# Question
Title: Is there a psychological explanation for people being 'overcome by the Holy Spirit'?
I am a scientist by nature, and I don't believe at all in God or any form of spirituality or the Holy Spirit (of course).

However, it does confuse me as to how some people genuinely do seem to be overcome by 'spirit' in certain more extreme churches.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BuOBdGeArZw Watch this clip, and at about 3:35 the man goes into a strange state, and states like this do happen. As well as this, my dad once began crying for no reason in a Church or Mosque or something at the altar.

Are there any scientifically/theoretical psychological explanations as to why this could be possible without the need for any sort of spirituality?

# Answer
Research in this area is pretty patchy. Summarizing what Wikipedia says on the topic:

* "God helmet" experiments were plagued by failures to reproduce by independent research groups
* TLE (temporal lobe epilepsy) and its effect known as Geschwind syndrome is one plausible cause... but that does not explain it in all people
* hippocampal atrophy is a more recent hypothesis, although it seems backed by only one study insofar

Independently of Wikipedia I found:

* a study by Urgesi et at. (2010) on the effect of brain lesions (following brain cancer removal) on self-transcendence, which determined that "self-transcendence increases after damage to lt and rt inferior parietal cortex".
* a 2009 study by Inzlicht et al. found that "religious conviction is marked by reduced reactivity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), a cortical system that is involved in the experience of anxiety and is important for self-regulation \[...\] These correlations remained strong even after we controlled for personality and cognitive ability." And the paper goes as far as having a "xanax of the people" heading for one its sections, and obvious pun on the better known phrase of Marx. The authors also point out that a similar anxiolytic effect was observed in studies of other strong beliefs, but not necessarily religious, e.g. ideological/political, citing Amodio et al. 2007 and Kay et al. 2008. (And starting to digress here, but the Amodio study has elicited strong reactions in the press).
> 2 votes

# Answer
One of the common answers is that it's driven by social demands and depends on the cultural expectation and the suggestibility of the individual.

I remember an example Spanos used to like to bring up regarding demonic possession. Catholics and protestants had different symptoms for demonic possession and people who exhibited it as a phenomenon each had the symptoms they were supposed to have. The long history of hypnosis, hypno-therapy and a variety of social and suggestibility related phenomenon suggests that's one potential cause for what you witness.

More recent theorizing talks about social emotional constructs such as social joy. The act of being with a group of people can make someone happy when all participating together and there is a strong feeling of shared belief. I think there's something to that and the general idea of spirituality that either comes from social contexts or strong isolation (isolation impacts an individual partly because of their reliance on the social). There is clearly some emotion that we can get that we attribute causally to God or a spirit that we do not fully understand. Of course, we've always attributed to God or a spirit that which we do not fully understand. Until we can better understand that and how it's important to the well being of humans, atheism will perpetually have an uphill battle.
> 1 votes

# Answer
I remember seeing something that mentioned that for people who actually believe that something spiritual is happening to them their actual brain chemistry is changing.

Heightened emotions emit serotonin, dopamine, etc, and that could have an effect on people with a combination of other chemicals. Any time that our emotions are heightened we experience physiological and sometimes psychological changes. To explain why people see strange things or angels and such, those are just hallucinations. These people are not mentally ill, but the way you behave and perceive the world depends on your brain chemistry and brain chemistry is malleable given certain circumstances, so over time, someone could go from a Christian to a pagan and feel and see totally different things.

For an example I want to mention near death experiences. Near death experiences are typically explained by some scientists as auditory, visual, and sensory hallucinations, some scientists think that the brain is still active to a degree after clinical death. Of course this is still being researched and debated but it would explain near death experiences and why they are all similar. Near death experiences are influenced by culture. Culture is a learned trait and for most people this culture is the same, especially when isolated. That could also be the reason why some people experience the same things as they do rituals, prey, etc. It is shared belief and it creates memories, among other things, as our brains are wired to fit these beliefs.
> -2 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, abnormal-psychology, religion
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# Question
Title: mirror-writing using non-dominant hand easier with closed eyes
I've learnt to mirror-write as shown below  using my non-dominant hand. One of the things I've observed is that it's a lot easier when I do it with my **eyes closed**. For e.g. if my eyes were closed, I'd be able to write faster and with less mirror-mistakes (writing **regular b** \- `b` instead of **mirrored b** \- `d`)

Is there any existing research that can explain this?

# Answer
> 1 votes
There has been some recorded research in this area from more than 150 years back (1858). The concept is called **Bilateral transfer of learning**.

**Definition:** "Bilateral transfer is an aspect of the transfer of learning and is the transfer of learning or performance from one side of the body after training to the other. So, for example, after training a task with the right hand there, is an improvement in left handed performance."

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I could also find a mention of this very specific example (Ref: Slide #8 in this slideshare presentation)-

"He (E H Weber) observed that some children trained to write with the right hand were able without further training to produce very good mirror writing with the left hand".

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Why closing the eyes helps may be due to the fact that it reduces distraction but I haven't been able to find any reference for this.

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Tags: brain-training, writing
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# Question
Title: What causes muscle stiffness contraction and tension during stress
What causes muscle contraction in times of stress? People say it's caused because of fight or flight response is activated, but this not exact. I am looking to find the direct cause, i.e is it a direct effect of adrenaline or maybe a direct effect of cortisol? Maybe is because glucose levels rise and it's the way of our body to use that extra energy? I don't really know and searching doesn't help.

# Answer
Presumably you to mean to ask what pathway mediates muscle tension. muscle tension is controlled by the reticular formation (in the brain stem), so it doesn't require anything special to happen in the bloodstream. The reticular formation is connected to many other areas of the brain.

To save this question from triviality and relate it to your prior one (which was about anxiety), muscle tension is the most common (if not the defining) feature of GAD, yet muscle tension cannot be understood in terms of the autonomous nervous system (ANS) response to stress (according to a 2009 review of Pluess et al.) That's basically a coy of saying we don't know what exactly causes muscle tension in GAD. Furthermore, some studies of GAD reported that the typical ANS responses to stress are not present in many GAD patients (according to the aforementioned review citing in Hoehn-Saric et al.). The latter issue is more controversial because a later (and more cited) study of Thayer et al. did find some correlates with ANS in terms of cardiac activity, but this still doesn't quite provide a complete explanation. Another 2009 GAD review discussed 5 different conceptual models of GAD, yet none of these theories does much to explain muscle tension in GAD.
> 2 votes

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Tags: physiology, stress
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# Question
Title: "How easily can you succumb to propaganda and manipulation" test
Part of the fictional story I am currently writing takes place in a typical dictatorship country with its propaganda, cult of the leader, etc. The main character undergoes several psychological tests over couple of days and their goal is to find out how easily the character can be manipulated, how strong an individual he is and if he succumbs to mass thinking.

Could you advise me on any psychological tests that can prove such things?

# Answer
**Historical examples** as mentioned in the comments, include: Asch's Conformity Experiment; Milgram's Obediance Experiment; and similarly, the Stanford Prison Experiment by Zimbardo.

Zimbardo's experiment had more to do with situational forces and taking on an assumed role. A brief synopsis: He randomly assigns healthy students to either guard of prisoner roles in a mock basement prison. They assume their roles with striking commitment, which leads to some unfortunate interactions between the guards and prisoners. Some of his rhetoric would probably suit your story nicely. In the later chapters of his book published after the conclusion of the experiment, Zimbardo discusses his idea of a "hero" able to resist the situational forces. He believes this to be a latent attribute within an individual, and that leads us towards personality psychology. It is more akin to Asch's study, in that there is no true "authority" but rather situational forces brought about by other conforming peers.

As far as an specific test, I believe the **Big Five Inventory** can be adapted to your purposes. In personality psychology, it is regarded as a rather valid and consistent tool. Some of the metrics included could predispose an individual to obedience. Some examples that come to mind:

**Agreeableness:** Includes applicable measures of trust and compliance

**Conscientiousness:** Perhaps some use of self-discipline and dutifulness would identify as positive traits for an obedient character (thinking soldier or the like).

**Openness to Experience:** Scoring highly in measures of curiosity and values may make a character less apt to be obedient.

Source \- Also includes a 44-item sample inventory.
> 1 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, test
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# Question
Title: What is the distribution of performance in academic programming subjects?
On Programmers SE there is a popular question about scientific evidence for whether some people either are or are not able to program.

One person cites an unpublished manuscript by Dehnadi and Bornat (2006) who state in an abstract:

> All teachers of programming find that their results display a 'double hump'. It is as if there are two populations: those who can, and those who cannot, each with its own independent bell curve.

That said, educators have choice in how individual assessments are scored, how assessments are combined, and whether and how any final scores are scaled. These could all influence the shape of the final grade distribution.

I also imagine that to get a double hump would suggest that the variables that best predict student performance (e.g., time spent on subject, general ability, subject-specific ability) would have to either show a double hump or show a discontinuous relationship with performance. In particular, I can see that students that drop out of a subject without formally un-enrolling are likely to fail very badly and appear in a separate hump. I also suspect that certain types of subjects where answers are clearly correct or incorrect and where intuition from everyday life is less directly relevant may also give rise to a process where it appears as if people can either do the subject or they can't.

### Questions

* What is the distribution of grades in university subjects?
* To what extent does the distribution of grades in programming subjects differ from non-programming subjects? Is it bimodal?
* Is there any theories or empirical evidence about what leads to bimodal grade distributions?

### References

* Dehnadi, S. & Bornat, R. (2006). The camel has two humps (working title). Middlesex University, UK. PDF and summary page.

# Answer
> 5 votes
Our university has a public grade distribution database, so I did a really quick analysis on some historical data to see if there was any support for this idea. To my surprise, it appears that there might be. But, my analysis is very limited.

I downloaded the grade distributions for all intro psychology and intro computer science classes from 2010-2014. This gave me the grades of about 15,000 psychology students and about 1,500 computer science students. I summed up the count for each letter grade, and then normalized to a percentage of students. Apologies for the somewhat ugly chart, but here's what I found:

The distribution for letter grades seems pretty consistent across both disciplines, but what jumps out to me is the assignment of "W" grades, which is the grade received when a student withdraws from the course after being enrolled for at least the first week of classes. About 20% of all intro CS students withdraw from the class, while less than 5% of intro psych students do. This might indicate that a larger number of CS students find the course to be too challenging for them, and withdraw rather than get a low grade.

# Answer
> 2 votes
(This is a bit brief given the complexity of the question. I'll expand later if I can summarize more of the findings.)

Probably the only thing which is certain is the high-failure rate in CS1-level classes, worldwide. From a recent (2014) meta-analysis:

> In this paper, we answer the call for further substantial evidence on the CS1 failure rate phenomenon, by performing a systematic review of introductory programming literature, and a statistical analysis on pass rate data extracted from relevant articles. Pass rates describing the outcomes of 161 CS1 courses that ran in 15 different countries, across 51 institutions were extracted and analysed. An almost identical mean worldwide pass rate of 67.7% was found. Moderator analysis revealed significant, but perhaps not substantial differences in pass rates based upon: grade level, country, and class size. However, pass rates were found not to have significantly differed over time, or based upon the programming language taught in the course.

There was a prior world-wide study in 2007 (using online self-reported data) which agreed with this number (~33% failure rate), although the distribution observed for the passing students was different:

Alas neither paper compares this number with other fields, but the 2007 one also calculated that graduation from CS tertiary education is low worldwide, 26.8% so getting past CS1 hardly guarantees smooth sailing thereafter.

The latter \[counterproductively 3D\] graph is based on UNESCO data, which is why North America is absent (the US boycott\[ed\] UNESCO.)

There is however one paper which does state that:

> Studies in Ireland \[1\] have shown that Computer Science has the highest failure rate, giving a 26.9% non-completion rate for Computing courses.
>
> \[... citing:\]
>
> \[1\] Mark Morgan, Rita Flanagan and Thomas Kellaghan, "Higher Education Report A Study of Non-Completion in Undergraduate University Courses" published February 2001

Several theories for the CS1 failure rate have been advanced: genetic basis, "learning edge momentum", and/or stumbling blocks but it's too early to tell if any of these have convincing empirical support. (In fact the last paper argues that insofar there isn't a good data gathering strategy that would even allow one to one to decide.) And one academic blog suggests (based on its own data) that none might be correct. Yet another paper suggests that (Duckworth's) grit plays a substantial role. And with respect to the final grade being an aggregation one paper (based on a single course) suggests that students' bimodal final grades come from the practical side of the evaluation:

Alas I was not able to find other papers looking into this aspect, however it does look to me that the grit paper does point in the same direction; it found that grit was a much better predictor than ACT (itself considered a proxy for IQ) for CS1 success.

The humps paper mentiond in the question is not taken very seriously (most of these papers dont' cite it), and even by its own authors themselves these days. It also does not seem to have been the first to observe the grade distribution phenomenon. I'm not entirely sure why it became popular on-line. Its strong language and/or the SE-effect maybe. For instance this 2005 paper noted the 30% to 40% failure rate as well.

---

Also here's a graph with the failure rate by country from the 2014 meta-analysis:

The authors note that the top 3 failure leaders Portugal, Germany and Brazil were represented by a pretty small sample in this study, so the data for those countries cannot really be relied upon. On the other hand, "of the 4 countries which made 80% of the sample, Finland was found to have the lowest pass rate 57.7%". The other three countries in this 80% bulk of the data, US, UK, and Australia had statistically indistinguishable rates.

Also, the methodology should have been more upfront in this meta-analysis but they do say "Currently we have found in this study 3/10 students do not complete, or fail CS1." So they definitely count withdrawals as failure, basically, for the statics they reported.

# Answer
> 2 votes
According to the research of Elizabeth Patitsas, the distribution is not bimodal. She sampled 778 University of British Columbia CS courses, as well as 5 University of Toronto CS courses and found the vast majority to not be bimodal:

> An estimated 85.1% of the final grades in UBC's undergrad CS classes are normally-distributed. 5.8% of the classes tested as being bimodal, which isn't a whole lot more than the false positive rate I'd expect to see (5%).

You can read more about these results in the blog post linked above or in "Evidence That Computer Science Grades Are Not Bimodal" by Elizabeth Patitsas, Jesse Berlin, Michelle Craig and Steve Easterbrook.

To make things worse, when discussing this, people who believe the distribution is bimodal are more likely to see a bimodal distribution in a normally distributed sampling:

> We delayed the debriefing until after our analysis was complete, on the assumption you’d want to know the preliminary results of the study. We indeed found that participants who agreed more strongly with the statement “Some students are innately predisposed to do better at CS than others” were statistically significantly more likely to label ambiguous distributions as bimodal.

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Tags: intelligence, performance, educational-psychology
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title: Can time be slowed in a lucid dream?

text:
# Question
Title: Can time be slowed in a lucid dream?
Lucid dreams allow a person to be conscious while dreaming. It has been reported that it's possible to control various aspects of the dream environment that are not possible during wakefulness, e.g. ability to fly.

Research has shown that the rate of time flow in a dream is same/similar to that of wakefulness. For example, an event that lasts about 5 minutes in a dream, corresponds to about 5 minutes of sleeping. Extending the idea that physically impossible things can be performed during lucid dreams, the question arises whether altering the flow of time, specifically slowing of it, is possible.

Philosopher Alan Watts has stated that it might be possible to alter the flow of time in a dream:

> \[...\] let’s suppose that you were able every night to dream any dream you wanted to dream, and that you could for example have the power within one night to dream 75 years of time, or any length of time you wanted to have. \[...\] And after several nights of 75 years \[...\] each \[...\]

If such alteration would be possible in a lucid dream, it would suggest the possibility of kind of "mental life extension", where, for example, the person physically lives ~80 years, but mentally, through lucid dreams, experiences the life of hundreds or thousands of years.

**Question: Is there anecdotal, or otherwise, evidence or documented past attempts for slowing of perceived passage of time via lucid dreaming?**

# Answer
> 3 votes
I'd say yes, in german literature there are some reportings of athelets "training" in slow motion while they are lucid dreaming. I'll try to recap those reportings in english.

Paul Tholey & Kaleb Utecht cite Sadko Günter Solinski, an equestrian, in "Schöpferisch Träumen" (p.257-258):

> Als Reiter kann ich somit im Klartraum (A) meine Figuren zentimetergenau in den Sand (bei der Dressur) bzw. in den Parcours, z.B. eines Cross-Country hufbreitgenau in die Landschaft zeichnen (bei der Military). Gelingt mir dies im Zeitlupentempo und verbinde ich (B) dabei sämtliche (dem Pferd angepassten) ”Hilfen“ im jeweils einzig richtigen Augenblick einer Bewegungsphase und ”reite ich“ (C) die Aufgabe so mehrmals (drei- bis neunmal) während eines Klartraums genau und vollständig durch, so verfügt mein Körper erfahrungsgemäß am folgenden Tag über genügend ”Körperwissen“, um den Parcours autonom, d.h. ohne mein bewußtes oder willentliches Zutun hinter sich zu bringen.

Summary: Solinski claims to able to prepare dressage and eventing very accuratly while lucid dreaming ("im Klartraum"). Sometimes he is able to do this in slow motion ("im Zeitlupentempo").

The citation can also be found in Daniel Erlacher's PhD thesis (p.62).

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Daniel Erlacher has another example in his german PhD thesis on motor learning in lucid dreams. It's about himself training high diving in a lucid dream (above PDF, p.125):

> Ein typischer Klartraum in dieser Periode sah etwa wie folgt aus: \[...\]
>
> Ich versuche, möglichst kunstvoll Salti und Schrauben, oder Auerbachsalti zu machen. Da das ganze langsam abläuft – wie in Zeitlupe – habe ich die gute Gelegenheit auf alle Bewegungsabläufe genau zu achten.

Summary: Erlacher describes one of serveral characteristic lucid treams, where he is trying to do backflips and so on. As everything happens really slowly ("Da das ganze langsam abläuft") - like in slow motion ("wie in Zeitlupe") - he is able to focus on every single movement.

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Tags: sleep, dreams, time
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# Question
Title: Difference between brain and electronic device signals
As I understand it, a brain communicates through sending signals via ions and chemical reactions resulting in concentrations of ions, a computer sends signals by electrons. I'm really trying to do 3 things:

1. Confirm that understanding
2. Understand what is the fundamental difference between the two types of signaling.
3. Is there more to what the brain is doing at least at a relatively macro level that I may be missing.

# Answer
This is a pretty broad question, however I think it's common enough that I think it's worth trying to answer. I'll break it down into the following:

1. What signals do the brain send?
2. How are these signals different than electronic signals?

# 1. Brain Signals

The brain has a lot of different signaling modalities. Some fast acting, some slow acting. Mostly, neurons communicate with the ions/chemicals you've mentioned above, which are actually called neurotransmitters.

# 2. Brain Signals vs. Electronic Device Signals

## Spikes vs. Pulses

Electronic devices communicate by raising a potential on a wire and wait for the target of the communication to receive that pulse. The pulse can either be on or off. Neurons communicate via spikes, where the information is not "on" or "off", but also the frequency of the spikes and the spacing between the spikes.

## Localised vs. Variable scopes

Electronic device pulses have clearly defined destinations. Although neurotransmitters can target a specific neuron, they can also modulate a group of neurons. This is called neuromodulation.

## Static vs. adaptive

The wires on an electronic device do no change in strength. However, there are a TON of mechanisms for how the brain learns. The brain's "wires" called synapses, change in their effectiveness of transmission over time. The neurons themselves change in receptivity over time.

# The Brain is not a Computer

To summarize, a computer or other electronic device is a really poor metaphor for the brain. I discuss this in my blog post "Understanding the Brain: Where Metaphors Limit You" if you would like a more in depth discussion on the subject.
> 3 votes

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Tags: theoretical-neuroscience, artificial-intelligence
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# Question
Title: Is staying with an abusive partner actually indicative of Stockholm syndrome?
For the longest time, I've wondered why it is that people who are physically or mentally abused by their partners stay in these relationships. Further, it seems, admittedly from personal experience, that many people *overwhelmingly* tend to remain in these unhealthy relationships, characterized by abuse and dependence. While reading an article about Stockholm syndrome, it occurred to me that this fairly obscure condition may in fact be far more common than previously thought.

What if, as a model to explain this behavior, a small portion of the population struggles to bond with people sufficiently to remain in relationships in the classical sense. In other words, prolonged periods of shared experience with exchange of emotion and vulnerability, the typical process by which bonds between people form, just isn't enough for this subset of the population. In such a population, it's not ridiculous to posit that bonds formed through Stockholm syndrome, which aren't dependent on the same shared experiences, could essentially be the only bonds left.

This model would suggest that a small portion of the population that struggles to open up to and connect with potential partners tends to form bonds with abusers, which is exactly what given evidence would suggest. Would someone a bit better educated in this subject agree or disagree?

# Answer
> 1 votes
Stockholm syndrome has been discussed in relation to domestic abuse, but not all that much. In the *Encyclopedia of Domestic Violence* (Routledge, 2007, NA Jackson ed.) I found criteria given that mirror those for kidnapping victims:

> 1. The victim perceives a person threatening her survival. The threats may be physical or psychological. It is not important whether others view her survival as threatened, but rather whether she does.
> 2. The victim perceives the abuser showing her some kindness, however small. For example, the kindness may be that for one day out of the month he does not abuse her.
> 3. The victim is isolated from outsiders. This isolation may be physical—she is not permitted to have contact with family or friends—and/or ideological—she is permitted exposure to only the abuser’s perspective.
> 4. The victim does not perceive a way to escape the abuser. Batterers use violence to help ensure that their partners do not leave them.

These are pretty strong criteria to fulfill, particularly number 3 and 4. The *Encyclopedia* doesn't have any systematic evidence how often all these are fulfilled, in other words we don't know what the prevalence in the population would be. There has been one scale proposed by Graham et al. (1995) for measuring a more gradual version of the syndrome, but I haven't found other papers using it.

As for the usual reasons why the victims remains in an abusive relationship, they usually see (or hope for) some redeeming quality in their abuser:

> a considerable number of women felt their abusive male partners still possessed some good qualities: More than half (54 percent) saw their partners as highly dependable, while one in five (21 percent) felt the men in their lives possessed significant positive traits (i.e., being affectionate).

What you are proposing is a bit different than Stockholm syndrome. When you say that

> a small portion of the population that struggles to open up to and connect with potential partners tends to form bonds with abusers

you're basically proposing is that some victims have a propensity (perhaps a personality trait) for abusive partners. I'm not sure if that's the case; surely some women have submissive or masochistic BDSM fantasies, even rape fantasies, but to argue that they could only bond with abusive partners seems extreme to me, even a form of blaming the victim. I haven't seen this trait-lie preference for abusive partners discussed in literature. As cited in the *Encyclopedia* Graham in a 1994 book (*Loving to Survive: Sexual Terror, Men’s Violence, and Women’s Psychology*) did propose that victims may develop "borderline-like" personality characteristics and behaviors... but again he says develop, not have them beforehand.

There is however one recent (2008) paper that does discuss the personality of the victims:

> Women victims of IPV \[Intimate Partner Violence\] had higher scores than controls in schizoid, avoidant, self-defeating personality scales, as well as in the three pathological personality scales (schizotypal, borderline and paranoid). Both physical and psychological IPV were strongly associated with personality disorder symptomatology, regardless of the effects of childhood abuse.

This is after the fact though. A longitudinal study would be able to establish correlates before the IPV, but I'm not aware of such a study.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, personality, abnormal-psychology, motivation, computational-modeling
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# Question
Title: Why is schizophrenia a thought disorder and bipolar a mood disorder?
Examining two major mental illnesses that are, loosely, grouped by mood and thought.

*Schizophrenia* is regarded as an illness associated with thought disorder.

*Bipolar* is regarded as a mood disorder.

Both conditions can lead to a psychotic break and behavioral disturbance. Hallucinations can occur in both.

Bipolar is characterized by depression with the occurrence of, at least, one episode of mania.

Schizophrenia is characterized by phases. An active phase, where psychotic symptoms peak and the negative phase, when the personality has little affect.

Given that both cause behavioral problems and changes to mood. That psychosis is based on false beliefs, and beliefs are thoughts. **What is the scientific and the psychiatric basis for regarding schizophrenia as a thought disorder and bipolar a mood disorder?**

# Answer
> 3 votes
The simple answer is that bipolar disorder can occur *without psychosis*. The paper that opens the other answer is titled "Differences in resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging functional network connectivity between schizophrenia and *psychotic bipolar* probands and their unaffected first-degree relatives." (Emphasis mine.)

You can also have (unipolar) depression with psychotic symptoms. And its status is (and has been) equally iffy:

> There has been a long-standing discussion as to whether psychotic depression is a distinct syndrome or simply represents a severe form of depression. Much of the debate stems from the fact that in DSM-II, published in 1968, “psychosis” meant severe and did not mean being out of touch with reality or having delusions or hallucinations. In 1970, Gerald Klerman and Eugene Paykel published an influential article that stated that in depression, there was a smooth continuum from mild outpatient depression to severe depression requiring inpatient hospitalization without any demarcation points. Observations that psychotic depressed patients differed from nonpsychotic patients in their response to pharmacological treatments led investigators to focus on more clearly defining this distinct clinical entity.
>
> In 1992, as Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)-IV was being planned, a strong argument was made in the American Journal of Psychiatry that there was sufficient evidence at that time from studies of clinical characteristics and symptoms, biology, family history, course and outcome, and treatment that psychotic depression should be a distinct illness in DSM-IV, separate from major depression. The American Journal of Psychiatry article led to a position paper submitted to the DSM-IV Work Group on mood disorders. The DSM-IV Work Group on mood disorders agreed that the clinical relevance of specifically designating patients with psychotic depression was high and considered 2 options: (1) to continue the classification as in DSM-IIIR designating psychosis as decimal point under the severity code and (2) to designate psychotic depression as a separate syndrome “major depression with psychotic features.” After much deliberation, the work group recommended the first option although it recognized it was less than optimal. Thus, in DSM-IV and DSM-IV text revision, psychotic depression remained as a subclassification of major depressive disorder.
>
> Similarly, in the International Classification of Diseases, 10th revision (ICD-10), psychotic depression is classified as a subtype of severe depression. Arguments that psychotic depression meets the criteria for a valid psychiatric syndrome due to its distinct clinical presentation, neurobiology, heritability, prognosis, and treatment response continue to be made with the hope that this will change in ICD-11.
>
> In DSM-V, psychotic depression will remain as a subclassification of major depressive disorder. However, in DSM-V, psychotic features will be separated from the severity rating, and major depressive disorder with psychotic features will not necessarily need to be classified as “severe.” This is a change from DSM-IV. Moreover, in DSM-V, a hierarchy giving precedence to mood-incongruent features is being introduced to allow classification of cases in which mood-congruent and mood-incongruent psychotic features coexist.

Sorry for the rather long quote, but I cannot summarize the controversy of psychotic depression in much less than that.

And to get back to bipolar, DSM-5 split the mood section (one chapter in DSM-IV) into two Depressive and Related Disorders and Bipolar and Related Disorders. They actually located Bipolar in-between Depressive and Schizophrenia Spectrum and Related Disorders

> in recognition of their place as a bridge between the two diagnostic classes in terms of symptomatology, family history and genetics

(DSM-5, p. 123)

And if you wonder why this progression, here's some correlational epidemiology

> A diagnosis of BPI \[bipolar I\] disorder was strongly predictive of psychotic features during depression compared to MDDR \[major depressive disorder\] (odds ratio \[OR\] = 4.61, p \< 0.0005). Having bipolar II compared to MDDR was not predictive of psychosis (OR = 1.05, p = 0.260), nor was having a family history of BPI in MDDR subjects (OR = 1.20, p = 0.840).

And one interesting thing is that in practice, the presence of psychosis makes the diagnosing psychiatrist significantly depart from the DSM:

> However, the question of where to place psychotic symptoms within the framework of clinical diagnosis is still confusing. Meyer and Meyer (2009) sought to examine this issue using identical vignettes of a clinical presentation adjusted only for the presence of auditory hallucinations (more commonly associated with psychotic disorders) and the decreased need for sleep (one possible symptom of mania) to evaluate how actual psychiatrists would diagnosis and what subsequent treatment they would recommend. Although the vignette was written to clearly present a patient with mania warranting a diagnosis of Bipolar Disorder (DSM-IV criteria), almost half of the psychiatrists gave an inappropriate diagnosis (45% total; 41.5% psychotic disorder, 3.5% other diagnosis), with a manic episode diagnosed by 37.3% of the psychiatrists and bipolar affective disorder diagnosed by 16.9% of the psychiatrists

as noted in "Historical Underpinnings of Bipolar Disorder Diagnostic Criteria " which is actually a very good read for the historical basis of the distinction (it started with the Kraepelian dichotomy), much more than I can hope to convey here.

What I will say is that the blurring distinction that the DSM-5 sorta acknowledged has been proposed much more vigorously by some researchers. In particular, Craddock "going" paper was one of my favorite papers some years ago, proposing an even more daring overlap, with cognitive issues of schizophrenia overlapping autism.

Alas, the quest for biomarkers in psychiatry is still in its infancy.

Also, while the DSM (IV) clearly defined bipolar as a mood disorder, they don't say that schizophrenia is a thought disorder, so I'm not sure what you based that on. Science Direct has a page with a lot definitions of schizophrenia excerpted from (recent) books, and none define it a thought disorder although one (Sontheimer) does say that it is

> a collection of symptoms that are dominated by psychosis. However, symptoms also include deficits in thinking, behavior, and affect \[...\]".

Another (Benson) says

> its defining symptoms are typically delusions and hallucinations in the absence of extreme emotion. Cognitive impairment or thought disorder is also considered a cardinal symptom.

On the other hand, the NHS does have a page on which it equates psychosis with thought disorder in the title. I guess the specialists don't consider the concepts synonymous, but for the general public... some let that slide.

# Answer
> 8 votes
In this paper, the authors note that bipolar disorder and schizophrenia share many abnormal resting state network connections. But some connections are specific to bipolar disorder and others are specific to schizophrenia.

I think to really describe the two illnesses, one must look at specific biological data. Fuzzy terms like "mood disorder" and "thought disorder" are used without any concrete meaning. If somebody looked at the fmri data he would be able to tell the difference between bipolar disorder and schizophrenia (without knowing any psychiatric terms). At the same time, I think looking solely at fmri data can be too abstract without being informed by psychology and psychiatry. A good book on this subject is *Brainwashed: The Seductive Appeal of Mindless Neuroscience*.

There is also some evidence that time perception may be altered in various mental illnesses. So one may distinguish bipolar disorder and schizophrenia in terms of differences of time perception.

**Source**

Differences in resting-state functional magnetic resonance imaging functional network connectivity between schizophrenia and psychotic bipolar probands and their unaffected first-degree relatives. Meda SA, Gill A, Stevens MC, Lorenzoni RP, Glahn DC, Calhoun VD, Sweeney JA, Tamminga CA, Keshavan MS, Thaker G, Pearlson GD.

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, psychiatry
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# Question
Title: How many times on average do people wake up per night?
It would be best if the answer could be broken down by age and sex, and even by other variables (alcohol-drinker vs teetotaller, etc).

If there's a difference between self-report data and data from studies that observe people sleeping, I'm interested in that too.

This image,

which I took from here, implies that waking up several times is normal, but the article doesn't provide any information on averages.

It may be that the median is more useful than the mean in this context.

# Answer
> 3 votes
Based on this paragraph from the Wikipedia article on hypnograms

> On a hypnogram, a sleep cycle is usually around 90 minutes and there are four to six cycles of REM/NREM stages that occur during a major period of sleep.
>
> Most SWS occurs in the first one or two cycles; this is the deepest period of sleep. The second half of the sleeping period contains most REM sleep and little or no SWS and may contain brief periods of wakefulness which can be recorded but are not usually perceived.
>
> The stage that occurs before waking is normally REM sleep.

And this image (also from wiki):

Sample hypnogram showing one sleep cycle (the first of the night) from NREM through REM

A normal and healthy person usually wakes for a brief time after his/her REM stage was finished in each sleep cycle. So, if we consider A 7–8-hour sleep probably includes four cycles, and each cycle include at least one REM, then each person at least wake four times.

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Tags: sleep
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# Question
Title: Do highly creative people dream more and/or differently than ordinary people?
Everybody dreams, and I'm trying to understand if there is a cause and effect relationship between ability to dream and recall dreams and creativity as an adult.

I would **define the kind of creativity** I'm talking about as creating art, designing products, inventing and making original stuff. These people are at the upper end of a bell curve of creativity or are outside the curve completely (extraordinary creative genius). This is in contrast to ordinary people who would be somewhere towards the middle of the creativity bell curve.

**The kind of dreaming I'm talking about is long, clear or multi episode dreams lasting over 5 minutes** as opposed to fragments and vague impressions of activity. Let's say 2+ dreams per night.

* Do highly creative people dream more and recall more than average or analytical people?
* Does active interest in dreams as a child or teenager(like keeping a dream journal) influences creativity as an adult?

I found some evidence to support that dreams and creativity are related, particularly in visual fields, like graphic design:

> Barrett also interviewed modern artists and scientists about their use of their dreams, documenting dramatic anecdotes including Nobel Prizes and MacArthur 'genius grants' whose ideas originated in dreams.\[6\] Her research concludes that while anything—math, musical composition, business dilemmas—may get solved during dreaming, the **two areas dreams are especially likely to help** are 1) anything where vivid visualization contributes to the solution, whether in artistic design or invention of 3-D technological devices and 2) any problem where the solution lies in thinking outside the box—i.e. where the person is stuck because the conventional wisdom on how to approach the problem is wrong.

Another example from an overview of the modern theory of dream content:

> Second, dreams cannot be the guardians of sleep if there are people who can sleep even though they do not dream, and we now have reason to believe there are such people, including young children (Foulkes, 1999), leucotomized schizophrenics (Jus et al., 1973), neurology patients suffering from parietal lobe injuries (Solms, 1997), and **perhaps normal adults with weak visuospatial skills (Butler & Watson, 1985)**.

Another example comes from Nancy Andersen's book "the Creative Brain", in which she suggests that highly creative people, like Issac Newton, Albert Einstein, Virgina Wolf, etc may be capable of thinking in a very different ways from ordinary people. She suggests this may be due to increased or different communication between their centers of the brain responsible for combining information and sensory input. It appears to me that dreaming is very related to this kind of information assimilation.

Another example from Domhoff's neurocognitive theory of dreaming. Spatial construction is required for "traditional" creative venues, like painting, sculpture and architecture.

> For example, the complete loss of dreaming in adults due to injuries to either inferior parietal lobe, when placed alongside the finding that **increased dream reporting in young children correlates with visuospatial skills**, suggests that the ability to dream in children depends in part upon the development of the neural network for spatial construction centered in the parietal lobes.

# Answer
There are some studies that seem to support your suggestion e.g.:

* Dream reports and creative tendencies in students of the arts, sciences, and engineering (paywalled, so I'm quoting the abstract):

> 105 students of arts, sciences, and engineering were asked to report a dream and to take a test which measures independence of judgment and relates to creativity. 4 predictions were stated: (a) (confirmed)—the proportion of dream recallers would be greatest among art students and least among engineering students; (b) (partially confirmed)—dream imaginativeness would be greatest among art students and least among engineering students; \[...\]
* Creativity and Dream Recall (same as above):

> The literature on creativity and dream recall often found significant positive correlations between measures of creativity and dream recall frequency (DRF). The present study investigated the relation between creative interests and DRF in detail. The findings confirmed the results reported in the literature, according to which persons with visual and verbal creative skills recalled more dreams. It is suggested that the visual memory may serve as a mediator variable in the relation between creativity and DRF.

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Yet dream recall is a complex topic. As you noted in your comment, it might be different for a single person from night to night. It also seems to be inlfuenced by a lot of factors. Schredl et al. name some of them in Factors of home dream recall: a structural equation model:

* Personality measures
* Creativity/fantasy
* Visual memory
* Sleep behavior
* Stress measures

Yet there are still a lot of factors more to be included, like demographic factors, attitude towards dreams, medication and so on (Schredl has written a lot about dream recall, if you want to dig deeper).

So I'd summarize creativity might increase dream recall but it's only a small part of a bigger picture.
> 3 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, dreams, creativity
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# Question
Title: What is (or is there) a clear distinction between cognitive and motivational explanations for a hypothesis?
For example, I see there is even a cognitive theory of motivation. I closest I can find is that cognitive explanations are more about the thought process of an individual which led to certain behaviour. What then, does a pure "motivational explanation" mean?

Here is an instance of cognitive vs. motivational explanation: "There are both cognitive and motivational explanations for the competence hypothesis. \[...\] Perhaps the major reason for the competence hypothesis is motivational rather than cognitive." This is an excerpt from "Preference and Belief: Ambiguity and Competence in Choice under Uncertainty" by Heath and Tversky.

# Answer
Summary: it appears that the contrast from the paper cited is based on a 1970s paradigm where a cognitive approach meant information processing applied only to problem data, whereas the motivational approach allowed for other variables, such as self-esteem, which nowadays would be described as an affective variable.

---

Here's the fuller context for the claim:

> we propose that—holding judged probability constant—people prefer to bet in a context where they consider themselves knowledgeable or competent than in a context where they feel ignorant or uninformed. We assume that our feeling of competence in a given context is determined by what we know relative towhat can be known. Thus, it is enhanced by general knowledge, familiarity, and experience, and is diminished, for example, by calling attention to relevant information that is not available to the decision maker, especially if it is available to others.
>
> There are both cognitive and motivational explanations for the competence hypothesis. People may have learned from lifelong experience that they generally do better in situations they understand than in situations where they have less knowledge. This expectation may cariy over to situations where the chances of winning are no longer higher in the familiar than in the unfamiliar context. Perhaps the major reason for the competence hypothesis is motivational rather than cognitive. We propose that the consequences of each bet include, besides the monetary payoffs, the credit or blame associated with the outcome. Psychic payoffs of satisfaction or embarrassment can result from self-evaluation from an evaluation by others. In either case, the credit and the blame associated with an outcome depend, we suggest, on the attributions for success and failure. In the domain of chance, both success and failure are attributed primarily to luck. The situation is different when a person bets on his or her judgment. If the decision maker has limited understanding of the problem at hand, failure will be attributed to ignorance, whereas success is likely to be attributed to chance. In contrast, if the decision maker is an "expert," success is attributable to knowledge, whereas failure can sometimes be attributed to chance.

So basically by "motivational explanation" they refer to is the posited existence of a "psychic payoff of satisfaction or embarrassment" in addition to the concrete/monetary one. In my view, the existence of a "psychic payoff of satisfaction or embarrassment" could also be a called a "\[more\] emotionally charged decision". There's been rivers of papers on the role of emotion in decision making, e.g. see Lerner et al. (2015) for a review.

By the way (and as an aside), there's a newer paper in this area by Klein et al. (2010) saying that Heath & Tversky basically confounded two effects:

> According to the competence hypothesis (Heath & Tversky, 1991), this pattern derives from favorable perceptions of one’s competence. In most past tests of the competence hypothesis, ambiguity is confounded with personal controllability and the source of the ambiguity (e.g., chance vs. missing information). We unconfound these factors in three experiments and find strong evidence for independent effects of both ambiguity aversion and competence.

Klein et al. seem very careful not to call controllability anything else... or advance any hypotheses for what's behind it, but there's one older paper by Harris (1996) saying

> Evidence that perceived controllability is associated with optimistic bias is reviewed. There is sufficient evidence that people are optimistically biased about negative events they perceive to be controllable. More work is needed to establish whether this is also true of positive events. There is evidence also that people often hold beliefs of their personal superiority on control-related dimensions. More experimental studies testing hypotheses about the mechanisms linking perceived control and optimistic bias are required. Future work should also expand the sophistication with which control is treated conceptually and empirically and the range of potential mechanisms examined

Wikipedia's article on illusory superiority says that "Illusory superiority's relationship with self-esteem is uncertain" (and does cite some studies in support of this statement).

It's also interesting that perceived controllability affects quite a few other things, including neural pain response; see Salomons (2004).

---

And back to the general question: affect and emotion are not exactly the same thing:

> Core Affect. This term is defined as a "neurophysiological state consciously accessible as a simple primitive non-reflective feeling most evident in mood and emotion but always available to consciousness" (Russell & Feldman Barrett, 2009, p. 104). Examples of core affect include pleasure and displeasure, tension and relaxation, energy and tiredness. A person experiences core affect constantly, although the nature and intensity of affect vary over time. Core affect can be a component of emotions and moods (defined next), but it can also occur in pure, or isolate, form. For example, according to Russell (2003), "pride can be thought of as feeling good about oneself. The 'feeling good' is core affect and the 'about oneself' is an additional (cognitive) component" (p. 148). As explained next, this qualifies pride as an emotion.

Since what Heath & Tversky talk about (motivation-wise) is basically an increase/decrease in feeling good about oneself (via satisfaction or embarrassment), technically I could have said "\[core-\]affectively charged decision" (instead of "emotionally charged") but that sounds really like a mouthful.

Also, even the broader class of affective phenomena has been disputed as being distinguishable from cognition, although this I think is a minority view. For a broader discussion of alternative viewpoints see "On the interdependence of cognition and emotion".

> We open the article by discussing three classic views for the independence of affect. These are (i) the affective independence hypothesis, that emotion is processed independently from cognition, (ii) the affective primacy hypothesis, that evaluative processing precedes semantic processing, and (iii) the affective automaticity hypothesis, that affectively potent stimuli commandeer attention and evaluation is automatic. We argue that affect is not independent from cognition, that affect is not primary to cognition, nor is affect automatically elicited. The second half of the paper discusses several instances of how affect influences cognition.

See also "Mechanisms of motivation–cognition interaction", which details the way motivation has been studied in psychology, which is to say in a somewhat fragmentary way:

> The preceding sections highlighted the differences in how motivation is defined and investigated in various subfields. In animal behavioral neuroscience, the emphasis is on learning and conditioning processes, using primary incentives (food, liquid, and sexual stimuli) and measuring simple behaviors (physiological reflexes, response rates, and stimulus preferences). In social and personality psychology, the emphasis is on the pursuit of temporally extended goals involving high-level incentives (power, achievement, and affiliation) and assessing self-reported beliefs and goal striving behaviors. In cognitive neuroscience and adolescent developmental research, the emphasis is on neural representations of incentive value, typically using monetary rewards, and assessing how these modulate effortful cognitive processing. Finally, in cognitive-aging research, there is an emphasis on emotion–cognition interactions, using affectively valenced stimuli and measuring attentional and memory biases.

Unlike the cognitive/affective case, I have not seen a detailed discussion where motivation and cognition are contrasted... except this 1980s article: "Attribution bias: On the inconclusiveness of the cognition-motivation debate". Basically, there the cognitive perspective is taken to mean information processing on the problem alone, whereas the motivational perspective allows for other variables such as self-esteem. I think it's in this paradigm that Heath and Tversky phrased their contrast of cognition vs motivation.
> 2 votes

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Tags: motivation, cognitive
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# Question
Title: Relation of serotonin level and mood/depression
Not a biologist. Not even related to science, however I read a lot of popular psychology stuff, plus read some info about antidepressants and a question tortures me :)

Antidepressants arise amount of serotonin in blood in short period of time. However, you should take antidepressants for quite a long period of time so that it took effect. Up to 1-4 months.

As I heard there is no explanation about this fact. On the one hand we know that serotonin affects our mood, on the other hand for some reason we cannot fix our mood by just increasing its level straight away.

So the question is: is there any explanation of this, and what I (as a non-scientist) am wondering more about is that why then we feel better after consuming such things as chocolate, sugar etc, which indirectly might increase serotonin level?

Plus, why we cannot consume large amounts of L-tryptophan for example? If I overdose tryptophan nothing scary happens, while if I overdose prozak or zoloft, I can end up with coma probably.

There are a lot of pop psychology articles talking about hormones, however I suspect that trying to change the level of hormones by some actions (which are advised by the articles, I don't know, starting from eating sweeties and ending with doing sports) won't change it much. I know that there should be some "normal" values of serotonin in blood (ng/mL). But I don't believe that if I go to sauna and eat snickers it will increase this level drastically :) Nevertheless I'll feel better. While if I take antidepressants and they will indeed increase the level, I won't feel happy right away. Why so?

# Answer
You say that

> Antidepressants \[a\]rise \[the\] amount of serotonin in blood in short period of time. However, you should take antidepressants for quite a long period of time so that it took effect. Up to 1-4 months.
>
> As I heard there is no explanation about this fact. On the one hand we know that serotonin affects our mood, on the other hand for some reason we cannot fix our mood by just increasing its level straight away.

There are some studies which suggest effect after the first week. E.g. Early Onset of Selective Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitor Antidepressant Action: Systematic Review and Meta-analysis (2006):

> Pooled estimates of treatment effect on depressive symptom rating scales were calculated for weeks 1 through 6 of treatment. In the primary analysis, the pattern of response seen was tested against alternative models of onset of response. The primary analysis incorporated data from 28 randomized controlled trials (n=5872). A model of early treatment response best fit the experimental data. Treatment with SSRIs rather than placebo was associated with clinical improvement by the end of the first week of use. A secondary analysis indicated an increased chance of achieving a 50% reduction in Hamilton Depression Rating Scale scores by 1 week (relative risk, 1.64; 95% confidence interval, 1.2-2.25) with SSRI treatment compared with placebo.

They actually suggest a logarithmically increasing treatment response:

Also a very similar study a year before: "Is there a delay in the antidepressant effect? A meta-analysis." (2005):

> The time course of improvement on active medication and placebo was nearly identical, as 60.2% and 61.6% of the improvement that occurred on active medication and placebo, respectively, took place during the first 2 weeks of treatment. Drug-placebo differences were not only present but were most pronounced during the first 2 weeks of treatment and diminished in a stepwise fashion thereafter. A series of subanalyses confirmed that this early drug-placebo separation was clinically observable and represented a true drug effect.

I think there are some practical difficulties with collecting data more than weekly in large trials. Also, a small increase is not likely to be noticed in everyday clinical practice (non-trial).

SSRI effectiveness has been mired in some controversy though, with a lot of the trials being (obviously) sponsored to some extent by drug companies.

---

And eating sweets will increase your serotonin, as will smoking (nicotine) for instance. The problem with using these as anti-depressants is how much you'd have to consume and for how long to get the same effect as from a SSRI. Quoting "Brain serotonin, carbohydrate-craving, obesity and depression":

> Serotonin-releasing brain neurons are unique in that the amount of neurotransmitter they release is normally controlled by food intake: Carbohydrate consumption--acting via insulin secretion and the "plasma tryptophan ratio"--increases serotonin release; protein intake lacks this effect. This ability of neurons to couple neuronal signaling properties to food consumption is a link in the feedback mechanism that normally keeps carbohydrate and protein intakes more or less constant. However, serotonin release is also involved in such functions as sleep onset, pain sensitivity, blood pressure regulation, and control of the mood. Hence many patients learn to overeat carbohydrates (particularly snack foods, like potato chips or pastries, which are rich in carbohydrates and fats) to make themselves feel better. This tendency to use certain foods as though they were drugs is a frequent cause of weight gain, and can also be seen in patients who become fat when exposed to stress, or in women with premenstrual syndrome, or in patients with "winter depression," or in people who are attempting to give up smoking. (Nicotine, like dietary carbohydrates, increases brain serotonin secretion; nicotine withdrawal has the opposite effect.)

WebMD has fairly accessible article on the latter, which says among other things:

> Researchers at Rush University Medical Center in Chicago found that carb cravers who have a mildly depressed mood seem to be self-medicating. They studied women who were overweight and had a history of carb cravings. They gave them a choice between a protein-rich beverage or a carb-rich one. They found that when the women reported being in the worst moods, they picked the carb beverage more often than the protein one. In addition, the carb drink improved their mood better.
> 2 votes

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Tags: depression, serotonin
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# Question
Title: What if we would fill room with face drawings? Would that change us?
I mean like if there would be a room in which we are spending most of the day working, sleeping etc. This room would be filled with eyes/faces drawing and painting on walls. Treat it like room from horror movies, something like this:

Would spending a lot of time in that kind of room change our personality/mood? In some way influence us? I don't mean it like getting used to watching horrors, but changing without 'us noticing'.

And in other way around can room filled with happy images like smiles, i dont know stuff like this , can make us more 'happy'?

Thanks

# Answer
Specific to your questions, I am not aware of any research on connection between "face" pattern and mood.

But of course, changing surroundings will have an affect. There are number of papers on how color affects mood and productivity of workers. For example, in "Impact of Three Interior Color Schemes on Worker Mood and Performance Relative to Individual Environmental Sensitivity"

> The findings on mood definitely suggest that color scheme alone may impact mood states in accordance with previous findings.

However, it is worth noticing that human brain (as well as simpler animals) has great capacity for habituation: ability to "get used" to non-threatening stimuli.
> 2 votes

# Answer
This is probably too broad of a question, but looking at "cute" stuff improves concentration, apparently (and I'm saying that because it's only based on one or two studies), where

> Cute objects are assumed to be characterized by baby schema. This is a set of features that are commonly seen in young animals: a large head relative to the body size, a high and protruding forehead, large eyes, and so forth.
> 1 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, personality
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title: Is V1 involved in visual imagery?

text:
# Question
Title: Is V1 involved in visual imagery?
It's well known that mental imagery shares the neural substrates of its respective modality, despite dissociable multivariate patterns. For example, visual imagery can be decoded across the ventral visual stream, but can be separated from vision-proper based on spatiotemporal dynamics.

However, there seems to be some controversy about the whether the "earliest" sensory regions (*e.g.*, V1) are involved in mental imagery. To my knowledge, many studies seem to show either nonsignificant, weak, or marginal involvement of V1 in visual imagery, but some theoretical articles seem to suggest the opposite.

Can anyone shed some light on the current thinking/evidence?

# Answer
**Short answer**
V1 can be recruited for visual imagery, but it is not strictly needed for imagery to occur, and it is not sufficient in itself to allow for visual imagery.

**Background**
Visual imagery is a complex and broad topic of research. It's in fact a big pain in visual prosthetic research. In this area of research it's often nice to show those fancy pics of deafferented visual areas in the brain to light up after having been deprived of visual activation for years. Then you find those seemingly strikingly activated visual regions by your awesome visual prosthetic, to be shot to pieces later by critical referees that believe it may just as well be that your subjects have been imagining stuff.

Anyway, visual imagery depends on much of the same structures in the visual system as seeing by itself. The retina, being considered part of the central nervous system, and the end organ of the visual system is not involved as it only delivers input by sensing light. Hence the optic nerve is not involved either. After that we have the brain stem and strikingly, already the LGN in the brain stem has been shown to be activated by imagery. And not surprisingly then, V1, being the output location of the LGN, is activated too (Chen *et al*., 1998).

However, activation of these regions does not mean they are necessary for imagery to occur. Because imagery follows the visual neural path pretty much in reverse, it is the higher association areas in the brain that are most crucial for this process to occur. Indeed, visual imagery has been shown to occur in people with large trauma-related defects in V1 nearly obliterating the occipital cortex (Bridge *et al*. (2012).

Meta analyses of various studies has delivered a potential reconciliation of these opposing findings. V1 recruitment may depend on the specific **type of imagery**, and specifically that detailed imagery is more dependent on V1 (Ganis, 2012).

**References**
**-** Bridge *et al*., *J Neurol* (2012) **259**: 1062–70
**-** Chen *et al*., *Neuroreport* (1998); **16**(16): 3669-74
**-** Ganis, Visual Mental Imagery, Springer Link (2012)
**-** Urbanski *et al*. *Frontiers Integr Neurosci* (2014); **8**:74

Fig. 1. Visual system. source: Urbanski *et al*. (2014)
> 5 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, perception, vision, sensation, imagery
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title: Is tianeptine addictive?

text:
# Question
Title: Is tianeptine addictive?
A recent (2014) study in cell cultures has found that tianeptine is a mu-opioid receptor (MOR) agonist (and \[mentioning for completeness\] delta opioid receptor agonist as well, albeit weaker). It's been generally proposed that

> The strong rewarding effect of MOR agonists likely contributes to the reported success of the ‘opioid depression cure’.

So are there reports of tianeptine addiction? Has its addictive potential been studied in more detail?

# Answer
> 3 votes
The internet is flooded with anecdotal reports of 'Tian' relating to the drug's addictive potential after recreational use, for example here, here and here. Often, though, these reports come from people already addicted to other illicit drugs. Notably, tianeptine is used for rehab purposes, just like the partial opioid agonist naloxone. So anecdotal reports can be misleading.

Scientific reports however also indicate the drug's addictive potential. Vadachkoria *et al*. (2009) report

> Supposedly, Tianeptine, in contrast to other anti-depressants, stimulates release of neurotransmitter dopamine in nucleus Accumbens, that probably determine\[s the\] addictive potential of this drug.

**Addiction** can be defined as a syndrome characterized by compulsive substance abuse. In a more verbose definition:

> Addiction is defined as a chronic, relapsing brain disease that is characterized by compulsive drug seeking and use, despite harmful consequences.† It is considered a brain disease because drugs change the brain—they change its structure and how it works. These brain changes can be long-lasting, and can lead to the harmful behaviors seen in people who abuse drugs

It is generally accepted that the antidepressant drugs do not cause addiction. However, tianeptine, among some other antidepressants do have addictive potential (Lapsekili & Yavuz, 2014).

<sub>**Reference**
**-** Lapsekili & Yavuz, *J Psychiatry Neurol Sci* (2014); **27**: 81-4
**-** Vadachkoria *et al*., *Georgian Med News* (2009); **174**:92-4</sub>

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Tags: psychopharmacology, addiction
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# Question
Title: Is pedophilia a sexual orientation or a mental disorder?
There are some different claims being made that pedophilia is a sexual orientation rather than a mental disorder.

At the moment there seems to be a growing group of psychologists advocating that pedophilia is, or at least should be considered a sexual orientation rather than a mental disorder.

For example:

> GOOD: You're a member of a growing group of psychologists who say pedophilia should be considered a sexual orientation. Why?
>
> Quinsey: Part of the definition of pedophilia is a person has a preference for a particular kind of partner. \[...\] pedophiles, unlike other men, show substantial sexual interest in prepubescent children. As far as we know—and many people have tried—these sexual interests are not modifiable by any method that’s been tried yet. So it appears like pedophilia is a sexual orientation. \[...\] You also can’t modify that interest; it’s stable through adulthood, just like pedophilia.

Another example:

> “Pedophiles are not simply people who commit a small offence from time to time but rather are grappling with what is equivalent to a sexual orientation just like another individual may be grappling with heterosexuality or even homosexuality,” emphasized Van Gijseghem.
>
> “True pedophiles have an exclusive preference for children, which is the same as having a sexual orientation. You cannot change this person’s sexual orientation.” He added, however: “He may however remain abstinent.”

There is also an advocacy/support group for people attracted to minors, B4UACT, who state in a section from their website (emphasis mine):

> Why do you say that minor-attracted people are stereotyped?
>
> Popular beliefs about minor-attracted people are not supported by the evidence. Research shows that they are no more violent or aggressive than the general population, nor do they suffer from psychopathology or personality disorders. **As a group, they do not share any particular characteristics or behaviors other than their feelings of attraction.**

As I understand things mental disorders tend to have observable associated symptoms, while a sexual orientation would not as it is just an instinctive attraction (in the general sense of the term).

**Are there studies that suggest that pedophilia is a sexual orientation? Do traits typically associated with a mental disorder apply to pedophilia?**

# Answer
Before trying to give any sort of answer, it is important to address a common misconception. In popular culture, the terms child-molester and pedophile are often equated. Scientifically, they are not at all the same. The approximate scientific definition for a pedophile is:

> an individual that has an unwavering sexual attraction to prepubescent children similar to attraction heterosexual men have for women

This means that **a pedophile might or might not molest children**, and a **child-molester might or might not be a pedophile**. Further, implicit in this definition is a close resemblance to a sexual orientation, and if you want a through and careful discussion of this (much better than my answer) then read:

> Seto, M.C (2012) Is Pedophilia a Sexual Orientation? *Archives of Sexual Behavior* 41(1): 231-236.

Now, the actually relevant scientific discussion (as opposed to merely a semantic distinction) is threefold: (1) can pedophilia be considered a choice in the legal sense? (2) what causes it? (3) can it be treated?

Note that for what we typically consider sexual orientations, questions (1) and (3) have clear answers: no, and no. However, for mental disorders, all permutations of answers to (1) and (3) are possible. Thus, answering these questions does not let you clear up semantic ambiguity.

To start with question (2): in broad strokes Blanchard, et al. (1999) and Cantor, et al. (2004) suggest that pedophilia has a prenatal cause. For question (3) there has been no evidence to suggest that pedophilia can be treated or "cured", much like how you cannot "cure" homosexuality. This lead to Van Gijseghem expert testimony before the Canadian Parliment's Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights that you quote from in your question. He concludes that pedophilia cannot be 'cured' through penal intervention. However, it is possible for a pedophile to abstain from becoming a child-molester.

This leaves us question (1), the legal part of this. In Canada, **being a pedophile *is not* a crime**, but **molesting children *is* a crime**. The status of pedophilia as a mental disorder or sexual orientation is irrelevant to this since both mental status and sexual orientation are protected by Canadian law as long as they do not infringe on other's rights. To help pedophiles abstain from molesting children there is the Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) program (note: it deals with all kinds of sexual offenders, not just child-molesters). This program is aimed to manage and not 'cure'. Wilson et al. (2007, 2009) have shown that CoSA produces dramatic decrease in re-offence rates for sexual offenders.
> 27 votes

# Answer
I think it's important to clarify that pedophilia is currently classified by the DSM IV as a ***paraphilia***. A paraphilia is as a "recurrent, intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving non-human objects, the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, children, non-consenting persons.

The word "paraphilia" is considered by most to be pejorative.

**It's interesting to note that until 1973, homosexuality was classified as a paraphilia**. It was considered as deviant as pedophilia is currently. Today, homosexuality is classified as a sexual orientation.

> The current edition, DSM-IV, categorizes pedophilia as a disorder only if the sexual fantasies or urges involve prepubescent children (defined as 13 or younger), if they last at least six months, if the individual has acted on them, or if they cause marked distress (including legal problems). The DSM-IV also specifies that a person be at least 16 years old and at least five years older than the prepubescent child.
> The draft version of DSM-V, now undergoing review, proposes several changes to the diagnosis of pedophilia. One is to expand the definition of this disorder to include hebephilia, an attraction to children who are going through puberty. The hybrid category, pedohebephilia, would consist of the pedophilic type (attracted to prepubescent children, generally younger than 11), the hebephilic type (attracted to pubescent children, usually ages 11 through 14), and the pedohebephilic type (attracted to both). In another significant change, the draft suggests that the use of pornography depicting prepubescent or pubescent children for six months or longer should be considered a symptom of pedohebephilia.
> The key points the article makes are these:
> \- **Pedophilia is a sexual orientation and unlikely to change**. Treatment aims to enable someone to resist acting on his sexual urges.
> \- **No intervention is likely to work on its own**; outcomes may be better when the patient is motivated and treatment combines psychotherapy and medication.
> \- Parents should be aware that **in most sexual abuse cases** involving children, **the perpetrator is someone the child knows**.
> *Pessimism About Pedophilia* \- *Harvard Mental Health Letter* \- Harvard Health Publications - Harvard Medical School - July 2010

The article goes on to discuss that regardless of classification (paraphilia versus sexual orientation) the focus on pedophilia will have to be on treatment to prevent the pedophile from acting out on his/her sexual urges.

Anecdotally, when in a training on community sex offender management probably, oh, five years ago, the trainer classified three main sexual orientations: homosexuality, heterosexuality, and pedophilia. I remember being so taken aback by this, as I had never even remotely thought of pedophilia as a sexual orientation. In this training, bisexuality was not represented as a sexual orientation, but a note was made of it between homosexuality and heterosexuality on the triangle-shaped chart the trainer was using.

According to the Wikipedia's entry on sexual orientation, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) has stated, "some people believe that sexual orientation is innate and fixed; however, sexual orientation develops across a person's lifetime". The APA also says that **"most people experience little or no sense of choice about their sexual orientation"**. Wikipedia - Sexual Orientation Note: the article elaborates, so you might want to read it in its entirety.

I think there is the impression that if pedophilia is classified as a sexual orientation then it is somehow condoning pedophilia. I disagree that this is true. Assigning *any* sexual orientation is merely a classification; it just so happens that pedophilia would be, technically, a *criminal* sexual orientation. I personally see validity in the classification of pedophilia as a sexual orientation, having had a good deal of training that focuses on sex offenders, and pedophiles in particular most of the time. That said, I recognize it's a very controversial topic.

**Edited to Add:** I wanted to update this answer with information about pedophilia as a sexual orientation and the difference between pedophilia and (child) molestation.

First, I want to reiterate ***regardless*** of classification (paraphilia versus sexual orientation) ***the focus on pedophilia will have to be on treatment to prevent the pedophile from acting out on his/her sexual urges***. You might be interested in this quick read, No Known Cure.

These statistics are circa 2008 and the source is the trainers from the Colorado Sex Offender Management Board (SOMB). The following chart shows the proposal for classifying pedophilia as a sexual orientation, rather than a paraphilia.

Heterosexuality (non-deviant), homosexuality (non-deviant), and pedophilia (deviant) are defined as the three main sexual orientations. I included bisexuality (non-deviant) as being on the spectrum of sexual orientation, and child molestation (deviant) separate from the sexual orientation spectrum, because molestation is often an opportunistic event rather than an ingrained paraphilia or orientation, and can be non-preferential when it comes to victims.

Why would pedophilia be considered a sexual orientation? (The following is from my notes and I cannot cite specific sources for, say, MRI studies). Pedophiles are sexually attracted to **children**. It is not a matter of seeing pedophiles who are attracted to the same or opposite sex; it is a matter of being attracted to **children** *in general*. Often pedophiles will fixate on prepubescent boys, but if you look at a pedophile's offense history (if they are involved in the criminal justice system) you will find a preponderance of male victims. However, a male-fixated pedophile will also have sexual contact with females when males are not available, which *is* circumstantial, but the point is pedophiles are sexually aroused by **children**. Pedophilia is like heterosexuality or homosexuality in that *it is innate*. It it not a *sought after* or *chosen* sexual orientation.

MRI studies have shown there are brain differences in pedophiles; there are areas of the brain that are "missing" or show dark spots or "holes" where gray matter should be. (I'm sorry my notes don't specify which part of the brain is involved)

In comparison, persons who molest a child, but who are not pedophiles, are more opportunistic about their crime(s). As far as sexual orientation goes, a pedophile's orientation is to children; a molester's orientation is to his/her peers, whether heterosexual or homosexual. A pedophile's attraction to children is permanent; a molester's is temporary. The average number of pedophiles who had sexual contact with a child by the age of 19 or younger is 74%; the average number of molesters who had sexual contact with a child by the age of 19 or younger is 57%. The average victim target for pedophiles are males under the age of 13; for molesters, the average target are females approximately the age of 13. Pedophiles are typically not in a relationship or marriage, or are in a marriage of convenience; molesters are typically in a relationship or marriage.

Yet, in opposition to the position that pedophilia is a sexual orientation, there are also statements like this from the SOMB, the same board that provided the training on pedophila as a sexual orientation. Go figure! Anyhow, it says:

> Sexual offenses are defined by law and may or may not be associated with or accompanied by the characteristics of sexual deviance which are described as paraphilias. Some sex offenders also have co-existing conditions such as mental disorders, organic disorders, or substance abuse problems.
> Many offenders can learn through treatment to manage their sexual offending behaviors and decrease their risk of re-offense. Such behavioral management should not, however, be considered a “cure” and successful treatment cannot permanently eliminate the risk that sex offenders may repeat their offenses.
> No Known Cure Position Paper -- Colorado Department of Safety, Division of Criminal Justice, Sex Offender Management Board

I hope this information is useful and not just a lot of jargon to wade through.

**Edited to Add:** Per your request, a couple paragraphs on paraphilias and mental disorders. Currently, the DSM-IV-TR classifies paraphilia as an Axis I mental disorder (you will also find mental illnesses on Axis I, such as mood disorders, schizophrenia, anxiety disorders, and dysthymia or unipolar depression). The DSM-IV-TR does differentiate between a latent paraphilia, consenting adults engaging in sexual activity that includes paraphilic interest(s), and an active paraphilia *in which harm is caused to another person*. It is only the latter that is classified as a mental disorder. Is it inherently a mental disorder to have a paraphilia? No. It becomes a mental disorder when acting upon one's paraphilia causes victimization and harm to another person.

Interestingly, some studies have found a solid co-morbidity of paraphilia and other Axis I mental illnesses. For example, A DSM-IV Axis I comorbidity study of males (n = 120) with paraphilias and paraphilia-related disorders (US National Library of Medicine, National Institute of Health). One interesting statistic from the aforementioned paper: *The prevalence of any ADHD in the sex offender paraphiliacs was 43.3%, and nearly 25% of offenders were diagnosed with ADHD-combined subtype*. Of course one sentence is out of context, so I encourage you to read the abstract in full. As a major symptom of ADHD is impulsivity, I found it a fascinating correlation.
> 25 votes

# Answer
**Is pedophilia a sexual orientation?**

The common definition of *"sexual orientation"* is:

> A preference for sexual partners of a specific **gender**.

The common definition of *"pedophilia"* is:

> A preference for sexual partners of a specific **age** (prepubescent).

Since age is not the same as gender, it follows that pedophilia is not a sexual orientation by definition.

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**Is pedophilia a disorder?**

Pedophilia is a disorder according to the current diagnostic system DSM-5 only if a child is actually abused (Criterion B of the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria):

> Most people with atypical sexual interests do not have a mental disorder. To be diagnosed with a paraphilic disorder, DSM-5 requires that people with these interests:
>
> • feel personal distress about their interest, not merely distress resulting from society’s disapproval;
>
> or
>
> • have a sexual desire or behavior that involves another person’s psychological distress, injury, or death, or a desire for sexual behaviors involving unwilling persons or persons unable to give legal consent

*See this question for a distinction between paraphilia and paraphilic disorder:* Is paraphilia a disorder?
> 3 votes

# Answer
I'm just gonna point out that in the DSM-5 there's a new distinction (in general) between a paraphilia and a paraphilic disorder. While nothing else changed in the operational definition given in the manual, in DSM-5 the formerly known pedophilia (of DSM-IV) is now called pedophilic disorder. The official change notice says:

> In the case of pedophilic disorder, the notable detail is what wasn’t revised in the new manual. Although proposals were discussed throughout the DSM-5 development process, diagnostic criteria ultimately remained the same as in DSM-IV TR. Only the disorder name will be changed from pedophilia to pedophilic disorder to maintain consistency with the chapter’s other listings).

And the guy who was apparently in charge of this, Ray Blanchard, said specifically:

> If you take \[an\] individual who has a very strong erotic attraction for children, but who has never acted on it, who never would act on it, who agrees that society’s prohibition of adult child sexual interactions should be in place, do you want to say this individual has a mental disorder?

So the DSM-5 position is not that pedophilia is a "sexual orientation", but that it might not always be a disorder either... just a paraphilia (with the new definition thereof). The latter is defined in DSM-5 as:

> \[A\]ny intense and persistent sexual interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulation or preparatory fondling with phenotypically normal, physically mature, consenting human partners.

A review-ish article concludes (on the classification issue) by saying that

> Paraphilias occupy an uneasy place in psychiatric nosology.

And also note that the American Psychological Association disagreed with the Psychiatric one by saying explicitly in a 2013 press release:

> The American Psychological Association maintains that pedophilia is a mental disorder;

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And Seto's paper (pointed out by Artem) says that

> pedophilia can be viewed as a sexual age orientation based on the more limited evidence available regarding its age of onset, associations with sexual and romantic behavior, and stability over time.

Note however that word 'age' is key here in the distinction he makes later:

> But what about the legal and social implications? In particular, what impact might there be in conceptualizing pedophilia as a sexual age orientation, based on empirical evidence, akin to sexual gender orientation such as heterosexuality or homosexuality? For example, there are anti-discrimination laws or policies that specifically mention ‘‘sexual orientation’’ as grounds for redress. The makers of these laws and policies surely had sexual gender orientation in mind, not sexual age orientation.

So basically his answer is that calling pedophilia a sexual orientation is unacceptable in society, because of the widespread use of "sexual orientation" referring only to gender orientation, the consequences of which (sexual acts) are lawful (well, in most of the world), whereas acting on pedophlia impulses breaks the law almost everywhere, and this is unlikely to change.

The DSM-5 apparently did (for a brief time) describe in one place (a discussion section) pedophilia as a sexual orientation, however this was described as an error that was fixed in November 2013:

> The phrase "sexual orientation" was used erroneously in the discussion section about pedophilia in the recently released fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5).
>
> In a press release, the American Psychiatric Association (APA) notes that the correct terminology is "sexual interest" and that it will correct the error in the manual's electronic version and in the next print edition.
>
> "Sexual orientation is not a term used in the diagnostic criteria for pedophilic disorder, and its use in the DSM-5 text discussion is an error," said the organization in its statement.
>
> The APA adds pedophilic disorder is a "paraphilia" and not a sexual orientation. Other paraphilic disorders included in the manual include exhibitionistic disorder, sexual sadism disorder, and fetishistic disorder.

It surely didn't help the Psychiatric Association's image that the discovery of the error was apparently made public by an evangelical Christian magazine.
> 3 votes

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Tags: terminology, reference-request, abnormal-psychology, psychiatry, physical-attraction
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# Question
Title: Is there evidence or indication that highly sensitive people (HSP) can feel elektromagnetic waves?
HSP's are often very sensitive persons for all kind of sensories, but are there any experiments that they can feel EM-waves or are more affected by them?

# Answer
> 3 votes
As of 2009 apparently not.

> In Rubin's 2009 paper, he looked at studies analyzing symptoms and investigating triggers in more than 1,000 people who reported having electromagnetic hypersensitivity.
>
> He concluded in the paper that "repeated experiments have been unable to replicate this phenomenon under controlled conditions."
>
> It may be that Wi-Fi isn't the culprit, but that something else is to blame for people's symptoms, Rubin said. A number of health and environmental conditions, different for each individual, could be responsible.
>
> Another factor at play could be the "nocebo effect," in which a person's belief that exposure to EMF triggers symptoms actually causes the real symptoms to appear, even if no exposure occur has occurred, he added.
>
> Regardless of whether Wi-Fi "allergies" are real, the suffering certainly is, Rubin said.

And I think I tracked down the actual paper that is talking about; it's been reasonably summarized by the press.

I honestly expected researchers to stop bothering after that, but I found some 2017 experiments, which were also negative:

> In the double-blind trials, no significant difference in symptom severity or exposure detection was found for any of the participants between the two conditions. Belief of exposure strongly predicted symptom severity score for all participants.

In the latter experiments, they really went out of their way to remove possible non-response causes, including testing people in their usual places where they reported the problems (using portable equipment), taking into account the history of their complaints, i.e. using equipment that was as close as possible to the sources the subjects claimed to be sensitive to, counterbalancing for time of day and time on task etc.

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Tags: abnormal-psychology
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# Question
Title: How are people working in psychophysics trained?
It is unclear to me how people in psychophysics are trained. Are they psychologists, or physicists, or physicians, or biologists, or physiologists? Or can they be any of those?

What if someone doing psychophysics (according to his own accord) is making statements about biological pathology?

Is Psychophysics currently a credible scientific field?

# Answer
**Short answer**
Psychophysics is a multidisciplinary field featuring people with a Physics, Psychology, Medicine and/or Biology background.

**Background**
OK, here follows a lot of personal account to illustrate where psychophysicists may come from.

Traditionally, psychophysics is a part of **Psychology**.

I do a lot of psychophysics and I'm a **Biologist** by training (MSc), but learned psychophysics during a postdoc. My supervisor teaching me psychophysics was a **physicist** (MSc) who acquired their skills during their PhD (in visual sciences).

My current supervisor is a physicist by training (MSc), but has done heaps of psychophysics as part of his post-grad **Audiology** training.

Many of my psychophysics colleagues are in fact physicists.
> 3 votes

# Answer
Through necessity. I recently started working in Dr. Sohee Park's lab at Vanderbilt University processing the psychophysiology data generated during the Virtual reality social skills training game for both the patients who have schizophrenia and the control subjects. My personal background is a double major in computer engineering and in neuroscience and I definitely have the experience using Matlab and python/dlang/whatever else to process data and ti write scripts for preprocessing data. That being said, even though I understand how one takes an input signal and filters it and process it by FFT pull out the relevant frequency domain information, there was a lot of learning why the particular methods and constants where used and what each signal and the extracted fearures actually mean. Likewise, the methods for processing the relevant features using machine learning are also new to me. To be good at research you have to be able to constantly learn new skills as you need them to get things done.
> 3 votes

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Tags: psychophysics
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# Question
Title: What type of friends do narcissists have?
For some time now, I have been looking up information on narcissism; however, **I have never found information on the type of friends narcissists have.**

Research tends to show results about `narcissistic friends` which is not what I am trying to figure out.

**So what is known about the types of friends narcissists have?** I know that there tend to be different types of narcissists and they will probably have different types of friends, but there must be some kind of generalizations and specializations about friends.

# Answer
Since I don't think this question should be closed with no answers, here's a brief summary: most of the research (never mind the popsci articles, which far outnumber actual research on this) seem to focus on the profile/personality of intimate partners who "fall" for narcissists.

Haslam and Montrose (2015) after surveying a British sample of young females (18-28 years old) say that

> Females value different traits in short-term and long-term partners. \[...\] Females with greater mating experience and those desiring marriage were more attracted to the narcissistic male personality. The narcissistic personality, whilst having many negative qualities, possesses qualities associated with status and resource provision. These traits are desirable in short and long-term mating contexts. Despite future long-term mating desires which are unlikely to be achieved with a narcissistic male and possession of substantial mate sampling experience, females view the narcissistic male as a suitable partner: a testament to the success of the narcissistic personality in facilitating short-term mating.

While this doesn't say much about the personality of the narcissists' potential mates, it does say something about their goals (aspriging for status and resource provision).

A study on speed dating by Jauk et al. (2016) found that

> Across both sexes, narcissism was positively associated with mate appeal for short- and long-term relationships. Further analyses indicated that these associations were due to the shared variance among narcissism and extraversion in men and narcissism and physical attractiveness in women, respectively. In women, psychopathy was also positively associated with mate appeal for short-term relationships. Regarding mating preferences, narcissism was found to involve greater choosiness in the rating of others' mate appeal (but not actual choices) in men, while psychopathy was associated with greater openness towards short-term relationships in women.

Again not much is said directly about the personality of the partner, but something is said about what they saw valuable in narcissists (extraversion, looks).

On non-intimate but long-term relationships, the OP himself found Maaß et al. (2016):

> Results showed that the friends' similarity in narcissism significantly predicted similarity in all Big Five domains. For the general Big Five similarity as well as extraversion, the effect of narcissism similarity was stronger for male than female or mixed friends. Similarity in psychopathy and Machiavellianism significantly predicted all domains except for openness and extraversion, respectively.

And that's basically summarized in the paper's title "Narcissists of a Feather Flock Together".
> 3 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, personality
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