# Question
Title: How do you analyse visual analogue scales with an ambiguous response?
For example, I might ask participants to complete a visual analogue scale for pain. They would be given a line that is 100mm long, and one end says 0 (No pain) and the other end says 100 (worst possible pain). The participant is asked to make a mark on the line with a pencil or pen to rate their level of pain. I would then use a ruler to measure the distance from the origin. E.g. how many millimeters away it is from the start of the line (i.e. zero).
The problem is that many times, people do not place a mark such as an x on the line, but they might circle a part of the line, or put a tick (check mark) there instead. I attach a picture of the standard response (participant 1) followed by 5 possible scenarios where the answer is ambiguous (participants 2 to 7), so I have left it as missing data/blank. Should these be excluded from the dataset (coded as missing data) or are some of them salvageable?

By way of explanation: In number 2) the line is very large so there isn’t one place that it intersects the horizontal line (usually it has to be accurate to the nearest mm).
Participant 3) has placed a circle on the line so it is difficult to say where on the line they meant. Participant number 4) has circled one of the numbers at the end. Can I be sure that they meant 0? Participant 7 is a variation on this.
Participant 5) has placed a tick (check) mark underneath the line (or sometimes they place a tick on the line itself). Which part of the tick do I measure from?
Participant 6) has placed a tick (check) mark on one of the numbers at the end of the scale. Can I be sure that they meant 100?
What is the best way to minimize bias while maximizing the use of the available data? Any thoughts would be appreciated.

# Answer
I fully agree to AliceD's thoughts. If you have a large sample, these problems might add a little noise, but won't make much of a difference (certainly not the cases 2, 3, and 5, because the psychological resolution of the scale is unlikely to be as precise as the millimeter measure suggests anyway).

In addition: If you want to be sure not to introduce any systematic bias yourself, the most prudent procedure would be to code this blind to conditions (if you have any) or other measures of the study. This way you can avoid that you unwittingly help you own hypotheses.
> 3 votes

# Answer
I am not an expert on these scales, but my 2-cents worth would be the following, which are simple work-arounds to include all the data:

1. Fine as is;
2. Take the middle of the thick line (the 'average');
3. Take the center of the circle (draw a cross in it, the intersection is the middle);
4. Apparently "0" - no pain;
5. Take the tip as the marker;
6. Apparently "100".
7. As in 4. ("0" - no pain);

Points #4 and #6 are obviously the most risky, especially in a small population. In a large population (say *N*=100) a few outliers don't matter too much. So in case the study sample is small, you may want to consider excluding uncertain cases (#4 and #6 as examples), or try to contact the subjects and re-assess.
> 4 votes

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Tags: measurement, methodology, data
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# Question
Title: Is fear in response to the sight of predators innate or acquired?
Children of very small age have less knowledge. They have very limited knowledge about harm, fear, etc.

Can children feel fear with such little knowledge?

Let us assume a child is playing in the house and suddenly a lion comes into the house. Does the child feel fear upon seeing it?

The child does not know that the lion is harmful at all. Does the child's brain indicate that something bad is going to happen just by seeing the lion?

If the child feels fear in situations like that, does the brain have inbuilt knowledge related to such issues?

Note: The lion does not make any noise. It is just approaching the child slowly.

**Is fear in response to the sight of predators innate or acquired?**

# Answer
Alright, so my familiarity with this area primarily comes from Vanessa LoBue's work. And what I get from her research is that we don't *really* know if certain fears are innate or acquired.

LoBue seems to favor a **prepared learning model**, which is just as it sounds. Infants are not born fearful of things like spiders, snakes, and heights (Adolph, Kretch, & LoBue, 2014; LoBue et al., 2012), but they are biased (prepared) to learn to fear them. She has supported this theory by showing that children are more rapid at attending to snakes than other stimuli (e.g., flowers, frogs, caterpillars), independent of snake knowledge/exposure (LoBue & DeLoache, 2008). Infants are also biased to associate undulating snakes, but not other stimuli, with negatively valenced sounds (DeLoache & LoBue, 2009). However, this wasn't true for static images of snakes.

Importantly, these stimuli are (ostensibly) evolutionarily significant (snakes, spiders, but not lions, tigers). However, the evidence for their threatening presence in human evolution, at least for spiders, is lacking (LoBue & Rakison, 2013). This has been a major criticism of the prepared learning model: which stimuli are 'prepared'?

LoBue suggests that the bias toward snakes might be mediated by low-level perceptual characteristics that pop out (i.e., curvilinear features) (LoBue, 2014). However, it's not clear if this visual saliency leads to actual fear learning of snakes (LoBue & Rakison, 2013). Moreover, this suggests that any predominantly curvilinear stimulus might bias attention.

Aside from her work, there are loads of mixed findings in this area that don't point to a clear answer. For example, there are studies that report a general attention bias for animals in general, threatening or non-threatening (e.g., Lipp, 2006). Plus there are several outstanding methodological problems in much of the past research.

**Frankly, there just needs to be a lot more research in order to figure this out. Although I would argue that the "non-associative model" (that infants don't need to learn, in some way, to fear snakes, spiders, etc.) is out of fashion and not well supported.** But for the most recent reviews, see LoBue & Rakison (2013) and LoBue (2013).

## References

Adolph, K. E., Kretch, K. S., & LoBue, V. (2014). Fear of heights in infants?. *Current directions in psychological science*, 23(1), 60-66. doi: 10.1177/0963721413498895 PMCID: PMC4175923 PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4175923/pdf/nihms574402.pdf

DeLoache, J. S., & LoBue, V. (2009). The narrow fellow in the grass: Human infants associate snakes and fear. *Developmental science*, 12(1), 201-207. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2008.00753.x

Lipp, O. V. (2006). Of snakes and flowers: Does preferential detection of pictures of fear-relevant animals in visual search reflect on fear-relevance? *Emotion*, 6(2), 296-308. doi: 10.1037/1528-3542.6.2.296

LoBue, V., & DeLoache, J. S. (2008). Detecting the snake in the grass: Attention to fear-relevant stimuli by adults and young children. *Psychological science*, 19(3), 284-289. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02081.x

LoBue, V. (2013). What are we so afraid of? How early attention shapes our most common fears. *Child Development Perspectives*, 7(1), 38-42. doi: 10.1111/cdep.12012

LoBue, V., Bloom Pickard, M., Sherman, K., Axford, C., & DeLoache, J. S. (2013). Young children's interest in live animals. *British Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 31(1), 57-69. doi: 10.1111/j.2044-835X.2012.02078.x

LoBue, V., & Rakison, D. H. (2013). What we fear most: A developmental advantage for threat-relevant stimuli. *Developmental Review*, 33(4), 285-303. doi: 10.1016/j.dr.2013.07.005

LoBue, V. (2014). Deconstructing the snake: The relative roles of perception, cognition, and emotion on threat detection. *Emotion*, 14(4), 701. doi: 10.1037/a0035898
> 9 votes

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Tags: emotion, fear
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# Question
Title: What is the effect of gradual increase of speech speed on speech comprehension?
When I am watching a YouTube video with normal speed I can understand everything with no problem. When I speed up the video to 1.25x my understanding of what someone is saying is a bit worse, but after 1-2 minutes it is very clear again.

I have made an experiment in which I was increasing the video speed gradually to 2x (in ~5 minutes) and I was understanding everything very good. After some time I started the same video again, but then I switched it directly from 1x to 2x and I still could understand what someone is saying in the video, but it was worse than in gradual speed increase.

Why is this happening?

# Answer
The ability to understand speech at increased voice rates is all about **learning**. A notable example in this regard is the use of text-to-speech software like **Jaws** used by blind folks unable to read the written word. Jaws is able to convert text on screen into the spoken word using a speech generator. After people get used to read on-screen content through speech, they are often able (and happy) to increase the voice rate settings to scan over the (often cluttered) computer screens more quickly. A recommended incremental step for Jaws in speech rate is 5%. I have experienced the speech rates deployed by some blind folks and the resulting speech was totally unintelligible to me.

With regard to the learning curve you describe: I bet that after repeated exposure to higher speech rate settings you wouldn't feel the necessity to start at a slower pace. Assuming you have normal vision, you are probably not too inclined to practice this for hours, though.
> 1 votes

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Tags: hearing, speech-comprehension
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# Question
Title: Does adult neurogenesis occur only in the olfactory bulb and the hippocampus?
The scholarpedia article on this subject says:

> Adult neurogenesis is the process of generating new neurons which integrate into existing circuits after fetal and early postnatal development has ceased. In most mammalian species, adult neurogenesis only appears to occur in the olfactory bulb and the hippocampus.

The Scholarpedia entry is dated 2007. Has there any more recent evidence been uncovered showing adult neurogenesis in other parts of the brain? If it is linked to brain plasticity, surely it would be useful to many more areas?

# Answer
> 8 votes
You are right that active adult neurogenesis is generally considered to be restricted to the dentate gyrus of the **hippocampus**, and the subventricular zone of the **lateral ventricles**. The latter generates neurons that subsequently migrate through the rostral migratory stream to the olfactory bulb to become interneurons (Ming & Song, 2011).

Although the hippocampus is critical for the formation of memory, hippocampal neurogenesis does not simply 'add memory' (Kemperman, 2002). Instead, hippocampal neurogenesis is believed to mediate the continuing modulation of cortical functions in response to exposure to novelty (Aimone *et al*., 2014). Specific examples are spatial-navigation learning and long-term spatial memory retention, spatial pattern discrimination and contextual fear conditioning. Adult olfactory bulb neurogenesis is associated with maintaining long-term structural integrity of the olfactory bulb, short-term olfactory memory, olfactory fear conditioning, and long-term associative olfactory memory involving active learning (Ming & Song, 2011).

Neurogenesis in other regions in the adult brain are generally believed to be limited under normal physiological conditions, but can be reproducibly induced after inflicting injury to the grain (Gould, 2007). These regions include the neocortex, amygdala, hypothalamus, substantia nigra and the brainstem, among other regions (see Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Regions of neurogenesis in mammals, shown in a rat's brain. The red regions (hippocampus & subventricular zone of the lateral ventricles) are considered to be neurogenic. The other regions may also be neurogenic, but only reproducibly so in experiments after damage to these regions. Source: Gould (2007).

**References**
**-** Aimone *et al*., *Physiol Rev* (2014); **94**: 991–1026
**-** Gould, *Nature Rev Neurosci* (2007); **8** 481-8
**-** Kemperman, *J Neurosci* (2002); **22**(3): 635-8
**-** Ming & Song, *Neuron* (2011); **70**(4): 687–702

**Related question**
**-** What evidence is there that the adult brain can produce new neurons?

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Tags: neuroscience, neuroanatomy, neurophysiology
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title: Is depression caused by life events?

text:
# Question
Title: Is depression caused by life events?
If we look at physical illnesses we could put them on a spectrum of 'Happened spontaneously/no choice in the matter' to 'Was clearly created by something that happened in their life'.

From less causal, to more causal I'd suggest a list like this.

* Genetic disorders. (Entirely genetic, from birth)
* Down syndrome. (Genetic, but age of parents plays a part)
* Cancers that happen 'randomly' (eg. breast cancer). (Random, but some people have genetic disposition)
* Common cold. (Not sure where to put this on the spectrum, but caused by a cold, but some people are more susceptible than others).
* Obesity. (Some people have a higher disposition to obesity)
* Smoking related illnesses. (Caused by smoking, but some people more susceptible than others).
* HIV. (Caused by a virus transferred by contaminated blood/unprotected sex)
* A broken leg. (Caused by physical trauma)

That is - the illnesses at the top of the spectrum have some kind of genetic cause, or we don't know enough about them to say how/why they occur, whereas the illnesses at the bottom of the spectrum are clearly caused by some life event.

With a mental illness like schizophrenia - it seems clear that this would fit at the top end of the spectrum - the schizophrenic was schizophrenic from birth, and there was nothing that 'caused it'.

However, it seems that depression is often the result of life events - stress, addiction, pregnancy, grief etc.

Is this a valid way of looking at depression? What terminology and research is there about it?

# Answer
> 9 votes
Both schizofrenia and depression are linked to a genetic predisposition and life events. Individuals with no genetic predisposition may become depressed when the trigger is sufficiently intense, while individuals with genetic predisposition may become depressed in the absence of clear life events triggering the depression (Kendler *et al*, 1995).

<sup>**Reference**
**-** Kendler *et al*, *Am J Psychiatry* (1995); **152**(6): 833-42</sup>

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Tags: depression
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# Question
Title: Using IT to quickly make a simulated brain
First of all, I would like to say that I know nothing about cognitive sciences. I am just posting this question because it interested me and I stumbled across this group in stack exchange.

I was recently speaking to a cognitive scientist who had just finished modelling a certain function of the brain for his thesis (using a simulation program).

He soon told me that this can be done because the neurons are an analogue system and this analogue system can be modeled using math (like any analogue system that I know of).

My first question was: Does his task in "modelling the neurons" have a fixed set of rules or steps logical that he follows.

He said that there are clearly defined rules even though many rules are still undefined.

Then my second question was: Could it be possible to automate the task of "modelling the neurons" (using IT) in order to make larger systems more quickly and to test the disputable arguments more quickly.

**Now my question to the forum is**: Is this a realistic approach and has anyone here already tried to do this? Before waving it aside please consider the fact that IT has been used to develop software that can solve complex problems. Ie. Mathematica, Sage, Matlab etc..

I am aware that it is much more complicated than math, but if it is possible to define rules it should also be possible to apply those rules automatically...

I'm sorry if I used bad or confusing terminology. I have no clue about this field and I am just asking out of curiosity..

# Answer
> 8 votes
This is an incredibly broad question, but I admire your spark of curiosity so I'm going to give you a quick answer anyways.

Firstly, there is no defined steps for modelling parts of the brain. The laboratory I was a member of created Spaun. Spaun is the world's largest functioning brain model and uses biologically plausible neurons as the foundation for it's computation. The methodology for creating the most recent iteration of this model varies wildly from part-to-part. The vision system was adapted from Deep Learning Convolutional Neural Networks, the basal-ganglia and thalamus came from an anatomical model and the working-memory model came from engineering analysis of dynamical systems. None of these could have come from evolutionary algorithms or any other sort of algorithm known to humanity at this point.

Another way of modelling the brain (mostly the human behaviour part of it) is ACT-R, which doesn't use neurons at all. Once again, there's no algorithm for evolving this system and interestingly it's the foundation behind a lot of the intelligent systems you mentioned.

The search for evolution and learning methods for groups to gain intelligence is generally called Artificial Life (ALife).

You'll notice that there's a bunch of different levels to approach the problem of modelling the brain. Your friend was at the biological bottom-up level, ACT-R is at the behavioural top-down level and Spaun is the weird hybrid. Although all of these systems use IT in some way (Spaun was built with a Python library called Nengo, ACT-R is written in LISP), the processes for creating these systems cannot be automated and would require the creation of a general artificial intelligence.

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Tags: cognitive-neuroscience
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# Question
Title: Do you ever think self diagnosis is called for?
I am in a situation where I can't exactly get help for my mental health issues. There are plenty, don't get me wrong, but there was one particular part of my mental health struggle that I could never...connect with anything else. I know I have trust issues and abandonment issues and so forth, but there was this one set of symptoms that kept bothering me. I like to have a name for something, even if it's not very specific, so I searched and searched to find something that fit me. Finally I stumbled upon DID, and the more research I did about the disorder the more sense everything made. Is it wrong that I did this? I just wanted answers, and I really wish that I could go to a doctor but I can't. I've heard both sides on self diagnosis and I want to see what a group of professionals would think. By the way, I haven't told anyone but my two closest friends, so no I'm not doing it for attention. I just wanted my symptoms to...make sense.

# Answer
I think this is a borderline question. As a rule of thumb, we do not answer questions about individual health problems in favor of asking the author to see a professional, for both ethical and practical reasons. And let me be absolutely unequivocal here: you should see a professional. But this is fundamentally a general question about self-diagnosis, so I'm going to answer that.

It's always good to educate yourself. **Accurate self diagnosis is necessarily impossible, however**―what you can see depends on what you know, and what you know depends on what you have seen, etc. This is uncontroversial. Being educated is therefore very *helpful* when seeing a professional, which I again strongly encourage you to do, but it is *never* a substitute for seeing a professional when you have problems.
> 2 votes

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Tags: abnormal-psychology
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# Question
Title: Handwriting analysis by profession (muscular control) - Athletes, musicians, etc
Is there any scientific study on handwriting by profession? In the whole world, the people with the most control of their muscles are athletes. Or pianists, who have extremely good control of their fingers. So perhaps their handwriting will be different from the average person?

# Answer
**Short answer**: Not really, because a) handwriting *style* is generally individual-dependent and not occupation-dependent, and b) the fine-motor skills responsible for handwriting *legibility* are specific enough to be near-independent of the muscle control that mandates one's success in athletics and/or music.

**Detailed answer**:

It is probably difficult to say anything definite about the variance in style of handwriting among profession, as handwriting *style* is something subjective. Furthermore, one's handwriting style is typically well-formed before the time of their occupation.

In terms of the objective nature of handwriting -- i.e. its legibility and general readability -- there tends to be a greater relationship with fine motor coordination. However, even then, the motor coordination is fairly specific to handwriting or letter generation. The ability to generate written text is largely dependent on orthographic-motor integration \[1\] and finger sequencing. \[2\] The latter variable may be practiced by musicians or certain athletes in specific sports, but these variables are by-and-large specific to handwriting and letter generation. In general, a greater indicator in how legible one's handwriting will be is how 'automatic' one's handwriting is. Thus, interventions that promote higher orthographic-motor integration tend to improve the 'automaticity' of one's handwriting, thus leading to better legibility and readability in their handwriting. \[1\] Again, these interventions are specific to handwriting, and general fine-motor skills typically do not affect this area.

You might also be interested to know that there is a field of study called graphology that attempts to analyze handwriting based on personality or personal characteristics, such as profession. However, it is largely regarded as a 'pseudoscientific' field due to its lack of reproducible research thus far. I mention this because a lot of the resources I found when looking up more information on this question came from books on graphology, and so I could not use them as scientific resources. :)

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Sources used:

\[1\] Jones, Dian; Christensen, Carol A. (1999). Relationship between automaticity in handwriting and students' ability to generate written text. Journal of Educational Psychology, Vol 91(1), 44-49.

\[2\] Berninger, V.W.; B.J. Wolf (2009). Teaching students with dyslexia and dysgraphia: Lessons from teaching and science. Baltimore, Maryland: Paul H. Brooks Publishing Co. pp. 1–240.
> 4 votes

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Tags: motor
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# Question
Title: Why do people bite their nails even when they do not want to?
Why do people bite their nails? People seem to be doing it primarily while contemplating something, or during problem-solving tasks. They seem to understand it is a bad habit, and sometimes they seem to try to active avoid it, but keep on doing it nonetheless so it seems. Why does this happen?

# Answer
Nail-biting is considered a **parafunctional habit**. A parafunctional habit is the habitual exercise of a body part in a way that isn't the way that that part was intended to be used. Other common parafunctional habits include bruxism (grinding of teeth), hair-pulling, and picking at skin.

Nobody knows what causes these habits. Possible physical or psychological causes may include emotions (aggression, anxiety, stress, tension), hyperactivity, complications from other disorders (such as obsessive-compulsive disorder), or as a coping or focus mechanism, similar to how babies and young children find it soothing to suck on their thumbs.
> 2 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology
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# Question
Title: Can people with absolute pitch identify the exact frequency, or simply the pitch class?
**Absolute pitch** can be defined as **the ability to identify or re-create a given musical note without the benefit of a reference tone**.

When people claim to have absolute pitch, does this mean they have the capacity to detect the exact frequency of a note, or merely the pitch class (i.e. C,C#,D, etc)?

# Answer
> 4 votes
**Short answer**
In practice, absolute pitch is generally tested for by using musical pitch classes.

**Background**
Absolute pitch (AP) is the ability to identify the pitch of a musical tone, or to produce a musical tone at a given pitch without the use of an external reference pitch. Most humans process musical pitch relatively rather than absolutely, and in fact most sensory systems operate relatively and not absolutely. AP is indeed a rare ability, occurring in less than 0.01% of the general population (Tekuechi & Hulse, 1993).

The way in which AP is tested is mostly using **pitch classes**. Pitch classes are likely preferably used experimentally, because people with AP are often musicians. Musicians are already familiar with pitch classes because of their training. In turn, AP typically manifests itself in trained musicians (Zatorre, 2003). Therefore, testing AP using frequencies expressed in Herz may simply be too abstract for most people with AP, since they are more accustomed to the use of pitch classes.

Note that, because the pitch A4 used to tune orchestras, corresponds to 440.0 Hz by modern convention, AP as tested with pitch classes can be, indirectly, considered to represent frequencies.

Some subjects with AP may consistently identify pitches a semitone low or a semitone high. This can occur because a subject may be accustomed to a different tuning standard for A4 than 440.0 Hz (Tekuechi & Hulse, 1993). Hence, AP has a strong correlate to training.

<sup>**References**
**-** Tekuechi & Hulse, *Psychol Bull* (1993); **113**(2): 345-61
**-** Zatorre, *Nature Neurosci* (2003); **6**(7): 692-5</sup>

# Answer
> 2 votes
It can be either, and is typically both, considering that

> Absolute pitch is an act of cognition, needing memory of the frequency, a label for the frequency (such as "B-flat"), and exposure to the range of sound encompassed by that categorical label.

Another way to look at it is that pitch class came from the necessary assessment and organization of pitch frequency, similar to how symbols such as letters came from our assessment of different phonemes. So the ability to detect one usually implicates the detection of the other, and we call this ability 'absolute pitch'.

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Tags: sensation, hearing
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# Question
Title: Consciousness - on/off switch or spectrum?
When we read the theories of consciousness, they usually state that a thing either has consciousness or does not have consciousness. Is there a reason why consciousness cannot be thought to be a spectrum? For example, I have more consciousness than a computer. (Implying that a computer has consciousness, just that it has less than I do.) Rather than I have consciousness, a computer does not.

# Answer
On/off is indeed not the commonest view of consciousness. In Hindu philosophical circles, consciousness is thought of as continuous across living systems. Humans have 'budding'consciousness, (plus free will), animals 'shuttered' and plants 'covered'consciousness, and these are points along a continuum. (Reference example: Hinduism and Science, by T D Singh; a paper in “Science and Religion: Global Perspectives”, June 4-8, 2005, in Philadelphia, PA, USA, a program of the Metanexus Institute).
> 1 votes

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Tags: consciousness
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# Question
Title: Predictive Experiments on Neuroscience of Free Will
It seems to be very interesting that we can use modern neuroscience and cognitive science research to inform us about the ages-old question of free-will vs. determinism. The standard experiment was done by Benjamin Libet in 1983 that demonstrated that electrode activity showed that in terms of using our left or right hands - electric signals showed a significant change in activity before the reported decision to make the movement was made. This is one of the founding experiments of the neuroscience of free-will.

However, it seems that this experiment informs us in a very limited temporal duration. Since I could not find any conclusive results myself, I wanted to ask if they were any neuroscience experiments that demonstrated long-term predictive behavior. An example would be if a person with a particular imaged localized area could be said pre-hand to have a certain behavioral reactions in response to stimuli. This would defend give a strong defense to the determinist philosophical position. Of course, I'm talking about conscious reactions (such as decision-making in social situations, since the idea is that people consciously think they make their own decisions). An experiment involving unconscious processes such as memory would not be very informative.

If so:

**Which experiment(s) comments on this?**

**What is the degree of validity of the experiment?** (Summary of Methods and Results)

**Are the results controversial? Does it truly make a comment on the philosophy of free will?**

If not, is it that Neuroscience is still not mature enough have predictive power like hard sciences such as biology, chemistry and physics. After all, the brain is a incredibly complex organ, and responding to complex multimodal stimuli (e.g. social situations) it would further complicate the possibility of any such study.

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**Sources:**

TIME OF CONSCIOUS INTENTION TO ACT IN RELATION TO ONSET OF CEREBRAL ACTIVITY (READINESS-POTENTIAL) BENJAMIN LIBET, CURTIS A. GLEASON, ELWOOD W. WRIGHT, DENNIS K. PEARL Brain Sep 1983, 106 (3) 623-642; DOI: 10.1093/brain/106.3.623

# Answer
There is a good article on Wikipedia on the Neuroscience of Free Will, with far too much content to adequately summarize here. Since your question is focused on long-term prediction of behaviour, I'll just mention about that.

Using newer fMRI technology, Soon et al (2008) used a learning algorithm to predict "free will" decisions from brain activity about 7 seconds (and up to 10 seconds) prior to the subject reporting awareness of having made the decision. This experiment has been replicated in other labs: Presenter Marcus du Satoy undergoes it for the BBC documentary The Secret You (2009/2010), and remarks that there is something creepy about the radiologist being able to predict his decision several seconds before he is aware of making it.

An important question remains regarding all long-term prediction experiments: Human behaviour is very predictable, as countless experiments in every area of psychology commonly demonstrate by manipulating causal factors - the ability to predict it well in advance with significant accuracy is hardly limited to neuroscience. Therefore, experiments have to be very carefully designed if they are to eliminate the effects of predisposing factors such as priming in decision-making, such that decisions are not influenced by uncontrolled unconscious factors (hence truly "free will"). However, if "free will" doesn't exist, then eliminating all predisposing factors will ultimately prove futile, so until researchers can control for *all* variables, some doubt will always remain.

Nonetheless, research thus far demonstrates that we are often unaware of underlying causal factors of "free will" decisions that we make.
> 8 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, brain-waves, free-will
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title: Is thinking with language efficient?

text:
# Question
Title: Is thinking with language efficient?
I wondered, whether it is efficient to **think** with language (of course it's efficient for communication). When I'm thinking with long words, it takes longer than thinking with short words. Maybe thinking without words would be even faster?

So, do babies, who didn't learn think faster because they don't immediately try to find words for their thoughts to tell someone about them?

> For example, when we see `1 + 1 = 2`, we think of every symbol as a word `one plus one equals two`. I assume, someone, who lacks language(Babies for example), would think of this without these words, but instead with emotions(maybe). See the note at the end.

In our everyday life, we almost always need to talk to others about our thoughts. This leads to us thinking with these words instead of just thinking and then finding words for it. It's like writing a manuscript just from front to end instead of first brainstorming and collecting ideas.

**Main question:** Is it possible to think in a two-step process(and would it be more efficient)? First, thinking with `emotions`(or whatever you want to call it) and then finding `words` for that to spread your idea?

> Note: I think the "Problem" here, is that, when we think of something, we simulate saying its name in our brain, to be prepared for a real conversation. Right?

# Answer
**Short answer** We do think with 'both', and there is evidence to suggest that we need some sort of conscious representation of our thoughts in order to reason about our surroundings. Emotion itself is not enough.

**Longer answer**:

We do think with our emotional reactions, and we also think with words. When we think with emotions, these are our 'instincts' kicking in. We rely on our emotional ('gut') reactions to tell us when something or someone is dangerous, for example. The instinctual drive is certainly a very valuable thing, and it would be awfully hard to survive without it.

Is thinking 'with words' inefficient? Maybe if an emotional reaction was all you needed in that moment. There are situations -- certain social interactions, for example -- that don't necessitate thinking 'with words'.

However, you can't throw out language entirely. The field of artificial intelligence relies on the fact that the brain can think with words (and, thus, consciously reason its way through situations). The idea of Connectionism in artificial intelligence research relies on the idea that mental states are representational, and thus can be used computationally. In fact, 'neural networks' can be viewed as thinking machines, and most (if not all) research done with neural networks relies on the property that they can *think* with some sort of representation, language or otherwise.

Why would this be important? One idea is that you need language to make 'connections' (or associations) in your brain between abstract objects. This idea is obviously pretty central to connectionism, given its name. With a storehouse of existing connections, you can modify the 'weight' of these connections upon receiving new input (i.e. new information). In non-technical terms, this means that you can learn more advanced topics, change existing beliefs, and use existing definitions to create newer, more complex ones -- all through human reasoning with conscious representations in the form of language. **Thus, language allows us to track the progression of a thought long enough to make a conclusion.** If you rely on simply the feeling you get when you see, hear, or remember something, it doesn't do much to increase your ability to *reason* about that thing.

However, since artificial intelligence focuses almost exclusively on cognition and human reasoning, we could probably look at its shortcomings in order to see where non-representational (i.e. unconscious, perhaps 'emotional') reasoning is a more efficient approach. One obvious problem is that machines can't recognize facial expressions or social context. While you and I could probably recognize a crying face without putting much thought into it, a machine would have to reason through a storehouse of representations (in this case, images of faces instead of words) in order to find the one that represents 'crying'. It would then have to compare this face to the face before it to determine how to comfort it. Even then, it would have to reason through a storehouse of 'comforting' sentences...and you get the idea.

You mention that babies learn faster. This is largely due to the fact that babies are more sensitive to novelty in the environment (see: critical period). This has been demonstrated through studies that show that infants will look longer at a novel stimulus than a familiar stimulus \[1\]. Given that there is less 'familiarity' in the world of a baby, their attention is more easily captured. There is certainly more to it than that, but there isn't a lot of consensus. We do know, however, that a 'critical period' seems to exist. You might be interested in this paper, which spends some time discussing the progress of a young girl who had lived in isolation and thus had not developed a first language until age eleven. Though she made steady progress, the pace at which she acquired language was much, much slower than that of an infant.

Furthermore, you mention that word length may put a damper on the efficiency of your thought processes. Bear in mind that every language is different. If you were reasoning in Chinese, for instance, your words would be much shorter, and you could arguably think more 'thoughts' in less time (the Chinese language lacks inflection, for instance). However, longer words can also provide more room for specificity. Many modern day concepts (the concept of 'intuition', for example) came directly from German, a language notorious for its long words.

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Sources used:

\[1\] Turk-Browne, Nicholas B., Brian J. Scholl, and Marvin M. Chun. “Babies and Brains: Habituation in Infant Cognition and Functional Neuroimaging.” Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 2 (2008): 16. PMC. Web. 24 Aug. 2015.
> 7 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, language-processing
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# Question
Title: Are there models of single neurons on slow timescales?
From what I've come across on the web, most models of single neurons seem to focus on the "fast timescale", where electrical signals are transmitted from one neuron to another. However, neurons are also cells, with all the associated complexity that cells bring: from gene expression to biochemical reactions happening in response to these electrical signals, albeit on a slower timescale. Are there any single neuron models that attempt to integrate these various timescales?

I'm mainly interested in knowing about more realistic abstractions of neurons than those used in Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) and so on. A key assumption I'm making is that neurons, being a type of cell, would have biochemical processes going on on a slower timescale that would modulate their 'spiking' behavior over time. Please correct me if this assumption is wrong.

# Answer
> 1 votes
The search for a biologically realistic neural network is never ending. As Sydney mentioned there are many newer models of neurons that take into account activity over larger time-scales, such as the Adaptive Leaky-Intergrate-Fire neuron. The bleeding edge of this search is the Blue Brain Project, which is trying to create the most biologically detailed model of the brain possible. The project should be a good resource if you're interested in the more advanced models.

Since you're interested in Artificial Neural Networks (which implies you're also interested in computation power), I would like to point out that the Neural Engineering Framework allows you to use as detailed of a model of neuron as desired on a realistic time-scale, while still allowing you to compute and learn arbitrary functions as a typical ANN allows.

# Answer
> 0 votes
Given that neurons operate by means of signal transmission and not on distinctive 'slow' or 'fast' timescales, I'm assuming that you are looking for abstract models of neurons that are more 'realistic' than the time-independent artificial representations most often used in neural networks, but correct me if I'm wrong.

There are neuron models that attempt to mimic the biological processes of the neuron, and there are also abstract models of neurons that attempt to work in imperfect or specific conditions (i.e. in response to individual neurotransmitters, as demonstrated during synaptic transmission). These models usually take into account the action potentials (spikes) and refractory periods of real neurons, and thus these models are also known as 'spiking neuron models'.

Here is one model of a spiking neuron, which attempts to imitate authentic spiking as observed in cortical neurons. This model incorporates Hodgkin-Huxley-type-dynamics with integrate-and-fire-type properties. Integrate-and-fire is another popular model of neuron (probably the earliest model -- it was invented back in the early 1900s). It is represented as 'the membrane potential of a neuron in terms of the synaptic inputs and the injected current that it receives' (read more here).

By extension, you might find spiking neural networks interesting. Unlike artificial neural networks, SNNs incorporate time, and neuronal and synaptic states into their model, thus increasing biological accuracy. You might also be interested in this paper, which focuses exclusively on computing with spiking neural networks.

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Tags: neuroscience, theoretical-neuroscience
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# Question
Title: Term for behaviour of transfering personal problems to other people and trying to solve them there?
I think my question is a little tricky to express, but I have observed this kind of behaviour pattern many times, and would like to know if it is coined in cognitive science.

As an example, consider an employer who has problems with time management - he is often late and even misses appointments. None of his employees have this kind of problem - his team is well functioning. However, the employer forces his team to use time tracking systems.

Another example: A person with a drinking problem tries to manipulate her friends and family to completely avoid bars, parties, and clubs, because these are the places where people tend to abuse alcohol.

The pattern I see is that a person is unable to deal with a particular personal problem, and instead obsessively tries to make sure that others don't get anywhere near that same problem. The measures to achieve this protection are often not rational and exaggerated.

I understand that at a healthy level, the described behaviour can be beneficial. For example if I experience a very painful situation and have an opportunity to teach others how they could avoid that experience, then I would vigorously do so.

However, I wonder if there is a term that describes when this behaviour is irrationally applied.

# Answer
There are a couple of defence mechanisms that may fit the bill. Keep in mind that these defence mechanisms typically involve an unconscious denial of the problem - ie, they apply to people who don't admit to the problem in themselves.

Projection:

> ... a theory in psychology in which humans defend themselves against unpleasant impulses by denying their existence in themselves, while attributing them to others. For example, a person who is rude may constantly accuse other people of being rude.

Someone with a time management problem may constantly focus on and accuse others of being late, while someone with a drinking problem may imply that others around them have this problem rather than themselves.

Reaction formation:

> ... a defensive process (defense mechanism) in which emotions and impulses which are anxiety-producing or perceived to be unacceptable are mastered by exaggeration (hypertrophy) of the directly opposing tendency.

Someone with a time management problem may actively promote the importance of punctuality and time tracking, while someone with a drinking problem may act as a spokesperson for the virtues of abstinence.

Note that the construct of defence mechanisms in general is outdated and has largely been superseded by cognitive dissonance theory.
> 7 votes

# Answer
You might be looking at cases of psychological projection, which is a method of denial in which people defend themselves from their own negative impulses by attributing them to others. In accordance with the theory, it is less a problem of 'defending' others from getting anywhere near the problem, and more an act of projecting the problem onto others, or assuming that they have the problem, too.

There is also the false-consensus effect, in which people overestimate the degree to which others share their beliefs. This is usually accompanied by the "projection" of personality traits (including negative traits) onto others. Adding on to this theory is the idea that thought suppression leads to an increased saliency of the particular thought, thus making it more readily accessible when viewing others. In other words, one who tries to suppress a perceived negative trait or impulse might unconsciously seek it in others, considering that thoughts of the impulse are made more accessible by repeated attempts to repress them. (see Newman, Duff, and Baumeister (1997)).
> 4 votes

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Tags: terminology, behavior, problem-solving, rationality, cognitive-dissonance
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# Question
Title: Tendency to see novelty in mundane and trivial statements
There exists a psychological phenomenon whereupon a person may encounter a rather trivial or mundane statement or thought, but would not recognize it as such; instead a person would experience a sense of revelation and even pride in being able to think about that particular statement.

The above phenomenon may happen to everyone occasionally, but some people are considerably more prone to it and may experience trivial "intellectual revelations" on a regular and frequent basis. I recall reading an article on the topic, and apparently the phenomenon is well recognized and even has a proper name (something derived from Greek, if I'm not mistaken). Would anybody be able to remind me of that name for the sake of further research?

# Answer
> 2 votes
Might apophenia be the term you are looking for?

> The term is attributed to Klaus Conrad by Peter Brugger, who defined it as the "unmotivated seeing of connections" accompanied by a "specific experience of an abnormal meaningfulness". Apophenia has come to imply a universal human tendency to seek patterns in random information, such as gambling.

Also, as mentioned somewhere above, it is commonly found in patients with schizophrenia.

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, personality, terminology, metacognition
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# Question
Title: What is the effect of listening to music on walking?
How does music affect walking speed and attitude? What will be the effects of different pitch and tempo of music on a person's walking behavior?

# Answer
> 3 votes
Research suggests that endurance is improved when movements are synchronized with a musical beat. \[1\] This research also supports the idea that music has 'motivational' qualities that may enhance performance. One study measured the pace and attitudes of participants running on a treadmill. The control conditions included: 1) no music ('acoustic stimuli'), 2) a metronome condition (a sequence of beeps matching the tempo of the participant, but nothing else), and 3) synchronous motivational music matched to participants' running tempo. From the abstract:

> The beat of the stimuli -which was most salient during the metronome condition- helped runners to maintain a consistent pace by coupling cadence to the prescribed tempo. Thus, acoustic stimuli may have enhanced running performance because runners worked harder as a result of motivational aspects (most pronounced with motivational music) and more efficiently as a result of auditory-motor synchronization (most notable with metronome beeps). These findings imply that running to motivational music with a very prominent and consistent beat matched to the runner's cadence will likely yield optimal effects because it helps to elevate physiological effort at a high perceived exertion, whereas the consistent and correct cadence induced by auditory-motor synchronization helps to optimize running economy.

Another study \[2\] measured oxygen consumption with synchronous, fast-tempo asynchronous, and slow-tempo asynchronous music. They found that the physiological effects of exercising with synchronous music was the most effective.

You mention walking in your question, and while walking is less an exercise than running or more rigorous physical activity, the results from both studies would suggest that people tend to respond 'best' to synchronicity between their movements and the music that they are listening to. Thus, humans have a natural tendency to match their steps to the tempo of this music.

Unsurprisingly, people also tend to move more energetically in response to louder, more aggressive music, and move less energetically to gentler, softer music. This is true regardless of the tempo of the music.

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Sources used:

\[1\] Bood, Robert Jan et al. “The Power of Auditory-Motor Synchronization in Sports: Enhancing Running Performance by Coupling Cadence with the Right Beats.” Ed. Ramesh Balasubramaniam. PLoS ONE 8.8 (2013): e70758. PMC. Web. 24 Aug. 2015.

\[2\] Effect of music-movement synchrony on exercise oxygen consumption. C. J. Bacon, T. R. Myers, C. I. Karageorghis. J Sports Med Phys Fitness. 2012 August; 52(4): 359–365.

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Tags: motor, music, attitudes, neuropsychology
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# Question
Title: Where does action based on thought originate within the human brain?
A rather basic question, but I don't see answer in Google, so here it goes: Humans have thoughts, sometimes these thoughts carry with them motivations to act, urges, cravings, etc. All these can make a person start moving to accomplish something.

> For example: "I'm rather bored, I think I will go get a snack". What happens the moment I cross the threshold from thinking to actually getting up to get a snack?

What happens the moment the person starts to act based on a thought? **Where in the human brain does a thought trigger action?**

**Update:** In response to an answer suggesting that in many cases action comes first and rationalization for action comes second:

The kind of action that I'm talking about comes after a longer period deliberation, where the current state is being weighted against the benefit of the action to take.

For example in the situations below, a person can deliberate for minutes:

* A person is in bed and is very close to sleep, being comfortable and relaxed. Loud noises from the outside disturb the person's attempt to fall asleep. In this case the person can experience conflict between staying in bed (comfortable but disturbed) or going to find earplugs / shut the windows (uncomfortable, but potentially lessening the disturbance)
* A person is trying to meditate, thus relaxing the body and unfocusing the mind. An itch on the foot is disturbing the meditation. Such person can either continue the current state while ignoring the discomfort or scratch the itch and potentially lose the meditative state.

In the examples above, two conflicting courses of action are evaluated by the brain. Due to the ongoing discomfort, it is possible to stay in this state of "almost making a decision" for quite some time. At a certain point the scale can tip into taking action to resolve the discomfort. **What is it that causes the person to take action as opposed to inaction?**

# Answer
There are many areas of the brain that are associated with planning complex behavior. This is because planning and executing are mediated by the brain's capacity for executive functioning, and EF is further associated with many areas of the brain -- in this case, the the frontal lobes, the prefrontal cortex, the caudate nucleus, and the putamen all seem to play a role.

What typically happens is that a thought is formed ('I'm hungry, I want a cookie', etc.), and then potential actions are envisioned and evaluated for their predicted effect, in line with the common coding theory of the relationship between perception and action. **From a functional standpoint, the caudate nucleus selects the appropriate action based on an evaluation of the outcome of the action.** \[1\] \[2\]

The more complex the task, the more cognitive strategies you may need to use, and these are mediated by your executive functioning ability. Cognitive shifting or task switching, information updating and monitoring ("updating"), and inhibition (or the 'tuning out' of irrelevant stimuli) all play a role in planning and executing complex tasks, or sequences of behavior. \[3\] For example, the ability to act in momentarily unpleasant yet beneficial ways (i.e. going to the gym) requires cognitive inhibition of more immediately gratifying, yet irrelevant stimuli (i.e. sitting on the couch, eating pleasurable food). For tasks of this nature, the frontal lobe plays a greater role.

Certain neurotransmitters also play a role in your ability to stay focused and dedicated to a task. Dopamine in particular is responsible for motivation (including the motivation to act), and norepinephrine is responsible for vigilance of attention, thus increasing the likelihood that an action will be performed and completed successfully. With a reduction in these neurotransmitters, you may demonstrate attentional shifts. Long-term, uncontrollable shifts in attention are often representative of an underlying disorder, such as attention-deficit disorder.

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Sources used:

\[1\] Grahn, Jessica; John A. Parkinson; Adrian M. Owen (12 April 2009). "The role of the basal ganglia in learning and memory: Neuropsychological studies". Behavioral Brain Research 199 (1): 53–60.

\[2\] Oury Monchi, Michael Petrides, Antonio P. Strafella, Keith J. Worsley, Julien Doyon (Feb. 2006). Functional role of the basal ganglia in the planning and execution of actions. Ann Neurol. 59(2): 257–264.

\[3\] Miyake A1, Friedman NP, Emerson MJ, Witzki AH, Howerter A, Wager TD. (Aug. 2000) The unity and diversity of executive functions and their contributions to complex "Frontal Lobe" tasks: a latent variable analysis. Cogn Psychol. 41(1):49-100.
> 5 votes

# Answer
All actions a person might take are ultimately a matter of using one's *muscles*. So in that sense, your question --

> What happens the moment the person starts to act based on a thought? **Where in the human brain does a thought trigger action?**

--probably ought to point us most to the **motor cortex**, since this area in the brain is most directly responsible for planning and "commanding" the patterns of activity of the muscles of the body as part of thought-driven (that, is conscious and willed) actions, though by use of neurons in subordinate areas of the nervous system, like the brain stem or the spinal cord, which then *directly* stimulate the target muscles to contract so as to produce the action.

So, just prior to actually moving as part of the conscious action (speaking, moving one's arm, etc.), there will be a change of activity of the neurons of the motor cortex that is ultimately responsible for those movements.
> 1 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, motivation, thought
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# Question
Title: Are the physical sensations of an emotion due to neural activity strictly in the brain or also in the body?
Symptoms of anxiety and anger are often described as some sort of energetic sensation in my chest and sometimes face or arms. Are these sensations an 'illusion' from neural activity strictly in the brain which projects sensations on their body or is there also neural activity in my chest, face or arms that they're 'actually' sensing? If so what is the nature of that activity. If not and the sensations are just an 'illusion' how is the brain creating that illusion. Also why does stretching seem to calm or make this sensation more pleasant?

# Answer
Psychophysiology is totally outside of my wheelhouse, but here it goes…

Those feelings in your chest, face, arms, etc. aren't an illusion. Indeed, it's long been argued that physiological arousal (in your body) is a core component of emotional experience (e.g., James, 1884; Russell, 1980)--alongside feelings of pleasure and displeasure.

Moreover, that you have interoceptive awareness (i.e., awareness of your internal physiological sensations; Craig, 2002) is absolutely critical for your experience of emotions (e.g., Craig, 2004). For example, damage to the anterior insula (thought to underlie interoception) impairs the experience, recognition, and regulation of disgust (Calder et al., 2000; Woolley et al., 2014).

In fact, disgust experience is consistently associated with increased activation of the anterior insula (Lindquist et al., 2012). This highly consistent relationship reflects the nature of disgust: It often involves some potent internal sensation, e.g., a pain in your stomach, a bad odor up your nose, a bad taste in your mouth, and so on.

We can go through the list of emotions and potentially find some consistent and specific psychophysiological profiles (e.g., fear/anxiety involving an increased heart rate, sadness involving a lower temperature), but this has never been successful (Quigley & Barrett, 2014). There seems to be a lot of variability in physiological activity across individuals, contexts, and time.

How activity in the body and the central nervous system interact is pretty complicated (intimidatingly so). But there are lots of psychophysiology guides out there (notably by Cacioppo), and Quigley and Barrett (2014) do a good job of summarizing some things.
> 6 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, neuroscience, perception, emotion, cognitive-neuroscience
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# Question
Title: Is there a term for not recognizing that other people think differently, or projecting your thought patterns on others?
For example I might make the argument that 'Women don't face discrimination in the workplace' or that 'There isn't actually any racism anymore'\* because I myself don't think in an explicitly racist or sexist manner.

\*Caveat: Of course I might qualify the statement with something like 'Everyone is a little unintentionally racist' or something like that. There's also the second problem that *my workplace* might be particularly progressive, and I'm not witnessing sexism that occurs in other workplaces.

This would be failure to recognize that while *I* think that way, not everyone else does and it may exist as a problem elsewhere.

Is there a term for this bias, and more importantly, is there some kind of experiment that demonstrates it?

# Answer
> 9 votes
Interesting question!

Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states, motivations, etc. to others and recognize that others have separate intentions, states, and motivations from his or her own.

The specific phenomenon that you are describing may stem from this concept called naive realism, or the idea that we see the world as it truly is, and that others share the same perceptions as we do. There are several other social biases that stem from the notion of naive realism. You might be particularly interested in the false-consensus effect, or the tendency to overestimate how many people share our beliefs. There is also attribution bias, or the tendency to interpret events in light of our own social world when trying to find reasons for the behavior of others.

Here are four studies that might be of interest to you, from a paper on the false-consensus effect and self-serving bias. As these are biases primarily from the realm of social psychology, most studies you find will be of groups and in-group biases. It might be more helpful to look for specific personality traits that may describe the phenomenon, i.e. lack of self-awareness.

You might also be interested in self-perception theory and, by extension, the truce experiment.

# Answer
> 1 votes
This is sometimes called the "mirror imaging" bias -- imagining or assuming that other people mirror your own thoughts / beliefs / desires / intentions.

See for example:

* The classic reference is Heuer's *Psychology of Intelligence Analysis*,now available from the CIA website. See Chapter 6. Scroll down to "Be wary of mirror images".
* It is mentioned on the stub Wikipedia page Cognitive Traps for Intelligence Analysts.
* Curiously it is absent from the extensive Wikipedia "List of Cognitive Biases" (but I lack sufficient karma to post a third link).

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Tags: terminology, bias
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# Question
Title: What can clinical psychologists do that psychiatrists can't do?
From Yahoo Answers:

> For example, I know that psychiatrists can prescribe medicine and psychologists CAN'T, but are there any things that clinical psychologists are specialised in that psychiatrists aren't? If not, then **why do we have psychologists and not just psychiatrists**? Sorry if it sounds like a stupid question, I'm just a little confused lol.

Is it correct to say that people who don't or might not need drugs for their problems would go to psychologists instead psychiatrists because it is significantly cheaper?

There's an answer:

> they are also able to provide meditation and breathing techniques for things such as panic attacks.

So psychiatrists can't do that? The only thing I can see psychologists doing outside the academia is being a cheaper alternative to a psychiatrist. If clinical psychologists (is that the same as non-academic psychologists?) charged the same as psychiatrists, why doesn't everyone go to psychiatrists?

# Answer
**Short answer** is that psychiatrists are medical doctors and (more often than not) medical researchers, and thus psychiatrists themselves often do not practice psychotherapy.

**Psychiatrists**

Psychiatrists are *physicians*, which means they have received a medical degree (M.D.) and have completed medical training, along with an additional four-year residency in psychiatry. Some psychiatrists pursue additional fellowship training after their residency. Thus, it takes at least twelve years of practice to become a psychiatrist.

Psychiatrists are legally allowed to prescribe psychotropic medications to patients. This is because they are medically trained to do so, having completed a medical degree and medical training. A large portion of this medical training is dedicated to learning how psychotropic medications work in the brain and in the body, particularly in those of patients with mental illnesses. For this reason, psychiatrists are generally more aware of the physical symptoms of illness (much like a doctor would be) as well as the mental symptoms, and thus must make an informed evaluation to determine whether the patients' symptoms are due to physical or mental factors (or both).

Though psychiatrists can perform psychotherapy, the vast majority are purely medical researchers. A psychiatrist may thus refer a patient to a clinical psychologist or a specifically-trained therapist for their individual psychotherapy needs. A physician or psychiatrist (both trained in psychopharmacology by definition) who both practices psychotherapy and prescribes psychoactive medication may refer to themselves as a "psychopharmacologist", though this is more of a distinction than a formal occupation.

**Clinical psychologists**

Clinical psychologists are PhDs who have received several years of graduate training in the science and theory of psychology-based dysfunction and mental illness. They do not receive medical training, but they do undergo 2-4 years of supervised clinical practice before they are licensed as clinical psychologists.

A clinical psychologist's job description is a bit more broad than that of a psychiatrist. While many provide psychotherapy to patients suffering from mental illness, other clinical psychologists may opt to teach, administer psychological testing, conduct research, work with administrators, develop treatment and prevention programs, or work as psychological consultants.

Though there is very little that a clinical psychologist can do that a psychiatrist simply *can't* do, a clinical psychologist is trained in mental health and well-being first and foremost, and thus is typically called on to perform tasks related to mental health (such as psychotherapy or psychometric testing). The difference may be comparable to that of a professor versus a teacher. Though the professor typically undergoes more training, they split their focus between their research and their students (and may prioritize research first), whereas high school teachers are often teachers through-and-through, and thus their primary focus is on the students. Thus the teacher role is a bit more interpersonal.
> 4 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, methodology, terminology, psychiatry, psychology
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title: Are humans biologically wired to lie?

text:
# Question
Title: Are humans biologically wired to lie?
Are humans biologically wired to lie? It seems that people create morals and decree that lying is bad. Yet everyone has lied before. Why is this?

# Answer
> 2 votes
Young children often learn how to lie before they have truly developed a sense for what it is, or why it may be unethical. This is demonstrated by the propensity for children to tell exaggerated and implausible lies, as young children may not yet have a sense of social cognition (or 'theory of mind'), and thus do not yet understand what others may find believable.

A child who examines another adult lying will understand that the adult is not telling the truth, but will see that the achieved effect is often in favor of the liar. Thus they will learn that disguising the truth can achieve a certain (often favorable) result. Like all negative behavior, if the child learns that lying has more negative consequences than positive ones, they will be less quick to demonstrate the behavior.

Despite recognizing it as an unethical behavior, people may still choose to lie out of fear, or to defend from the consequences of truth telling. Lying can also be a pro-social attitude to spare the feelings of another, thus avoiding conflict and preserving civility in human relationships.

From a neurobiological standpoint, there may be parts of the brain that influence the decision to lie. One study showed that pathological liars had increased white matter volumes in certain regions (namely the orbitofrontal, inferior frontal, and middle frontal cortices). \[1\]

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**Sources used**:

\[1\] Yang, Y., Raine, A., Narr, K., Lencz, T., LaCasse, L. Colleti, P., Toga, A. (February 2007). "Localisation of increased prefrontal white matter in pathological liars." British Journal of Psychiatry, 190, 174–175.

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Tags: social-psychology
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# Question
Title: What is the name of the bias when one expects you to possess his knowledge?
What is the name of bias or fallacy when, often while in argument, someone expects you to know the same things as he does. Usually, you just say "well, how should have I known that. I'm not inside of your mind."

I've searched through wiki's list of cognitive biases, but couldn't find anything.

EDIT:

To clarify what I have in mind: When people disregard the availability of information to the subject they are talking to. Or maybe they do not take into account that the subject might not have given the question in hand as much thought as they have, therefore he might not have arrived at the same conclusions. Or they just forget the fact something might not be so obvious to the subject as it is for them.

(so in my original post I've been influenced by the same bias to a degree)

# Answer
> 9 votes
If you had asked about cognitive distortions, I probably could've answered straight away about one of those!

I think it might be an *illusion of transparency*. Your example somewhat aligns to the definition provided by Gilovich, Medvec & Savitsky (1998):

> "... we refer to this tendency to overestimate the extent to which others can read one's internal states as the illusion of transparency." (p.332)

However it doesn't necessarily meet the criteria for someone expecting another person to know the same things that they do. The illusion of transparency is rather an exaggeration of transparency rather than an exaggeration of being epistemologically levelled.

It could be a *projection bias* or an *assumed similarity bias* \- both of which might be relevant to your scenario. Projection bias refers to the tendency to assume that others share one's current emotional states and thoughts (Hsee & Reid, 2006). An assumed similarity bias refers to the bias that others are similar to the self (Srivastava, Guglielmo & Beer, 2010). The response - "well, how should have I known that. I'm not inside of your mind." is a product of those biases being invalidated.

Hopefully, these were the ones you were looking for.

**References**

* Gilovich, T., Savitsky, K. & Medvec, V.H. (1998). The illusion of transparency: biased assessments of others' ability to read one's emotional states. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 75(2), 332-346
* Hsee, C.K., Reid, H. (2006). Decision and experience: why don't we choose what makes us happy? *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, 10(1), 31–37
* Srivastava, S., Guglielmo, S. & Beer, J.S. (2010). Perceiving others’ personalities: Examining the dimensionality, assumed similarity to the self, and stability of perceiver effects. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 98(3), 520–534

# Answer
> 4 votes
The question is related to a large area of research showing that people are egocentrically biased when they think about the thoughts and feelings of others.

The classic study is Ross, Green and House's (1977) paper on the **false consensus effect**, according to which people overestimate the extent to which their own beliefs, opinions, behavioral choices, and traits are shared by others. For example, when Ross et al. asked participants whether they would allow a supermarket to use their endorsement of the store in an ad, 66% said that they would agree and they believed that 75% of the people would do the same. In contrast, the 34% who said they would decline the request believed that 43% of the people would do the same. In other words, people overestimated the extent to which others would decide in the same way as themselves.

This effect is highly robust and similar phenomena have been studied in various domains, sometimes using different terms, such as **social projection**, **egocentric bias**, **hot-cold empathy gap**, **"curse of knowledge"-effect**, or **hindsight bias**.

A good primer to the literature is the chapter by Van Boven and Loewenstein (2005) which lays out several ways in which people can be inaccurate in thinking about the minds of others.

**References**

Ross, L., Greene, D., & House, P. (1977). The “false consensus effect”: An egocentric bias in social perception and attribution processes. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 13(3), 279–301. http://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(77)90049-X

Van Boven, L., & Loewenstein, G. (2005). Cross-situational projection. In M. . Alicke, D. A. Dunning, & J. I. Krueger (Eds.), The Self in Social Judgment (pp. 43– 64). New York, NY: Taylor & Francis.

# Answer
> 3 votes
Egocentrism?

I can't even find the Family Circus comic where the boy is talking on the phone, playing with a yo-yo, and says, "Look what I can do, grandma!"
Update: Huh, I didn't find that comic, but it's still a Family Circus comic that accompanies the topic.
Grandma: "Tell me, Jeffy, what was this fun dream about last night?"
Jeffy: "Don't you remember, Grandma? You were in it with me." (Jeff and Bil Keane, 8-21)

Other examples in the section include a two-years-old showing someone else a picture with the picture facing the child, a three-years-old making themself invisible by blocking their own vision, and a young boy claiming that he has a brother yet also that his brother does not have a brother (Phillips, 1969, p. 61).

**References**

* Myers, D. G. (2007). Infancy and Childhood. In Psychology (8th ed.) (pg. 139-159). New York, NY: Worth Publishers.
* Phillips, J. L. (1969). *Origins of Intellect: Piaget's theory*. San Francisco: Freeman. (p. 145)

# Answer
> 3 votes
I think the most commonly used term for this is **the curse of knowledge**.

On p1233 of Camerer et al (1989) it's defined as the phenomenon whereby

> "In predicting the judgments of others, agents are unable to ignore the additional information they possess."

This seems to be the first time this term was used in print, although the authors state that the term was suggested to them by Robin Hogarth. Since 1989 the term seems to be increasingly used in contexts beyond "predicting the judgments of others", as https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Curse\_of\_knowledge indicates.

Camerer, C., Loewenstein, G., & Weber, M. (1989). The curse of knowledge in economic settings: An experimental analysis. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 1232-1254.

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Tags: social-psychology, terminology, bias
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# Question
Title: Is there a relation between speed of executing a task and ones intelligence?
I recently came across a code refactoring problem. Considering the risk of getting into a risky bug later I switched to my usual mode of think and solve it, rather than go and make the changes fast. However, another colleague of mine solved the same problem with a fast paced code changes approach. Both of them worked correctly. However, this incident made me wonder whether it was actually a problem with one's ability to solve the problem that led one to take a slower approach.

So my question is, whether intelligent people actually can finish their tasks faster, or whether it is the speed of working that gives an illusion of intelligence?

What is the significance of speed in finishing tasks in general?

# Answer
> 2 votes
**Short answer**: Processing speed is linked to executive functioning (EF) ability as well as specific, individual abilities (verbal, spatial, etc.), whereas generalized inspection time (IT) and reaction time (RT) to simple stimuli is more representative of general intelligence.

**Detailed answer**: There are several factors that go into intelligence. Three specific, measurable paradigms are **reaction time (RT)**, **inspection time (IT)**, and **speed of processing**. Reaction time refers to the ability to respond to simple, familiar stimuli, and inspection time refers to the ability to identify a familiar stimulus. For example, if you are asked to press the space bar when you see a letter on the screen, your IT is being measured (time it takes to recognize the letter) as well as your RT (time it takes to press the space bar). Speed of processing is related to your ability to quickly perform familiarized or over-learned tasks, particularly when high mental efficiency is required. **The difference**: With RT and IT, you are asked to perform simple tasks that require little 'effort', yet they are (presumably) not tasks that are familiar to you. Speed of processing comes into play when you are asked to perform over-learned tasks that require more mental effort.

Though speed of processing has always been linked to intelligence in some form, it is now believed that RT and IT are related to ***general intelligence***, whereas ***specific abilities*** (e.g. verbal abilities, spatial abilities) are moreso related to processing speed than to general intelligence. \[1\].

Speed of processing is often linked to **working memory capacity**. \[2\] This is demonstrated in those with certain learning disorders (such as ADHD), who often have working memory deficits and thus often process information slowly, regardless of IQ. Studies have also found that removing a time limit on testing removes the problems associated with dysfunctional working memory (such as lapses in attention). Thus it can be said that speed of processing is greater linked to **executive functioning ability** (which is a higher set of cognitive processes that working memory is a part of). \[3\]

So the answer to your question is that ***speed of processing*** is representative of *specific abilities* insofar as one's working memory capacity (and, by proxy, general executive functioning ability) is not dysfunctional, whereas the time it takes to ***identify and respond*** to a simple situation is linked to general intelligence.

In your particular instance, you were asked to answer an unfamiliar question with a non-trivial answer. Thus, it was *speed of processing* that was at play here, more closely linked to ability or knowledge of the topic at hand than general intelligence. The method in which the knowledge was acquired may have to do with intelligence, but there is too little context (and evidence) to support this.

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**Sources used**:

\[1\] Placing inspection time, reaction time, and perceptual speed in the broader context of cognitive ability

\[2\] Conway AR, Kane MJ, Engle RW (December 2003). "Working memory capacity and its relation to general intelligence". Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (12): 547–52.

\[3\] "Working memory function in attention deficit hyperactivity disordered and reading disabled children". British Journal of Developmental Psychology 19 (3): 325–337.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, intelligence
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# Question
Title: How can we be formed by our childhood's environment if we don't remember much of it?
Studies with rats have shown that how much a pup is licked during their early childhood predicts their adult personality \[1\]. Also, many psychologists say that early childhood is the part of our lives where our personality is formed \[2\]. However, recent evidence suggests that childhood memories are actively removed, to be replaced with new ones \[3\]. So how can childhood affect us so much?

# Answer
It all comes down to the type of memory.

Infantile amnesia is largely associated with the loss of episodic memory, a type of explicit memory that can be consciously recalled (eg, remembering a past event). Implicit memory, such as learned skills (eg, remembering how to tie your shoes), the learned part of personality, and priming associations, are largely unaffected.

Though the reasons for infantile amnesia are not well understood, it has some similarity to retrograde amnesia, that also affects mostly episodic memory, but not implicit memory (so again, you lose memories of past events, but not your personality). The hippocampus, an area of the brain associated with memory consolidation, is an important factor in both types of amnesia.

PS: The first article you link to is about genetics, or specifically epigenetics, that is to do with gene expression. This is a completely different factor that is also immune to amnesia since it is not related to memory, and so far it is only implicated in a very few traits.
> 7 votes

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Tags: memory, personality, brain-development, neurogenesis
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# Question
Title: Does research support the notion of mimicry building trust?
Mimicry is the behaviour in which one person subconsciously imitates the gesture, speech pattern, or attitude of another person.

Some people believe that mimicry has strong social effects. For example, according to NLP, mimicry can be used strategically to build rapport (here, the technique is called "mirroring").

Has there been any scientific research on the effects of mirroring? If so, does research support the notion that mirroring builds trust?

# Answer
> 2 votes
A good primer on the psychological effects of mimicry is the review by Chartrand and Lakin (2013), who define mimicry as "the automatic imitation of gestures, postures, mannerisms, and other motor movements" (also see this earlier question).

They cite several findings suggesting that **mimicry indeed contributes to positive relationships between people**. For example, people being mimicked become more prosocial to the mimicker, as expressed in increased liking, empathy, helping behavior, and felt closeness. Chartrand and Lakin describe mimicry as a kind of "social glue" bringing people together.

More specifically with regard to your question, several studies are in line with the idea that **mimicry increases trust**.

For example, as per Chartrand and Lakin (2013):

> Van Swol (2003) had a confederate, while trying to change the participant’s opinion on a topic, imitate his or her behaviors (or not). Later, participants reported that they perceived the mimicking confederate as more knowledgeable and persuasive, even though they did not ultimately change their opinion on the topics. In a twist on this, Bailenson & Yee (2005) found that participants liked a computer avatar that mimicked their head movements more than one that didn’t, and were more persuaded by its arguments.

They also cite studies that measured trust specifically:

> Trusting behaviors tend to increase after a person has been mimicked. For example, mimicked participants seem more willing than those who were not mimicked to divulge personal information to strangers, even when that information could be embarrassing (Gueguen et al. 2012). According to Maddux et al. (2008), mimicry also smoothes the progress of negotiations. They instructed negotiators to either mimic or not mimic partners’ behavior and later assessed mimicry’s impact on negotiation outcomes. Mimickers experienced higher individual and dyadic gains and were more willing to come to an agreement with others regarding a difficult decision, and the relationship was mediated by interpersonal trust (see also Swaab et al. 2011)

**Does mimicry always work?**

NLP holds that Mirroring is a powerful technique. Note, however, that the cited findings only document modest mean differences, showing that mimicry can have an effect. Nevertheless, the size and importance of this effect may still be questioned.

Furthermore, under some circumstances **mimicry may not work or even backfire**.

Lakin and Chartrand (2013):

> It turns out that one does need to mimic the “right” people to enjoy the positive consequences of mimicry. Recent research has found that mimicking may backfire (in terms of public opinion about one’s social competence) if someone mimics an unfriendly person. After watching someone mimicking unfriendly behaviors, people thought the mimicker was less socially competent than someone who mimicked a friendly partner or someone who mimicked no one (Kavanagh et al. 2011).

In addition mimicry may work less well if people mimic outgroup members, if one has to mimic nonaffiliative expressions (e.g., anger), or when people have a proself mindset or have high levels of social anxiety (Chartrand & Lakin, 2013).

Finally, in some situations, complementary (doing the opposite) rather than imitative behavior may increase liking. For example, Tiedens and Fragale (2003) asked confederates to mimic or complement bodily postures of dominance or submission (using an expanded or constricted posture). Participants whose behavior was complemented (the confederate showed a submissive posture when the participant was behaving in a dominant way, or vice versa) liked the confederate more. Thus, in power or status relationships mimicry may have different effects.

**References**

Chartrand, T. L., & Lakin, J. L. (2013). The antecedents and consequences of human behavioral mimicry. Annual Review of Psychology, 64, 285–308. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-113011-143754

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Tags: social-psychology, trust, body-language
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# Question
Title: How to examine person's awareness of a certain topic?
I am conducting a case study on the topic of refugees and asylum seekers. My particular interest is: How aware is my test subject of the reasons (political persecution, famine, war, ...) why these people are leaving their home country?

I would like to avoid asking explicit questions like "How often do you think about the political situation in Syria?"

So, is there any standardized or way of investigating awareness (not knowledge) of a certain topic?

# Answer
I think what you may be after is the **accessibility** of people's attitudes. The idea is that people not only have different attitudes, but that they also differ whether these attitudes are on top of their minds (or how easy it is for them to retrieve them, when they are prompted to indicate an attitude). If an attitude is subjectively important or often thought about, it should be highly accessible. On the other hand, for other things, people may have a very negative or positive attitude, that is, nevertheless, relatively inaccessible to them. Accessible attitudes have been shown to guide behavior more strongly (there is a higher correspondence between attitudes and behavior). The classic paper is by Fazio and colleagues (1989).

**Attitude accessibility can be measured by measuring the reaction time to attitudes questions**. If people are faster in answering an attitude question, this is taken as an indicator of a highly accessible attitude. This would also be the kind of indirect measure that you might have in mind.

So in your example, you could ask participants to agree or disagree whether certain reasons for seeking asylum are important, and measure the reaction time of their answers. Quicker answers would indicate that these reasons are more accessible to them.

**References**

Fazio, R. H., Powell, M. C., & Williams, C. J. (1989). The role of attitude accessibility in the attitude-to-behavior process. Journal of consumer research, 280–288.
> 2 votes

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Tags: methodology, consciousness, attitudes, awareness
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# Question
Title: When was statistics used in psychology research first?
I am wondering about the origin of statistics' usage in psychology. Psychology was rooted in philosophy. At that time there were no experiments and analysing the data, but I guess that there must be the very first time when someone came up with the idea to use statistics in the analysis. (and that's my question).

# Answer
> 3 votes
This paper suggests it was a psychophysics experiment by Fencher in 1860.

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Tags: history-of-psychology
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# Question
Title: From a psychosocial standpoint, how is violence different from aggression?
I recently watch Steven Pinker's video on violence and figured out that I don't understand the difference between violence and aggression.

According to Wikipedia aggression is:

> Aggression, in its broadest sense, is behavior, or a disposition, that is forceful, hostile or attacking.

and for Violence they use the WHO's definition:

> the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, which either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment, or deprivation

At first sight it seemed that the difference could be intentionality, i.e., aggression has intentionality attached to it and violence doesn't.

But the WHO's report linked says:

> The definition used by the WHO associates intentionality with the committing of the act itself, irrespective of the outcome it produces

So the difference is not all that clear to me.

# Answer
> 4 votes
The definition of aggression and violence is a thorny issue, and there is considerable disagreement about the terms between disciplines, but also within disciplines. Sometimes authors use the terms interchangeably.

In psychology, the term **aggression** is often used as the **broader term that encompasses all forms of harmful behavior**.

For example, according to the widely cited definition by Baron and Richardson (1994), **"aggression is any form of behavior directed toward the goal of harming or injuring another living being who is motivated to avoid such treatment".** This would include verbal aggression, or indirect forms of aggression such as gossiping.

In contrast, the term **violence** is often limited to extreme forms of physical aggression.

For example, Anderson (2000) defines violence in the Encyclopedia of Psychology as

> a **subtype of aggression, generally used to denote extreme forms of aggression** such as murder, rape, and assault. All violence is aggression, but many forms of aggression are not violent.

**References**

Baron, R. A., & Richardson, D. (1994). Human aggression. New York: Plenum Press.

Anderson (2000). Aggression and violence. In A.E. Kazdin (Ed.) Encyclopedia of psychology, 8, 162-169. New York & Washington D.C.: Oxford University Press and the American Psychological Association.

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Tags: social-psychology, terminology, aggression
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# Question
Title: How does obedience correlate with the Big 5 factors of personality?
I am looking for correlations for any Big 5 traits with obedience. Are there any research reports on this, **available for me to read**?

# Answer
Bègue et al. (2015) have recently investigated how the Big 5 traits predict obedience in a variant of the Milgram paradigm.

Participants believed they were participants in the pilot screening of a TV show. The talk show host (as the authority figure of the experiment) asked them to deliver electric shocks of increasing intensity to another participant (presumably a quiz contestant) whenever he or she gave an incorrect answer. As the intensity of the shocks increased, the contestant (in reality a confederate of the study) could be heard screaming and protesting, asking to stop the shocks. Nevertheless, the host insisted that the shocks should continue for the sake of the game show. The central measure of obedience was the highest intensity of the shock (when the participant refused to continue).

Result: **Conscientiousness and Agreeableness predicted obedience as expressed in the willingness to administer electric shocks of higher intensity as demanded by the authority figure**.

Here are the detailed results:

**References**

Bègue, L., Beauvois, J.-L., Courbet, D., Oberlé, D., Lepage, J., & Duke, A. A. (2015). Personality predicts obedience in a milgram paradigm. Journal of Personality, 83, 299–306. doi:10.1111/jopy.12104 (pdf)
> 2 votes

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Tags: personality, big-five, obedience
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# Question
Title: Do different meta-cognitive measurements depend on the same mechanism?
There are different meta-cognitive judgments: feeling of knowing, ratings of warmth, confidence, judgments of learning, tip-of-the-tongue or not, insight or not, etc.

**Are these judgments based on the same mechanism or there is a different mechanism in each case?**

# Answer
> 3 votes
This is a topic of research currently. The short answer is no (there's quite a clear distinction between e.g. visual and memory metacognition), the long answer is that in some cases, some metacognitive mechanisms might be shared.

Some examples for the short 'no' answer:

Some examples showing that there actually is some degree of domain-generality:

# Answer
> 2 votes
Here are some finding of neuroscience mechanisms of metacognition:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/10924251

They claim that several of them are included. They didn't mentioned nothing about cerebellum.

In research of creativity where pretty much of metacognition is needed cerebellum has significant role:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creativity#Neurobiology\_of\_creativity

According to this there could be several mechanisms. I also have this book in my hand several weeks ago and I think they wrote about several mechanisms: http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/site/2012/metacognition.xhtml

There is also article where we could argue on mechanism connected to cortex and another one which is not: http://rstb.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/367/1599/2213

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, metacognition
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# Question
Title: Is it better to study multiple subjects simultaneously or focus on one subject intensely at a time?
Since I will soon have a bit of free time, I thought I'd use it to enhance my knowledge pool. I chose four subjects that always interested me (but that are not related) and thought I'd dive in a bit more seriously.

However, now I have a question - Assuming I wish to make the most of my time (one month, four hours each day) and learn the most in the small time-frame I have, I can think of two approaches:

One: Study one subject intensely, say four hours a day, for a full week, before completely switching to another subject.

Two: Study all subjects simultaneously, say one hour each per day, for the full month.

My question is: Are there studies which show which of these two paths will lead to greater retention of the material studied in the given time-frame? In other words, which is better if you wish to study diverse subjects: Focus on one at a time or spread out equally?

# Answer
> 4 votes
I think that this is one of those cases where **it depends on personal preference and learning style**.

The reason I say this is because the ability to **shift from one task to another** (also known as 'set-shifting') is a type of cognitive flexibility that is linked to one's individual executive functioning ability. In turn, this is usually mandated by one's ***frontal inhibitory activity***.

On the other hand, those who often fall prey to a phenomenon called task perseveration (also known as 'hyperfocus') may have a **reduced or impaired ability** to switch between tasks. This seems to occur at above-average rates in twice-exceptional children. \[1\] For those predisposed to task perseveration, switching between several topics a day may be marginally more difficult.

Another thing to consider would be cognitive load, which is the **amount of mental effort being used in one's working memory**. As cognitive load increases, it becomes difficult to manage and learn new material. It is known that cognitive load increases in the face of difficult material (with 'difficulty' as perceived by the learner). For this reason, one common method of reducing cognitive load in teaching and learning is to divide subjects up into subtopics and teach these subtopics in isolation, and then later integrate them into the subject as a whole. Furthermore, it is known that there are **individual differences in cognitive load capacity**, particularly among experts and novices. \[2\] Experts have more knowledge associated with a topic or skill, which reduces the cognitive load necessary to learn more material within that topic. This lends itself to the idea that ***the more familiar you are with the material, the easier it becomes to learn more of said material***. \[3\]

In short, there is **no clear-cut answer**; there are simply *factors* that may go into a *contextualized* answer. In the case of studying four unrelated subjects, it might be worth asking the following: **How well do you know the subjects?** Are you studying all four from the ground up? If so, it might be more effective to study one at a time in order to allow the fundamentals to sink in, thus decreasing cognitive load. The other factor to consider would be your overall discipline level. **Do you fall prey to task perseveration, or is your ability to shift from one task to another generally uninhibited?** These are all factors to consider in determining *your own* study plan.

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**Sources used**:

\[1\] Misdiagnosis And Dual Diagnoses Of Gifted Children And Adults p.50-51

\[2\] Murphy, Gregory L.; Wright, Jack C. (1984). "Changes in conceptual structure with expertise: Differences between real-world experts and novices.". Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition 10 (1): 144–155.

\[3\] Voorhies, D. & Scandura, J.M. (1977). "7". Determination of memory load in information processing. Problem Solving, NY: Academic Press. pp. 299–316.

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Tags: memory, learning
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