to be cognitively "lazy" is not really the prevailing view. Additionally, I think that Kahneman's comment may be more focused on reasons for individual differences in thinking styles rather than general preference.

System 1 and 2 are part of dual process theory, which is actually a conglomerate of subtly different theories with some commonalities (a great review here). As each individual theory has its own approach and measurement tools, this question is probably far too broad to adequately cover here, but a couple of interesting examples might suffice.

Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) is one example of a dual-process theory where significant research has been done on individual differences in thinking styles:

> Indeed, reliable individual differences in preference for thinking styles consistently emerge from studies that use these assessments. What's more, individual differences in preference for a particular thinking style, as assessed by the REI, has been associated with a number of meaningful life outcomes. A preference for rational thought shows a number of beneficial associations. Increased academic achievement (GRE scores and grade-point average), self-esteem, openness to experience, and conscientiousness and decreased levels of depression and state-trait anxiety have all been associated with Need for Cognition. Higher levels of Faith in Intuition have more mixed results. Creativity, spontaneity, emotional expression, agreeableness, extroversion, and positive interpersonal relationships have all been associated with a preference for experiential processing. However, it has also been linked with authoritarianism, superstitious beliefs, and stereotypical thinking. Sex and age differences in thinking styles have also been found.

As you asked about a learning component to such preferences, I should mention that studies that compare these particular thinking styles typically prompt subjects to switch back and forth as needed by the experiment by ... asking them. The simplicity of this method belies a learning component. A few years ago, a couple of highly publicized studies demonstrated how even more subtle prompting (using words, imagery,and even different fonts!) can have an effect on system 1 and 2 thinking preferences - the researchers were able to temporarily affect religious belief by prompting analytical thinking. It is theorized that perhaps culture plays an important role in thinking style preference: Religious people may prefer a heuristic thinking style that is more socially acceptable (less likely to result in conflict), while disbelievers have a preference for critical thinking and are less concerned with social acceptance. Establishing cause-and-effect is a challenge, so these types of studies are important in demonstrating the role of prompting in the environment in affecting thinking preference.
> 4 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology
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# Question
Title: What causes fetishes? Are they sexual disorders?
Why do people have fetishes, such as foot fetishes?
How do such fetishes form? Are childhood incidents the main cause of fetishes? Are fetishes a sexual disorder?

# Answer
> 4 votes
Having one or more fetishes is very widespread, and thus rather normal.

> The prevalence of fetishism is not known with certainty.\[21\] The majority of fetishists are male.\[21\] **In a 2011 study, 30% of men reported fetishistic fantasies**, and 24.5% had engaged in fetishistic acts. Of those reporting fantasies, 45% said the fetish was intensely sexually arousing.\[23\] **In a 2014 study, 26.3% of women and 27.8% of men acknowledged any fantasies about "having sex with a fetish or non-sexual object"**. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sexual\_fetishism

A disorder is per definiton something **abnormal**

> disorder \[dis-or´der\] a derangement or abnormality of function; http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/disorder

So the answer to your question would per definition be: **No. Having fetishes is normal and not a disorder.**

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, developmental-psychology, sexuality
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# Question
Title: What is the difference between "double dissociation" and simply having control and experimental groups?
According to my textbook *Cognitive Psychology* by E. Bruce Goldstein,

> a *double dissociation* occurs if damage to one area of the brain causes a function A to be absent while function B is present, and damage to another area causes function B to be absent while function A is present. To demonstrate a double dissociation, it is necessary to find two people with brain damage that satisfy the above conditions.

I don't understand how this is any different from merely having a control group and experimental group. Suppose I take a group of people who destroyed hippocampuses and observe they cannot store episodic memories. I then take a group of people who have hippocampus and observe they can store episodic memories. This tells me the function of the hippocampus must be in part to store episodic memories.

**My Question:**

How does a double dissociation yield information any different from this?

# Answer
> 7 votes
In brain damage/lesion studies, a double dissociation gives evidence that function A and B are, to some degree, implemented in different regions of the brain. In general, a double dissociation shows evidence that A and B are independent of each other.

This is a different kind of claim than saying that function A is implemented in brain region X. For this kind of claim, performing an experiment that lesioned (removed) a brain region in some subjects but not others (obviously not an ethical experiment, but let's ignore that) would be a reasonable way to test the claim.

However, this kind of experiment wouldn't be able to provide evidence that functions A and B are implemented in independent regions. To illustrate why, let's consider the possible outcomes of the experiment:

* **Functions A and B both remain in tact** or **Functions A and B are both disrupted**. Clearly this outcome doesn't provide any evidence that A and B are implemented in different regions, since both functions are affected equally by the lesion.
* **Only function A is disrupted, function B remains in tact**. The most that this outcome shows is that region X (the lesioned area) is crucial for function A but not B. However, what is doesn't show is that function A is independent of function B. It could be the case that function A can be disrupted without disrupting function B, but that any disruption of function B will disrupt function A.

# Answer
> 3 votes
It actually has nothing to do with having an experimental and control group.

A double dissociation refers to documenting two distinct patterns of impairment in two different groups or individuals, proving that two functions are neurologically distinct.

For example, someone with hippocampal damage will have trouble forming declarative memories (memories you are consciously aware of). If you repeatedly present them with a tone followed by an electric shock, and then play the tone and ask them what's about to happen, they won't be able to answer correctly. However, they are still capable of forming a conditioned aversion, which means that the tone will induce a feeling of fear in them even though they have no conscious memory of getting shocked. In fact, it will elicit just as much fear in a patient with hippocampal damage as in a normal control.

In contrast, someone with amygdala damage will have no trouble learning the tone-shock association - they'll figure it out as quickly as a normal control would, in fact. However, they won't be afraid of the tone. Even though they know full well that tone=shock (declaratively), and the shock is just as painful to them as it would be for a normal control, they can't form the unconscious association that the tone should be feared.

A control group is important to determine which functions are intact (as opposed to just 'less impaired'). But for a double dissociation, you need two kinds of patients with opposite impairments - not just one patient group with one function impaired.

To illustrate why one patient group wouldn't be enough, imagine you have a patient who fails second-order theory of mind tests ('I know you don't know that I know where you hid the candy') but passes first-order theory of mind ('I know you don't know where I hid the candy'). Does that mean that first-order and second-order theory of mind are distinct skills? No, because we have yet to find anyone who fails first-order theory of mind tests *who doesn't also* fail second-order theory of mind. Instead, it makes more sense to think of the two tests as measuring the same thing, with the first-order tests just being *easier* than the second-order tests.

If you were to damage the hippocampus in one group and leave the other group undamaged, you'd know the hippocampal damage caused their memory problems. But when they successfully develop a phobia of a tone paired with a shock, you wouldn't know if that's just an *easier* kind of memory to form, or if it's truly a separate memory system. You need the patient with the opposite pattern of deficits to prove that you really do have two separate systems in play.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, cognitive-neuroscience
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# Question
Title: How do cognitive scientists measure creativity?
Einstein said once something like creativity is more important than intelligence. Intelligence as it is measured is really one's speed and efficiency at processing information. How one processes the information is the 'province' of creativity.

Are there any effective, psychologically-approved tests that measure creativity and ones capacity for interesting or clever creative associations between sets of ideas?

# Answer
The **Torrance Test of Creative Thinking** is a good place to start. It scores for fluency (number of responses) as well as originality (statistical rarity of responses) and elaboration (level of detail) on a variety of different tasks. The validity of the TTCT has been examined with several long-term studies, so there is a fair amount of data on its measurements as well as the form of the test itself.

Torrance, E. P. (1981b). Empirical validation of criterion-referenced indicators of creative ability through a longitudinal study. Creative Child and Adult Quarterly, 6, 136-140.
> 8 votes

# Answer
The concept of creativity *per se* makes it hard to measure it in a standardized way, since creativity by definition opposes standardization. Even tests such as the one suggested by Krysta run into the problem that in order to rate answers with regard to their rarity will have to rely on some kind of standardization according to which one can rate the answers given. Certainly, there are tests aiming at measuring creativity. I doubt, however, that these tests truly capture the construct at which they aim.

This standpoint obviously prohibits any scientific investigation of creativity, at least using quantitative measures widely used in psychology.
> 3 votes

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Tags: measurement, methodology, intelligence, creativity
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title: Why do we procrastinate?

text:
# Question
Title: Why do we procrastinate?
As the title says. What is the cognitive reason for procrastination? I feel there is a component of uncertainty about the path to be taken. I feel like if I know exactly how to reach my goal and I want to reach it, I take the path and follow through until the end. On the other hand, if I have the feeling I don't know how to solve my problem, I get uninterested, lose track and never deliver.

Our brain is somehow always curious but also very lazy: if knowledge is at hand, it works. If not, it watches TV ;)

# Answer
Procrastination is deep and complex subject and its not "Hey you are just lazy man" thing.

People procrastinate for wide variety of reasons here are few ideas:

* Procrastination can be a symptom of deeper inner meaning problems or mindset problems.
* Procrastination can be due to fear of failure, fear of success (!)
* Procrastination can be due to be overwhelmed by size and nature of task.
* Procrastination can be due to uncertainty and analysis paralysis.
* ADD (Attention Deficit Disorder) creates brain that is myopic to time perception, which in turn creates procrastination behavior. People with ADD/ADHD often heavily discount the importance of an event if it's sufficiently far away from the current time. Only thing that gets done is events screaming "Your house is on fire, do it NOW". They live in perpetual now discounting the future, everything far away in time is simply a blur until it comes too close within their range of time perception which is 'now'.
* Procrastination can be due to inability to focus and distraction issues.

The list is only partial, you can google out following terms to learn more:

Growth verses fixed mindset, Distraction and Continuous Partial Attention, ADHD Russell Barkley
> 2 votes

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Tags: procrastination
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