# Question
Title: Have there been followups to the Rosenhan Experiment?
The famous Rosenhan experiment of 1973 showed that doctors in asylums routinely misdiagnosed normal people with various psychiatric disorders.

Have any followup studies been done to confirm these results? I am particularly interested in any studies in which the pseudopatients did not feign insanity, but act normally during the course of the experiment.

# Answer
> 2 votes
There **was** a follow-up to Rosenhan (1973). The whole study was revisited by Scribner (2001).

> The present study is a replication of sorts, modified to suit the contemporary, postdeinstitutionalization state of mental health care. The findings suggest that a significant shift has occurred in mental health care since 1973. At the time of the original study by Rosenhan (1973), the troubling issue was the ease with which people could receive an unwarranted diagnosis and unnecessary treatment for a nonexistent mental disorder. In today's mental health care environment, the troubling issue is the difficulty involved in obtaining treatment that is warranted for conditions that are present.

## References

Rosenhan, D. L. (1973). On being sane in insane places. *Science*, 179(4070), 250-258. DOI: 10.1126/science.179.4070.250

Scribner, C. M. (2001). Rosenhan revisited. *Professional Psychology: Research and Practice*, 32(2), 215. DOI: 10.1037/0735-7028.32.2.215

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, experimental-psychology, psychiatry
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title: Brain Wave Research PTSD, Depression

text:
# Question
Title: Brain Wave Research PTSD, Depression
Let me preface this with I am a Software Engineer, NOT a neuro-scientist. Please forgive me if my terminology isn't spot on.

I am obsessed with using my skills as a computer scientist to help veterans with PTSD and Depression.

Currently I am attempting to do research on the effects that depression takes on brainwaves. From my, all be it limited, understanding, depression causes a drop in Alpha brainwaves. I want to continue doing research on this topic and nail down as many brainwave signals as possible before I go into the development phase but for the life of me, I have no idea where to begin my research.

What I am looking for is someone to provide me with a resource\[s\] that will teach me about the effects depression has on brainwaves.

# Answer
> 2 votes
Some research which may help is as follows:

Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., Rytsälä, H., Suominen, K., Isometsä, E., & Kähkönen, S. (2007). **Impaired functional connectivity at EEG alpha and theta frequency bands in major depression**. *Human brain mapping*, 28(3), 247-261. DOI: 10.1002/hbm.20275

Peniston, E. G., & Kulkosky, P. J. (1991). **Alpha-theta brainwave neurofeedback for Vietnam veterans with combat-related post-traumatic stress disorder**. *Medical Psychotherapy*, 4(1), 47-60.

Saxby, E., & Peniston, E. G. (1995). **Alpha‐theta brainwave neurofeedback training: An effective treatment for male and female alcoholics with depressive symptoms**. *Journal of clinical psychology*, 51(5), 685-693.
DOI: 10.1002/1097-4679(199509)51:5%3C685::AID-JCLP2270510514%3E3.0.CO;2-K

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, reference-request, clinical-psychology, neuropsychology
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# Question
Title: Is it possible to develop immunity to mental health drugs?
After watching The Princess Bride, I discovered this word: Mithridatism, "the practice of protecting oneself against a poison by gradually self-administering non-lethal amounts."

Is it possible for people to become immune to mental health drugs after sometime of taking them?

# Answer
> 2 votes
It seems that it is possible.

Norman Sussman, MD (2017) discusses pharmacological and non-pharmacological causes of treatment resistance.

> Treatment resistance is addressed in the latest edition of the *\[Kaplan and Sadock's\] Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry* as follows: “Some patients fail to respond to repeated trials of medication. No single factor can explain the ineffectiveness of the various interventions in these cases. Strategies in these cases include the use of drug combinations, high-dose therapy, and use of unconventional drugs. Limited evidence is available on the comparative success rates associated with any given strategy (Sadock et al., 2017).” This Special Report on treatment resistance provides expert guidance on how to treat patients who are still unresponsive after multiple unsuccessful attempts at intervention for some common mental disorders. ADHD, PTSD, panic disorder, and bipolar disorder are especially difficult to treat successfully, for a number of reasons...

## References

Sadock, B. J., Sadock, V. A., & Ruiz, P. (2017). *Kaplan and Sadock's Comprehensive Textbook of Psychiatry* 10th ed. Philadelphia: Wolters Kluwer Health/Lippincott Williams & Wilkins.

Sussman, N. (2017). Treatment Resistance in Psychiatry. *Psychiatric Times* 34(11) Special Report Retrieved from: http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/special-reports/introduction-treatment-resistance-psychiatry

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, psychopharmacology
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title: Meaning of "attitudinal acceptance"

text:
# Question
Title: Meaning of "attitudinal acceptance"
I found an interesting study called "A Comparison of Family Functioning, Life and Marital Satisfaction, and Mental Health of Women in Polygamous and Monogamous Marriages" by Al-Krenawi et al. It is about the negative impact of polygamy on numerous aspects of the wifes' wellbeing. As an erstwhile physicist I understand statistics, but the terminology in psychology and psychiatry is totally new for me.

I want to ask about the precise meaning of the word "attitudinal in "attitudinal acceptance". The context is the following:

> Previous research suggests that education and attitudinal acceptance of polygamy are inversely correlated...

Google search returns a plethora of scientific articles, but so far I haven’t spotted a definition. The general definition of "attitudinal" from Webster reads:

> relating to, based on, or expressive of personal attitudes or feelings

and seems to suggest that any acceptance would be attitudinal. Thus, I believe it must carry a specific meaning in psychology.

# Answer
For more context, the passage in Al-Krenawi & Graham (2006) reads as follows on page 12.

> Previous research suggests that education and attitudinal acceptance of polygamy are inversely correlated (Heaton & Hirschl, 1999; Maziak et al., 2002; Nevadomsky, 1991); other findings are less conclusive (Nevadomsky, 1991). The Bedouin-Arab community is in a massive state of transition, part of which includes higher attainment for youth. Respondents in monogamous marriages therefore may have had greater opportunity for education; and the potential for less acceptance of polygamy may be modestly influential on the cohort.

My interpretation is that research indicated by 3 papers suggests that where education is high, acceptance of polygamy is low, and where education is low, acceptance is high. **The acceptance is shown through attitude**.

As @ArnonWeinberg pointed out, "attitude" would normally refer to "expressed attitude" measured via a survey or interview or similar report. In this case it was questionnaires.

> Questionnaires were structured; data collectors were present during the interview, completed the questionnaire forms with the respondent and, for those with limited reading or writing skills, the researchers read to the respondent and filled in the questionnaire according to the given responses (pages 7—8).

## References

Heaton, T., & Hirschl, T. A. (1999). The trajectory of family change in Nigeria. *Journal of Comparative Family Studies* 30(1), 35-55. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/41603608

Al-Krenawi, A., & Graham, J. R. (2006). A comparison of family functioning, life and marital satisfaction, and mental health of women in polygamous and monogamous marriages. *International Journal of Social Psychiatry*, 52(1), 5-17. DOI: 10.1177/00207640060061245

Maziak, W., Asfar, T., Mzayek, F., Fouad, F. M., & Kilzieh, N. (2002). Socio-demographic correlates of psychiatric morbidity among low-income women in Aleppo, Syria. Social science & medicine, 54(9), 1419-1427. DOI: 10.1016/S0277-9536(01)00123-X

Nevadomsky, J. (1991). Attitudes of Nigerian students toward marriage and family relationships. *International Journal of Sociology of the Family*, 21(2), 201–212. Retrieved$nbsp;from http://www.jstor.org/stable/23029820
> 2 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, terminology
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# Question
Title: Is there a term for the desire to maintain a level of anxiety?
As a war veteran who has/had PTSD, I've noticed in myself a desire to maintain a level of anxiety and stress closer to what I was used to.

You've probably also heard/seen this type of behavior from other veterans who engage in High Risk Behavior after separation from service.

I've also known former incarcerated individuals and PhD graduates who do the same.

Is there an official term for this behavior? Further reading on the topic?

# Answer
With "normal" risk taking related to "thrill seekers" what you could be talking about can be

* **Sensation Seeking** (Zuckerman, 2007)
> Risky behavior can be an expression of a normal, genetically influenced personality trait, sensation seeking. Its expression in risky behaviors such as extreme and risky sports, vocations, substance abuse, unsafe sex, and crime, among others, is the topic of this fascinating and accessible book.

or

* **Disinhibition** (Wikipedia), which is a lack of restraint manifested in disregard for social conventions, impulsivity, and poor risk assessment.

In the case of PTSD (or other mental health problems) causing the behaviour, it is **Negative Urgency** (Cyders & Smith, 2008), which is the tendency to engage in rash action in response to extreme negative affects (experiences of negative emotions, poor self-esteem and/or poor self-concept)

Cyders & Smith (2008) believe there is

> striking circumstantial evidence that positive and negative urgency play an important role in adolescence. It seems likely that the normative adolescent experience involves a developmentally limited increase in levels of urgency, and also that there are important individual differences in the urgency traits during these years.

A study conducted by James, Strom & Leskela (2014) looked at the risk-taking behaviours and impulsivity among veterans with and without PTSD. They also compared the results with those who not only suffered PTSD, but also mild Traumatic Brain Injury (mTBI).

> \[A\] 42-item scale developed for the study permitted the assessment of a wide range of behaviors that are not captured in existing risk-taking measures but tend to be common and problematic among veterans (e.g., risky driving practices). Items were derived from a review of relevant literature. Participants reported how frequently they engaged in each of the behaviors using a 5-point Likert-type scale ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (very often). Total scores range from 0 to 63. In addition to the total score, scores on four subscales (substance abuse, aggression, risky sexual practices, and thrill seeking) were also evaluated **\[...\]**
>
> As expected, the co-occurring PTSD + mTBI group endorsed significantly more risk-taking behaviors and Negative Urgency than the control group and significantly more risky substance use, aggressive behavior, and Negative Urgency than the mTBI group. An identical pattern was found for the PTSD group compared to the control group and the mTBI group. Counter to expectations, the co-occurring PTSD + mTBI group did not endorse significantly more impulsivity and risk-taking behaviors than the PTSD group. That is, individuals with PTSD, regardless of TBI status (i.e., PTSD; PTSD + mTBI), tended to engage in more risky behaviors and more impulsive behaviors in the context of negative affective states than controls and those with mTBI only. The control group and mTBI group did not significantly differ from each other. Across all four groups, thrill-seeking behaviors were the most frequently reported risk-taking behaviors. There were no group differences in Sensation Seeking.

Not surprising, considering the nature of PTSD and its effects, the study also found other highly problematic behaviours

> Notably, both theoretical and empirical works also link disinhibition, or the highly related construct of impulsivity, to suicide-related behaviors. In the present study, the PTSD groups (i.e., PTSD, PTSD + mTBI) were not only characterized by greater levels of the Negative Urgency facet of impulsivity and risk-taking behaviors than the mTBI and control groups but were also more likely than the control group to have thought about suicide and purposely driven a vehicle into another object. Thus, premorbid disinhibition may place people on a track toward later involvement in risky or other highly problematic behaviors that ultimately result in psychopathological and self-destructive outcomes.

(See also, Cyders & Smith (2008) about urgency and psychopathology)

**Due to risks involved with Negative Urgency, therapy needs to be sought with regard to this too.**

## Therapy Available

When receiving psychological help for PTSD, it is best to highlight the fact that you have a desire to maintain a level of anxiety and stress closer to what you are now used to compared to the past. That way, the best form of help can be ascertained via your therapy provider.

Your therapist may be able to incorporate therapy for this using the same techniques they use for your PTSD, or they may tweak the sessions to incorporate other techniques such as Cognitive Behaviour Therapy (CBT) or Dialectical Behavior Therapy (DBT; see Linehan, 1993 or Lynch, et al., 2007)

> One main focus of DBT is teaching individuals to respond adaptively to the experience of extreme emotional states, referred to in this treatment as Distress Tolerance Skills.

## References

Cyders, M. A., & Smith, G. T. (2008). Emotion-based Dispositions to Rash Action: Positive and Negative Urgency. *Psychological Bulletin*, 134(6), 807–828. PMCID: PMC2705930 DOI: 10.1037/a0013341

James, L. M., Strom, T. Q., & Leskela, J. (2014). Risk-taking behaviors and impulsivity among veterans with and without PTSD and mild TBI. *Military medicine*, 179(4), 357-363. DOI: 10.7205/MILMED-D-13-00241

Linehan, M. (1987). Dialectical-behavioral treatment of borderline personality disorder: Theory and Method. *Bulletin of the Menninger Clinic*, 51(3), 261—276
Free ResearchGate PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Marsha\_Linehan/publication/19580590\_Dialectical\_Behavior\_Therapy\_for\_Borderline\_Personality\_Disorder\_Theory\_and\_Method/links/553076c80cf20ea0a06f7fb8/Dialectical-Behavior-Therapy-for-Borderline-Personality-Disorder-Theory-and-Method.pdf

Lynch, T. R., Trost, W. T., Salsman, N., & Linehan, M. M. (2007). Dialectical behavior therapy for borderline personality disorder. *Annual Review of Clinical Psychology*, 3, 181-205. DOI: 10.1146/annurev.clinpsy.2.022305.095229
Free ResearchGate PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Marsha\_Linehan/publication/6124095\_Dialectical\_Behavior\_Therapy\_for\_Borderline\_Personality\_Disorder/links/599ce0290f7e9b892bb003d9/Dialectical-Behavior-Therapy-for-Borderline-Personality-Disorder.pdf
> 3 votes

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Tags: personality, anxiety, ptsd
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# Question
Title: Is there any strong empirical support that "casual" (10-20 minutes per day) mindfulness meditation leads to lasting cognitive improvements?
I want to emphasize that I'm not referring to the intense mindfulness-based cognitive therapy (MBCT), but instead just 10-20 minutes of daily mindfulness meditation (MM), perhaps guided by a smartphone app.

It's usually claimed that MM leads to improvements in the prefrontal cortex (enhanced focus, working memory etc.) and the amygdala (reduced depression, anxiety, stress etc.).

I have read recent studies claiming that mindfulness meditation is no more effective than watching a documentary, is counterproductive at work etc. (Some of these studies may have been context-specific.) Anecdotally, I've done MM myself on-and-off for several years and didn't notice any significant improvements in the areas listed above.

Due to publication bias, p-hacking, the reproducibility crisis etc. and my own personal experience, I'm skeptical that MM does anything significant (noticeable changes) and/or lasting (after the meditation, during the day).

Is there a large-scale, pre-registered replication effort to support the benefits of 'casual' MM (i.e., not the more intense MBCT)?

# Answer
> 4 votes
The following is the empirical support I can find

> **Beauchemin, J., Hutchins, T. L., & Patterson, F. (2008). Mindfulness meditation may lessen anxiety, promote social skills, and improve academic performance among adolescents with learning disabilities. *Complementary Health Practice Review*, 13(1), 34-45. DOI: 10.1177/1533210107311624**
>
> **Free PDF**
>
> All outcome measures showed significant improvement, with participants who completed the program demonstrating decreased state and trait anxiety, enhanced social skills, and improved academic performance. Although not directly assessed, the outcomes are consistent with a cognitive-interference model of learning disability and suggest that mindfulness meditation decreases anxiety and detrimental self-focus of attention, which, in turn, promotes social skills and academic outcomes.

> **Moore, A., & Malinowski, P. (2009). Meditation, mindfulness and cognitive flexibility. *Consciousness and cognition*, 18(1), 176-186. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2008.12.008**
>
> **Free PDF**
>
> Overall the results suggest that attentional performance and cognitive flexibility are positively related to meditation practice and levels of mindfulness. Meditators performed significantly better than non-meditators on all measures of attention. Furthermore, self-reported mindfulness was higher in meditators than non-meditators and correlations with all attention measures were of moderate to high strength. This pattern of results suggests that mindfulness is intimately linked to improvements of attentional functions and cognitive flexibility. The relevance of these findings for mental balance and well-being are discussed.

> **Zeidan, F., Johnson, S. K., Diamond, B. J., David, Z., & Goolkasian, P. (2010). Mindfulness meditation improves cognition: Evidence of brief mental training. *Consciousness and cognition*, 19(2), 597-605. DOI: 10.1016/j.concog.2010.03.014**
>
> **Free PDF**
>
> Our findings, with naïve participants learning mindfulness techniques by means of a brief training format, are consistent with those that have been reported for adept meditators. Four days (20 min/day) of MM training was effective in signifi- cantly increasing mindfulness scores in comparison to an active control group. Our brief MM training protocol promoted sig- nificant effects on several cognitive tasks that require sustained attention and executive processing efficiency (Symbol Digit Modalities Test, verbal fluency, and the hit runs on n-back task). However, no specific benefits from MM training were found with many of the mood scales, the forward and backward digit span or speed on the n-back task. It is important to note that the groups did not differ at baseline on any of the measures and had no prior meditative experience.

> **Chiesa, A., Calati, R., & Serretti, A. (2011). Does mindfulness training improve cognitive abilities? A systematic review of neuropsychological findings. *Clinical psychology review*, 31(3), 449-464. DOI: 10.1016/j.cpr.2010.11.003**
>
> **Free PDF**
>
> \[T\]he results of the present review provide preliminary support for the notion that MMPs could provide significant benefits on several measures of cognition which seem specific for the phase of meditation training under investigation. However, further higher quality studies focusing on more standardized MMPs are needed to replicate available findings, to more deeply explore the effects of mindfulness training on further domains of cognition and to reduce discrepancies of findings deriving from systematic differences in mindfulness protocols.

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Tags: meditation
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# Question
Title: Why might sleeping on the floor alleviate PTSD symptoms?
**Question:**

Does sleeping on the floor have similar neurotransmitter effects, as sleeping under a weighted blanket might? Psychiatrically, would it be expected that a person having PTSD would find similar results sleeping under a weighted blanket as they do when they sleep on the floor?

***Could sleeping on the floor actually be a subconscious attempt at regulating neurotransmitters or possibly even to promote better REM sleep?***

**Background:**

There are many views on the interplay of different neurotransmitters and hormones, (dopamine, serotonin, etc.), and PTSD, anxiety, depression, etc.

There is also a lot of consensus on how weighted blankets seem to help alleviate these symptoms, providing that sense of security. They also seem to be used a lot by parents of children with Autism, Aspergers, and ADHD.

There are a variety of theories why people with PTSD sleep on the floor, could a valid rival hypothesis be a neurotransmitter affect?

1. To be in a position to respond to threats more effectively.
2. To askew comforts, and lavishness, in view of self-worth.
3. The sense of security and being "grounded".

Article linking sleeping on the floor with hypervigilance: Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Reactions.

# Answer
> Why might sleeping on the floor alleviate PTSD symptoms?
>
> Question: Does sleeping on the floor have similar neurotransmitter effects, as sleeping under a weighted blanket might? Psychiatrically, would it be expected that a person having PTSD would find similar results sleeping under a weighted blanket as they do when they sleep on the floor?
>
> There is also a lot of consensus on how weighted blankets seem to help alleviate these symptoms, providing that sense of security. They also seem to be used a lot by parents of children with Autism, Aspergers, and ADHD.
>
> Could sleeping on the floor also be related to this, possibly because of the firmness and sense of security felt from being on the floor? (Even if physically uncomfortable.)

No. Don't connect those very different studies and use it as a basis for a conclusion.

The article you reference mentions the word "floor" 3 times, twice to mention that 2 children sleep on the floor and the third time the author writes:

> "Children who sleep on the floor instead of their bed after a trauma do so because they fear the comfort of a bed will let them sleep so hard that they won’t hear danger coming.".

It is the claim, of proponents of weighted blankets, that they: reduce movement, let you feel as if you are being held, and thus promote better sleep.

Source: "What's the deal with weighted blankets?":

> "The thought is that this weight mimics the pressure of being held, which helps release anxiety to let you fall asleep faster. Some studies, including a 2015 one "Positive Effects of a Weighted Blanket on Insomnia" from the Journal of Sleep Medicine and Disorders, back this up (.PDF). The research found that weighted blankets did in fact provide a "beneficial calming effect" for those suffering from insomnia.

In case one it is the decision of a few children that they won't sleep as well, in the second case it is businesses that want to sell weighted blankets to cause you to sleep better. Opposites.

References on beds such as Wikipedia's "Bed" webpage or Mattress Mart's "History of the Bed" ;) attribute the invention of the bed as a means to increase comfort. One must also consider pressure ulcers caused by insufficient padding and reduced movement.

Comparing misread articles, few in number, and extending it to other unreferenced articles and ailments isn't a supported basis on which to advance a theory on psychology involving biological, behavioral, cognitive and social disciplines.

> Prior to 3600 BC mankind did without bedding.

> Source: "History of the world - Early Humans":
>
> The closest living relatives of modern humans, Homo sapiens, evolved around 4.6 to 6.2 million years ago. Anatomically modern humans arose in Africa about 200,000 years ago, and reached behavioural modernity about 50,000 years ago.

By the reasoning of your theory and extension of those two prior paragraphs one would conclude that prior to 5620 years ago there were no PTSDs, it is the modern bed that is a contributing factor.
> 3 votes

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Tags: sleep, autism, dopamine, ptsd, serotonin
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# Question
Title: Need to define observation/phenomenon in order to study it, same replies to same political topics, different individuals
I was wondering if anyone could help me define my observation, in order to read some literature on the subject. I have some Cog. Psych. background but have never encountered this during my studies. It is a social, behavioral and a cognitive phenomenon, that I have observed reading the news and political forums. Every time N Korea is mentioned, people start talking about how hungry their nation is, and make jokes about Kim's weight. Almost every time a popular topic appears on the news regarding the subject, these kinds of posts can be seen. I can provide many examples, if necessary. It is always different individuals with the same kinds of replies/responses.

Is there anything I can read to inform myself about this phenomenon ?

EDIT: as pointed out, not all observations/phenomena need a term. However, I do need some references to read more about it, so I am not completely lost.

# Answer
> 1 votes
I doubt there's anything deeper than a meme or stereotyping at play here. See https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/hungry-kim-jong-un

> On December 23rd, the "Kim Jong-Un is Hungry"\[4\] single topic blog launched on the microblogging site Tumblr with the tagline "He's always thinking about food. For himself… not for his people."

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Tags: bias, behaviorism, cognitive
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# Question
Title: Does James Holmes diagnosis of schizotypal personality disorder indicate a predisposition for mass murder?
> On May 27, Dr. William Reid, a court-appointed psychiatrist who interviewed Holmes for a total of about 22 hours, testified that Holmes was mentally ill but legally sane, diagnosing him as having schizotypal personality disorder, which is characterized by constricted behavior and difficulties relating to others.

From Wikipedia

In other interviews and articles I have read, Holmes told psychiatrists that he had always had homicidal thoughts, in childhood they were to do with killing everyone via nuclear weapons, but progressed to more realistic scenarios (serial killing or gun rampage) as he got older. (This was contained in the recently unsealed psychiatric evaluation released by the court).

My question: does schizotypal personality disorder explain lifelong homicidal ideation / obsession, or predisposition to same? If not, why does James Holmes' psychiatric evaluation (both court-appointed and otherwise) fail to address the source or origin of his self-confessed homicidal tendencies (even speculatively)?

Such attempted explanation would seem to have had high intrinsic value.

# Answer
> 5 votes
So the question is

> does schizotypal personality disorder explain lifelong homicidal ideation / obsession, or predisposition to same?

Schizotypal personality disorder does include paranoid ideation among its symptoms. Paranoid ideation has been linked to homicidal behavior in some studies

> Patients who reported homicide attempts could be distinguished from patients with no homicidal behaviors by the presence of other aggressive behavior such as suicidal ideation and suicide attempts by themselves and their family members and by elevated current measures of interpersonal sensitivity, hostility, and paranoid ideation.

As to whether it's enough to "explain" such behavior... that's a tricky question as it depends on what you mean by "explain". If you interpret "explain" as "makes it more likely", a psychiatrists would say yes. If you interpret "explain" as "excuses in the eyes of the law", a jurist would say no.

According to Wikipedia (which does not cite any ref for this)

> Most courts accept a major mental illness such as psychosis but will not accept the diagnosis of a personality disorder for the purposes of an insanity defense

Note however that the distinction between personality disorders and the rest (formerly axis I) has been abolished in DSM 5. So this is an area of fairly recent changes in psychiatric thinking. I don't know how courts will react (or maybe some have done so already) in reaction to this change in the DSM. N.B. you'll probably want to read https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3811091/ for more on the criminal law and personality disorders; it's written in 2013 (so after the adoption of DSM-5), but doesn't mention any cases where the new categorizatoin has influenced criminal-law decisions. I guess it was still too early for that. See also http://jaapl.org/content/42/2/141.long which is more focused on the DSM-5 change. From the latter is worth quoting:

> The DSM-5 contains an expanded Cautionary Statement of explicit relevance to forensic psychiatry. It states in part that, “In most situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-5 mental disorder … does not imply that an individual meets legal criteria for the presence of a mental disorder or a specified legal standard… .” It goes on to state that, “a diagnosis does not carry any necessary implications regarding the … individual's degree of control over behaviors that may be associated with the disorder” (Ref. 3, p 25).

So again a psychiatrist's view and a the law's view are different. Note than in mostly non-US (but still English-law-based) jurisdictions, there's a notion of diminished responsibility, often applied in cases of mental illness contributing to a crime. The US law use of this notion of diminished responsibility appears very limited; it seems to be used mostly in California (but not in Colorado where Holmes was tried.)

And since we're talking serial killers with psychotic tendencies it's probably worth recalling the case of Breivik and Norwegian law. It's hard to summarize that case here since it's an entire saga with front-page disagreements on the diagnosis etc., as well as peculiarities of the Norwegian law with respect to mental illness definitions. But in the case of Breivik, just like in that of Holmes, there was no agreement among psychiatrist what his diagnosis should be. In Breivik's case the court ultimately accepted the personality disorder diagnosis rather than an axis I diagnosis proposed by some psychiatrists. In the case of Holmes the alternative diagnosis was schizoaffective disorder, offered by another court-appointed psychiatrist. Given the difference in law between Colorado and Norway, it's less relevant what Holmes' actual diagnosis was; in Norway a psychotic disorder automatically qualified as incompetence to stand trial, but not in Colorado, where the M'Naghten test (telling right from wrong) applies.

And coming back to the meaning of "explain", the latter psychiatrist who examined Holmes said:

> Metzner, who diagnosed Holmes with schizoaffective disorder, said he did not think Holmes went on his rampage to get notoriety or because of his longstanding hatred of mankind, which he described in a spiral notebook. Instead, Metzner said, Holmes' actions were "directly related" to delusions that killing people would increase his self-worth.
> "I can come up with no other explanation for what he did," Metzner said.
> Holmes knew what he was doing was illegal and that others would think it was wrong, Metzner reiterated in response to questions from District Attorney George Brauchler. The prosecutor brought up Holmes' statement that he did not want to date someone because he did not want anyone to be featured in news coverage as the girlfriend of a mass killer.

And paralleling the Berivik case, the judge didn't dig this

> \[Judge\] Samour ordered a second evaluation after he found Metzner’s report was “incomplete and inadequate.”

---

And regarding some of the subsequent questions

> Is it likely that such ideation could be kept secret for one's whole life?

Schizotypal personality disorder also has among symptoms a "reduced capacity for close relationships" usually manifested as "lack of close friends". So that makes it more likely such individuals will not have many people they could talk to about their weird ideas, so they may not get noticed until it's too late.

From the unsealed notes of Dr. Fenton and Ms. Roath

> Holmes had been referred to Dr Fenton by University of Colorado social worker Margaret Roath in March 2012, who noted it was “hard to interview him as he would just start and take a long time to answer”.
>
> “When I asked him about other symptoms, he said he did not want to say as I would have to report him. He says he wants to kill other people, but no one in particular and has never done anything to harm others,” Roath noted.
>
> A note of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder was accompanied by the description that “(Holmes) has problems concentrating, eats OK, does not have crying spells and does not have thoughts of suicide.”
>
> In an email to Dr Fenton to see him “soon if possible”, Ms Roath described Holmes was the “most anxious guy I have seen”.
>
> “Most concerning is that he has thoughts of killing others people, though I do not think he is dangerous,” she said, adding Dr Fenton would see him as it “might be best to keep him in the system”. \[...\]
>
> In her notes, Dr Fenton expressed concern over Holmes’s homicidal thoughts but his lack of a willingness to address specifics with her. He told her if she revealed more details she would “lock him up.”
>
> Those in charge of his courses has told her of his “extremely awkward” social interactions and “odd comments”, but “neither had heard of him making threatening remarks”, she noted in a June client summary.
>
> A background check had revealed no weapons permits, she said.
>
> “At this point. James is … intermittently functioning at a psychotic level,” Dr Fenton wrote.
>
> But she concluded he “does not currently meet criteria for a mental health hold”.
>
> “He is not gravely disabled and has no evidence of suicidal ideation. Longstanding homicidal ideation but denies any specific targets and there is no current evidence he is angry at the grad school (or anyone else).”
>
> She noted that while Holmes had made hostile remarks to her and another psychiatrist, he had not made threats.
>
> Captioned: "Psychiatric notes released to public. This one, a mental status exam, by Dr Fenton"

So your (2nd) question becomes mostly hypothetical in view of this. Also, whatever obscure statement he may have made to a friend about "floodgates" pale in comparison to the more direct statements made to mental health professionals before the murders, although had a professional heard those, they might have seen it as a sign he was going to act. We can only speculate at this point what some professional might have done corroborating all the evidence.

As an aside, Fenton was sued in 2013 by some victims' relatives. Fenton did warn someone on the campus police:

> The documents show Fenton went to University of Colorado police officer Lynn Whitten and informed her that Holmes confessed homicidal thoughts to her and that he was a danger to the public, "per her requirement," the documents say. Whitten responded "by deactivating Holmes' key-card access to secure areas of University of Colorado medical campus buildings," the Denver Post writes. Fenton also told Whitten that Holmes had "stopped seeing her and had begun threatening her via text message," the documents state.

There's a bit more of the campus-level story:

> Holmes started seeing Fenton in 2012 to help with his social anxiety. He soon confided that he was having thoughts about killing people.
>
> His last visit was June 11, 2012. By then he had already amassed an arsenal of weapons and body armor and was meticulously planning his attack on a packed showing of a new Batman movie. But all Holmes told Fenton and another psychiatrist, Robert Feinstein, was that he had failed a key exam and was dropping out of the neuroscience program.
>
> Holmes "left in a huff," Fenton told Whitten, whom she called the same day. She was concerned because Homes had told her "I want to kill as many people as possible," and she wondered if he was nearing a psychotic break, according to the documents.
>
> Though he had "constant homicidal thoughts," Fenton told Whitten, he had never revealed specific targets or plans. But Whitten wrote in her notes that "Holmes indicated to Fenton that he liked thinking about it."
>
> Fenton was alarmed enough to violate Holmes' health privacy rights and call his mother, Arlene. But Fenton did not tell Arlene Holmes about her son's homicidal obsession, instead mentioning that he'd dropped out of school.
>
> The documents show that Fenton found Holmes' mother's reaction reassuring.
>
> She left a voicemail for Whitten: "It's pretty good news on our guy James. It sounds like he's always been like this. I've talked to his mom, she and the dad are kind of putting some quiet support in place. They've got my number in case they need anything."
>
> She concluded: "So, anyway, I think we've got everything in place for now, so if something else comes up I'll let you know."
>
> Arlene Holmes testified during the trial that Fenton didn't return her calls seeking more information. Fenton chose not to detain Holmes because she felt he was "on the borderline" and didn't think it would help, she told Whitten, according to the documents provided by the university.
>
> About the same time, Fenton called University of Colorado professor Sukumar Vijayaraghavan, head of the neuroscience program, about Holmes, according to documents provided by prosecutors.
>
> "James had told her (Fenton) he did not think he would make a mark on the world with science so he could blow up people and become famous," Vijayaraghavan told Aurora police after the shooting. Vijayaraghavan said he then called Whitten, who told him "action would be taken immediately." She said she had suspended his student ID and "police are aware of the situation and are keeping an eye on the whole thing."
>
> After the shooting, Whitten told Aurora police she "discussed Holmes" with her sergeant and checked with others on the status of his withdrawal from the university.
>
> \[...\]
>
> The university said in a statement that its faculty and staff acted responsibly. Campus police officer Lynn Whitten, who was not named in the lawsuit, has since retired. Her attorney, Tom Rice, said she did all that she could with the limited information she had, none of which gave her reason to believe Holmes was an imminent danger.

From this one can guess that the civl lawsuit against Fenton didn't get far because:

> Under Colorado law, mental health professionals cannot be held liable in civil suits for failing to predict a patient’s violent actions unless it involves a “serious threat of imminent physical violence against a specific person or persons.”

And I was right on the money, the lawsuit against Fenton was dismissed in 2016.

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, developmental-psychology
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title: Saying things to shock others

text:
# Question
Title: Saying things to shock others
Is it *strange* or *categorically bad* to say things that shock others knowingly, and enjoy their reaction?

I have a close friend who partakes in such behavior, and I want to understand his motivation a bit better.

**Some context**

> I am not speaking about an attention aspect, per se, since this satisfaction from saying "shocking things" would be usually in a personal relationship context, whether that be friendship, intimate, or familial.

Perhaps the idea stems from *hurting others as a coping mechanism?*

> Further, the satisfaction is not sexual at all, but merely a satisfaction from the reaction to whatever was said.

---

I am currently investigating this idea, as I have seen my friend partake in such behavior, and often at that. This behavior is private, so I am doubtful that it is for attention.

# Answer
If I understand the question correctly, this article might interest you.

To break it down, it suggests that actions taken out to seek attention are a coping mechanism that have their roots in early neglect by the family. Since attention is an important social need, if it is not readily available as a child, the brain wires itself to go to extreme lengths to receive it.

In the case you mentioned, saying inflammatory things to enjoy a reaction fulfills that need for attention. According to the article, this releases endorphins that reduce the anxiety that accompanies not receiving adequate attention.
> 0 votes

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Tags: behavior
---


title: MEG from simulated neurons

text:
# Question
Title: MEG from simulated neurons
Given MEG is an approximation of neuronal spiking, are there any models that associate the spiking of simulated neurons to an MEG signal? Ideally, this would be a model with some amount of behaviour (mapping to an output, such as a motor action), but purely biological models are fine too.

# Answer
> 4 votes
Techniques that measure brain activity at a distance such as EEG and MEG measure spiking activity very poorly and indirectly. Instead, these techniques primarily measure *synaptic currents*.

Synaptic currents of course originate in some way from spiking activity, however:

1. Synaptic currents may not occur in the vicinity of the spiking cells
2. The amplitude of synaptic currents depends on the current state of the cells impinged upon
3. Synaptic currents of different types in the same area can cancel each other out
4. Phase, polarity, and geometry can lead to a complex inverse problem at the sensor that has an infinite number of solutions.

However, by making some rather strong assumptions, one can attempt to solve this inverse problem. Higher frequency EEG/MEG activity is more closely associated with spiking activity, and therefore most appropriate for attempting to localize spiking rather than other types of activity. See for example David and Friston 2003.

I'd also add that although the current agreement seems to be that EEG/MEG primarily come from synaptic currents, because synaptic currents do originate ultimately from some sort of spiking, EEG/MEG signals can correlate well with spiking activity measured with depth electrodes (for example Whittingstall & Logothetis, 2009). It's just likely that the correlation is indirect, mediated through synaptic potentials.

---

Buzsáki, G., Anastassiou, C. A., & Koch, C. (2012). The origin of extracellular fields and currents—EEG, ECoG, LFP and spikes. Nature reviews neuroscience, 13(6), 407.

David, O., & Friston, K. J. (2003). A neural mass model for MEG/EEG:: coupling and neuronal dynamics. NeuroImage, 20(3), 1743-1755.

Whittingstall, K., & Logothetis, N. K. (2009). Frequency-band coupling in surface EEG reflects spiking activity in monkey visual cortex. Neuron, 64(2), 281-289.

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Tags: reference-request, theoretical-neuroscience, meg
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# Question
Title: Human vision detection of faint blinking or moving point of light, guidelines for sensitivity versus frequency
This question is in the neurology/neuroscience rather than the psychology aspect of this site.

I'd like to check the limits of visibility of a (presumably green) LED at large (kilometer) distance, and I'm assuming that modulation of intensity (blinking) or position ("wiggling") would make the same brightness noticeable at larger distances than a steady, stationary point of light.

My options are to vary the frequency and duty cycle of the pulses, and to alternately flash two different LEDs separated by a large enough distance that the point would appear to "wiggle" or move slightly either left/right, or up/down.

Neurologists and human visual processing researchers have studied the limits of visual detection of stimuli for quite a long time, and so the body of work is quite large and therefore beyond my scope of understanding.

Might there be a *best frequency* or range of frequencies for blinking or "wiggling" that the human vision system might be most sensitive to? I'm just guessing that it might be somewhere near the range of 1 Hz to 10 Hz, but I'm just guessing without any scientific basis.

As far as separation for the "wiggle" what might a *best separation* or range of separations that might be most noticeable?

An answer that points me to the underlying physiological phenomenon that I should read further about would be just as acceptable as numbers with supporting links. Because I'm not so familliar with the neurology of vision, I can't judge beforehand which way to cast the question.

---

Possibly helpful for context or background are my previous questions:

# Answer
> I'd like to check the limits of visibility of a (presumably green) LED at large (kilometer) distance, and I'm assuming that modulation of intensity (blinking) or position ("wiggling") would make the same brightness noticeable at larger distances than a steady, stationary point of light.

If you want to 'do the math' Wikipedia provides this webpage on attenuation coefficient, that allows you to calculate intensity versus distance in a medium.

As for your belief that green is most easily visible, that's not strictly true since the human eye has four photoreceptors each *tuned* to a different frequency, but a slightly different frequency of monochromatic light that was slightly brighter would be perceived as the same color.

It is wide spectrum light acting on different photoreceptors that is **interpretated by the brain** as being the seeing of a particular color. It's not *what* you see, it's what you (unconsciously) *think* you see. It's the addition of wide spectrum light between the frequencies of 498 and 534 nm **acting on two photoreceptors** that gives the impression that **one** color is brighter, when in fact it's a range, monochromatic light wouldn't be brighter.

From Wikipedia: Human photoreceptors:

> "The photoreceptor proteins in the three types of cones differ in their sensitivity to photons of different wavelengths (see graph). Since cones respond to both the wavelength and intensity of light, the cone's sensitivity to wavelength is measured in terms of its relative rate of response if the intensity of a stimulus is held fixed, while the wavelength is varied. From this, in turn, is inferred the absorbance.\[15\] The graph normalizes the degree of absorbance on a hundred-point scale. For example, the S cone's relative response peaks around 420 nm (nanometers, a measure of wavelength). This tells us that an S cone is more likely to absorb a photon at 420 nm than at any other wavelength. **If light of a different wavelength to which it is less sensitive, say 480 nm, is increased in brightness appropriately, however, it will produce exactly the same response in the S cone. So, the colors of the curves are misleading. Cones cannot detect color by themselves; rather, color vision requires comparison of the signal across different cone types.**

So you would want to use 4 different LEDs of 420, 498, 534, and 564 nm each to maximally stimulate each photoreceptor. You ***could*** *just* use a 'white' light with a green filter but that isn't efficient.

As you can see from the graphic, assuming no color blindness (which you probably want to consider) each photoreceptor is equally sensitive.

From Wikipedia's webpage: Color vision - Wavelength and hue detection:

> "**In very low light levels**, vision is scotopic: light is detected by rod cells of the retina. Rods are maximally sensitive to wavelengths **near 500 nm**, and play little, if any, role in colour vision. In brighter light, such as daylight, vision is photopic: light is detected by cone cells which are responsible for colour vision. Cones are **sensitive to a range of wavelengths**, but are most sensitive to wavelengths **near 555 nm**. Between these regions, mesopic vision comes into play and both rods and cones provide signals to the retinal ganglion cells. The shift in colour perception from dim light to daylight gives rise to differences known as the Purkinje effect
>
> The perception of "white" is formed by the entire spectrum of visible light, or by mixing colours of just a few wavelengths in animals with few types of colour receptors. In humans, white light can be perceived by combining wavelengths such as red, green, and blue, or just a pair of complementary colours such as blue and yellow.

**That** is how the simplified explanation: "green is brighter" comes about.

Photopic relative brightness sensitivity of the human visual system as a function of wavelength (luminosity function).

Having decided upon using a wide spectrum light with a filter **or** four separate LEDs of a particular frequency we come to flash rate.

Way too slow leaves a lot of 'off time' which saves power but might make it less noticeable (though speed of travel is also a consideration, lighthouses flash slowly and ships travel slowly).

Moderately fast and you run the risk of photosensitive epilepsy (PSE), in particular red light at 4 Hz is most likely to affect 1 in 3000 people.

Continuous light is power inefficient and not attention grabbing, how well would a distant green light with a background of tall trees be seen?

Physiologically amber is the color chosen to avoid red green or blue and is common for stobe lights used on warning signs. Amber is not 'calming blue', 'stimulating / annoying red' nor 'overabundant green'.

The "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices: Inserts Only", by the Department of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration is worth a look.

The approved, presumably well tested by many Standards over many years, road sign is designed and described this way in North America:

These demo videos: "Feniex Industries - Flash Patterns" show that ready-made devices with a wide range of preset flash patterns in various color combinations can be **extremely** attention grabbing.

Choosing a ready made strobe light will save the time and cost of designing your own.
> 1 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, vision, stimulation
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# Question
Title: What is the difference between the structure and the conception of an empirical study in psychology?
Can someone explain to me the difference between the structure of an empirical study in psychology and its conception?

My interpretation is so far that structure means the test arrangement and conception the basic concept of how the study is designed. Would you agree?

# Answer
> 1 votes
As has been touched on in the comments to this answer, "structure" and "conception" are not precisely defined terms in psychology. They do have meaning, but researchers will differ in how they conceptualise them. This would be my interpretation

### Structure of a psychological study

The structure of a study sounds broadly synonymous with the "method". I.e., all the details of how data was collected and potentially how it was analyzed. That said, "structure" does suggest something more general. I.e., often we think of the structure as the broad elements on which the details sit. From this perspective, the design of the study and possibly the measures hint more at structure. For example, is it longitudinal or cross-sectional? If it is an experiment, how many between and within subjects factors are there? Was there random allocation to groups, etc.? What was the order of measures? These are all features that you might use to describe the broad structure of a study.

### Conception of a psychological study

Conception, in this context, generally refers to the process by which a study comes into existence. I.e., how does the research go from having no study to have a study.

There are many ways of doing this. One approach is to read the literature, identify a gap or topic of importance, come up with a research questions, and consider practical and useful study design that might contribute knowledge about that research question.

Other times, you might be working in an established paradigm, and the methodology itself might be tightly linked to the research questions that you choose to explore.

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Tags: experiment-design
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# Question
Title: Why might mindfulness and meditation lead to anger and anxiety?
**Background:** I have been trying mindfulness/meditation but I don't understand how to do it. For example, I tried sitting thinking and focusing on my breath, but thoughts kept intruding, so I just observed them, without trying to suppress them. Soon, one thought led to another, I felt myself getting angrier and more depressed. By the end of my meditating session, i felt terrible, anxious and agitated.

**General Question:**

* Does meditation and mindfulness cause many people to get anxious and angry?
* Why might meditation and mindfulness lead to anxiety and anger?
* Is a positive response to meditation related more to the method or the person?

# Answer
I have found several studies which support the general consensus that mediation helps to ease anxiety.

* Bahrke, M. S., & Morgan, W. P. (1978). Anxiety reduction following exercise and meditation. Cognitive therapy and research, 2(4), 323-333.
* Krisanaprakornkit, T., Sriraj, W., Piyavhatkul, N., & Laopaiboon, M. (2006). Meditation therapy for anxiety disorders. The Cochrane Library.
* Tacón, A. M., McComb, J., Caldera, Y., & Randolph, P. (2003). Mindfulness meditation, anxiety reduction, and heart disease: a pilot study. Family & community health, 26(1), 25-33.
* Lee, S. H., Ahn, S. C., Lee, Y. J., Choi, T. K., Yook, K. H., & Suh, S. Y. (2007). Effectiveness of a meditation-based stress management program as an adjunct to pharmacotherapy in patients with anxiety disorder. Journal of Psychosomatic Research, 62(2), 189-195.

However, one study by Heide and Borkovec describes the phenomena of relaxation induced anxiety (RIA):

> While procedures such as progressive relaxation, biofeedback and meditation can often be effective in reducing subjective anxiety and physiological hyperactivity, recent evidence indicates that these same procedures apparently can initiate or exacerbate anxiety in certain individuals (Heide and Borkovec, 1983).

They suggest that this may be because

> Somatic, affective and cognitive states arising during relaxation are perceived as threatening, perhaps due to the loss of control which they represent. Loss of control, in turn is avoided as either a perceived threat to coping and survival or perhaps more commonly as a threat to social acceptance (e.g. the fear of emerging inner conflicts and emotions, and the expression of which may be linked to anticipated social rejection). To guard against such loss of control, individuals may adopt strategies to cope with the environment and control anxiety; such strategies frequently maintain tension and may be antithetical to relaxation.

Based on this study, one would assume the effect of meditation is based on the individuals response to it, rather than the efficacy of the meditation techniques

Reference: Heide, F. J., & Borkovec, T. D. (1984). Relaxation-induced anxiety: Mechanisms and theoretical implications. Behaviour research and therapy, 22(1), 1-12.
> 6 votes

# Answer
**TL; DR** One way to see mindfulness meditation as a high-intensity exercise session of experiencing failure and not "freaking out" about it (e.g. being apprehensive of failing, or criticizing yourself for having failed, or being angry at yourself for not being able to simply achieve something which seems easy on the surface, or being anxious of never being able to do it right, or being frustrated about it not being as easy as you'd like it to be). If you are experiencing frustration, anger and anxiety, it can be two things: you are not yet good enough at it (it's very tough to learn if freaking out is your usual reaction to failure - and it probably is, if you think you need mindfulness meditation), or you are not even aware of the above and therefore not doing it right - that is, you are not doing anything about changing the way you relate to your goals and the way you react to failing to achieve them.

---

One of the major effects of meditation when used for relieving stress and anxiety is to get you out of a kind of a frustration treadmill. Frustration is the emotion which arises when a person is prevented from achieving a goal he deems important, and can be similar to/occur together with anger and anxiety.

The way mindfulness meditation tries to counteract this is to put you in a frame of mind where you have no expectations. When you are not pursuing a particular goal, you cannot be frustrated by not achieving it, and so frustration does not arise. This reduces negative emotions, and you can start evaluating the thoughts that occur during meditation in a more rational way. Once you learn that, you will have a tool to defuse emotional outbursts which occur in your daily life, outside of meditation, by slipping into that mode.

But there are a few important points which some of the briefer meditation tutorials out there don't explain. First of all, you really have to stop having expectations during the meditation. Not of yourself, not of the meditation, not of anything. In a successful meditation, you observe what is happening, without getting into a "this is what is happening, and it is different from what I want to be happening, dang this isn't working" chain of thoughts.

The second thing the short manuals don't tell you, is that meditation is hard. It is very, very difficult to achieve the ideal situation described in the manuals: perfect focus on one thing (or even nothing) without any distraction. As a beginner, you will not be able to achieve it for more than a few seconds of being in the "right" mode before you slip into the "wrong" mode again. This is completely normal. At one level, meditation appears to be paradoxical: your goal is to have no goals. Don't expect it to happen easily.

A usual session of mindfulness meditation looks like

1. You focus on your subject and keep that focus
2. Your thought process smoothly transitions to thinking about something else, you are busy thinking these thoughts without realizing that you are not at step 1 anymore
3. You notice that you have drifted off.
4. Your mind reacts to you noticing the drift.

4.a The intended reaction is to acknowledge the distraction, keeping an attitude of mild curiosity and amusement. "I am enumerating the items to get from the supermarket again. But I am meditating now, so let's leave that for later. I could go back to the breathing focus now. In. Pause. Out. Pause. In..."

4.b Any other reaction is not the intended one. For example, "Wait! I should be meditating, not composing a shopping list! That's wrong! It shouldn't have happened! I'm failing at that damn meditating stuff again! Will I never get it right?" But also "OK, I have drifted away. I have to go back to the focusing part. Did I just react right? Oh yeah, I did! I'm getting good at it, baby! I might get the hang of it after all."

If 4.a happens, you are already back at 1. If 4.b happens, you are already back at 2: you are not focused on your subject. So the whole cycle runs again, this time not about the original drifting away, but about your reaction to the drifting away. This time, 4.a looks something like "Oh, it seems I am judging myself. That's not what meditation is about, so let's go back to the breath again. In..."

You will go through the cycle hundreds and thousands times during a single meditation session. And that's OK. While your long-term purpose is to spend more time in 1 and else get to a 4.a as soon as possible, during a meditation, it should not matter to you whether this happened or not. It's like the difference between being the lotto player who is fervently awaiting the drawing of the exact numbers he crossed on the form, reacting with joy or sadness depending on whether the state of the world matched his expectations and wishes, and being the person who pushes the button to get the balls rolling and then records the numbers - part of the process, and focused on it, but not giving a damn about which number comes out.

While I cannot be 100% sure from your short description that this was what happened to you, it fits with a common side effect of not realizing the above. Instead of seeing each drift-off during meditation as a fresh opportunity to exercise being equanimous and unperturbed by whatever they observe happening, beginners frequently experience it as a frustrating failure. And because it happens so quickly in so such a short, intense time period, the frustration mounts, leading to the feelings you described.

If you are serious about doing therapeutic meditation, I would suggest learning more about how it works, how it doesn't work, and to use sources intended for this purpose, not sources intended for religious meditation. The one which helped me most was "The mindful way through depression" by Mark Williams. While it is obviously geared towards depression, you don't have to have a depression diagnosis to benefit from it. Its focus is on good techniques of mindful meditation. You can simply read on these techniques while leaving out the depression specific material.

You can also try to learn more about human emotional reactions, which is very helpful for understanding yourself while meditating and reducing unrealisitc expectations you might have about your control over your own thought process (which result in frustration during meditation). A very accessible source is Paul Ekman's "Emotions revealed". Note that his categorizing of emotions is only one of many suggested in research, so don't take that part as gospel, although it's fun to read. But his explanation of how an emotion plays out in the mind is valuable, and the detailed descriptions of several emotions can help you deal better with them when they arise in you.
> 1 votes

# Answer
It is best to learn meditation/mindfulness by attending an ongoing class – for example, the MBSR-8 week course. That way, these types of issues are resolved as soon as they arise.

Breath meditation is a hard meditation for a person to learn at the beginning. Therefore, I suggest first doing Loving-Kindness Meditation \[reference: Zeng, Xianglong et al.(2015).“The Effect of Loving-Kindness Meditation on Positive Emotions: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Frontiers in Psychology 6:1693.\]. If you take a look at some of the individual studies listed in this review, you will be able to understand how this meditation is carried out – basically, it is a method of extending compassion towards yourself and all others.

Also, another strategy (for a person who has a hard time meditating) is to do physical yoga, where one attempts to focus attention on the movements without drifting into thoughts. Afterwards, one can gradually train the mind on mindfulness – such as mindfulness of body sensations (before progressing into mindfulness of the breath).

Training the mind has been compared to taming a wild animal – so, one would expect it to drift a LOT – however, each time it drifts, one can bring it back, but this needs to be done with a lot of self-compassion and with “*gentleness and kindness*” – this is how one makes progress in the practice.

Simply setting aside time and practising itself is considered a positive thing and noticing that the mind has drifted when it has drifted is also a positive thing. So, congratulate yourself for trying, and not for achieving! If you focus on 'trying,''achieving' will come gradually...
> 1 votes

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Tags: meditation
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# Question
Title: What tasks is Spaun 2.0 able to perform?
According to "A Large-Scale Model of the Functioning Brain" by Eliasmith et al., Spaun 1.0 was able to perform 8 distinct cognitive tasks:

1. **Copy Drawing**: Given a randomly chosen handwritten digit, Spaun should produce the same digit written in the same style as the handwriting.
2. **Digit recognition**: Given a randomly chosen handwritten digit, Spaun should produce the same digit written in its default writing.
3. **N-arm bandit task**: Spaun should perform a three-armed bandit task, in which it must determine which of three possible choices generates the greatest stochastically generated reward. Reward contingencies can change from trial to trial.
4. **List memory**: Given a list of any length, Spaun should reproduce it.
5. **Counting**: Counting. Given a starting value and a count value, Spaun should write the final value (that is, the sum of the two values)
6. **Question answering**: Given a list of numbers, Spaun should answer either one of two possible questions:

i. What is in a given position in the list?

ii. Given a kind of number, at what position is this number in the list?
7. **Rapid variable creation** Given example syntactic input/output patterns (e.g., 0 0 7 4 → 7 4; 0 0 2 4 → 2 4; etc.), Spaun should complete a novel pattern given only the input (e.g., 0 0 1 4 → ?)
8. **Fluid Induction** Spaun should perform a syntactic or semantic reasoning task that is isomorphic to the induction problems from the Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM) test for fluid intelligence

In "Spaun 2.0: Extending the World’s Largest Functional Brain Model" by Xuan Choo, it is written:

> The final Spaun 2.0 model consists of approximately 6.6 million neurons, can perform 12 cognitive tasks, and has been demonstrated to reproduce behavioural and neurological data observed in natural cognitive agents.

What novel cognitive tasks does Spaun 2.0 add? Reading the thesis, I've only been able to identify:

1. **Adaptive arm control**: Given a force field applied to Spaun's arm, Spaun should adapt to the force and continue to be able to draw in spite of the changing environment dynamics.
2. **Stimulus matching task**: Given an example image from ImageNet, match other images of the same categories.

Hypothetically, instruction following could be considered as a task, but it seems like more of a meta-task, since it defines how Spaun can combine tasks to create new tasks without any architecture changes.

# Answer
Counting task numbers in Spaun becomes somewhat meaningless due to it's instruction following capabilities. However, the missing task was the **stimulus response task**, wherein given an image from ImageNet, classify it according to it's given identifier.
> 1 votes

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Tags: theoretical-neuroscience, cognitive-modeling, nef, spa
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# Question
Title: How to ask in a survey for emotional vs. rational personality
In a survey I would like to find out the correlation between different factors based on the personal dimension "being more emotional vs. rational". Are there any known studies with items that could be used to differentiate between those two personalities or validated items in general about this topic?

# Answer
I know that Helen Fisher, who is a love researcher, has developed a four factor personality model where two of the factors are quite relevant to your question. See (Fisher *et al*, 2015) for some general information regarding the personality model. The two factors that are relevant to your question are called (1) analytical/tough-minded, and (2) Prosocial/empathetic.

I will now show a few of the questions that load on the two factors:

**Analytical/Tough-minded:**

* I pursue intellectual topics thoroughly and regularly
* Debating is a good way to match my wits with others
* I am intrigued by rules and patterns that govern systems
* I am more analytical and logical than most people
* I am able to solve problems without letting emotion get in the way
* When making a decision, I like to stick to the facts rather than be swayed by people’s feelings

**Prosocial/Empathetic:**

* I like to get to know my friends’ deepest needs and feelings
* I highly value deep emotional intimacy in my relationships
* Regardless of what is logical, I generally listen to my heart when making important decisions
* After watching an emotional film, I often still feel moved by it several hours later
* I am very sensitive to people’s feelings and needs
* I feel emotions more deeply than most people

See (Fisher *et al*, 2010) for the rest of the questions. She has also conducted some research on the neural correlates of these personality types which might be of interest, see (Brown *et al*, 2013).

Another thing you may look at is the empathy and systemizing quotient, see for example (Groen *et al*, 2015). I believe the idea was originally developed by Simon Baron-Cohen.

This is far from a comprehensive answer, and I don't know how solid and well-established the research it. However, it may be a helpful starting point for you.

---

References:

Fisher, Island, Rich, Marchalik, Brown (2015). Four broad temperament dimensions: description, convergent validation correlations, and comparison with the Big Five. DOI: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01098

Fisher, Rich, Island, Marchalik (2010). The second to fourth digit ratio: A measure of two hormonally-based temperament dimensions. DOI: 10.1016/j.paid.2010.06.027

Brown, Acevedo, Fisher (2013). Neural Correlates of Four Broad Temperament Dimensions: Testing Predictions for a Novel Construct of Personality. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0078734

Groen, Fuermaier, Den Heijer, Tucha, Althaus (2015). The Empathy and Systemizing Quotient: The Psychometric Properties of the Dutch Version and a Review of the Cross-Cultural Stability. DOI: 10.1007/s10803-015-2448-z
> 5 votes

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Tags: emotion, measurement, data, survey, rationality
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# Question
Title: Can machines really create anything new?
AlphaGo is an artificial intelligence which has beaten top human GO-players. Even the creators and instructors do not know how AlphaGo came to it's conclusion to put a stone just at this position. Top-Players thought, AlphaGo did a mistake and in further progress it appeared to be a genius move. In fact AlphaGo played like no player in thousands of years - and won that match.

**How could AlphaGo create that novel move? Is it really a new creation or is it just a product of a machine?**

# Answer
This is actual a pretty old and often debated question. It is called "Lady Lovelace's Objection" and first appeared in Alan Turing's seminal paper "Computing Machinery and Intelligence".

Below is my response to Lovelace's Objection, as well as Alan Turing's response which I wrote for a philosophy course in 2015. Perhaps it will be of interest to you?

> Turing created the imitation game as a way to talk about cognition in machines without being bogged down by the philosophical history of the word “think” and “machine”. In his discussion of the imitation game, he addresses Ada Lovelace's objection and refutes one aspect of it, however he does not cover all aspects. Namely, his rebuttal to Lovelace's objection seems to assume the universe is deterministic and by rephrasing Lovelace's argument, he may be missing some of it's more subtle implications.
>
> Turing's imitation game has the objective of causing a human judge to be unable to correctly guess which amongst two players is a computer. The only tool at the judge's disposal is textual communication that can be directed to each of the players individually, similar to an Internet chat room or an e-mail exchange. If the machine can confuse the judge, given a certain time or question limit, the machine is said to have won the imitation game and to have passed the Turing test.
>
> Lovelace's argument against a machine passing the Turing test and thus being able to “think”, is that a machine (specifically referring to the Analytical Machine) “has no pretences to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform” (Turing 1950, 450). Turing faces this argument by first rephrasing it into questioning whether a machine “can never do anything 'new'” (Turing 1950, 450). He refutes this reformulated objection by questioning whether human beings have ever done anything new. In other words, he claims that there is no verifiable proof that any creation from a human being was not the product of their education; whether formally studied or learned from the environment.
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> Turing's claim is a reasonable one, but he risks getting caught up in the debate of free will versus determinism, since he seems to be claiming that a human being is purely a function of this environment. He assumes that all that is necessary to imitate a human being is to determine the function that maps the external environment to human reasoning. The belief of the existence of this function is known as determinism within philosophy and is a matter of much debate. Alternatively, to avoid this philosophical quagmire, instead of appealing to determinism, we could instead look at what is required for a computer to create something “new”. Creating something “new” could be interpreted as synthesizing new information. The proof that a computer can accomplish this task can be proven by examining a rule-based system.
>
> A rule-based system is based on the idea that most of human knowledge can be represented by rules and human reasoning can be approximated by the manipulation of these rules in a logical manner. For example, to represent a navigation plan, you can know a series of logical steps or rules describing routes, such as “Lester street connects my house to highway 69” and “highway 69 leads to Sudbury”. It is possible to program a computer using to search through these steps and come to a conclusion, in this case the route from Sudbury to Lester street (Thagard 2005, 47). You can then synthesize new rules by combining them using a process known as “chunking” or “composition”, and saving them so that the search doesn't need to be executed every time this objective (getting from Sudbury to Lester) needs to be accomplished (Thagard 2005, 49). Additionally, rules can be used to generate explanations or hypotheses by abductive inference (Thagard 2005, 50). Both the plan, the explanation and the summary did not exist until the computer sought them out and discovered them. This can be seen as the equivalent of a machine producing something “new” and acquiring “new” knowledge. Using mathematical terminology, it can be said that the system is non-monotonic.
>
> There are many flaws to this simplistic rule-based system. It is computationally inefficient and does grasp all of the psychological complexity of a human being. Consequently, it could be argued that this model could never evolve to successfully imitate a human being. However these are superficial concerns. It would be a mistake to broaden this specific rule-based system's inability to evolve to all computational models. Instead, what should be retained from the example of the rule-based system is that it is possible to contain aspects of human reasoning and ingenuity within a computational model. Additionally, the flaws of computational inefficiency and psychological incompleteness can be and have been addressed by newer, more complete models. For example, ACT-R has been shown to be able to imitate certain attributes of a human being, such as natural language processing, in the form of language acquisition (Anderson 2002, 1).

References:

* Alan Turing (1950), Computing Machinery and Intelligence
* Paul Thaghard (2005), Mind: Introduction to Cognitive Science, 2nd Edition. MIT Press.
* Taatgen, N.A. & Anderson, J.R. (2002). Why do children learn to say "broke"? A model of learning the past tense without feedback. Cognition, 86(2), 123–155.
> 3 votes

# Answer
> How could AlphaGo create that novel move? Is it really a new creation or is it just a product of a machine?

The answer is that it is a new creation which is a product of the intelligence programmed into the computer software. The move was not conceived by any human, therefore it was new and it was created by the software.

Another example can be found if you look at the computer folding project. Computers are creating new models of protein structures through the use of many computers around the world, and these folded structures tell researchers what role they play in all sorts of diseases throughout the body, including the brain.

They are working things out a lot faster than any human can and you cannot say anything other than the fact that these computers are creating new things. Things unknown to humans prior to their creation.
> 0 votes

# Answer
It's not a product of a mechanical device anymore! Yes, it's the result of calculations of a cluster of machines, but the complexity of the group is in no way similar to what we used to know as machines. It's more complex by orders of magnitudes. In a way, you could say the brain is also mechanical since it's a group of neurons and a neuron is close to mechanical. But when the number of neurons is so large, the group is no longer similar to an individual. This is also what happens to the deep learning cluster of machines. It's already super machinery. It's like a human body is no longer similar to a cell. So there is creativity in AlphaGo.

On the other hand, you could argue that mathematically there is a best strategy for Go. Knowing this strategy could lead to victory over any opponent, if not draw, including AlphaGo and world champions. So there is not creativity in any game. All is brutal calculations.
> 0 votes

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Tags: computational-modeling, artificial-intelligence, creativity
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# Question
Title: What are the standard mental health tests that are available online?
Are there standard mental health tests available online with score interpretations? For example, if someone was interested in getting a grasp on their mental condition before seeing a psychologist/psychiatrist.

# Answer
> 4 votes
There's no "standard" on-line test for mood disorders. The only standard one is \[semi-\]structured evaluation (e.g. SCID-5) by a mental health professional.

With that disclaimer aside, there are some screening tools designed to be self-rated, e.g.

And here's a more extended disclaimer from one of those, which applies to all:

> The BDI suffers from the same problems as other self-report inventories, in that scores can be easily exaggerated or minimized by the person completing them. Like all questionnaires, the way the instrument is administered can have an effect on the final score. If a patient is asked to fill out the form in front of other people in a clinical environment, for instance, social expectations have been shown to elicit a different response compared to administration via a postal survey.

and from another (PHQ page actually):

> The influence of these biases can mitigated by following up with a structured or semi-structured interview, the gold standard for diagnostic assessment.

There's a longer list of tests on Wikipedia, not all of which might be on-line presently. https://www.outcometracker.org/library/ is an alternative list of printed questionnaires; not sure how long it will be there. Also these are not all designed to be self-rated; the instruction at top of which page will give clue in that respect. https://psychology-tools.com/ is the most on-line-oriented of these collections.

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Tags: clinical-psychology, test
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# Question
Title: What does "dimensionality of power distance" mean?
The BBC's article Cracking India's mystifying nod code is an interesting read and contains the paragraph:

> However, there is more to the Indian head wobble than just a cultural quirk passed through the generations. In renowned cultural scientist Geert Hofstede’s exhaustive research on cultural norms across different countries, India scored 77 on the dimension of Power Distance – the extent to which people expect and accept power inequalities within their own society – compared to a world average of 56.5. This high score indicates a deep respect for hierarchy and limited scope for disagreement with those considered superior in any way.

and links to the website hofstede-insights.com where one can compare countries (cultures?) I've spent over a decade in the US and Taiwan each for example, and certainly the following comparison using the tool on that website rings true per my personal experience:

The terms "dimensionality" and "distance" have meanings to me in mathematics and physics, but I'm not familliar how they might be used in Hofstede's cultural dimensions theory.

Could someone help me understand the terms "dimensionality" and "distance" in the current context, using language accessible to one not familliar with the field, Hofstede's work, or formal psychology in general?

Does "the extent to which people expect and accept power inequalities within their own society" sum it up completely, or do "dimensionality" and "distance" carry more meaning than just "extent of expectation and acceptance"?

# Answer
Hofstede has developed a cultural dimensions theory to compare countries, which uses factor analysis to assign values across 6 dimensions of culture. These dimensions are:

* Power Distance Index
* Individualism vs Collectivism
* Masculinity vs Femininity
* Uncertainty Avoidance Index
* Long Term Orientation vs Short Term Orientation
* Indulgence vs Restraint

That's all their seems to be when it comes to defining the term 'dimension': a measurable aspect of a situation. As for power distance, as you have already quoted as "*the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally*", basically means how readily the people of the culture accept hierarchies and inequalities of power. A larger power distance would imply a wider gap between people at different levels of the hierarchy, and greater acceptance of this gap with lesser questioning or asking for justifications.
> 8 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, cross-cultural-psychology
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# Question
Title: What is the difference between problem solving and intelligence?
What is the difference between problem solving and intelligence?

All I know is that the tower of hanoi is thought of as a problem solving test, perhaps due to its lack of automation, I don't know. I'd assume that "intelligence" is broader, measured by iq tests and reflected in skills etc..

Is it just that intelligence is learnt?

# Answer
> 2 votes
First, intelligence (as a notion in psychology) is a theoretical construct... with numerous definitions. Wikipedia's article on intelligence lists a lot of them. Just going with the fist one there (which comes from an op-ed signed by many intelligence researchers), intelligence is defined as

> A very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, **solve problems**, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, learn quickly and learn from experience. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings—"catching on," "making sense" of things, or "figuring out" what to do.

So, at a theoretical level, problem solving is seen a specific (but pretty important) aspect of intelligence. In practice, the way intelligence is usually tested in IQ tests, involves solving some types of problems (assuming a generous defintion of "problem"). Which essentially entails operationalizing intelligence. It's fair to say IQ tests test some specific types of problem solving. Of course the hope is that these correlate well enough with "problem solving anything".

There have also been some definitions proposed in psychology literature for what "problem solving" should mean. I'm not sure any of them has gained enough acceptance to be worth mentioning here.

IQ tests are however not the only investigated paradigm covering problem solving. There's a lesser known one that talks about CPS ("complex problem solving"), proposed in one definition to be:

> “(…) the successful interaction with task environments that are dynamic (i.e., change as a function of the user's interventions and/or as a function of time) and in which some, if not all, of the environment's regularities can only be revealed by successful exploration and integration of the information gained in that process.”

However it's not terribly clear how that is different from the theoretical notion of intelligence. What is different is how \[C\]PS is operationalized, i.e. the tests used to measure it... and that actually affects the level of correlation:

> This theoretical ambiguity is reflected in empirical findings on the relation between CPS and intelligence. Multiple early studies indicated that, while performance in CPS tasks varied tremendously among individuals, psychological assessments of general intelligence were unable to explain this variability (Brehmer, 1992; Rigas & Brehmer, 1999). Kluwe,Misiak, and Haider (1991) summarized 11 of these early studies on the relation between CPS and intelligence and concluded that most of them failed to show a close relation between intelligence scores and CPS performance measures. This led several researchers to suggest CPS to be a cognitive construct mostly independent from intelligence (Putz-Osterloh, 1985). Rigas and Brehmer (1999) summarized this view in the different-demands hypothesis. To explain the weak correlations that researchers observed between measures of general intelligence and CPS performance, this hypothesis suggests that CPS tasks demand the performance of more complex mental processes than intelligence tests \[and they mean IQ tests\] do, such as the active interaction with the problem to acquire knowledge on the problem environment, which, in turn, results in low empirical correlations between the constructs. \[...\]
>
> In reaction to these problems, Funke (2001) introduced Linear Structural Equation systems (LSE) and Finite State Automata (FSA) as formal frameworks that allowfor the description of underlying task structures. Both of these frameworks enabled the creation of single complex systems \[SCS\], which are independent of any semantic embedment (Greiff, Fischer, Stadler, &Wüstenberg, 2014) as they only specify an underlying system that can be clad in multiple semantic contexts. In particular, the LSE formalism has been widely adopted by CPS research and has led to the development of a considerable number of single complex systems (e.g., Multiflux, Kröner, 2001; FSYS,Wagener, 2001). In a further advancement, after Leutner, Klieme, Meyer, and Wirth (2004) had used a combination of two single complex systems for measuring CPS, Greiff, Wüstenberg, and Funke (2012) used the LSE framework for the development of the multiple complex systems (MCS; Greiff et al., 2014) approach, which was featured in the Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) 2012, the arguably most important large-scale assessment worldwide. \[...\]
>
> The comprehensive answer to the question on the relation between CPS and intelligence however, appears to depend on the operationalization of CPS.Whereas themoderator analyses did not indicate significant differences between measures of general intelligence and measures of reasoning in respect to their relation to measures of CPS, there are substantial differences inmean effect sizes found for studies using different operationalizations of CPS. The smallest average effect size for the relation of CPS and intelligence was found for classical measures of CPS, M(g) = .339, followed by single systems based on LSE, M(g) = .471. CPS scores gained from MCS tests are related most strongly to intelligence, M(g) = .585 \[...\]
>
> However, unlike classical measures of CPS or SCS, current MCS tests do not feature some highly complex elements of problem solving such as the recognition and handling of time-delayed effects. Thus, the cognitive demands posed by MCS tests are likely to be relatively closer to those posed by intelligence measures. Following the different-demands hypothesis (Rigas & Brehmer, 1999), this might be causing the high correlations of intelligence and CPS scores obtained from MCS tests. In order to test this hypothesis, it would be necessary to develop MCS tests that feature highly complex elements while simultaneously maintaining high levels of reliability.

The bottom line is that there are problem solving abilities not entirely captured in basic IQ tests. Whether that tells us anything about "intelligence" vs "problem solving" is a matter of how one construes these notions theoretically.

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Also asking if "Is \[it just that\] intelligence \[is\] learnt?" is a pretty different question, and I will not devote too much space to that here to that.

Of course intelligence (as usually measured, IQ) develops over time in adolescence, and according to some empirical stuedies the more schooling a child has, the better the outcome for IQ tests as well.

But this raises the question: what allows one to learn (better)? The answer, according to some is that there's no distinguishable factor between intelligence and learning ability. So basically, the question is circular in this view: you learn (better) because you are (more) intelligent, which make you (even more) intelligent. And that seems a pretty widely held view:

> However, if we think of IQ as prediction devices, there is no better predictor of future learning than past learning. Furthermore, past learning does not just predict future learning—it often enables it.

But that hinges on the definition of intelligence as being this whole encompassing thing, which includes learning ability. Just going back to the opening definition of intelligence, but emphasizing a different portion of it should be enough to illustrate this:

> A very general mental capability that, among other things, involves the ability to reason, plan, solve problems, think abstractly, comprehend complex ideas, **learn quickly and learn from experience**. It is not merely book learning, a narrow academic skill, or test-taking smarts. Rather, it reflects a broader and deeper capability for comprehending our surroundings—"catching on," "making sense" of things, or "figuring out" what to do

It would make a good separate question whether learning ability and problem solving (rather than intelligence) can be substantially differentiated in cognitive tests... and whether assuming such a testing separation is possible, are the results highly correlated anyway?

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Tags: intelligence
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# Question
Title: Difference between valence and sentiment
Can someone please clarify for me the difference between valence and sentiment? I am from a computer science background. In our literature they seem to be used in the same sense.

Currently I am doing some natural language processing where I estimate both valence and sentiment using two separately established lexicon data sets. Surprisingly, for my data, the valence and sentiment scores are very different. Are they really the same?

The definition of valence as given here seems very similar to sentiment (intuitively). Here valence is defined as one aspect of sentiment (referring to a publication by Russell, 1979).

# Answer
Basically, in the context of this research, "sentiment" can mean the same thing as "valence" if the analysis is unidimensional; that is "valence" is the usual "sentiment" analyzed. Otherwise "sentiment" can have a broader meaning, with "valence" being just one dimension of "sentiment".

As for why the two lexicons come with different valence values, that's a methodological question for the natural language processing community (e.g. https://ai.stackexchange.com) or even better, the author of the papers. What is obvious to me just from the web page is that the first "sentiment" lexicon has

> Association scores: binary (associated or not)

whereas the 3-dimensional one with valence as one dimension has scores between 0 and 1.

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In the context you have it, "sentiment" just refers to sentiment analysis, an endeavour in NLP (natural language processing) that most psychologists are probably completely oblivious to.

The previously linked Wikipedia page explains that "sentiment analysis" is an umbrella term for a fairly broad class of analyses:

> Generally speaking, sentiment analysis aims to determine the attitude of a speaker, writer, or other subject with respect to some topic or the overall contextual polarity or emotional reaction to a document, interaction, or event. The attitude may be a judgment or evaluation (see appraisal theory), affective state (that is to say, the emotional state of the author or speaker), or the intended emotional communication (that is to say, the emotional effect intended by the author or interlocutor).

A paper accopmpanying the data you mentioned defines it as:

> Sentiment Analysis involves determining the evaluative nature of a piece of text. For example, a product review can express a positive, negative, or neutral sentiment (or polarity).

Which is the most common instance of "sentiment analysis" in my experience.

As far as the psychology of "sentiments" goes, general terms used in psychology (and psychiatry) in this area are: mood, affect, emotion and (sometimes) feeling. I will not detail these here, because it's not what you are asking for (they all have Wikipedia pages). Only the first two (mood affect) have somewhat more scientific definitions but there's still a great deal of confusion over them.

If I were to propose a cross-field linkage, "sentiment analysis" tries to infer affect (and sometimes perhaps even mood) from text. In fact there is a notion in psychology of affect display, which is basically just the manifestation of affect that can be seen or read.

As for "valence", it is indeed a specific concept as used in that data page you link in a comment. From a companion paper they wrote

> Russell (1980, 2003) showed through similar analyses of emotion words that the three primary independent dimensions of emotions are valence or pleasure (positiveness– negativeness/pleasure–displeasure), arousal (active–passive), and dominance (dominant– submissive). He argues that individual emotions such as joy, anger, and fear are points in a three-dimensional space of valence, arousal, and dominance. It is worth noting that even though the names given by Osgood et al. (1957) and Russell (1980) are different, they describe similar dimensions (Bakker et al., 2014).

So "valence" is indeed referring to Russel's core affect framework as you suggest. However, looking at Bakker et al. as well as Russel's own paper, he doesn't seem to use the word "valence", preferring "pleasure" instead. I'm not sure who came up with "valence" for "pleasure"; from Bakker, I see not even Osgood used that term.

Also Russell's (2003) conceptualization seems two dimensional. In his own words:

> Core affect is a pre-conceptual primitive process, a neurophysiological state, accessible to consciousness as a simple non-reflective feeling: feeling good or bad, feeling lethargic or energised. There is something it is like to feel core affect. Its presence in consciousness varies from being focal to peripheral to out of sight. A structural description of core affect is an empirical matter, and I have proposed a circumplex with the two underlying dimensions of pleasuredispleasure and activationdeactivation (Russell, 1980, 2005; Yik, Russell, & Steiger, 2008). Although two-dimensional, core affect is, subjectively, a single feeling. That is, the two dimensions combine in an integral fashion to form one unified feeling. Pleasure and arousal combine to form the single feeling of ecstasy, for example. An analogy is the sensation of a specific colour, such as the red of the autumn leaf outside my window. The dimensions of hue, saturation, and brightness combine in an integral fashion to form one unified sensation of any particular colour.

From Bakker's illustration of that:

I looks like the 3rd dimension (dominance, not shown aboce) came from Mehrabian.

Also "valence" has a somewhat broader meaning in psychology that is reasonably close to the way it is used above by the author of those NLP lexicon studies:

> Valence, as used in psychology, especially in discussing emotions, means the intrinsic attractiveness/"good"-ness (positive valence) or averseness/"bad"-ness (negative valence) of an event, object, or situation. The term also characterizes and categorizes specific emotions. For example, emotions popularly referred to as "negative", such as anger and fear, have negative valence. Joy has positive valence. Positively valenced emotions are evoked by positively valenced events, objects, or situations. The term is also used to describe the hedonic tone of feelings, affect, certain behaviors (for example, approach and avoidance), goal attainment or nonattainment, and conformity with or violation of norms. Ambivalence can be viewed as conflict between positive and negative valence-carriers.

Having said this, it looks like few(er) psychology researchers actually use this term. The definition quoted right above originates in a book by Dutch psychologist Nico Frijda.
> 3 votes

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Tags: arousal, sentiment-analysis
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