# Question
Title: Resources for reliable psychology research
I'm looking for resources of reliable research in psychology. I mean 'reliable' in the following two senses:

**1. Replicability**

It seems more and more of the famous effects that I, as a psychology-curious layman, learned about by watching intro psych lectures or in popular media fail replication. It starts to seem like anything one believes to know about psychology is as likely as not to be false. As a layman it is quite difficult to track down all of the possible effects and replications thereof. Is there some resource which tracks the replication status of psychological research and collects the different effects which are reproducible (and which aren't)?

EDIT: I was able to find the following which is actually pretty close to what I was looking for. This is not a complete list but it is the kind of thing that I am after.

https://osf.io/fgjvw/

I found this through the links in the accepted answer to this SE question, which was suggested by a commenter below. However, now the comment is gone for some reason so I cannot give credit.

**2. "Bi-partisanship"**

Some areas of psychology are politically charged. Things like gender, race, intelligence, etc., are understandably controversial. It seems that often professional psychologists fall down on either side of a given issue, each insisting that it was settled by the scientific community long ago in their favour. As a layman, this is rather frustrating to make sense of. Is there some "common ground" resource which tracks the research that all sides agree on?

# Answer
'psychology' is too big for this in general. But lots of people do care a lot about replication and there have been some nice many-labs efforts to asses the state of replicability across the field. Klein, et al. (2014). was one attempt.

This study is taking the usual logic of inference about a population (in this case 'effects') from a small sample, so it has the usual problem of leaving uncertain how representative the sample is of the population. For what it's worth, I think their results suggest that the size of possible 'partisanship' bias mentioned in this question is small relative to 'some effects are small and unreliable but people chase them anyway'. Of course, science media may be choosing which of these leprechaun-chasing exercises they want to report on in a partisan way, but that's a different question.

As far as I know, there is NO common ground analogous to the standard model in physics. Although many smart people have tried, as of 2018 it's still the wild west out there. The linked project certainly isn't a common-ground reference, its scope is modest (ie realistic) and it's just one of a small family of similar studies, eg see also Open Science Collaboration (2015) or Ioannidis, et al. (2014).

**References**

Ioannidis, J. P., Munafo, M. R., Fusar-Poli, P., Nosek, B. A., & David, S. P. (2014). Publication and other reporting biases in cognitive sciences: detection, prevalence, and prevention. *Trends in cognitive sciences*, 18(5), 235-241.
DOI: 10.1016/j.tics.2014.02.010
PMCID: PMC4078993
PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4078993/pdf/nihms579109.pdf

Klein, R. A., Ratliff, K. A., Vianello, M., Adams Jr, R. B., Bahník, Š., Bernstein, M. J., ... & Cemalcilar, Z. (2014). Investigating variation in replicability: A “many labs” replication project. Social psychology, 45(3), 142.
DOI: 10.1027/1864-9335/a000178
PDF: http://psycnet.apa.org/fulltext/2014-20922-002.pdf
Updated 2017: https://osf.io/wx7ck/

Open Science Collaboration. (2015). Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science. *Science*, 349(6251), aac4716.
DOI: 10.1126/science.aac4716
PDF: https://osf.io/447b3/download?format=pdf
> 1 votes

# Answer
# Short answer

There is no **official** database I can find that collects the different effects proposed in psychology and track how they replicate. However, reputable psychology papers are published in professional journals and are re-examined all the time with meta-analyses and further research, also published in professional journals.

Professional psychologists, psychiatrists and therapists are required to maintain an up-to-date knowledge of psychological research as part of their professional codes of conduct and ethics.

# Long Answer

## Replicability

With regard to *replicability* within your question, if I am not mistaken, you are referring to finding the demarcation between science and pseudoscience within psychology as referred to by Karl Popper, in his book *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1959)

I would like to first of all point out that although there is a lot of argument which states that a large proportion of psychology is non-scientific, I would direct you to Sven Ove Hansson (2013) who argues the fact that in order for any research in psychology to be non-scientific (pseudoscientific) it has to be non-scientific when a PsychologyToday article (2016) points out that

> psychology was defined by the application of scientific method(s) and psychologists conduct valuable research and have developed some key insights into animal behavior, cognition, consciousness, and the human condition.

I would also point you to my extensive answer on the subject in meta which you can read alongside other's viewpoints.

## "Bi-partisanship"

As for *"Bi-partisanship"*, I would argue that **professional** psychologists, psychiatrists and therapists **do not** fall down on either side of a given issue as intimated in your question. Whilst there are a select few, **those who do are unprofessional** as they are prejudicial and therefore do not abide by professional codes of conduct and ethics, which include:

* **General Principle E: Respect for People's Rights and Dignity**
of the *American Psychological Association (APA) Code of Conduct* (APA, 2017)
> ...Psychologists are aware of and respect cultural, individual, and role differences, including those based on age, gender, gender identity, race, ethnicity, culture, national origin, religion, sexual orientation, disability, language, and socioeconomic status, and consider these factors when working with members of such groups. Psychologists try to eliminate the effect on their work of biases based on those factors, and they do not knowingly participate in or condone activities of others based upon such prejudices.
* **Clause 22a-h of the Good Practice section**
of the British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP) *Ethical Framework for the Counselling Professions* (BACP, 2018)
> 22. We will respect our clients as people by providing services that:
>     **a.** endeavour to demonstrate equality, value diversity and ensure inclusion for all clients
>     **b.** avoid unfairly discriminating against clients or colleagues
>     **c.** accept we are all vulnerable to prejudice and recognise the importance of self-inquiry, personal feedback and professional development
>     **d.** work with issues of identity in open-minded ways that respect the client’s autonomy and be sensitive to whether this is viewed as individual or relational autonomy
>     **e.** challenge assumptions that any sexual orientation or gender identity is inherently preferable to any other and will not attempt to bring about a change of sexual orientation or gender identity or seek to suppress an individual’s expression of sexual orientation or gender identity
>     **f.** make adjustments to overcome barriers to accessibility, so far as is reasonably possible, for clients of any ability wishing to engage with a service
>     **g.** recognise when our knowledge of key aspects of our client’s background, identity or lifestyle is inadequate and take steps to inform ourselves from other sources where available and appropriate, rather than expecting the client to teach us
>     **h.** are open-minded with clients who appear similar to ourselves or possess familiar characteristics so that we do not suppress or neglect what is distinctive in their lives. challenge assumptions that any sexual orientation or gender identity is inherently preferable to any other and will not attempt to bring about a change of sexual orientation or gender identity or seek to suppress an individual’s expression of sexual orientation or gender identity
* **Delivering a Service section**
of *National Counselling Society (NCS) Code of Ethical Practice* (NCS, 2018).
> All Practitioners undertake to:
>
> 1. Work in ways that promote client autonomy and well-being and that maintain respect and dignity for the client.
>     2. Demonstrate a fully developed, professional awareness of diversity issues; and specifically not permit considerations of religion, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, marital status, age, disability, politics or social standing to adversely influence client treatment. (See Appendix B)

> **Appendix B: Conversion (Reparative) Therapy**
> We take the view that the practice of conversion therapy has no place in the modern world. It is unethical and harmful and not supported by evidence.
>
> Conversion Therapy is the term for therapy that assumes certain sexual orientations or gender identities are inferior to others, and seeks to change or suppress them on that basis.
>
> Sexual orientations and gender identities are not mental health disorders, although exclusion, stigma and prejudice may precipitate mental health issues for any person subjected to these abuses. Anyone accessing therapeutic help should be able to do so without fear of judgement or the threat of being pressured to change a fundamental aspect of who they are.
>
> 1. The Society respects sexual diversity as part of our approach to diversity, equalities and social responsibility.
>     2. The Society does not consider homosexuality, bisexuality, transsexual and transgendered states, or asexuality to be pathologies, mental disorders or indicative of developmental arrest. These are not ‘symptoms’ to be treated by counsellors in the sense of attempting to change or remove them. Counsellors must at all times respect the best interests of their clients.
>     3. Practitioners must recognise the limits of their practice, training and experience in issues of sexuality and if necessary refer the client to an experienced therapist for specific help.
>     4. If a practitioner’s personal, theoretical or religious beliefs mean that they are unable to work in a non-judgmental way with a lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender client, or one who identifies as asexual, the client should be referred to another therapist.
>     5. No member should offer counselling that seeks to change sexual orientation or influence gender identity (SOCE, reparative, conversion or reorientation therapy, or similar therapies by other names).
>     6. Counselling should not be offered that seeks to eliminate or reduce same sex attraction in clients.
>
> Please contact the Society for further information if necessary.

**Clause 22a-h of the Good Practice section of the BACP Ethical Framework for the Counselling Professions, and Appendix B of the NCS Code of Ethical Practice follows the UK Council for Psychotherapy (UKCP) *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Conversion Therapy in the UK*, signed by many professional registering bodies, including the NCS, BACP, NHS, The British Psychological Society, and the Royal College of General Practitioners (UKCP, 2017).**

## To summarise

Whilst there is no official database that would collect the different effects proposed in psychology and track how they replicate, reputable psychology papers are published in professional journals and are re-examined all the time with meta-analyses and further research, also published in professional journals.

## References

APA (2017). *Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct* \[Online\]
Available at: http://www.apa.org/ethics/code
**Free PDF**: http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/ethics-code-2017.pdf

BACP (2018). *Ethical Framework for the Counselling Professions* \[Online\]
Available at: https://www.bacp.co.uk/events-and-resources/ethics-and-standards/introducing-the-new-ethical-framework-2018
**Free PDF**: https://www.bacp.co.uk/media/3103/bacp-ethical-framework-for-the-counselling-professions-2018.pdf

Hansson, S. O. (2013). Defining pseudoscience and science. In: Pigliucci, M. & Boudry, M. (Eds.) *The philosophy of pseudoscience*, Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press. pp. 61-77.
**Fully Readable in: Google Books** at https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Pc4OAAAAQBAJ&lpg=PA61&dq=Hansson%2C%20S.%20O.%20(1996).%20Defining%20Pseudoscience.&lr&pg=PA61#v=onepage&q=Hansson,%20S.%20O.%20(1996).%20Defining%20Pseudoscience.&f=false

NCS (2018) *Code of Ethical Practice* \[Online\]
Available at: https://www.nationalcounsellingsociety.org/about-us/code-of-ethics
**Audio Copy:** https://youtu.be/zSjS0B7-sao
**Copies in braille or large format available as required:** https://www.nationalcounsellingsociety.org/about-us/equal-opportunities/accessibility/

Popper, K. R. (1959) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*. New York: Routledge

PsychologyToday article (2016) *The “Is Psychology a Science?” Debate* \[Online\]
Available at:https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/theory-knowledge/201601/the-is-psychology-science-debate

UKCP (2017). *Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Conversion Therapy in the UK.* \[Online\]
Available at: https://www.psychotherapy.org.uk/about-ukcp/public-policy/conversion-therapy
PDF: http://www.psychotherapy.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/UKCP-Memorandum-of-Understanding-on-Conversion-Therapy-in-the-UK.pdf
> 2 votes

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Tags: reproducible-research, reliability
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# Question
Title: Is there a difference between physiological stimulations and psychological stimulations?
From what I understand, **physiological stimulation** (or *stimulus* or *sensation*) "refers to sensory excitation, the action of various agents or forms of energy (stimuli) on receptors that generate impulses that travel through nerves to the brain (afferents)", while **psychological stimulation** (or *conceptualized stimulation*) involves cognitive process like perception, reasoning, emotion, experience. However, reading the Wikipedia page of stimulation, I feel like the two concepts are the same.

Are they the same or different? I guess we can say that psychological stimulation **is** physiological stimulation because it can explain (or be explained by) these phenomenons:

* Brainwaves are combinations of harmonic oscillators range from 0.5 to 700 Hz
* Synesthesia, when some people can literally see an orange triangle in space when they hear a trumpet

If so, how does this energy change in the brain related with perception, reasoning, emotion, experience? Is there any experiment that support or against this?

 FYI: Physically, when the oscillators aren't aligned, the wave will not jump:

But if they are aligned, the wave will jump:

Related:
Does neurodynamics have any relation to psychodynamics?
Why do brains oscillate within specific frequency ranges?
Is there a relation between large-scale oscillations and small-scale oscillations? in Physics

# Answer
> 5 votes
Psychology and physiology are at different *levels of explanation* or levels of analysis. The answer depends entirely on how you view the relationship between such levels and in particular (mental) causality within and between levels. As this is still heavily debated, this metaphysical consideration is a precursor for giving a more specific answer to your question. Some options:

The physicalist and reductionist answer is probably the simplest: they are the same thing, only physical stimulation is the only real one! According to this view, Psychology is an (epiphenomenal) abstraction which is entirely realized by lower levels. Therefore, there can only be psychological stimulation in the presence of physical stimulation, but the latter may occur without the former being *intrinsic* to that. As an example, you present a snake to the subject to elicit psychological fear, but the physical stimulation (photons tranduced by the retina and the pressure transduced by the cutaneous receptors in the skin) is a necessity for this to happen. If you count neuronal activity as physical self-stimulation, then fearful memories could be cast in the same language.

Others try to keep the relationship between levels less well defined. For example, if you align more with emergentism, poetic naturalism, or the like, you acknowledge the underlying physical reality, but you want to keep the *causal language* such as "the snake made him fearful" within a given level of analysis rather than crossing levels. So the answer to your question is that there IS no difference, but you better act as if there is because you'll miss something or get confused if you don't.

A dualist, of course, would hold that physical stimulation and psychological stimulation can (at list in principle) occur in its own right. Usually, they have great difficulties answering the very question you pose, and even though most people in their day-to-day lives tend to think dualistically (as intuitive psychologists), very few defend dualism in academia nowadays.

There are other positions as well, and each of the above has many branches. But the above should give some search terms to get acquainted with the heavy players in the field.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, sensation, sensory-perception, synesthesia, stimulation
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# Question
Title: Brain computer interface Final year project
My professor told me to collect data for the states we want to to use to control the movement of our robot i.e., thinking, meditation and other emotional or physical states using an Emotiv EEG headset which I don't have at the moment.

Is there any alternative software for acquiring and visualizing these signals without the need for headset right now? How many samples need to be taken for the training of the neural set or any other classifier? What sampling rate and which file format must these samples need to be saved?

Is there any online free simulator for analyzing the data and map it’s working on a simulated robotic object? Which embedded hardware is ideal for the project Arduino or Raspberry Pi for a 32 bit Windows 7 operating system.

What online tutorials, research papers and books would assist in taking this project to completion and creating artificial neural networks?

# Answer
> 1 votes
There is lot of way to create BCI, (SSVEP, VEP, imaginary movement, brain state, etc...). In your case it seems to be with brain states.

You should first know what kind of information you will extract from your signal. In this case you will need to extract different band of frequencies (alpha, beta, gamma, theta, etc...). To do that, you can use calculate spectrum based on Fourrier transform, or use wavelet...

Then you will need to classify this different states, using clustering or machine learning techniques (ANN, naives bayes, PCA, SVM, etc...). You should have a 'training' dataset, where you have extracted information with state label.

Then you create a 'mapping' where for each detected state, and you get an activation of your effector (robot)

I recommend you to use python, where you have lot of library available for signal processing, and machine learning.

Good luck !

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Tags: eeg, brain-computer-interface
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title: Uses of the Brief Anxiety Scale

text:
# Question
Title: Uses of the Brief Anxiety Scale
I am currently completing my undergraduate research thesis on self-affirmations measured with anxiety. I am trying to see if the self-affirmation task reduces anxiety after. I found the Brief Anxiety Scale and am trying to find out what it is best used with, but my search of articles has not made the uses clear to me.

For what is the scale best used? Are there different scales that might instead be recommended for my research?

Thank you in advance to anyone who can provide assistance!

# Answer
# Short Answer

The Brief Anxiety Scale is one of many Pychometric Rating Scales (Tyrer, et al. 1984) used to assess necessary Routine Outcome Measures (BACP, 2016; Harmon et al., 2007; Lambert and Shimokawa, 2011; Simon et al., 2012).

The scale which is recommended for your research will depend on your reseach requirements. Some scales are quick to complete as they are shorter than others, but longer ones can provide more detail where you feel they are needed. You need to assess for yourself which scale suits the requirements and then use the one most appropriate.

# More Detailed Answer

## Routine Outcome Measures

**After gaining informed consent from the client**, it is a good idea to obtain routine outcome information and devise outcome measures:

* before any therapy begins,
* after each session, and
* after therapy ends

because Routine outcome measures support the therapeutic process by enabling the therapist and the client to monitor progress (BACP, 2016; Harmon et al., 2007; Lambert and Shimokawa, 2011; Simon et al., 2012), and can play an important role in measuring service quality and lead to improvements.

You especially need to implement Routine Outcome Measures when dealing with severe anxiety as your duty of care to your client extends outside the therapy room as far as reasonably practicable. Post-therapy measures may need to include post therapy talks to calm the client at the end of the session if they are particularly anxious due to something which they have brought forward towards the end of the session.

## Pychometric Rating Scales for Anxiety

The rating of anxiety is a long-established psychometric exercise and there are more than 20 instruments available (Tyrer, et al. 1984). There are *subject completed scales* and *observer completed scales*. The authors of these scales emphasise that **they are not diagnostic instruments** and should only be used with patients who are diagnosed as having anxiety states. However, in clinical practice anxiety is often mixed with other emotions and it is difficult, if not impossible, to separate the anxiety element (Tyrer, 1984).

### Subject Completed Rating Scales

These rating scales take the form of questionnaires which the client in therapy would fill in. The Brief Anxiety Scale (Tyrer, et al. 1984) is one of these rating scales suitable for recording anxious symptoms.

Patient Health Questionnaires (Spitzer, et al., n.d.) can also be used for rating scales in order to form a basis for devising outcome measures. All of the questionnaires can be used but the GAD-7 questionnaire — a 7 question sheet — is designed specifically for anxiety. These come with an instruction manual on how to interpret the results.

### Observer Completed Rating Scales

These rating scales take the form of questionnaires which the therapist would fill in as a record for future reference. One observer scale for anxiety is the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety (Hamilton, 1959). However, Hamilton did not consider the scale to be in its final state and Snaith, et al. (1982) modified the scale, which afterwards only contains six items. Other observer scales for anxiety include the Buss Rating Scale (Buss, et al. 1955) and the Anxiety Status Inventory (Zung, 1971) but they have never achieved the popularity of the Hamilton Rating Scale for Anxiety (Tyrer, et al. 1984).

## Which scale might be recommended for your purposes?

The scale which is recommended for your purposes will depend on your requirements. Some scales are quick to complete as they are shorter than others and may be more beneficial due to the short time needed to complete them. Would it seem to be too laborious to the client? But on the other hand longer ones can provide more detail where you feel they are needed. You need to assess for yourself which scale suits the requirements and then use the one most appropriate.

## References

BACP (2016). *Children and Young People Practice Research Network (CYP PRN): A toolkit for collecting routine outcome measures* \[PDF\] Available at: https://www.bacp.co.uk/media/2355/bacp-cyp-prn-toolkit-for-collecting-routine-outcome-measures.pdf

Buss, A. H., Wiener, M., Durkee, A., & Baer, M. (1955). The measurement of anxiety in clinical situations. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, 19(2), 125-129. DOI: 10.1037/h0048964

Hamilton, M. A. X. (1959). The assessment of anxiety states by rating. Psychology and Psychotherapy: Theory, Research and Practice. *British Journal of Medical Psychology*, 32(1), 50-55. DOI: 10.1111/j.2044-8341.1959.tb00467.x

Harmon, S. C., Lambert, M. J., Smart, D. M., Hawkins, E., Nielsen, S. L., Slade, K., & Lutz, W. (2007). Enhancing outcome for potential treatment failures: Therapist–client feedback and clinical support tools. *Psychotherapy research*, 17(4), 379-392. DOI: 10.1080/10503300600702331

Lambert, M. J., & Shimokawa, K. (2011). Collecting client feedback. *Psychotherapy*, 48(1), 72. DOI: 10.1037/a0022238 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Jose\_Garrido13/post/the\_cooperation\_between\_empathy\_and\_congruence\_in\_the\_therapeutic\_relationship/attachment/59d6365fc49f478072ea42e3/AS:273673120878601@1442260164528/download/Norcross\_evidence-based\_therapy\_relationships.pdf#page=23

Simon, W., Lambert, M. J., Harris, M. W., Busath, G., & Vazquez, A. (2012). Providing patient progress information and clinical support tools to therapists: Effects on patients at risk of treatment failure. Psychotherapy research, 22(6), 638-647. DOI: 10.1080/10503307.2012.698918 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Lambert\_Michael/publication/236664707\_Effects\_of\_providing\_patient\_progress\_feedback\_and\_clinical\_support\_tools\_to\_psychotherapists\_in\_an\_inpatient\_eating\_disorders\_treatment\_program\_A\_randomized\_controlled\_study/links/0c96051969ab0c091b000000.pdf

Snaith, R. P., Baugh, S. J., Clayden, A. D., Husain, A., & Sipple, M. A. (1982). The clinical anxiety scale: an instrument derived from the Hamilton anxiety scale. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, 141(5), 518-523. DOI: 10.1192/bjp.141.5.518

Spitzer, MD, R. L., Williams, J. B. & Kroenke, MD, K. (n.d.) Patient Heath Questionnaire (PHQ) Screeners. \[Online\] Available at: http://www.phqscreeners.com/

Tyrer, P. (1984). Classification of anxiety. *The British Journal of Psychiatry*, 144(1), 78-83. DOI: 10.1192/bjp.144.1.78 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Peter\_Tyrer/publication/16504411\_Classification\_of\_anxiety/links/54a52c1b0cf267bdb906ff78/Classification-of-anxiety.pdf

Tyrer, P., Owen, R. T., & Cicchetti, D. V. (1984). The brief scale for anxiety: a subdivision of the comprehensive psychopathological rating scale. *Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery, and Psychiatry*, 47(9), 970–975. PMCID: PMC1028000 PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1028000/pdf/jnnpsyc00125-0082.pdf

Zung, W. W. (1971). A rating instrument for anxiety disorders. *Psychosomatics*, 12(6), 371-379. DOI: 10.1016/S0033-3182(71)71479-0
> 3 votes

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Tags: experimental-psychology, anxiety
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# Question
Title: What are examples of stimuli that we know cause a grief or sadness reaction in humans?
I am looking for examples of stimuli that has been shown to cause sadness in humans in a controlled environment as opposed to the neurological basis or evolutionary reason for sadness

# Answer
> 1 votes
I m not sure how much of sadness images are covered under it but perhaps you could have a look at IAPS ( International Affective Picture Series) . They seek to make media for specifically inducing desired affective states in research work including images , audios and videos.

http://csea.phhp.ufl.edu/media.html

Perhaps you could have a look into Mood Inducing Procedures ( MIP) used to induce both positive and negative affects in a laboratory setting .

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Tags: social-psychology, emotion
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# Question
Title: How are musical hooks defined/studied in psychology?
I know about the common concept of a 'musical hook': a *"short riff, passage, or phrase, that is used in popular music to make a song appealing and to 'catch the ear of the listener'."*

The Wikipedia article mentions how it is studied in marketing research, and provides two links to websites of organizations which study the 'hook' ('Hooked on music' and 'Hooked!'). However, I am not interested in marketing research and the two websites linked to as 'scientific research', at a glance, do not provide any insight into the research they are conducting.

Is this concept studied within the field of psychology or neuroscience? Is there any domain-specific terminology used to refer to what makes music appealing or 'catch the ear of the listener'? I would like to start reading into this literature but currently do not know what to search for.

# Answer
Looking into the term *earworms* lead me to the following answer.

If you search *earworms* into Google Scholar, at the top of the list is 3 papers, after which the rest seem to be about corn earworms. The papers are Beaman & Williams (2010) followed by Halpern & Bartlett (2011) which is then followed by Williamson, et al. (2012).

It was the last paper which lead me to the term *Involuntary Musical Imagery* and the paper was in *Psychology of Music* which lead me to the field of ***Music Psychology***

> or the ***psychology of music***, \[which\] may be regarded as a branch of both psychology and musicology. It aims to explain and understand musical behavior and experience, including the processes through which music is perceived, created, responded to, and incorporated into everyday life (Tan, et al.2010; Thompson, 2015).

Searching Google Scholar for *Involuntary Musical Imagery* leads you to much more.

## References

Beaman, C. P., & Williams, T. I. (2010). Earworms (stuck song syndrome): Towards a natural history of intrusive thoughts. *British Journal of Psychology*, 101(4), 637-653. DOI: 10.1348/000712609X479636 PDF: http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/5755/1/earworms\_write-upBJP.pdf

Halpern, A. R., & Bartlett, J. C. (2011). The persistence of musical memories: A descriptive study of earworms. *Music Perception: An Interdisciplinary Journal*, 28(4), 425-432. DOI: 10.1525/mp.2011.28.4.425 PDF: http://www.academia.edu/download/45162267/The\_Persistence\_of\_Musical\_Memories\_A\_De20160428-27955-1tiomp.pdf

Tan, S., Pfordresher, P., & Harré, R. (2010). *Psychology of Music: From Sound to Significance*. New York: Psychology Press.

Thompson, W. F. (2015) Music, Thought, and Feeling: Understanding the Psychology of Music, 2nd Edition. New York: Oxford University Press.

Williamson, V. J., Jilka, S. R., Fry, J., Finkel, S., Müllensiefen, D., & Stewart, L. (2012). How do “earworms” start? Classifying the everyday circumstances of Involuntary Musical Imagery. *Psychology of Music*, 40(3), 259-284. DOI: 10.1177/0305735611418553 PDF: http://www.doc.gold.ac.uk/~mas03dm/papers/Williamson\_etal\_Earworms\_POM\_2012.pdf
> 2 votes

# Answer
It seems that you are a perfect reader of this book:

# On Repeat: How Music Plays the Mind

> ## What is it about the music you love that makes you want to hear it again?
>
> ### Why do we crave a "hook" that returns, again and again, within the same piece?
>
> ### And how does a song end up getting stuck in your head?
>
> On Repeat offers the first in-depth inquiry into music's repetitive nature, focusing not on a particular style, or body of work, but on repertoire from across time periods and cultures. Author Elizabeth Hellmuth Margulis draws on a diverse array of fields including music theory, psycholinguistics, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology, to look head-on at the underlying perceptual mechanisms associated with repetition. Her work sheds light on a range of issues from repetition's use as a compositional tool to its role in characterizing our behavior as listeners, and then moves beyond music to consider related implications for repetition in language, learning, and communication.
> 2 votes

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Tags: terminology, music
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# Question
Title: Are there any studies that examine the phenomenon of songs stuck in the head?
Frequently I hear people say (and myself included) "darn it, I can't get that song out of my head!".

**Are there any studies that examine this phenomenon of songs getting stuck in people's heads?**

I.e., what factors are involved in some people to get a certain song stuck in their head and not others:

* When is it more likely to occur?
* Why does the same song gets stuck for one person and not for others?
* What methods can stop it?
* Is there any relation to other issues like OCD?
* When it is considered not normal?

# Answer
Here is a study that creates and manipulates the "song stuck in your head" phenomenon. In particular, it is a myth that only "bad" songs are stuck in your head. These songs can be categorized as intrusive thoughts. Also the obvious finding was that recently heard music was more likely to be stuck in your head.

The authors comes up with a term called the "Goldilocks Effect." In particular, songs are more likely to be stuck in your head if you are doing a really easy or a really hard task. If you are doing a really easy task it is easy for your mind to think about other things (e.g. think about driving on a highway and being in a "highway hypnosis"). When you are doing a hard task sometimes a moment of relaxation and insight is needed. This is where songs often come up. Thus to control this, you should do an activity that is not too easy or too hard (or not too little or too much arousal following the Yerkes Dodson Law).

**Source**

Going Gaga: Investigating, Creating, and Manipulating the Song Stuck in My Head

Ira E. Hyman Jr.\*, Naomi K. Burland, Hollyann M. Duskin, Megan C. Cook, Christina M. Roy, Jessie C. McGrath, Rebecca F. Roundhill

Kounios, J., & Beeman, M. (2009). The Aha! Moment The Cognitive Neuroscience of Insight. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18(4), 210-216.
> 11 votes

# Answer
There is a book dedicates only for that:

# On Repeat: How Music Plays the Mind

> ## What is it about the music you love that makes you want to hear it again?
>
> ### Why do we crave a "hook" that returns, again and again, within the same piece?
>
> ### And how does a song end up getting stuck in your head?
>
> On Repeat offers the first in-depth inquiry into music's repetitive nature, focusing not on a particular style, or body of work, but on repertoire from across time periods and cultures. Author Elizabeth Hellmuth Margulis draws on a diverse array of fields including music theory, psycholinguistics, neuroscience, and cognitive psychology, to look head-on at the underlying perceptual mechanisms associated with repetition. Her work sheds light on a range of issues from repetition's use as a compositional tool to its role in characterizing our behavior as listeners, and then moves beyond music to consider related implications for repetition in language, learning, and communication.
> 1 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, perception, music
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# Question
Title: What hormones stimulate non-sexual intimate behaviour?
From wikipedia article sexual motivation and hormones, it is said that testosterone/estrogen, oxytocin and vasopressin are stimulating sexual behaviour. But I'm wondering if any of these hormones are linked with physically intimate non-sexual behaviour, like hugs, kisses and cuddles. Also, is there any link through them with having pleasure from these activities?

Is there any research on that and are there gender (sex?) differences?

# Answer
> 5 votes
> But I'm wondering if any of these hormones are linked with physically intimate non-sexual behaviour, like hugs, kisses and cuddles.

Kissing is a little messy because it could be characterised as sexual behaviour.

However, oxytocin does has a far more broader role in pro-social and affiliative behaviour than just sexual activity.

Here's one reference. It also seems to suggest a stronger role of oxytocin in women than males:

> **Effects of Partner Support on Resting Oxytocin, Cortisol, Norepinephrine, and Blood Pressure Before and After Warm Partner Contact**
>
> Objective: We examined whether the magnitude of plasma oxytocin (OT), norepinephrine (NE), cortisol, and blood pressure (BP) responses before and after a brief episode of warm contact (WC) with the spouse/partner may be related to the strength of perceived partner support.
>
> Methods: Subjects were 38 cohabiting couples (38 men, 38 women) aged 20 to 49 years. All underwent 10 minutes of resting baseline alone, 10 minutes of WC together with their partner, and 10 minutes of postcontact rest alone.
>
> Results: **Greater partner support (based on self-report) was related to higher plasma oxytocin in men and women across the protocol before and after WC.** In women, higher partner support was correlated with lower systolic blood pressure (SBP) during solitary rest after WC but not before. Also, higher OT in women was linked to lower BP at baseline and to lower NE at all 4 measurements.
>
> Conclusion: **Greater partner support is linked to higher OT for both men and women; however, the importance of OT and its potentially cardioprotective effects on sympathetic activity and BP may be greater for women.**
>
> ABP = ambulatory blood pressure; BMI = body mass index; BP = blood pressure; CVD = cardiovascular disease; DBP = diastolic blood pressure; HPA = hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal; HR = heart rate; IV = intravenous; MI = myocardial infarction; NE = norepinephrine; OT = oxytocin; SBP = systolic blood pressure; SNS = sympathetic nervous system; SRI = Social Relationships Index; WC = warm contact.

And another:

> **More frequent partner hugs and higher oxytocin levels are linked to lower blood pressure and heart rate in premenopausal women**
>
> In animals, ventral stroking for \>5 days increases oxytocin (OT) activity and decreases blood pressure (BP), but related human studies are few. Thus, relationships between self-reported frequency of partner hugs, plasma OT and BP levels were examined in 59 premenopausal women before and after warm contact with their husbands/partners ending with hugs. Higher baseline OT before partner contact was associated with lower BP and heart rate, and met criteria to be a partial mediator of the lower resting BP shown by women reporting more frequent hugs (P \< 0.05). OT levels during post-contact stress were unrelated to hugs or BP. Menstrual cycle phase did not influence any OT measure. **Thus, frequent hugs between spouses/partners are associated with lower BP and higher OT levels in premenopausal women;** OT-mediated reduction in central adrenergic activity and peripheral effects of OT on the heart and vasculature are pathways to examine in future research.

Also, other transmitter systems are involved in what we might characterise as *affectionate behaviour*. the opioid system has a role in both humans and non-human primates:

In non-human primates:

> **Opioid receptor blockade reduces maternal affect and social grooming in rhesus monkeys**
>
> Seven lactating female rhesus macaques, housed in social groups, were administered with low doses (0.5 mg/kg) of the opioid antagonist naloxone when their infants were 4, 6, 8, and 10 weeks old. A control group received saline. **Mothers receiving naloxone were involved in less grooming with other group members, and were less protective towards their infants. By infant-age week 8 they also groomed their infants less, while other monkeys groomed the infants more. Other behavioural measures of mother-infant interactions were not altered.** With time, from infant-age week 6 onwards, some short-lived dysphoric conditioned drug responses to naloxone became apparent, although these were not correlated with the decline in social interaction. These results are interpreted in terms of possible interference of naloxone with maternal affect.

And humans:

> **Social touch modulates endogenous μ-opioid system activity in humans**
>
> In non-human primates, opioid-receptor blockade increases social grooming, and the endogenous opioid system has therefore been hypothesized to support maintenance of long-term relationships in humans as well. Here we tested whether social touch modulates opioidergic activation in humans using in vivo positron emission tomography (PET). Eighteen male participants underwent two PET scans with \[11C\]carfentanil, a ligand specific to μ-opioid receptors (MOR). **During the social touch scan, the participants lay in the scanner while their partners caressed their bodies in a non-sexual fashion. In the baseline scan, participants lay alone in the scanner. Social touch triggered pleasurable sensations and increased MOR availability in the thalamus, striatum, and frontal, cingulate, and insular cortices.** Modulation of activity of the opioid system by social touching might provide a neurochemical mechanism reinforcing social bonds between humans.

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Tags: neuroscience, motivation, sexuality, behavior, gender
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# Question
Title: Use of Botulinum toxin A (botox) to treat depression and its effect on fight/flight repsonse
Over in Health.SE, @faustus provided a couple of references to papers which suggest the use of Botulinum toxin A (BTA) - otherwise known as botox - to treat depression — Magid, et al. (2015a) and Finzi & Rosenthal, (2016)

Magid, et al. (2015a) states that

> a single treatment of BTA in the glabellar region can produce a strong reduction in the symptoms of major depression
>
> <sup>***Figure:*** *Improvement in BDI score. The figure shows absolute reduction in the BDI scores (14.3 vs. 5.1±standard error of the mean) from the baseline to the primary end point 6 weeks thereafter in the combined sample (n=134) for the BTA (n=59) and the placebo group (n=75), respectively.*</sup>

whilst Finzi & Rosenthal, (2016) states that

> In an initial case series, one of us (EF) injected BT into the frown of ten depressed patients, eight of whom went into remission after one treatment (Finzi and Wasserman, 2006; Finzi, 2013). The study was limited by its small size, lack of controls, and lack of blinding. In three subsequent randomized, double blind and placebo controlled trials, we and other researchers have found response rates of 50—60% in major depression, with about one third of patients going into remission (Wollmer et al. 2012; Finzi and Rosenthal, 2014; Magid et al. 2014, 2015b). BT showed antidepressant effects both when used as an ancillary treatment and by itself.

However, they then go on to say

> How might injecting BT into the corrugator muscle influence the emotional brain? FMRI imaging has shown that subjects who received BT injections into their frown muscles had amygdala that were less responsive to negative stimuli (Hennenlotter et al. 2009). Recent work has confirmed that amygdala activity in response to angry faces was decreased when the frown muscles were paralyzed by BT injection. Furthermore, amygdala activity returned to its original inducible state after the effects of the BT injection had worn off, confirming that BT reversibly severed afferent feedback from the corrugator muscle to the amygdala (Kim et al. 2014).

**With the decrease in amygdala activity in response to angry faces, am I correct in thinking that this could have a detrimental effect with regard to the flight/flight response in potentially dangerous situations?**

## References

Finzi, E. (2013). Antidepressant effects of botulinum toxin A: scientific rationale. *Journal of psychiatry & neuroscience: JPN*, 38(5), E29. PMCID: PMC3756121

Finzi, E., & Rosenthal, N. E. (2014). Treatment of depression with onabotulinumtoxinA: a randomized, double-blind, placebo controlled trial. *Journal of psychiatric research*, 52, 1-6. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2013.11.006

Finzi, E., & Rosenthal, N. E. (2016). Emotional proprioception: treatment of depression with afferent facial feedback. *Journal of psychiatric research*, 80, 93-96. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2016.06.009

Finzi, E., & Wasserman, E. (2006). Treatment of depression with botulinum toxin A: a case series. *Dermatologic Surgery*, 32(5), 645-650. DOI: 10.1111/j.1524-4725.2006.32136.x

Hennenlotter, A., Dresel, C., Castrop, F., Ceballos-Baumann, A. O., Wohlschläger, A. M., & Haslinger, B. (2008). The link between facial feedback and neural activity within central circuitries of emotion—New insights from Botulinum toxin–induced denervation of frown muscles. Cerebral Cortex, 19(3), 537-542. DOI: 10.1093/cercor/bhn104

Kim, M. J., Neta, M., Davis, F. C., Ruberry, E. J., Dinescu, D., Heatherton, T. F., ... & Whalen, P. J. (2014). Botulinum toxin-induced facial muscle paralysis affects amygdala responses to the perception of emotional expressions: preliminary findings from an ABA design. *Biology of mood & anxiety disorders*, 4(1), 11. DOI: 10.1186/2045-5380-4-11

Magid, M., Reichenberg, J. S., Poth, P. E., Robertson, H. T., LaViolette, A. K., Kruger, T. H., & Wollmer, M. A. (2014). Treatment of major depressive disorder using botulinum toxin A: a 24-week randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled study. *The Journal of clinical psychiatry*, 75(8), 837-844. DOI: 10.4088/JCP.13m08845

Magid, M., Finzi, E., Kruger, T. H. C., Robertson, H. T., Keeling, B. H., Jung, S., ... & Wollmer, M. A. (2015a). Treating depression with botulinum toxin: a pooled analysis of randomized controlled trials. *Pharmacopsychiatry*, 25(06), 205-210. DOI: 10.1055/s-0035-1559621

Magid, M., Finzi, E., Kruger, T. H. C., Robertson, H. T., Keeling, B. H., Jung, S., ... & Wollmer, M. A. (2015b). Treating depression with botulinum toxin: a pooled analysis of randomized controlled trials. Pharmacopsychiatry, 48(6), 205-210. DOI: 10.1055/s-0035-1559621

Wollmer, M. A., de Boer, C., Kalak, N., Beck, J., Götz, T., Schmidt, T., ... & Sönmez, D. (2012). Facing depression with botulinum toxin: a randomized controlled trial. *Journal of psychiatric research*, 46(5), 574-581. DOI: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2012.01.027

# Answer
> 1 votes
> With the decrease in amygdala activity in response to angry faces, am I correct in thinking that this could have a detrimental effect with regard to the flight/flight response in potentially dangerous situations?

Yes, but like everything in neuroscience, it's probably more complicated that that. Working back from first principles, the same could be said of other antidepressant treatments:

> **Antidepressant Drug Treatment Modifies the Neural Processing of Nonconscious Threat Cues**
>
> *Background* The amygdala is believed to play a key role in processing emotionally salient, threat-relevant, events that require further online processing by cortical regions. Emotional disorders such as depression and anxiety have been associated with hyperactivity of the amygdala, but it is unknown whether antidepressant treatment directly affects amygdala responses to emotionally significant information.
>
> *Methods* The current study assessed the effects of 7 days administration of the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI), citalopram, on amygdala responses to masked presentations of fearful and happy facial expressions in never-depressed volunteers using blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) functional magnetic resonance imaging. A double-blind, between-groups design was used with volunteers randomized to 20 mg/day citalopram versus placebo.
>
> *Results* Volunteers receiving citalopram showed decreased amygdala responses to masked presentations of threat compared with those receiving placebo. Citalopram also reduced responses within the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) specifically during the fear-relevant stimuli. These neural differences were accompanied by decreased recognition of fearful facial expressions assessed after the scan. By contrast, there was no effect of citalopram on the neural or behavioral response to the happy facial expressions.
>
> *Conclusions* **These results suggest a direct effect of serotonin potentiation on amygdala response to threat-relevant stimuli in humans.** Such effects may be important in the therapeutic actions of antidepressants in depression and anxiety.

Maybe perceiving the world as less threatening is precisely what depressed people need in their lives. However, there may be something more interesting at play with respect to botox. In the papers you cite, these all have to do with interpretation of facial expressions. For example, in Hennenlotter et al. 2009:

> **The Link between Facial Feedback and Neural Activity within Central Circuitries of Emotion—New Insights from Botulinum Toxin–Induced Denervation of Frown Muscles**
>
> **Afferent feedback from muscles and skin has been suggested to influence our emotions during the control of facial expressions.** Recent imaging studies have shown that imitation of facial expressions is associated with activation in limbic regions such as the amygdala. Yet, the physiological interaction between this limbic activation and facial feedback remains unclear. To study if facial feedback effects on limbic brain responses during intentional imitation of facial expressions, we applied botulinum toxin (BTX)–induced denervation of frown muscles in combination with functional magnetic resonance imaging as a reversible lesion model to minimize the occurrence of afferent muscular and cutaneous input. We show that, during imitation of angry facial expressions, reduced feedback due to BTX treatment attenuates activation of the left amygdala and its functional coupling with brain stem regions implicated in autonomic manifestations of emotional states. **These findings demonstrate that facial feedback modulates neural activity within central circuitries of emotion during intentional imitation of facial expressions.** Given that people tend to mimic the emotional expressions of others, this could provide a potential physiological basis for the social transfer of emotion.

If the mechanism of action of botox involves facial proprioception and there's a reduced amygdalar response to angry or fearful facial expressions, I would speculate that this involves mirror neurons in some manner.

Without the administration of botox, an interesting experiment would be examine the threat perception of facial expressions in people with a forced grin. We would also predict that threat perception is still present when other threatening stimuli are used e.g. handgun. I'm sure it's been done by someone.

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Tags: cognitive-neuroscience, clinical-psychology, depression, anxiety, pharmacopsychiatry
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# Question
Title: NEO-FFI vs. NEO-FFI-3: What's the difference?
I just ran out of a large shipment of NEO-FFI booklets, so I went to order more from PARinc. This shipment has lasted since 2014.

It seems that the original version of the NEO-FFI that I was using (from 2003) is now out of print and has been updated with the NEO-FFI-3.

Is anyone aware of the differences between the two versions? I can't really find much information on the change between the two, so I assume they're not significantly different?

# Answer
> 3 votes
## First a bit of background for those who may not know what NEO-FFI is...

NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI) is a shortened version of the NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI) now in its 3rd edition (NEO-PI-3). Both inventories were first published in 1985 and now the NEO-FFI is also in its 3rd edition as of 2005 (NEO-FFI-3).

NEO-FFI-3 measures the "Big 5" personality traits (Neuroticism, Extraversion, Openness, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness), comprises 60 items and is designed to take 10 to 15 minutes to complete; by contrast, the NEO-PI-3 takes 45 to 60 minutes to complete.

Both NEO-PI and NEO-FFI were originally developed for use with adult men and women without overt psychopathy.

## Now onto the question of difference between the 2nd and 3rd editions

The latest revision of the NEO-FFI involved the replacement of 15 of the 60 items to improve readability and psychometric properties. The revised edition is now thought to be more suitable for younger individuals and is also thought to have a stronger factor structure and increased reliability (McCrae & Costa, 2010).

For further reading, see the NEO research bibliography

## References

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T., Jr., (2010). *NEO Inventories: Professional manual.* Lutz, FL: Psychological Assessment Resources, Inc.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, neuroscience, cognitive-neuroscience, personality
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# Question
Title: Is there a "base set" of feelings used to classify images?
In an app I am creating I am profiling user behavior in a multitude of different ways. One of the techniques I would like to use is track the imagery they interact with to get a handle on their current mood. The imagery uses an internal tagging nomenclature that indicates various aspects of the image one of which is the key feeling it is intended to trigger. The feelings I am using are something along the lines of

Health, Desire, Hunger, Comfort, Indulgence, Relief, Peace, Relaxation, Nurture, Creativity, Excitement

To provide a context here is a clutch of images (not the actual ones I am using)

My intent here is to attempt to build up a corpus of knowledge regarding the moods of the user and the way they vary over time and space based on what types of imagery they interact - in the sense of tap on to engage with the asssociated content - with.

I use a large range of profiling techniques most of which have a firm basis in published research. And then every once in a while I think of an idea such as this one "all on my own". Which brings me to my question - is there any scientific literature on the subject that reduces feelings triggered by images to a core list? Having such a list would assist me in tagging the imagery I use in the app.

I have researched the subject on Google, ResearchGate and Elsevier but come up with nothing useful. This could be in part because I am searching for the wrong terms - I am afterall, a mere IT guy who is blundering into psychology.

I have found useful information in resources such as this one. Whilst I appreciate the insights and sense that they are talking sense there is very little by way of referenced research to back up what is claimed.

# Answer
> 2 votes
I am pleased to see the interest that this question has aroused. I have eventually managed to find one scientific article on the subject - http://www.imageemotion.org/machajdik\_hanbury\_affective\_image\_classification.pdf.

which provides me with a decent starting point. I would be most grateful to pointers to any other research in the field.

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Tags: emotion, imagery
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# Question
Title: What forms of human thinking are present on animals and protohumans?
**General idea**

I'm trying to see what characteristics of human thinking are present on animals and protohumans. In other words, how our thought depends on previous forms of intelligence (because of evolution and particularly that of brain structure, I suppose).

**Background and problem**

Some days ago someone said on the streets:

> Measuring means comparing.

And it became clear to me that comparison is fundamental for the way we relate to the world, for the way we think and see he world. Why A is bigger\taller\better that B?

Another way we relate through the world is by analogy. Analogy and for extension metaphor are on the beginnings of language; comparison between one thing or another seems also ancestral. So there are two ways of thinking that might be identified with animals thinking.

**The question**

Are those ways of thinking present in earlier human beings or monkeys?

---

I don't expect a complete answer but some help for me to start. Links\recommendations of videos, essays, papers orr short books are very welcome. (I don't believe in long texts, I apologise for this)

# Answer
> 2 votes
Animal brains, especially mammals', are quite similar to humans. So far, attempts to define what makes human cognition "different" in some way have been for the most part a failure - the goal posts continue to be pushed. What seems to remain is a suggestion that human brains are especially socially-focused, and that humans have a uniquely developed ability to understand, plan, and simulate how others may be thinking (for example: Adolphs, R. (2003). Cognitive neuroscience: Cognitive neuroscience of human social behaviour. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 4(3), 165.).

However, we don't even need to look to apes, primates, or even mammals, to see cognitive abilities of the types that you mention.

For example, at least some birds are capable of quite a lot. As far as easily digestible material, there is a NOVA program on animal minds. I have only seen the bird episode, so I cannot speak to the others.

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/nature/inside-animal-minds.html#animal-minds-birds

Although for the made-for-TV format a lot of the details are omitted for the sake of brevity, the program attempts to test the hypothesis that birds are capable of some advanced behaviors that are not attributable to simple memorization or repeated tasks. These include the ability to solve novel puzzles, and to learn hierarchical relationships of the form: X\>Y and Y\>Z therefore X\>Z.

Some others from a variety of species:

**Monkeys learning the value of tokens:**

Addessi, E., Crescimbene, L., & Visalberghi, E. (2007). Do capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) use tokens as symbols?. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 274(1625), 2579-2585.

**Basic arithmetic in chimpanzees:**

Rumbaugh, D. M., Savage-Rumbaugh, E. S., and Hegel, M. T. (1987). Summation in the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes). J. Exp. Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 13, 107–115.

**A paper and further discussion on generalization of a learned rule in birds:**

Kamil, A. C. & Jones, J. J. 1997. The seed-storing corvid Clark’s nutcrackers learns geometric relationships among landmarks. Nature, 390, 276–279.

Biegler, R., McGregor, A. & Healy, S. D. 1999. How do animals ‘do’ geometry? Animal Behaviour, 57, F4–F8

Kamil, Alan and Jones, Juli E., "How do they, indeed? A reply to Biegler et al." (1999). Avian Cognition Papers. 12. http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/biosciaviancog/12

**Macaques recognizing themselves in the mirror**

Rajala, A. Z., Reininger, K. R., Lancaster, K. M., & Populin, L. C. (2010). Rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) do recognize themselves in the mirror: implications for the evolution of self-recognition. PloS one, 5(9), e12865.

**Monkeys reject unequal pay**

Brosnan, S. F., & De Waal, F. B. (2003). Monkeys reject unequal pay. Nature, 425(6955), 297.

---

And I could go on and on - these are just a few examples, not necessarily the best or most current ones. What you will see that all these works share is that it is very difficult to probe animal behavior, because it is often difficult to rule out alternative strategies as we impose our own cognitive biases on animal behavior.

That said, it seems very unlikely that most of the higher-order cognitive skills humans possess are in any way unique to humans. Some specifics like the exact structure of human language are probably fairly specialized, but other social animals also have forms of language, it may just not be as complex or developed as human language.

I'll close with what I find to be a couple cartoons that are highly insightful in this area of research:

https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/2013-01-25

https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/humans-are-amazing

https://www.smbc-comics.com/comic/humans-are-special

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Tags: thought
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title: Is this an example of objectification?

text:
# Question
Title: Is this an example of objectification?
Here is the scenario:

A man and a woman meet at a conference. During a small talk, the man says "I will try to determine the sport you played by looking at your body type." Then he backs up, looks at the woman from the top to the bottom and says "you probably played tennis."

After the event, the woman says that she was objectified and avoids the man for the rest of the conference.

Questions:

1) Is the behavior of the man an example of objectification?

2) Is the behavior of the man an example of sexual objectification?

3) Was the man's behavior sexist?

Any help/comment/opinion would be greatly appreciated.

# Answer
I think the answer to your questions is, yes, probably, and almost definitely.

1. Not necessarily, but likely yes. "I will try to guess what sport you played based on your body type," is essentially turning a person into a guessing game. The fact that he is doing it based on the person's body (i.e., their concrete form and not their feelings or personality) only makes this more apt a description for what he's doing. Whether the person wants to be objectified (which is doubtful in this case) is a different matter.
2. It depends on his internal motivations and feelings. Did he do it because it excited him sexually at all? If so, then yes, of course it is sexual objectification. I suppose it could also be the case that he wasn't sexually motivated, but she interpreted it as sexually motivated. Strictly speaking I guess you could say that he wasn't sexually objectifying her in that case, but in another sense, it should be recognized that a man looking a woman up and down and then commenting on her body is suggestive enough that the man's intent is not the only factor in whether his objectification could at least be interpreted as sexual. That is, if he wants to later claim that it wasn't sexual, I think the burden of proof is on him.
3. Probably. If he says things like this to women only, then it was definitely sexist. Even if he says things like this to men just as frequently, he failed to recognize that his comments are made in a societal context of which he is a part, and cannot be interpreted separately from that context. It is (or should be) well known that the history of women in the workplace is fraught with men commenting on women's bodies in an unprofessional if not outright sexual and harassing manner. In that context, there is simply no way for a man to randomly comment on the body of a woman he just met at a conference and claim that it's appropriate. He ought to recognize how it sounds, and that it understandably sounds much different to a woman than it does to a man.
> 3 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, gender
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# Question
Title: Does the act of neural-repair fire off neurons?
*Disclaimer: I'm not well educated in this field, just a random curious person. I don't know anything about neural repair save that it happens while we sleep.*

Anyways, the question is pretty simple: **Does neural repair result in firing neurons?**

Perhaps a damaged neuron being healed sometimes misfires, perhaps the little road workers that go around fixing neurons sometimes bump into things nearby and knock something loose, perhaps the processes of repairing leaves a bunch of neuro transmitters just floating in that area.. any of these could be a *reason for **yes***.

A *reason for **no*** might be "We've studied where brain repair occurs, and where neurons are firing and there is no relation."

Any solid speculation is nice too, as long as it's offered with a grain of salt.

I'm really just looking for something better than "no clue."

# Answer
Question: Does neural repair result in firing neurons?

This is a difficult question. Because a repair occurs when and where there is a damage. If there are abnormal firings of neurons, it will be difficult to sort out which one is the cause. It is also possible that both cause the firings.

However, there is no evidence that the majority of repairs, which are the repairs to maintain healthy cellular structure and functions and which occur ubiquitously all the time in the nervous system in the normal condition, cause abnormal neuronal firings. For example, there is no evidence that abnormal brain waves, seizure activities, or abnormal neurological symptoms occurr in normal people because of these normal repairs.

So, all that can be concluded for now is that the majority of repairs, which occur in the normal condition, do not cause abnormal neuronal firings.

For more, please refer to:

Martino, G., Pluchino, S., Bonfanti, L., & Schwartz, M. (2011). Brain regeneration in physiology and pathology: the immune signature driving therapeutic plasticity of neural stem cells. *Physiological reviews, 91*(4), 1281-1304. doi: 10.1152/physrev.00032.2010 pcmcid: PMC3552310
> 1 votes

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Tags: neuro-transmitters
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# Question
Title: Do children really show brand preference at age 2?
As I was reading a marketing textbook, I came across a paragraph that stated research has shown children as young as two can show brand preference (although I haven't yet searched for the source in the back of the book to check what research it's referring to.)

> Research shows that children evidence brand preferences at age two, and these preferences often last a lifetime. This knowledge prompted the licensing of the well-known Craftsman brand name to MGA Entertainment for its children's line of My First Craftsman toys and power tools and Time Inc.'s *Sports Illustrated Kids*

Marketing 12th Edition - Kerin Hartley Rudelius

Is it really the case that children are showing brand preference, preferring one brand over others when presented options, because of a specific affinity for that brand?

I'd be more inclined to believe that such children aren't showing a brand preference, but are simply not familiar with the other products. For instance, if I ask my son if he wants a Pop Tart or a Toaster Pastry, he's going to say Pop Tart because that's the term he knows. In such a case, it has more to do with how we've taught him about brands/foods, and not always distinguishing between them, then him showing a preference.

---

Sources cited by textbook:

Deborah Roedder John, "Consumer Socialization of Children: A Retrospective Look at Twenty-Five Years of Research," *Journal of Consumer Research*, December 1999, pp. 183-213.

Gwen Bachmann Achenreinver and Deborah Roudder John, "The Meaning of Brand Names to Children: A Developmental Investigation," *Journal of Consumer Psychology* 13, no. 3 (2003), pp. 205-19.

Elizabeth S. Moore, William L. Wilkie, and Richard J. Lutz, "Passing the Torch: Intergenerational Influences as a Source of Brand Equity," *Journal of Marketing*, April 2002, pp. 17-37.

# Answer
## Is it really the case that children are showing brand preference, preferring one brand over others when presented options, because of a specific affinity for that brand?

According to research, it does seem that way.

A longitudinal study of 20 years (Guest, 1964) found that brand preferences originally expressed during the ages of 7–18 correlated with brand usage reported 20 years later, with the average amount of agreement between 1941 preferences and 1961 use being 23%. Guest concluded that early childhood experiences exert considerable influence upon later brand purchasing behaviour.

## Your belief that such children aren't showing a brand preference, but are simply not familiar with the other products.

Ji (2002) whilst talking about the effects of brands such as Barbie and McDonalds on children, pointed out that parents, mass media and peers do play a part in it all:

> *Parents* are probably the most instrumental in teaching children basic rational aspects of consumption, such as satisfying basic consumer needs in the marketplace (Riesman, Glazer, & Denny, 1956), understanding price–quality relationships (Moore & Stephens, 1975), handling money wisely (Marshall & Magruder, 1960), and shopping for different qualities among products (Ward, Wackman, & Wartella, 1977). Although parents are considered the primary socialization agents of children, no other agent of consumer socialization has received more attention (in the literature) than the *mass media* (Moschis, 1987; John, 1999). Through massmedia, including both advertising and editorial/program content (O’Guinn & Shrum, 1997), children may learn about new brands and products (Goldberg, Gorn, & Gibson, 1978), how to use products and who uses them (Atkin, 1978), realities and beliefs about them (Gorn & Florsheim, 1985), and preferences for them (Gorn & Goldberg, 1977). *Peers* also have input to children’s consumer socialization process. Studies show that young people learn the symbolic meaning of goods or expressive elements of consumption from their peers (Moschis & Moore, 1982). In addition, peers play an important role in the development of children’s preference for stores (McNeal, 1964), products (Hawkins & Coney, 1974), brands of selected products (Moschis, Moore, & Stanley, 1983), and things to collect (Baker & Gentry, 1996).

The thing is, a great deal of people do stick with what they know, and you could say this is in part due to people's comfort zones. Whether this phenomenon is the cause of people favouring certain brands is open to opinion. What is definite is that 100s of billions of dollars in business expenditure is spent looking at how they can use leverage such as television advertising, product design and even packaging, to encourage people to buy their product (Scheybani, 2015; Quelch & Cannon-Bonventre, 1983; Spanier, 2018). As well as with children, this affects adult behaviour, which as pointed out by Ji (2002), is passed onto children who in turn influence their peers through peer pressures.

## Your title question: Do children really show brand preference at age 2?

Ji (2002) wrote (emphasis mine):

> **Why Study Children’s Relationships with Brands?**
> Studying the child–brand relationship phenomenon has its practical implications. First, children consume a wide range of products from the time they are born. For example, parents use J&J baby powder on their babies, feed them with Gerber baby food, and cover them with Huggies diapers. **At around age two, children begin to eat their first solid food, often cereal (Cole & Cole, 1996), and develop relationships with certain brands, such as Cheerios, that may last a lifetime.** As children grow older, they not only consume more brands such as McDonalds’ food and Barbie dolls through the purchases of their parents, but also begin to make purchases using their own income (McNeal, 1999). **In all, children consume a wide range of brands and these early experiences may serve as definite influences on their choices in adulthood (Guest, 1942).**

## References

Atkin, C. K. (1978). Effects of drug commercials on young viewers. *Journal of Communication*, 28, 71–79. DOI: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1978.tb01658.x

Baker, S. M., & Gentry, J. W. (1996). Kids as collectors: A phenomenological study of first and fifth grade. In K. P. Corfman & J. G. Lynch (Eds.), Advances in consumer research (Vol. 23, pp. 132–137). Minneapolis, MN: Association for Consumer Research.
Available at: http://acrwebsite.org/volumes/7928/volumes/v23/NA-23

Cole, M., & Cole, S. R. (1996). *The development of children (3rd ed.)*. New York: W. H. Freeman

Goldberg, M. E., Gorn, G. J., & Gibson, W. (1978). TV messages for snack and breakfast foods: do they influence children's preferences?. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 5(2), 73-81. DOI: 10.1086/208717

Gorn, G. J., & Florsheim, R. (1985). The effects of commercials for adult products on children. Journal of consumer research, 11(4), 962-967. DOI: 10.1086/209030 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Renee\_Florsheim/publication/24098404\_The\_Effects\_of\_Commercials\_for\_Adult\_Products\_on\_Children/links/5925cee3aca27295a8f054a7/The-Effects-of-Commercials-for-Adult-Products-on-Children.pdf

Gorn, G. J., & Goldberg, M. E. (1977). The impact of television advertising on children from low income families. Journal of Consumer Research, 4(2), 86-88. DOI: 10.1086/208683

Guest, L. P. (1942). The genesis of brand awareness. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 26(6), 800. DOI: 10.1037/h0055390

Guest, L. (1964). Brand loyalty revisited: A twenty-year report. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, 48(2), 93. DOI: 10.1037/h0046667

Hawkins, D., & Coney, K. (1974). Peer influences on children’s product pref- erences. *Journal of Academy of Marketing Science*, 2, 322–330. 10.1007/BF02722335

Ji, M. F. (2002). Children's relationships with brands:“True love” or “one‐night” stand?. *Psychology & Marketing*, 19(4), 369-387. DOI: 10.1002/mar.10015

John, D. R. (1999). Consumer socialization of children: A retrospective look at twenty-five years of research. *Journal of consumer research*, 26(3), 183-213. DOI: 10.1086/209559 PDF: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Deborah\_John/publication/24099029\_Consumer\_Socialization\_of\_Children\_A\_Retrospective\_Look\_At\_Twenty-Five\_Years\_of\_Research/links/02e7e52bb53593d1a7000000/Consumer-Socialization-of-Children-A-Retrospective-Look-At-Twenty-Five-Years-of-Research.pdf?origin=publication\_detail

Marshall, H. R., & Magruder, L. (1960). Relations between parent money education practices and children's knowledge and use of money. *Child Development*, 253-284. DOI: 10.2307/1125902

McNeal, J. U. (1964). *Children as Consumers, Marketing Study Series No. 9.* Austin, TX: Bureau of Business Research The University of Texas.

McNeal, J. U. (1999). *Kids market: Myths and realities.* Ithaca, NY: Paramount Market.

Moore, R., & Stephens, L. (1975). Some communication and demographic determinants of adolescent consumer learning. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 2, 80–92. DOI: 10.1086/208619

Moschis, G. P., & Moore, R. L. (1982). A longitudinal study of television advertising effects. *Journal of Consumer Research*, 9(3), 279-286. DOI: 10.1086/208923

Moschis, G., & Moore, R. L., & Stanley, T. (1983). An exploratory study of brand loyalty development. In T. Kinner (Ed.), Advances in consumer research (Vol.11, pp. 412–417). Chicago: Association for Consumer Research.
Available at: http://acrwebsite.org/volumes/6286/volumes/v11/NA-11

O'Guinn, T. C., & Shrum, L. J. (1997). The role of television in the construction of consumer reality. *Journal of consumer research*, 23(4), 278-294. DOI: 10.1086/209483 PDF: http://academic.csuohio.edu/kneuendorf/quillin/oguinn%20shrum%20role%20of%20television%20in%20construction%20reality%201997.pdf

Quelch, J., & Cannon-Bonventre, K. (1983). Better Marketing at the Point of Purchase. *Harvard Business Review* \[Online\]
Available at: https://hbr.org/1983/11/better-marketing-at-the-point-of-purchase

Riesman, D., Glazer, N., & Denny, R. (1956). *The lonely crowd: A study of the changing American character*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Scheybani, O. How advertising has become an agent of social change. *Medium* \[Online\]
Available at: https://medium.com/@moonstorming/how-advertising-has-become-an-agent-of-social-change-148aa0ef303a

Spanier, G. (2018). ITV, Channel 4 and Sky unite to champion TV advertising in face of online threat. *Campaign Live* \[Online\]
Available at: https://www.campaignlive.co.uk/article/itv-channel-4-sky-unite-champion-tv-advertising-face-online-threat/1456482

Ward, S., Wackman, D., & Wartella, E. (1977). *How children learn to buy: The development of consumer information processing skills*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, Inc.
> 3 votes

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Tags: psychology, neuromarketing
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# Question
Title: Why do we talk unconsciously while sleeping
Somniloquy is very fascinating.

It is unclear what are the causes, but most of the time it is not seen as a medical condition.

> "Sleep talking usually occurs by itself and is most often harmless. However, in some cases, it might be a sign of a more serious sleep disorder or health condition."
>
> http://www.webmd.com/sleep-disorders/excessive-sleepiness-10/talking-in-your-sleep

Here is a brief descriptive testimony of someone having this condition:

> This is what happened to me for about one year: almost every night, I talk unconsciously while sleeping (of course I don't know, but my room mate told me that). I dream almost every night and I consciously perceive that I'm dreaming, that I'm talking to someone, that what is happening in my dream.
>
> Why does this happen? Is it a kind of mental disorder? Is it because my brain is too active and I keep thinking too much about one thing, so that it keeps obsessing me, even in my dream?

In other words, I understand that Bringing dreams to conscious awareness is possible, but why are facial muscles sometimes activated when talking in dreams? Are there correlations with other types of sleep disorders?

# Answer
> 3 votes
Brief periods of sleep-talking (somniloquy), mostly gibberish, are quite common, particularly in children. It is not typically useful to call something a "disorder" unless it is causing a problem. Aside from disturbing others, sleep-talking is rarely problematic by itself, but in combination with other parasomnias (behaviours that indicate arousal during sleep) may be symptomatic of a more concerning sleep disorder.

Sleep-talking while dreaming is most often associated with REM sleep. However, note that not all sleep-talking happens while dreaming, and both dreaming and sleep-talking may also occur during transitions from non-REM sleep to waking state (partial arousal).

REM sleep normally involves a loss of voluntary muscle movement, referred to as REM sleep atonia, that prevents dreamers from physically interacting with their dreams:

> When the body shifts into REM sleep, motor neurons throughout the body undergo a process called hyperpolarization: their already-negative membrane potential decreases by another 2–10 millivolts, thereby raising the threshold which a stimulus must overcome to excite them. Muscle inhibition may result from unavailability of monoamine neurotransmitters (restraining the abundance of acetylcholine in the brainstem) and perhaps from mechanisms used in waking muscle inhibition.

The process involved with REM sleep motor inhibition is complex and not fully understood, but presumably, a deviation from or malfunction in this process may result in temporary partial loss of atonia, or partial arousal during non-REM sleep, that can trigger sleep-talking. Causes of such anomalies include medication, alcohol and drugs, illness, genetics, mental disorders, and stress. Of course, partial arousal can also be triggered by external stimuli.

When associated with more complete loss of atonia, and occurring nightly or even multiple times a night, sleep-talking while dreaming is a common symptom of RBD, a sleep disorder in which patients act out their dreams. As RBD is itself potentially a symptom of a degenerative neurological disorder, significant chronic loss of atonia, including vivid sleep-talking, particularly in the elderly, would be more concerning than sleep-talking on its own.

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Tags: consciousness, sleep, dreams, unconscious
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# Question
Title: Do pictures help young children read (understand meaning) better or does it give them a delayed sense of imagination when decoding information?
I have started to read a book called "Vexed Texts: How Children's Picture Books Promote Illiteracy" by Pamela Protheroe and her belief is that images promotes illiteracy. There seems far too much evidence that pictures books aid children in a vast amount of ways.

But, it did make me wonder on children's dependency of what they see in comparison to what they imagine. My investigation is to find out children's understanding of the words and what they see internally without the visual cues.

# Answer
> 1 votes
I wrote Vexed Texts a long time ago. Since then I have asked the same question and found no research on it, so I did my own research as my doctoral thesis. You can find the results if you want to in my published thesis (I received my PhD from Victoria University in Wellington New Zealand). The title is: The Effect of Illustrations on the Ability of Children to Draw Inferences while reading Narrative Texts.

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Tags: learning, language, communication, linguistics, visualization
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# Question
Title: Do we know a priori any rules about the world?
**1) Is there any set of rules that human beings or, more generally, other sentient living beings know a priori before any learning process? In other words, do sentient living beings always were born knowing some causal relations about the world?**

For instance, a newborn baby may not know that walking from a high place in direction of an edge may result on him falling due to gravity. Maybe he doesn't even know that he can move its arms and he only learns that after performing fortuitously an impulse that generates such action. Maybe he doesn't even know that he must breath in order to survive and he only learns that after feeling the discomfort and pain caused by the lack of oxygen.

As a disclaimer, I'm excluding here tautological logical syllogisms such as the principle of non contradiction and other axioms of logic. I'm also excluding here any synthetic a priori knowledge that can be derived from these (if you believe in synthetic a priori).

**2) In the positive case, how complex can these causal relations be (maybe a measure or an undeniably remarkable complex a priori knowledge)?**

I'm particularly interested in a priori knowledge about normative judgements mainly related to social mores.

# Answer
This is a pretty popular research topic! One good place to start might be with the work of Spelke, she's all over this. Try this: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nNq\_a\_wgdgQ

If you prefer written words, this paper is a nice broad overview, although note the 2007 publishing date, there's been a fair bit of work since then. Spelke, Elizabeth S., and Katherine D. Kinzler. "Core knowledge." Developmental science 10.1 (2007): 89-96.
> 4 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, neuroscience, learning, behavior
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# Question
Title: Question concerning Jeff Hawkins' On Intelligence
In 2004 Jeff Hawkins' book On Intelligence was widely praised. But Hawkins made some claims about artificial neural networks that seem (to me) untenable today, only 13 years later. He gives the impression that artificial neural networks are in principle not capable of what he calls invariant representations and hierarchical storage of patterns (p. 70 ff).

My questions are:

* Did he just not (fore)see the development of deep learning which started off at the latest in 2005 (see History of deep learning) and which includes both invariant and hierarchical representations?
* Or are his retentions against artifical neural networks (including deep learning) justified, and the invariant and hierarchical representations of deep learning are uncompetitive to those of biological networks, i.e. the neocortex? In which respect, then?

---

About invariant and hierarchical representations (in my words and understanding):

* An invariant representation - e.g. of a face - is one, that is independent of and thus invariant with respect to contingent aspects of the image of the face having to do with distance, viewing angle, lighting conditions and the like.
* It is the representation in the highest layer of a hierarchy of representations with local geometric features being represented in the lowest layer.

This describes superficially both deep learning and cortical architectures. But maybe there are details of implementation/realisation that make the one significantly and genuinely more efficient than the other, e.g. cortical columns which seem not to be present in deep learning architectures, do they?

# Answer
# Summary

I think Hawkins' terminology tends to be not as precise as it should be. I guess that's the root cause of this question as well.

The impression that Hawkins says computers or neural networks will never be able to perform certain tasks which are routine for the human brain may be due to his lack of precision.

# Details

You write (in a comment):

> I have the impression, that he sees computers and ANNs as somehow the same.

That's not my impression1, so I'll answer two questions:

1. Regarding Hawkins' statements about artificial neural networks
2. Regarding Hawkins' statements about "computers"

## Regarding Hawkins' statements about artificial neural networks

In chapter 2, "Neural Networks", pp. 23-39, Hawkins talks about a certain kind of artificial neural networks (mainly pp. 24-29).

He's mostly talking about very simple ANNs. See p. 25:

> Most neural networks consisted of a small number of neurons connected in three rows.

It is true that there are a lot of tasks that such simple ANNs can't do (or can't do well), but of course that's not true for more complex ANNs. I think the problem here is that Hawkins' doesn't always make this distinction clear enough, although he says on p. 28:

> I don't want to leave you with the impression that all neural networks are of the simple three-layer variety. Some researchers have continued to study neural networks of different designs. Today the term neural network is used to describe a diverse set of models, some of which are more biologically accurate and some of which are not.

Maybe the following quote on p. 32 could be interpreted such that he actually *did* foresee some developments after 2004:

> In recent years, belief in the importance of feedback, time, and prediction has been on the rise. But the thunder of AI and classical neural networks kept other approaches subdued and underappreciated for many years.

## Regarding Hawkins' statements about "computers"

In chapter 4, "Memory", pp. 65-84, (which contains p. 70ff you mentioned) he does *not* talk about artificial neural networks, but about "computers". He doesn't specify exactly what he means, but I guess it's roughly "machines that work mostly like current computers".

On p. 67, he says that even "the largest parallel computer imaginable can't solve" certain tasks that the brain can solve. I think that's wrong, but since it's not quite clear what he means by "computer", I'm not sure.

## Conclusion

Some or most of Hawkins' claims may be correct, but that depends on what he means by "computers" or "neural networks", and he doesn't always make that clear.

### Footnotes

1 For example, this quote on p. 24 seems to imply that he does see a difference:

> A neural network is unlike a computer in that it has no CPU and doesn't store information in a centralized memory.
> 2 votes

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Tags: cognitive-neuroscience, theoretical-neuroscience, neural-network, artificial-intelligence
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# Question
Title: How to report a quasi-experiment in APA?
As one reads the psychology literature (e.g. social psychology), it seems to me, and I hope I'm not wrong, that such a discipline is highly dependent on quasi experiments (correct me if I'm wrong please).

Yet, one is most likely to read "we carried out the experiment/study with N participants... etc.", and never "we carried out the quasi-experiment with N participants... etc.".

The idea is, there seems to be systematic avoidance of declaring the name of the design. One has to use a kind of induction from experience to discover the design procedure.

My questions:

1 - Why?... I'm a naive undergraduate and I need to know what is the design in a clear and declarative manner that doesn't confuse me.

2 - What is the official reporting procedure for reporting quasi experiments in APA (if such a procedure exists)?... Do I need to report the details of the design? and if so, how much details?

# Answer
> 4 votes
The distinction between experiment and quasi-experiment is often made in undergraduate psychology courses.

In general, the term quasi-experiment is used to identify studies that fall short of a controlled experiment in some respect: e.g., pre-existing groups; allocation of participants to groups in a non-random way. In some cases, repeated measures experiments are labelled as quasi-experimental especially if they confound order with condition, especially simple pre-post designs.

The purpose of the term "quasi-experimental" is to highlight that there are potential confounds to causal inference that would not be present in a controlled experiment (e.g., time effects, pre-existing group differences, etc.).

However, more generally, an experiment typically refers to doing something in the world and observing the effect. In this sense, experiments are also sometimes distinguished from purely observational studies.

So in general, researchers should generally not use term "experiment" to describe an observational study. However, "quasi-experiments" can be labelled experiments.

So to come back to your question: how do you know whether a study is an experiment or a quasi-experiment? You have to read about the design and see whether the conditions for a controlled experiment are satisfied.

In general, as you progress in your psychology education, you may find that you use more nuanced descriptions of studies than simply "quasi-experimental". For example, you might describe a study as a simple pre-post repeated measures design. Or you might say that it compared a treatment and control group using pre-existing groups. The point is that these descriptions are more informative than simply saying "quasi-experimental".

In terms of reporting procedures for quasi-experiments in APA style, I think as above, this question does not entirely make sense. There are a variety of different types of quasi-experiments. For each type, there would be common things to report. For example, in simply describing your design, you will say what are between and within subjects factors and how participants were allocated or not allocated to groups.

You might find these APA reporting standards useful: "Reporting Standards for Research in Psychology" https://www.apa.org/pubs/authors/jars.pdf

This APA Task Force article also describes many of these issues quite clearly around how to report methods: Wilkinson (1999) https://www.apa.org/pubs/journals/releases/amp-54-8-594.pdf

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Tags: methodology, experiment-design, publication, apa-style
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# Question
Title: Can you get sad by sniffing onions, just like you can get happy by forcing yourself to smile?
I've read about a study where they found that people who were forced to keep a smile-like face were reportedly happier than those who were forced to stay in a frown-like a face. Similarly, could onions induce sadness by forcing one to cry?

# Answer
I assume you're referring to the experiment by Strack, Martin, and Stepper (1988) in which people rated a cartoon as funnier when they had to hold their face in a smile shape by gripping a pencil in their teeth.

This has been applied to negative affect by Larsen, Kasimatis, and Frey (1992) who had participants furrow their brows during an activity. Golf tees were attached to their eyebrows such that furrowing the brow caused the tips of the tees to touch together. Participants showed more negative emotion in the brow furrowing condition (in which they were instructed to keep the tips of the tees touching).

Both studies, however, hypothesize that the effects are due to facial expression, specifically, to sensations of activating the muscles associated with positive or negative emotions. In the onion paradigm that you propose, it is unclear which (if any) emotion-relevant muscle activations would happen in conjunction with eye irritation.

Nobody that I know of has studied whether eye irritation or production of tears (independent of the accompanying facial expressions associated with sadness) will lead to an increase in sadness.

A competing theory might be that since crying can be cathartic, tear production might make people feel better rather than worse. However the research support for crying and catharsis is mixed and depends heavily on the context of the crying (Bylsma, Vingerhoets, & Rottenberg, 2008).

**References**
Strack *et al*., J Personality Social Psych (1998); **54**(5): 768-7

Larsen *et al*., Cognition and emotion (1992); **6**(5): 321-338

Bylsma *et al*., J Social and Clinical Psych (2008), **27**(10): 1165-1187
> 8 votes

# Answer
**Short answer**
No

**Background**
Onions produce the irritant *syn-propanethial-S-oxide*. It stimulates the eyes' lachrymal glands and thereby stimulate the release tears (source: Library of Congress). The watering of the eye is hence the consequence of a physical irritant and has nothing to do with emotions whatsoever.

Anecdotally spoken, chopping onions agitates me more than it makes me sad, as I can't see what I'm doing through the tears while I'm hungry :)
> 2 votes

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Tags: cognitive-neuroscience, emotion, neurophysiology, physiology
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# Question
Title: Is there any evidence that fluid intelligence is malleable?
So although working memory training was somewhat of a fad (and I guess some benefits did come out of training, like improved attention/executive function), reviews such as Melby-Lervåg et al. (2016) show that even though WMC changes, fluid intelligence does not through WM training.

I'm wondering if there's any evidence out there that fluid intelligence can change. If so, are there any proven interventions that can change fluid intelligence; or are we still looking for those interventions with the trust that something will prove successful in terms of fluid intelligence improvement?

<sub> Melby-Lervåg, M., Redick, T. S., & Hulme, C. (2016). Working memory training does not improve performance on measures of intelligence or other measures of “far transfer” evidence from a meta-analytic review. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 11(4), 512-534. \[PDF\] </sub>

# Answer
> 10 votes
> Is there any evidence of malleability of fluid intelligence?

### **In the downward direction, definitely yes.**

There are many ways you can directly pull fluid intelligence downwards. Things like being exposed to much lead, suffering from iodine deficiency (especially a developing fetus during pregnancy, see e.g. (Qian et al, 2005)), or by not getting decent nutrition. Anything that interferes with a healthy development of the brain might be implicated in intelligence. Similarly, you could presumably push intelligence downward by directly harming the brain (Brain lesions, anyone?). Fluid intelligence also lowers with ageing (Whitley et al, 2016), and so anything that slows down the ageing process may also have an effect.

Next, let's consider the more interesting question:

> Besides avoiding decreases in fluid intelligence, can we push it up?

### **There does not seem to be a reliable way of increasing intelligence known (as of yet), perhaps except for one.**

Here we have to turn to Richard Haier, the editor-in-chief of the journal *Intelligence*, as he has written extensively on this topic. Perhaps disappointingly, we refer to his article *Increased Intelligence is a Myth (So Far)*. The title says it all. He goes into details with the difficulties of establishing increased intelligence. You need to show that you're not just raising test scores, but actually something that transfers over to general intelligence. He also goes into further detail regarding the topic of increasing intelligence in his book *The Neuroscience of Intelligence*.

To truly appreciate the difficulty of increasing intelligence, you really need to understand the history of methods being suggested. This also helps you develop a healthy amount of scepticism -- you should not believe any method without a substantial amount of evidence backing it up. What has been suggested to increase intelligence? First, the Mozart effect. Meta-analyses show no convincing effect especially when you consider the evidence of publication bias (Pietschnig et al, 2010). The second craze was memory training as you've already noted. Again, not convincing (Melby-Lervåg et al, 2016). Similarly, chess training has been suggested as a way of improving intelligence, but the results are not great (Sala & Gobet, 2017). Now the craze is video games, although it suffers from many of the same methodological issues: (very) small sample sizes, and probably publication bias.

While people can cite all kinds of studies showing increases in intelligence, the real question is really whether these can withstand hard scientific scrutiny.

It is likely not impossible to raise intelligence. Haier suggests some plausible ways of increasing intelligence in his book, but no massive evidence yet. Currently there does not seem to be a very convincing way of increasing intelligence...

### **...Perhaps except for one way?**

Education has been suggested as a candidate for improving intelligence. There is a question whether education really increases general intelligence or just specific skills (Ritchie, Bates, Deary, 2015), but currently education is the best bet (Ritchie & Tucker-Drob, Preprint 2017). Ritchie and Tucker-Drob report the following:

> *Education appears to be the most consistent, robust, and durable method yet to be identified for raising intelligence.*

However, even here we should withhold some scepticism. First, it may simply be increases of specific skills. Secondly, the fadeout effect is pervasive in psychological research of intelligence. Intelligence increases do not seem to last. For example, massive programs such as Head Start showed some initial increases in intelligence measurements, but this boost eventually fades out (Protzko, 2015).

Like Head Start, other programs have been created with the purpose of increasing school performance. For example, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation program *Gates Effective Teaching Initiative* did not see the benefits it hoped.

It might also be hypothesized that expensive private schools would improve the intelligence of the pupils (beyond regular schools). It is well known that pupils of these private schools show higher average scores, but the question is: is it because of the schools? These schools are also highly selective; the pupils attending these expensive private schools are not representative of the general population. This has been tested in at least one large sample. They found that after controlling for factors involved in prior pupil selection, there remained no statistical difference (Smith-Woolley,..., Kovas, Plomin, 2018). In other words, they found that expensive private schools did not demonstrate improvements in intelligence beyond what ordinary schools did.

In fact, all of this goes back to Arthur Jensen's infamous 1969 paper *How Much Can We Boost IQ and Scholastic Achievement*, which made intelligence research controversial if it wasn't already. He concluded already back then that teaching intervention did not show noticeable improvements. Jensen's opening line in his long paper:

> *Compensatory education has been tried and it apparently has failed.*

So currently, *if* education can increase intelligence it does not appear to be through teaching intervention, but simply through longer education.

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## **Summary**

* Many methods for increasing intelligence have been suggested. They tend to not withstand proper scientific scrutiny.
* Therefore, it is important to have some healthy scepticism to suggested methods, and accept them only when a high evidential threshold has been reached.
* Currently, the most backed up way of increasing intelligence is through longer education. However, even here it is not certain, and more research is needed to understand the relationship between education and intelligence.

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Tags: intelligence, working-memory, iq
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