# Question
Title: Are there studies on the evasion of characterization?
Sometimes I see people that perform some kind of activity, which could entitle something to them and when the entitlement is made, they refuse being called that way - they prefer to avoid characterization or to characterize themselves with a new word that does not carry the (usually) pejorative meaning of the previous one and that, in their opinion, better characterize their activity.

Although I speculate some answers for why this phenomena happens, like for example: We may want to perform such activity without the effects of the stigma. I don't know if it's certain nor know what is the full extent of the study of such phenomena (perhaps there are a lot more things than I couldn't think about).

# Answer
> 2 votes
Its a kind of non-conformity. Its caused by desires for uniqueness. It can be treated if it becomes abnormal or interferes with life or the lives of those who love.

> Conformity is the act of matching attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors to group norms. Norms are implicit, unsaid rules, shared by a group of individuals, that guide their interactions with others. This tendency to conform occurs in small groups and/or society as a whole, and may result from subtle unconscious influences, or direct and overt social pressure. Conformity can occur in the presence of others, or when an individual is alone. For example, people tend to follow social norms when eating or watching television, even when alone.

-Wikipedia Conformity

> A high need for uniqueness undermines majority influence. Need for uniqueness (a) is a psychological state in which individuals feel indistinguishable from others and (b) motivates compensatory acts to reestablish a sense of uniqueness. Three studies demonstrate that a strive for uniqueness motivates individuals to resist majority influence. In Study 1, the need for uniqueness was measured, and it was found that individuals high in need for uniqueness yielded less to majority influence than those low in need for uniqueness. In Study 2, participants who received personality feedback undermining their feeling of uniqueness agreed less with a majority (vs. minority) position. Study 3 replicated this effect and additionally demonstrated the motivational nature of the assumed mechanism: An alternative means that allowed participants to regain a feeling of uniqueness canceled out the effect of high need for uniqueness on majority influence.

-What Motivates Nonconformity? Uniqueness Seeking Blocks Majority Influence

# Answer
> 1 votes
Not sure which particular study to point you toward (there are probably plenty out there on variously related topics), but to me, it seems pretty unremarkable that people seek to avoid pejorative characterizations. Then again, it's pretty remarkable **how far we'll go** to do this! We're social animals with a lot riding on our reputations, hence we're quite sensitive to others evaluations of us, and we're generally eager to please, or at least to be respected. Individual differences in these concerns exist in big ways though, as should surprise no one who's heard anything good about personality psychology lately.

Consider checking out the literature on *self-monitoring*. It's a well-studied individual difference in the tendency to alter one's self-presentation to please others, or at least control others impressions of oneself, basically (it's actually a somewhat complex construct, or two or three, depending on how you measure it). **Low self-monitors** tend to act how they act without worrying too much about it, about who might be watching, or about what others might think about them. (Come to think of it, one might even call low self-monitoring a characteristic resistance to social psychological phenomena in general! There's a hypothesis worth testing...but don't quote me on it until you do!) Conversely, **high self-monitors** make good actors / actresses: they know who's watching, how they look in front of "the camera," and they know how to please their audiences (or, at least, they think they do; it's often measured by self-report). **\[Edit\]:** Just in case it's unclear, I've described the meanings of "high" and "low" scores on a continuous dimension (or maybe two or three) of individual differences here; real people can be anywhere in-between too, or maybe even more extreme.

Self-monitoring might not be exactly what you're talking about—it's a characteristic adaptation to a pretty broad range of social situations—but I bet you could predict exactly what you're talking about with a nontrivial degree of accuracy using self-report questionnaire scores on self-monitoring.

P.S. Whenever I mention self-monitoring, I can't resist adding that I'm a former research assistant of the guy who came up with it. It entitles me to add that Mark Snyder is an awesome psychologist in general!

---
Tags: social-psychology
---


# Question
Title: What is the current state of SAD treatment according to research?
Seasonal Affective disorder SAD affects many people moods during seasons when the sun is less prevalent, myself no included. What is the current state of SAD treatment options according to published research?

# Answer
> 2 votes
Coming from the North, I'm most familiar with light treatments, where patients get on a regular schedule exposing themselves to a bright light every day. Folklore in the North is that it needs to have high reds and blues like the spectrum of the sun; I haven't read the papers in detail, so I don't know if that's true, but light therapy has been effective in small trials:

Preliminary studies in 11 patients suggest that extending the photoperiod with bright artificial light has an antidepressant effect.

Both morning and evening light therapy improved depressive symptoms in patients (of 30) with SAD independent of their circadian phase or sleep timing.

Several patients (of 13) were able to maintain the antidepressant response throughout the winter months by continuing daily light treatments.

---
Tags: abnormal-psychology, psychiatry
---


# Question
Title: Bias in which you judge others by what you are good at?
Motivated by this question about programming and intelligence, I've noticed that people often judge other people's competence in terms of how well they perform on the domains that they have more expertise. A few examples:

* I'm a good programmer. This manager can't program.
* I'm a good manager. This programmer doesn't know how to lead others.
* I'm a good statistician. This applied researcher knows so little about statistics.
* I'm a good applied researcher. this statistician knows so little about the substantive problems in this research context.

In particular, while such claims may be factual statements. The bias occurs when a person's overall competence is evaluated relative to your own standards of expertise, rather than what is objectively important for the other person.

**Does this bias of evaluating others competence by your own areas of expertise have a formal name?**

# Answer
> 2 votes
I think its Professional Ethnocentrism. That is the professional culture of the programmer promoting itself automatically above the culture of the manager and likewise. Judging and comparison is a major problem in all ethnocentric behaviors.

> Ethnocentrism is judging another culture solely by the values and standards of one's own culture. Ethnocentric individuals judge other groups relative to their own ethnic group or culture, especially with concern for language, behavior, customs, and religion. These ethnic distinctions and subdivisions serve to define each ethnicity's unique cultural identity. Ethnocentrism may be overt or subtle, and while it is considered a natural proclivity of human psychology, it has developed a generally negative connotation.
>
> ..."the technical name for the view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it."...

-Wikipedia Ethonocentrism

---
Tags: cognitive-psychology, terminology, bias
---


# Question
Title: Is it truly necessary to upgrade Tononi's criteria of consciousness in the Integrated Information theory?
I am referring specifically to a very recent paper by Max Tegmark. In this paper he proposes 3 more criteria (independence, dynamics, and utility principle) in addition to Tononi's original criteria (information and integration).

I have seen the paper being discussed in Hacker News, reddit's r/neurophilosophy, and lesswrong, but I think they are mostly light jabs on the actual content of Tegmark's proposal.

# Answer
Yes in science all things are constantly upgraded. My main concern is that Tegmark's level of specificity has not been validated through peer review so it may be faulty and not suitable to build future theories.

As Rex Kerr points out in examining Tononi's general criteria I'd consider Tegmark's criteria more specific expositions rather than purely novel information. Further specification beyond Tegmark's work seems to be necessary to define consciousness beyond primary like metacognition.

I don't see how a group of conscious individuals like a society having a collective consciousness by sharing information and integrating it into commonality like works of governance, science and art are differentiated from a conscious individual by either Tononi's or Tegmark's current level of specificity.

Edelman, G. M., Tononi, G. (2000). A Universe of Consciousness: How Matter Becomes Imagination. New York: Basic Books
> 3 votes

---
Tags: consciousness, neural-network
---


# Question
Title: Is there evidence that "people in Eastern societies are more in touch with their communities while Western societies value uniqueness more"?
In a lecture, a prof claimed that in Western societies, people tend to value independence and uniqueness, whereas Eastern cultures tend to value helping each other and living harmoniously. In a nutshell, people in Eastern cultures think of the community more than themselves, whereas in Western cultures people tend to think about what makes themselves unique.

Are there any studies that relate to these claims?

# Answer
While I can't, and won't make any comment on the accusations of racism (I think the comments below your question answer that quite well), the Western/Analytic vs. Eastern/Holistic dichotomy is pretty well established and supported by studies in cognitive and social psychological literatures.

This may be a little different to what you had in mind, as your question is more about social notions like 'valuing independence' versus 'coexisting in harmony', which are harder to empirically demonstrate (I'm not a social psychologist). What I'm referring to here is more like 'logic, rules, and working details out step by step' versus 'taking everything into account, and seeing the bigger picture'.

However, the idea is a bit more complicated than what I'm able to explain in a few sentences. Nisbett et al's (2001) review (free preprint copy here) is the Rolls-Royce of reviews when it comes to this, and that paper will address most of the questions you might have (note the racial diversity of the authors). You can also find more work by the same authors here.

## References

(just the one)

Nisbett, R. E., Peng, K., Choi, I., & Norenzayan, A. (2001). Culture and systems of thought: holistic versus analytic cognition. Psychological review, 108(2), 291.
> 3 votes

# Answer
The difference between collectivistic and individualistic cultures is one of the recurring topics in introductory lectures in Social Psychology, I-O Psychology and related fields.

The most widely cited book on culture is *Cultures and organizations: Software of the mind* by Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov (2010), originally published by Hofstede and Hofstede in 1991. In addition, here are two basic and popular publications on the topic, available online:

There's more, of course, but these and the references in Hofstede et al. will keep you busy for years.
> 2 votes

---
Tags: social-psychology, personality, cross-cultural-psychology
---


title: Is paraphilia a disorder?

text:
# Question
Title: Is paraphilia a disorder?
There has been some confusion in recent questions about the term paraphilia. In most questions and answers, including my own, paraphilias have been seen as disorders that might require treatment.

But are paraphilias disorders?

# Answer
The DSM-5 does not list all paraphilia as a disorder! According to the DSM-5,

> The term **paraphilia** denotes any intense and persistent sexual interest other than sexual interest in genital stimulationor preparatory fondling with phenotypically normal, physically mature, consenting human partners.

What the DSM-5 does list are paraphilic disorders:

> A **paraphilic disorder** is a paraphilia that is currently causing distress or impairment to the individual or a paraphilia whose satisfaction has entailed personal harm, or risk of harm, to others. A paraphilia is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for having a paraphilic disorder, and a paraphilia b itself does not necessarily justify or require clinical intervention.
>
> In the diagnostic criteria set for each of the listed paraphilic disorders, Criterion A specifies the qualitative nature of the paraphilia (e.g., an erotic focus on children or on exposing the genitals to strangers), and Criterion B specifies the negative consequences of the paraphilia (e.g. distress, impairment, or harm to others). In keeping with the distinction between paraphilias and paraphilic disorders, the term *diagnosis* should be reserved for individuals who meet both Criteria A and B.
> 9 votes

---
Tags: sexuality, clinical-psychology
---


# Question
Title: How to ethically research the effect of expert lies on lay people
I'm conducting a study about the effects of a verbally administered placebo.

The actual setting and intervention are different from the example I give here, but similar enough that the example may serve as a basis for discussion.

In the study, a team of psychologists running a local practice offers a new experimental service. The psychologists have developed a diagnostic tool that allows them to predict with surprising accuracy if a single person will fall in love within the upcoming four weeks. To further test and refine this diagnostic tool they now offer a public service after having tested it on a small sample of students. So they invite local residents to their practice to be tested through an advertisement and offer them a free diagnosis, whether or not they will fall in love within the next two weeks. The participants are told that the diagnostic tool for this prognosis is being evaluated in its predictive power and that they should report back after four weeks and tell the researchers if they had fallen in love or not.

Of course there is no diagnostic tool. The psychologists believe that they are being perceived as experts by the laypeople, and that if they make such a prediction after some impressive psychological examination, this prediction will *cause* people to fall in love, if without this intervention they would not have, or remain "out of love", if they had fallen in love.

Obviously, the researchers do not want to give negative (not fall in love) prognoses, because they do not want anyone to refuse and miss out on an "offer" they would have been happy about. (They do not believe that they will cause people to fall in love with unsuitable suitors and cause grief, only that participants with a will-fall-in-love prognosis will react more benevolently and accepting to offers they receive.) And, in the absence of negative prognoses, the researchers will need a control group that receives no prediction, but still reports back after two weeks.

The psychologists do not know how to set up this experiment so that they can give positive (fall in love) diagnoses or no diagnosis to random participants, without raising suspicion. Some of the patients will obviously know each other and talk about this experimental "service", and they will notice that they know no one with a negative diagnosis. That would seem odd to them. Also the reason to not give a diagnosis to many participants must be valid without raising doubt regarding the validity of the prognoses that were given.

**What would you tell your participants to allay their doubts over the absence of negative prognoses?** And how would you explain that often you do not give a prognosis, without invalidating the prognoses you give?

---

**Note**

Since the ethic concerns are being pushed to the forefront of the discussion, I have edited my question to include an example that more closely resembles the real research. Yet, I want to repeat that **this is an example only**, so please don't get hung up on the specifics of falling in love. The real study includes psychologists and a behavior prediction, but not about falling in love. Similar research has been done in a laboratory setting, the difference is I want to do it out "in the field".

If you are worried about psychologists lying to their participants, you need to understand that cover stories are a common method in psychological research. They are in fact so very common, that it is easier to list instances where cover stories are *not* used: only if the knowledge of the purpose of the study cannot falsify the results are participants told in advance what is being studied and how. In all other cases the researchers lie to the participants and debrief them after the experient.

Of course, if there is any danger that this lie would have lasting or strong negative effects, such research will not be conducted.

You can safely assume that

* participants will be informed that they are taking part in an experiment and asked to give their consent (this is easily part of the cover story, as it allows to not give a prognosis to some of the participants)
* participants will be debriefed by a trained psychologist
* participants will be given contact information and told to contact a team member when they observe any kind of effect at all, positive or negative (since we want to measure these effects, this is easily part of the cover story)
* an ethics commitee of our university will evaluate the study design

Since similar "lies" have been told to participants of other experiments before, I am quite confident that this study will be approved by our ethics committee also. Here is an example of a study where the researchers lied to the participants about their sleep quality: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/24417326

There are also many examples of research, where researchers actually induce negative (i.e. unwanted by the participants) effects in their participants. A recent example is experimentally lowering self-esteem: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165178113007774.

# Answer
### Scientific perspective

From a design perspective, it would not be difficult to set out a design where participants did not know each other or did not know each other well enough to deduce that the information was false. You could also include a manipulation check that probed participants at the conclusion of the study about the degree to which they believed the diagnosis provided, and filter out participants who doubted the validity of the diagnosis.

### Ethical perspective

The more fundamental question is whether the study is ethical to run. It violates several basic ethical principles:

* There is no informed consent at least at time of initial participation.
* It may cause harm to people who rely on the information about their health
* It may also bring the medical profession or medical research into disrepute

Of course, in some cases you can justify lack of consent. In particular, you need to look at the risks and potential harm and weigh that against the potential social benefits. On the face of it, I doubt the study as described would meet requirements for ethics approval.
> 4 votes

---
Tags: experimental-psychology
---


# Question
Title: Would a teacher benefit from reading psychology journals?
I am currently volunteering as a teacher to low income families.

I have had no training on teaching. I am working for a B.S. in chemistry and mathematics. Furthermore, I am quite new at this. I would like to improve how I teach, and somewhat believe that understanding how someone learns would help me become a better teacher.

I am currently taking a year off. Since I am no longer enrolled, I no longer have access to a library, journals, etc. Nevertheless, I would like to continue teaching and I am wondering what your opinion is on enrolling on a membership on a psychology journal, getting books, etc. So far I have narrowed my options down to the journal of applied psychology and the journal of learning, memory, and cognition.

What would you suggest?

# Answer
> 4 votes
If you don't have a decent amount of education in psychology already, I wouldn't recommend diving straight into journals...but I wouldn't recommend you don't either. If you want to check them out, I'd say the only harm is the cost and the chance of getting discouraged, so first of all, I'd recommend this: don't get discouraged! You're on the right track. The best teachers are those who still spend plenty of time learning (if only to keep up with their fields), IMO. Educational psychology ("ed psych") is a deep subject—as deep or deeper than many, if not most. In my limited experience as a higher ed educator, I'd say I've learned more about teaching through experience than through what meager training I've been offered, and colleagues of mine who have sought more training haven't had good things to say about their programs...so I'd say you're not necessarily missing much for lack of training, relative to most of us, if you've got a good head on your shoulders, good communication skills, a professional attitude, plenty of respect and tolerance for the circumstances and shortcomings of others, and have paid attention to the teaching styles you admire in your own time as a student. To some extent, training programs mostly teach the basics of these qualities, and can't teach much more. However, I also have a colleague in an ed psych program, and judging from what I've heard from her (I admit I don't have any other real exposure to ed psych on which to base my opinion), I think we've all got plenty more to learn that they won't teach you in the average teacher training program anyway. Therefore I applaud your ambition for self-education, and certainly don't want to steer you away from going straight to the source. I hope I've already disillusioned you somewhat regarding the training you're lacking; it's important for maintaining minimal standards, but in my experience, it hasn't offered much guidance for growth beyond that. If you don't have any particular shortcomings that need ironing out—if you're already a halfway decent teacher—you're probably better off skipping the watered-down, "common-sense" sort of educational psychology you'd get from people who specialize in other things, and who are only teaching how to teach because it's a job they could get.

I would, however, recommend testing the waters of those journals you're thinking of diving into before shelling out the subscription fees. Some journals can be quite dense and advanced reading without a proper introduction (especially cognitive psychology articles, in my experience). This isn't to say you can't hack it, but you may find a lot of articles referring to concepts that are introduced in other articles (or worse, books!) that you can't access for free except through your university, which might also require inter-library loaning (you might not be able to do that without being enrolled, but you should at least be able to get access to some journals by visiting an on-campus library). This becomes quite a lot of legwork, so don't dive in unless you're ready to swim the equivalent of the English Channel. Try looking for free articles from these journals you're interested in (e.g., the links on the right that you can access through a Google Scholar search for "Journal of Applied Psychology"), see how comfortable you are with reading them, and see how far you can follow the reference lists whenever you come across an interesting idea that you'd like to know more about. If you can make a go of it and be happy with what you get out of it, if you're not happy with what you can already access for free by means like Google Scholar or your university, and if you're willing to pay the price of subscription, I don't see any further reason to dissuade you!

Regardless (or *especially* if these journals don't work out for you), I'd also recommend checking out more introductory literature on ed psych. The thing about journal articles (in case you don't already know this; forgive me if I'm getting pedantic) is that their authors often write to a fairly advanced research audience, so it's not exactly like learning to swim in the shallow end, where most inexperienced students would probably be better off starting. Some books are like this too of course, but it seems to me that most books in psychology are less afraid to belabor their points and more keen on appealing to a more general audience. Especially when setting the average book aside and looking directly to introductory books and textbooks, you can expect to find the process of learning the foundational theories of most domains a lot easier, and probably more efficient; again, I haven't tried doing this with ed psych texts myself, but I'd assume the same is true of this domain as it is of others. In general, the advantage of intro text/books is not just that they're directed at more general audiences; they'll also usually take a much broader overview of the field as a whole. You might have to do a LOT more reading to get the same breadth out of journal articles as you could out of an intro text/book. You'd probably get a much deeper exposure through journals, but if your time is short enough as is, you're probably more concerned with covering all the fundamentals than with sharpening your knowledge on any specific subject, let alone all of them, by yourself!

If you're sold on the idea of checking out intro text/books, you don't actually have to *buy* anything necessarily. For instance, check out this list of free e-books on ed psych that I just found. To make sure I wasn't tossing you a red herring, I went ahead and downloaded Seifert and Sutton's (2009) **Educational Psychology** for myself, for free; it looks fairly solid to me at first glance. In any case, it's not your only free option on this list alone, and with a little extra effort or a trip to the library, I'm sure you could find plenty more options for free. If that won't cut it, or if you see recommendations for a particular text/book, consider ordering it used. You ought to be able to get plenty of them for *much* less than the price of a subscription to the journals you mentioned, which look like they'd run you $\\$455$ apiece. I'm a fan of Half.com for used book buying myself. I see some options here for less than $40!

Good luck; I hope you learn a lot of good stuff, and come back to share some of your insights with us here! We could all stand to know more about these topics...Except maybe those who really know these topics, whom I hope will give you some answers of their own too!

# Answer
> 2 votes
There is a specialized field within psychology that combines clinical psychology with educational psychology to address the specific needs of teachers, pupils and parents. It is called "**School Psychology**".

* The English Wikipedia article lists and links to several academic journals that will certainly hold valuable information: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/School\_psychology
* **It also lists introductory textbooks. I'd start with one of those to get a general grasp of the field first.** You can then dive deeper into those areas that interest you most.
* If you live near a university, you can read journals and lend books even if you are not a student. (At least I could, while being a tourist in the US.) Some big public libraries have similar access to scholarly journals and recent textbooks. Ask.
* Start with the most recent books and only move to older literature, if the newer articles and books advise you to. Science is progressing, and old information is often no longer considered valid.
* There is an International School Psychology Organization and similar organizations in all Western countries. Again, the Wikipedia article links to some of these organizations. They will certainly have information for teachers or help you locate relevant resources.
* The sidebar in the Wikipedia article links to similar pages in other languages. Often the information differs, sometimes fundamentally, so you might find more links and information, if you read any of the other languages.

---
Tags: educational-psychology
---


# Question
Title: Sadistic personality disorder, psychopathy and correlation with violence
Going through some article, it seems the differences between the descriptions for sadistic personality disorder and psychopathy is minimal, if at all existent. In the first article it appears the only difference is a propensity for physical violence. In the second article, the high correlation between psychopathy and physical violence is debunked as a myth.

Given the similarities between the two conditions;
**What is the real difference between an individual with Sadistic Personality Disorder and Psychopathy?**

**What are the real facts correlating violence in psychopathy?**

The excerpts are provided below:

> The Sadistic Personality disorder is characterized by a pattern of gratuitous cruelty, aggression, and demeaning behaviors which indicate the existence of deep-seated contempt for other people and an utter lack of empathy. Some sadists are "utilitarian": they leverage their explosive violence to establish a position of unchallenged dominance within a relationship. Unlike psychopaths, they rarely use physical force in the commission of crimes. Rather, their aggressiveness is embedded in an interpersonal context and is expressed in social settings, such as the family or the workplace.
>
> This narcissistic need for an audience manifests itself in other circumstances. Sadists strive to humiliate people in front of witnesses. This makes them feel omnipotent. Power plays are important to them and they are likely to treat people under their control or entrusted to their care harshly: a subordinate, a child, a student, a prisoner, a patient, or a spouse are all liable to suffer the consequences of the sadist's "control freakery" and exacting "disciplinary" measures.
>
> Sadists like to inflict pain because they find suffering, both corporeal and psychological, amusing. They torture animals and people because, to them, the sights and sounds of a creature writhing in agony are hilarious and pleasurable. Sadists go to great lengths to hurt others: they lie, deceive, commit crimes, and even make personal sacrifices merely so as to enjoy the cathartic moment of witnessing someone else's misery.
>
> Sadists are masters of abuse by proxy and ambient abuse. They terrorize and intimidate even their nearest and dearest into doing their bidding. They create an aura and atmosphere of unmitigated yet diffuse dread and consternation. This they achieve by promulgating complex "rules of the house" that restrict the autonomy of their dependants (spouses, children, employees, patients, clients, etc.). They have the final word and are the ultimate law. They must be obeyed, no matter how arbitrary and senseless are their rulings and decisions.
>
> Most sadists are fascinated by gore and violence. They are vicarious serial killers: they channel their homicidal urges in socially acceptable ways by "studying" and admiring historical figures such as Hitler, for instance. They love guns and other weapons, are fascinated by death, torture, and martial arts in all their forms. 1

In another discussion the idea of a psychopath being typically violent is dispelled as a myth:

> All psychopaths are violent. Research by psychologists such as Randall T. Salekin, now at the University of Alabama, indicates that psychopathy is a risk factor for future physical and sexual violence. Moreover, at least some serial killers—for example, Ted Bundy, John Wayne Gacy and Dennis Rader, the infamous “BTK” (Bind, Torture, Kill) murderer—have manifested numerous psychopathic traits, including superficial charm and a profound absence of guilt and empathy. Nevertheless, most psychopaths are not violent, and most violent people are not psychopaths. In the days following the horrific Virginia Tech shootings of April 16, 2007, many newspaper commentators described the killer, Seung-Hui Cho, as “psychopathic.” Yet Cho exhibited few traits of psychopathy: those who knew him described him as markedly shy, withdrawn and peculiar. 2

**1** Sadistic Personality Disorder "Personality Disorders Revisited" (450 pages e-book) By: Dr. Sam Vaknin

 **2** What "Psychopath" Means It is not quite what you may think By Scott O. Lilienfeld and Hal Arkowitz

*note: I post a run of related questions, please do not be disturbed by the content.*

# Answer
> 1 votes
First of all you must understand that "psychopathy" or "sadistic personality disorder" are *names* given by scholars to groups of behaviors that seem to have something in common. These categories are not god-given, but human made, and what they include or exclude changes with the progress of scientific knowledge as well as political interests.

**Sadistic personality disorder** was a diagnosis proposed in the appendix of the DSM-III-R, but it has not been included in the DSM-IV or DSM-5. Currently it is not a diagnosis that can be given to anyone, although it is still used by some researchers, because they find it useful for research purposes.

**Psychopathy** has never been a distinct diagnosis in the DSM (or ICD), but the manual stated that *antisocial personality disorder* includes what is referred to as psychopathy.

The **difference** between sadistic personality disorder, as it was defined by the DSM-III-R, and psychopathy, as it is defined by different scholars using the term as well as the DSM's antisocial personality disorder, is that a sadist is cruel and aims at physically or mentally inducing pain and suffering, while the psychopath disregards norms and the rights of others. Their behavior might outwardly look the same, and they might have the same goal of dominance, but they differ in their personalities, which are perfectly described by the everyday meaning of the words **sadistic** and **antisocial**.

# Answer
> 0 votes
Anti social behaviour is the psychiatric standard for the disorders you discuss according to the DSM 5. Both psychopathy and sadistic personality disorder are subtypes of type of antisocial personality disorder. Both diagnosis have a negative outlook. Assuming the psychiatrist uses Theodore Millon's or the like subtypes when psychopathy is a diagnosis.

Your assumption that all those who suffer from ASP are violent and citations as such are incorrect as things like non-violent gambling happen in ASP as well. There are books and webpages dedicated to high functioning ASP but it is not a well researched area of study. Even the term high functioning ASP is not in the literature.

---
Tags: abnormal-psychology, psychiatry, behaviorism, aggression
---


# Question
Title: Is it possible to sleep with your eyes open?
It is generally observed that animals and human alike close their eyes when they sleep. It looks seemingly natural.

But I have heard (and might have observed one too, just not sure whether he was actually sleeping or not) that there are certain people who can fall asleep with there eyes open.

So, is it possible to sleep with your eyes open?

# Answer
> 7 votes
Nocturnal lagophthalmos is the search term you're looking for. But it's less that they "can" fall asleep with their eyes open and more that they "can't" close their eyes during sleep:

> Nocturnal lagophthalmos is the inability to close the eyelids during sleep. Lagophthalmos is associated with exposure keratopathy, poor sleep, and persistent exposure-related symptoms. There are a variety of causes of lagophthalmos, grouped as proptosis/eye exposure etiologies and palpebral insufficiency etiologies.

---
Tags: sleep, eye-movement
---


# Question
Title: What are "linear spatial weightings" and "specific temporal windows" in Philiastides & Sajda (2006)?
I am undergraduate student in mathematics and a complete beginner in the field of neuroscience. I recently started a project in Mathematical biology which brought me to the above mentioned paper. I couldn't understand what is meant by the "linear spatial weightings" and "specific temporal windows" in the following passage :

> "We used a machine learning approach to identify linear spatial weightings of the EEG sensors for specific temporal windows which optimally discriminate between target (faces) and non-target (cars) trials."

I would really appreciate if someone could break these things down in simpler terms and if possible suggest me some sources to refer. ( I was wondering if the 'linear spatial weightings' here is similar to the concept of 'Center of mass' which can be said as 'linear spatial weightings' of mass; just a guess.And the 'specific temporal windows' is some continuous range in the 'time taken' (to respond to stimulus) axis. Again, only a guess.)

**References**

* Philiastides, M. G., & Sajda, P. (2006). Temporal characterization of the neural correlates of perceptual decision making in the human brain. Cerebral Cortex, 16(4), 509-518.

# Answer
I can make a guess, until someone who really knows the answer comes along :) I haven't read the paper and the answer I can give is probably not going to be formal enough for a math student. But I can tell you what I think.

The goal of the paper, I'm guessing, is to look at the pattern of activation recorded by EEG when viewing pictures of faces and cars, and to try to say if the two activity patterns differ. One way to so this is to show some faces and cars, look at EEG activity and tell your algorithm which is which. Then, after a training period, let your algorithm classify future input into faces and cars as well as it can. In the end, you want to see if it can classify above chance. If yes, then you can say with certainty that the pattern of neural activity between cars and faces differs.

You might then wonder how it differs. If this guesswork is correct, then *temporal windows* refers to moments in time when this pattern classification works best - for example, 150-200 milliseconds after the picture was displayed. This can tell you something about how much visual processing must happen before objects are seen as belonging to a certain category. If not done properly, though, you might just be detecting simple visual differences such as amount of information in a certain frequency band - not very exciting. A very early temporal window of best performance of your classifier algorithm would indicate that this is the case. In any case, you learn something from seeing where the best temporal window is.

*Spatial weightings of the sensors* refers to the difference in activity recorded in each of the individual EEG sensors. From that, you might infer that the difference between cars and faces is most prominent in, say, frontal sensors, which gives you a hint about the possible brain areas involved in category classification. The *linear* I don't know what to make of unfortunately. It refers to the bit of the algorithm that decides how to classify these spatial patterns, perhaps by relying on how neural activity is spread over a distance (i.e. how activity originating at a certain place will be captured by the sensor just above it, and how by sensors further away), but to know what makes it linear, you would really need to see the algorithm.

Hope this helps!
> 3 votes

---
Tags: cognitive-neuroscience, decision-making, theoretical-neuroscience
---


# Question
Title: Is consistent dual n-back training likely to improve the performance of analysis (mathematics) students?
Suppose you isolate a class of undergraduate mathematics majors who are about to enroll in a semester of real analysis (rigorous, proof-based calculus) and split them into two groups. Then, you schedule the first group to study n hours of real analysis every week and the other group to study (n-m) hours of real analysis every week and perform m hours of n-back training (assume that n and m are reasonably well tuned; m is probably much smaller than n).

Also assume that the second group does not take shortcuts in doing the training (where certain patterns are exploited).

* Which group do you conjecture to perform better in the analysis course and why?
* To what degree will one group perform better and why?
* Does having a wider short-term memory horizon of numbers (which I assume n-back produces) result in being able to keep track of more variables and rigorous proof steps in a sharper way (working memory) and in faster comprehension of mathematical concepts (fluid intelligence)?
* Does the training result in a larger attention span and therefore to better grades?

# Answer
I assume that the group that spends **100% of their time studying real analysis and 0% of their time doing n-back training** will do best in any subsequent real analysis course.

Cognitive skill acquisition does not generalise all that much (for a review see VanLehn, 1996). Transfer is often limited. I'm sceptical of any claims that short term training can lead to far reaching cognitive change as implied by n-back training.

The demands on working memory of problems in a domain get less as the knowledge and rules implied by a domain get better acquired. Over time students will start to recognise patterns, and will learn to apply rules specific to the domain. Domain specific practice is probably the best way to acquire that knowledge. And in general, the more time that is spent on learning that knowledge, the more knowledge that will be acquired.

Of course, much could be said about creating an optimal learning environment for real analysis. For example, consolidation of prerequisite knowledge, providing practice at the right level of difficulty, providing feedback to the learner, providing a good mix of presentation of content with problem exercises, distributing practice over time, and so on are all important components of an effective learning environment. However, these have nothing to do with n-back, and everything to do with good pedagogy. In particular, if you want to teach something other than real analysis, but your aim is effective performance in real analysis, then you should examine what are the relevant skills and prerequisites for effective performance in real analysis. And combine this with an examination of student difficulties and knowledge gaps.

### Empirical Evaluations

@Ofri Raviv pointed out two references (Shipstead et al, 2012; Melby-Lervag et al, 2013) that provide reviews of working memory training and are generally critical of its utility.

**Melby-Lervag and Hulme (2013)** did a meta-analysis of working memory training studies:

> To be included in the review, studies had to be randomized controlled trials or quasi-experiments without randomization, have a treatment, and have either a treated group or an untreated control group. Twenty-three studies with 30 group comparisons met the criteria for inclusion. The studies included involved clinical samples and samples of typically developing children and adults. Meta-analyses indicated that the programs produced reliable short-term improvements in working memory skills. For verbal working memory, these near-transfer effects were not sustained at follow-up, whereas for visuospatial working memory, limited evidence suggested that such effects might be maintained. More importantly, there was no convincing evidence of the generalization of working memory training to other skills (nonverbal and verbal ability, inhibitory processes in attention, word decoding, and arithmetic). **The authors conclude that memory training programs appear to produce short-term, specific training effects that do not generalize.**

### References

* VanLehn, K. (1996). Cognitive skill acquisition. Annual review of psychology, 47(1), 513-539.
* Shipstead, Zach; Redick, Thomas S.; Engle, Randall W. Psychological Bulletin, Vol 138(4), Jul 2012, 628-654. doi: 10.1037/a0027473 2
* Melby-Lervag, M., & Hulme, C. (2013). Is working memory training in children effective? A meta-analytic review. Developmental Psychology, 49, 270-291. PDF
> 9 votes

# Answer
I'm only be able to answer part of your question in specific ways.

Does having a wider short-term memory horizon of numbers (which I assume n-back produces) result in being able to keep track of more variables and rigorous proof steps in a sharper way (working memory) and in faster comprehension of mathematical concepts (fluid intelligence)?

**Answer*\*$\rightarrow$ dual-n-back in my experience was more like a booster to help me achieve my peak on working memory for several minutes and deduct while time goes by. The effect usually last for half a day. Since it is like a booster, it can't help me to maintain the peak high performance. The training gives "intuition" only; it helps me to verify logical fallacies most, and it does make me speak much more logically with only a sufficient number of words. (I did learn concrete some knowledge about different kind of fallacies.) Eliminating logical mistakes made me draw rational decisions. But it is only a booster, and in fact I did maintain some of the "recalling ability". It is most likely possible to maintain the fruits, since I've given up some time to calm down after training, and it takes me long hours. If you can't do this with the proof of actually knowing how exactly it affects you, don't train. It has side effect while you're over-trained.

Does the training result in a larger attention span and therefore to better grades?

**Answer*\*$\rightarrow$ I'm not sure about what you mean by attention span. But I can tell you that it helps to read effectively by eliminating crap.

And most IMPORTANT, the gameplay of "brainworkshop" is not the best; time interval shouldn't be fixed while training and it varies for different people. This setting is the worst in that it could make your answers out of control. E.g., you can't recall the letter or the position without having 1 more second, and the task remaining will be ruined.
> -1 votes

---
Tags: learning, mathematical-ability, working-memory, brain-training
---


# Question
Title: How and why can movies take us out of our everyday physical reality and into a fantasy world?
Have you ever experienced that feeling after watching a really great movie (somewhat like a dramatic one) that after watching the movie, you got carried away? Even though the movie ended well in a happy ending, there is that feeling inside you that remained. The feeling can't be explained, but the sad part of the movie remained somewhat. What do you call that feeling, and is there any explanation for this?

How and why can movies take us out of our everyday physical reality and into a fantasy world, so that when the movie ends, we are left feeling dissociated from our own lives, feeling feelings that don't belong to us, but to the fictional characters from the movie?

# Answer
When we "enter" a fictional world, we *imagine* that we are there. The question therefore is: How can we imagine an experience? To answer this question, you have to understand how our perception of reality works.

When we perceive the world, we are not in direct contact with the world, but rather removed two steps: the physcial objects that (probably) surround us reflect light, cause sound, send out molecules and so on, and our sensory organs register these light particles, changes in air density, molecules (smell) etc. Our sensory organs then send signals to our brain, and our brains try to make sense of these signals by comparing them to information already stored in our memories. That information itself, of course, is only stored sensory input and the sense we gave it, so that in essence our knowledge of the world is like trying to decipher a text in an unfamiliar script: by observing regularities and repetition, i.e. a non-random *structure*, can we deduce the *meaning* that this text (or the world) has in relation to us. So in effect the "real" outside world, as we experience it through our bodies and in our minds, is an image.

Here is a graphic illustrating this idea (Velmans, 2008):

When we feel sad, because something sad happens in our lives, we do not actually experience any of the things that go on around us. What we experience is the image our mind creates from the sensory input. Our bodies may live in the outside phyisical reality, but our Self, as we are conscious of it, lives in a mental image of that outside world.

This image of the world is being induced in our minds by the sensory input. But there are experiences that feel totally "real", although they lack sensory input or are caused by input that does not resemble them, for example when we dream or when we halluciante. People who hallucinate cannot tell if what they "see" is real or imagined.

When you watch a movie, read a book or daydream, you *know* of course that you are merely reading or watching a movie or daydreaming, but you *suspend* that knowledge and allow the image that you create from that limited input to take up a large part of your thoughts. And like the image of the real world, this image created from text or moving pictures will of course trigger emotions. This image will be "weaker", somewhat "transparent" (in the sense that you can still see the real world through it), so the emotions it causes are weaker.

The basis of the influence of media on you is your motivation. If you watch a movie with a critical eye, refusing to forget that what you see are paid actors that will take a shower and go home after shooting that scene, no image will form in your mind, you won't "enter" that fictional world, and you will feel nothing special, except maybe a numb back from sitting in the cinema for two hours. But if you *want* to go to that wondrous place and *allow* your imagination to be transported there, then your imagination will use the movie or book to create an image that cannot but affect you.

---

Note:

The model of perception given above is the one most commonly held to be accurate by scientists and philosophers today. Max Velmans, from whose article I used an image to illustrate that model of perception, believes a different model, that of reflexive monism, "most closely follows the contours of ordinary experience, the findings of science, and common sense". Read the article linked to below, if you are interested in his views.

Sources:

---

*I believe that this answer does not need any sources beyond the quoted image. All of the above follows logically from how our perception works, which, as it is taught in school, can be regarded as common knowledge.*
> 2 votes

---
Tags: social-psychology, emotion, motivation, philosophy-of-mind
---


# Question
Title: Regarding "a human brain can hold enough information to fill 10 libraries", can we quantify the memory required for a given task?
It is not the exact phrase, but I have heard variations of this claim. I am wondering whether such claim is supported by a study or experiment. I am also curious if there is a way to sort of vaguely quantify memory. In other words, is there a way to know how much memory/resources a type of task occupies? For example, is it possible to know experimentally whether the muscle memory required to play a piano needs more memory/resources than the memory needed to read a piano sheet?

# Answer
> 7 votes
First, consider that those questions can potentially be answered only in animals, like mice. There is no way to test such things in humans, because methods like fMRI give resolution of $\approx$1,000,000 neurons. In order to test your hypothesis, you need resolution below the neuronal level, because what your need to see is how the connections (*synapses*) between neurons are established. Theoretically, you can train mice to run a maze. Then, with a microscope, one can count how many synapses were created. I think, to date, you cannot do this without killing the mice. If so, then you will take other mice and teach them to play piano :) So, the difference between change of connections might be your estimate. But you cannot know whether two tasks are equivalent, so you may end up comparing apples and tomatoes. Overall, the term "memory" is not something that is precisely defined on a biological level, like RAM or hard-drive capacity on a PC. There are prominent hypotheses about how memories are created (connections between neurons), but those are still hypotheses.

You might be interested to read this book; hopefully it is not too complicated without much background: Connectome: How the Brain's Wiring Makes Us Who We Are (Seung, 2012)

**Reference**

Seung, S. (2012). *Connectome: How the brain's wiring makes us who we are*. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Trade.

---
Tags: learning, memory
---


# Question
Title: Is there any plausible answer for naturally explaining veridical perception in near death experiences?
Is there any way to explain veridical perception in near death experiences and out of body experiences, naturally? Or is it strong evidence that the mind is a soul?

# Answer
There is no evidence that "the mind is a soul". This is what's known as the "hard question of consciousness".

There has been some research conducted on "out-of-body" experiences. The only one I can remember offhand was a couple of years ago where words and numbers were placed on top of cabinets in operating theatres. The logic behind this was that if anyone genuinely had an out-of-body experience while under anaesthesia, they would be able to read, and later recall, these words and numbers. I hope I'm not misquoting the findings (I'm doing this from memory), but I seem to recall that they found no evidence whatsoever for these experiences.

It is far more likely that experiences prior to death are hallucinatory and caused by chemical changes, or degradation, of the brain. In a similar way, out of body experiences in an operating theatre are almost certainly the result of similar hallucinations.
> 1 votes

---
Tags: cognitive-psychology, abnormal-psychology, developmental-psychology
---


# Question
Title: How does our brain consider something to be funny?
What makes something that we watch (a clown's antics, hidden camera pranks, etc.), hear (jokes), read (satire), or do (pranks) be perceived as funny?

Even babies find certain actions and sounds funny, and they will laugh.

Is there a common attribute in all of the above which triggers a canonical funny trigger? If so, what is it?

# Answer
> 8 votes
Psychological theories of humor are a growing area of research. I attended a seminar on it for a day as an undergraduate myself, but dropped it before giving the instructor a chance to demonstrate that there was much detailed knowledge out here. Also, this was several years ago, so I'm sure the field has progressed since then.

**I doubt there is a single, common, canonical attribute that triggers the humor sense, but there are probably many, partially independent factors that each contribute to humorousness.** I'm familiar with four in particular$^{\[1\]}$:

1. The **"funny because it's true"** factor may explain why cleverness and originality are important. Myself and many others find stimuli funnier when we haven't encountered them before, and especially when they violate expectations. Novelty is an important factor in the experience of pleasure in general (Lyubomirsky, 2013), and this clearly applies in humor to some extent, in that jokes often "get old" eventually. At first hearing, a joke may offer more opportunity for new insights (depending on whether one "gets it" right away; this also explains why one generally won't laugh until one *does* get the joke), though it may continue to remain funny as one continues to process new insights gained from reconsideration of the joke's implications. I often find jokes less funny when they express misconceptions or depend on an ignorant perspective that I don't share (e.g., the suggestion that some apparent contradiction is absurd doesn't amuse me as much if I know the reason for the apparent contradiction already).

This isn't to say that something needs to be true or representative of reality in general to be funny though. Absurdist humor in particular relies on the violation of expectations in ways that seem coherent at least (i.e., it probably won't be funny if it's just too confusing or bizarre to make any kind of sense), but in ways that may seem particularly absurd (and probably novel too) due to violations of the laws or probabilities of physical or social reality. This principle suggests one reason tastes may vary in the sense of humor: individuals vary in their tolerance for expectation violations, and in their abilities to make sense out of them. Openness to experience relates to cultural preferences (e.g., traditional vs. avant-garde), level of educational attainment, and (negatively to) need for closure, which suggests a particular hypothesis of individual differences that may be worth testing: openness may relate positively to appreciation of absurdist humor, and negatively to appreciation of "blue-collar" comedy (at least when the latter appeals more to simple, traditional, or uneducated sensibilities, which it doesn't always).
2. The **nervous laughter** factor may increase laughter as a sort of coping mechanism for social discomfort. This may partially explain the popularity of humor on taboo topics such as political incorrectness (e.g., *Politically Incorrect*), demographic (e.g., gender, age, and ethnic) stereotypes, general immorality (e.g., "dark humor"), sex, and "toilet humor". By nature of being taboos, experience with these topics and exposure to a variety of opinions on them are commonly limited, so this factor may depend partly on the novelty factor.

However, nervous laughter does not involve novelty necessarily. Self-perceptive processes may produce the impression that something is funny because one is laughing, even when one is laughing for other reasons. Various social reasons may disincline people to express anxiety or discomfort directly (e.g., if a friend or comedian is obviously trying to amuse you with something distasteful), and forced laughter is a common and sometimes habituated way of hiding negative emotions through an opposite expression (a *reaction formation*) of levity and enjoyment. This reasoning appeals to a somewhat circular theory of humor (i.e., our laughter defines humor as that which makes us laugh), but people use circular logic in many ways (e.g., early has been criticized as circular). Therefore, to whatever extent humor is a social construct by definition, theories of humor need not be less valid to the extent that they are circular and simply descriptive of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that relate to laughter. Over time and repeated exposure, people may come to commonly regard a topic as humorous simply because it provokes laughter, even if that laughter is only a nervous reaction initially.

A particularly loose line of reasoning that could tie nervousness to laughter would apply this explanation to the laughter reaction to tickling, which is a particularly odd unconditioned response (that seems to occur in animals too). Again, just a bit of personal speculation based on evolutionary theory, FWIW: in mammals, ticklish areas are often vulnerable to physical injury, and therefore sensitive. These areas seem to generate an odd sort of nervous discomfort reaction and motivate defensive movements reflexively, maybe to naturally prioritize protection of these areas from injury. Natural selection may have engendered such a reflex to extended this reaction even to sleep or intimate contact with trusted others (which could cause injury during aggressive play, sex, or by betrayal). Experience of this defensive reflex in action during seemingly inappropriate circumstances may generate laughter through surprise (thus involving the novelty factor again) or through reaction formation to nervous discomfort, among other possible explanations. For support of this explanation, note that the laughter response to tickling can be suppressed intentionally when the experience of tactile discomfort remains.
3. **Conformity** may cause laughter and tickle the sense of humor in similar ways. Following the above reasoning somewhat, self-perceptive processes may kick in after one laughs to mimic others nearby. People conform to others' behavior for a wide variety of reasons, and in a wide variety of ways. This may explain why people sometimes enjoy stand-up comedy more when attending live performances than when watching them recorded from home, and why many television comedy shows use laugh tracks.

One explanation of laugh tracks would again involve novelty somewhat. Subtlety in humor is often an expression and consequence of cleverness and originality in the delivery of a message, as by implication rather than explicit expression (comedians often try to avoid "beating" their audiences "over the head" with their punchlines). Yet again, one must notice and (often, but not always) comprehend a stimulus to find it funny. Thus a laugh track serves to cue the audience to parse stimuli for humorous content, and may help compensate for individuals' varying abilities to detect subtle stimuli or their implications. Cuing appropriate responses to ambiguous stimuli and situations is a common function of conformity in general.

Conformity occurs even in the relative absence of ambiguity though (cf. the Asch conformity experiments). This suggests another explanation of laugh tracks: a pure conformity manipulation aimed at manipulating humor judgments through self-perception. This explanation may apply more broadly to the commonly experienced social phenomenon of "contagious" laughing fits in groups, which some special groups capitalize upon (e.g., *Laughology*, *Laughercise*). Yet again, laughter may result in response to the novelty and seeming absurdity of such events as well.
4. Furthermore, the social contagion of laughter and some instances of animal laughter suggest as an additional principle that laughter may arise as a simple behavioral manifestation of **positive affect in general**. Joy and exuberance may naturally result in laughter as an exaggerated form of grinning. In this sense, **intensity** of the stimulus becomes an important factor unto itself; consider how much harder one laughs at something especially hilarious. Next, consider the common emphasis on surprise as a comedic element, and the opposite effect of having to explain a joke. A sudden surprise may load all of the stimulus' information content into a briefer, more intense moment, thereby intensifying the emotional reaction. Conversely, spreading out that information over a long-winded explanation may spread out the emotional reaction so much that one no longer finds the joke funny for lack of emotional intensity, even though the same amount of information (and sometimes more) is ultimately conveyed.

Because positive affect is generally desirable, and laughter is generally enjoyable, people may force laughter somewhat simply to enjoy themselves more, and this need not occur consciously. This implicit motive may lower people's thresholds for laughter (and thus the perception of humorousness) in situations where positive affect is generated by other factors, and maybe also in situations where positive affect is lacking (e.g., in the midst of sadness, frustration, or anxiety). Consider as (somewhat circumstantial) evidence how popular media such as movies often mix comedy and tragedy to accentuate each.

Yet *again*, this effect may be partially mediated by the novelty factor if one is surprised at the depth of one's joy. The other social factors I've mentioned here might conceivably play mediating roles too. For instance, extreme joy might heighten emotional arousal past comfortable levels, leading to anxiety and nervous laughter; or one might force laughter to communicate a desire for levity or to manipulate one's social atmosphere through conformity-based mechanisms. This last point may apply especially to laughter as a direct coping mechanism for negative emotions: laughter may not only hide negative emotions, but may overwrite them somewhat with positive emotions.

$^{\[1\]}$ These theories don't necessarily apply to everyone (in light of the pervasiveness of individual differences in the ever-growing human population, one might argue they probably don't), but I'm unaware of exceptions. I'm not including any empirical research directly here, and would be happy to edit some in (or let others do so) if anyone else knows of some, but I'm short on time for reviewing literature right now. I'm answering mostly from personal experience and from memory of theories I've read here and there over the years, some of which may (or may not) have been based on empirical research.

**Reference**

Lyubomirsky, S. (2013). *The myths of happiness: What should make you happy, but doesn't; What shouldn't make you happy, but does*. The Penguin Press HC. Official website: http://themythsofhappiness.org/.

---
Tags: emotion, humour
---


# Question
Title: Is there any evidence to suggest telling puns to a child makes them enjoy it when they are older?
My own experience was that my father and grandfather retold many puns as I was in my childhood and teens; at the time, I thought it was abysmal.

Now I think they're the funniest things ever.

**Is there any evidence to suggest that telling puns to children makes them enjoy those puns when they are older?** I.e., are puns 'conditioned'?

# Answer
Nostalgia for fond memories commonly produces positive emotion (for further review, see Zhou, Wildschut, Sedikides, Chen, & Vingerhoets, 2012). As for the increase in your appreciation of these particular puns, I've mentioned in a very recent answer of mine to another very recent question about humor that positive emotion alone may encourage the sense that something is funny. Depending on the nature of the particular puns, they might also appeal to a certain sense of humor you've had to develop with age and experience.

This last point is just conditional speculation though; I also admit that the article I've cited doesn't pertain to humor directly, and I can't provide more direct evidence of the sort your question requests offhand. I hope someone else can!

**Reference**

Zhou, X., Wildschut, T., Sedikides, C., Chen, X., & Vingerhoets, A. J. (2012). Heartwarming memories: Nostalgia maintains physiological comfort. *Emotion, 12*(4), 678–685. Available online, URL: http://www.wildschut.me/Tim\_Wildschut/home\_files/emo-2012-05385-001.pdf.
> 1 votes

---
Tags: developmental-psychology, conditioning, humour
---


# Question
Title: Is there a formal definition for the difficulty of learning something?
Sometimes I hear that one subject is harder than another, but never scientifically investigated. For example, in high school, it's commonly thought that mathematics is the hardest subject. But I think that this definition is poorly built. I remember when I was in high school, and mathematics wasn't hard, but I really had no interest, and I ignored it and obtained poor grades. Today I've started to like mathematics, and it's really not that hard. I can solve problems and prove propositions, and the only thing I feel that changed in my mind is the addition of interest.

It seems that sometimes, the subject is *not* hard, and the student is under the effect of something that compels him to not do it, such as mathematical anxiety or the lack of interest as I pointed out before. I believe that the concept of difficulty per se is a poor measure of skill needed for doing something and that it interacts with other aspects. So, I got curious: are there studies on the definition of difficulty?

I have found this question after making my question, and it seems to address some of the questions I've made, but it doesn't mention the effects of willingness or lack of interest in obtaining knowledge.

# Answer
First, let me start by saying your topic is extremely broad. There are many reasons why something may be difficult to learn. However, the exact "difficulty associated with learning something" is known by many different terms in the scientific literature, and in particular, I have found *cognitive load theory* to be a particularly useful description of this. According to Sweller, Cognitive Load falls into three distinct domains:

1. *Intrinsic cognitive load* is that difficulty that is associated with the material itself, independent of the learner.
2. *Extraneous cognitive load* is associated with the instructional methods or materials (poor instructional techniques increase this load).
3. *Germane cognitive load* is load that the learner requires to create associations and connections among the concepts, and depends on the learner's knowledge base.

The basic premise is that subjects are difficult to learn if they require a great number of connections to be formed (a mental model or schema). The greater the connections required, the greater the difficulty. Complicating this, certain topics are inherently difficult, such as mathematical computation and critical thinking, and learners bring their own pre-conceived mental notions to the table. Cognitive Load theory attempts to provide a framework for thinking about the interactions between these variables.

I have studied the difficulty with teaching/learning engineering subjects, such as statistics, variability, critical thinking, etc. using controlled experiments that attempt to hone in on the second and third aspects of CLT. Here is a link to a conference proceeding that I published on the subject; I have another paper in-work that I can't share until it is published- but so far, my results very much support CLT.

Interest can be a factor, because attention given to a learning subject will take away from the students' ability to process other cognitive loads. Likewise, anxiety can also be a factor. Lots of research left to do in this field if you ask me, though - so expect these theories to develop substantially in the next 10-20 years.
> 7 votes

# Answer
@JeromyAnglim's answer to your linked question says most of what I'd have wanted to say in response to your original (title) question. Difficulty of any given question in terms of item response theory is generally defined as the probability of answering it correctly at a given level of a (often latent) relevant skill. This definition of difficulty can be applied to an aggregate of questions as well (e.g., the probability of getting an "A" as one's final grade in a math class).

Mathematics may have a reputation for being a relatively "hard" subject because it relies more directly on quantitative, spatial, and logical reasoning than on verbal, social, or emotional reasoning. This may not be the case for many other subjects. These kinds of reasoning and the aptitudes associated with them aren't completely independent, but they are somewhat independent (i.e., intelligence as a whole is partly *multidimensional*, though the extent to which this is true is debated hotly), and may certainly be practiced somewhat independently. The latter set of reasoning skills (those not-so-relevant to math) may be practiced more frequently in everyday experience, especially during adolescence, and to a probably lesser extent, youth in general. Furthermore, those with special strengths in verbal, social, or emotional reasoning (and without corresponding strengths in math-relevant aptitudes, however rare that may be) may have more influence over the reputation of the subject. Thus the popular reputation may disproportionately reflect the opinions of those who are used to feeling stronger in other subjects, even though they may still be relatively strong in math as well.

A second major factor in both willingness to learn and the experience of interest is *stereotype threat*. This is one of probably many causes of academic anxiety in topics such as math—in fact, stereotype threat in math may be one of the most commonly studied varieties of the general social phenomenon. This may be due to Western society's many demographic stereotypes and prejudices with respect to quantitative reasoning, most notably ethnicity and gender. Stereotype threat research describes a complex process beginning with incidental membership in a group with a relevant stereotype. When stereotyped individuals are aware of a negative stereotype (e.g., their group is bad at math), they often fear that they will confirm the stereotype through their behaviors (e.g., earning a bad grade in math). This fear interferes with performance in often already high-pressure testing environments, often making the feared outcomes harder to avoid (an example of a *self-fulfilling prophecy*). Fear also reduces the capacity to enjoy the challenge of a test or other learning opportunity; enjoyment and self-confidence are crucial to the experience of *intrinsic motivation*.

Loss of interest and motivation, especially when due to fear, may often motivate use of cognitive coping mechanisms in defense of one's ego. One such mechanism is disparagement of the source of anxiety. In the all-too-common case of a person who experiences stereotype threat regarding his or (more likely) her mathematical ability, one may choose (not necessarily consciously) to see mathematics classes as inherently uninteresting, unfair, and difficult, even though none of these are necessarily true (for instance, imagine taking a middle school math class at your age). Naturally, one who believes these things is more likely to voice these things, particularly in as much as doing so may afford opportunities for ego compensation, or may be necessary to further offset others' negative judgments.

Stereotype threat theory has received some pretty serious criticism via empirical study (e.g., it's not the only cause of differences; (Sackett, Hardison, & Cullen, 2004). Nonetheless, it seems to have survived the test of meta-analysis reasonably well (Nadler & Clark, 2011). These analyses have revealed several moderators, including strength of identification with mathematics among women (Nguyen & Ryan, 2008).

**References**

 \- Nadler, J. T., & Clark, M. H. (2011). Stereotype threat: A meta‐analysis comparing African Americans to Hispanic Americans. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 41*(4), 872–890.
\- Nguyen, H. H. D., & Ryan, A. M. (2008). Does stereotype threat affect test performance of minorities and women? A meta-analysis of experimental evidence. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 93*(6), 1314–1334. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/23489223\_Does\_stereotype\_threat\_affect\_test\_performance\_of\_minorities\_and\_women\_A\_meta-analysis\_of\_experimental\_evidence/file/60b7d51a8da2aeacb0.pdf.
\- Sackett, P. R., Hardison, C. M., & Cullen, M. J. (2004). On interpreting stereotype threat as accounting for African American-White differences on cognitive tests. *American Psychologist, 59*(1), 7–13. Retrieved from http://www.asc.upenn.edu/usr/ogandy/C45405%20resources/Sackett%20et%20al%20stereotype%20threat.pdf.
> 3 votes

---
Tags: cognitive-psychology, learning
---


# Question
Title: Can reduced cognitive load lead to some kind of mental or physical "atrophy"?
Muscles, if you don't use them, degenerate. Everyone who has had a broken leg in a cast for a few weeks and then seen the thin stick that reemerged once the cast was removed, can attest to that fact.

But does the same happen to the brain? Does mental ability or brain matter atrophy, if life is to easy for us because all the products we use are so highly usable that we don't have to think anymore?

# Answer
Assuming you're getting at a related idea to your other recent question (Does a more ergonomic and user friendly interface/device make the human brain work less?), I wouldn't worry about user friendliness causing mental atrophy by precluding the need for thought. Thought continues well beyond matters of control to matters of application and optimization. (E.g., can I use my washing machine on AstroTurf? How much high-efficiency detergent do I really need? Can I still use the old stuff?) When systems work particularly well together, entirely new areas of thought may emerge (e.g., the Industrial Revolution and the Italian Renaissance depended largely on the stability and prosperity of their host societies).

However, the "use-it-or-lose-it" principle may apply to specific skills and even general abilities and physical senses to some extent. Secondary language proficiency is one such popularly recognized example. I'd also recommend checking out the Scientific American Frontiers miniseries, *Changing Your Mind* (some episodes are available on YouTube). One particular episode with which I'm familiar features a research participant wearing a blindfold for a long period of time, during or after which a neuroimaging method (probably fMRI, but I can't quite remember) shows activity in her visual cortex when she's processing tactile stimuli. These sort of repurposing processes probably occur naturally throughout neurological development, especially in youth when neuroplasticity is greatest. AFAIK, neurological models of learning and development in general describe a lot of processes involving pruning of unused connections and reinforcement of frequently used connections. Others here probably know a lot more about these topics than I do, but it seems clear enough even to me that to some extent, atrophy is a natural and even adaptive part of the learning process. Even without referring to neurological substrates, one can argue that learning often involves the process of elimination, so the atrophy of ideas representing eliminated possibilities (e.g., the world is flat?) is desirable in some ways.

Of course, not all atrophy is desirable, and not all results in adaptive repurposing of the relevant brain structures. My former doctoral advisor once told me a particularly disturbing story about the punishment of one of the assassins of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, whose death played a role in sparking the first World War. I've looked into it a bit since, and suspect the story is apocryphal, but it's interesting nonetheless. Supposedly the assassin was locked away in a completely dark cell for so long that he went blind. If, as I suspect, this is mere apocrypha, I don't know whether this can happen in general, but the loss of vision in subterranean species of fish, lizards, and insects is well-documented in evolutionary theory.
> 4 votes

---
Tags: intelligence, attention, plasticity
---


# Question
Title: What makes some things more fun than others universally?
Recently I have been presented with the question, "What makes something addictive, and why are some activities more addicting than others?" This question intrigues me, as logically, the answer would be along the lines of, "The mind has a constant desire / falsified need to go through the experience of the activity." And if you think about it, that's just a definition of what causes addiction.

My question is: **what makes some fun things addictive and some things not, and overall, "What is fun?"** For example, your average adolescent would find playing video games, watching television and communicating through social media "fun", while also finding recreational activities like drawing, playing sports, and, say, board games "fun". Why then is the former list addicting and the latter non-addictive?

**If any activity the mind desires, once achieved, can be described as "fun", then why aren't some things addictive?** And since some people find, say, studying or even work "fun", then if some routine is made out of it, isn't it possible to become addicted to these activities?

Is it possible to channel our desires, define what we find fun, and choose our addictions?

# Answer
This is a primary subject of study in *game studies* and *ludology*, which are domains of theory and research unto themselves. Moreover, the question as it pertains to games might be interesting to ask over on Arqade, though I can't guarantee it would be "on topic" enough for their community. You might find the following questions from Arqade interesting, as they hint at some general principles:

Problems I've seen mentioned in answers to these (to which I relate personally as a gamer) include:

* The ability to continue playing for a longer time than one can engage in other activities
* Costs of quitting freely and abruptly, such as loss of progress or satisfaction from proximal goals
* Proximity of goals in general, and immediacy of gratification
* Social involvement and its time sensitivity: teamwork requires coordination with friends' schedules
* Availability of games on a PC: even when I go to work, I inadvertently bring games with me!

Finally, the existence of consequent problems in general is an important part of what motivates the use of the negatively connoting word, "addiction". Practically anything can be done to excess of course, but drawing and playing sports may have higher thresholds of activity before they become counterproductive overall. At high levels of activity and skill, drawing and sports become marketable trade skills, and athletic activity generally promotes health. Gaming has less obvious benefits too (see for review Johnson, Jones, Scholes, & Carras, 2013), but popular culture and research literature are both still catching up with this, as well as to the revelation that many of the supposed problems with gaming aren't so bad after all (e.g., aggression; Ferguson, Garza, Jerabeck, Ramos, & Galindo, 2013). Therefore, I wouldn't read too much into popular (mis-)usage of "addiction" in this case. That's also not to say that true gaming addiction doesn't exist; I don't honestly know, but I've heard of cases that seemingly ought to justify application of addiction models to game obsessions, so it may just be a matter of time before the DSM takes note. (If it hasn't already; again, I don't know, and wish I had more time to look into it!)

Anyway, considering what makes games fun might lead to some insights as to why they produce fanatics. Whether video games really produce more than these other hobbies is an empirical question that I haven't seen answered yet, but my intuition suggests you're probably right to think they do, because video games appeal to people on very many levels. Again, you might have a hard time finding articles on game studies that don't address ways to appeal to people and reinforce participation. By virtue of being designed expressly to entertain us and reinforce participation, video games represent a culmination of creative efforts and marketing experiences that probably should supersede less modern forms of entertainment and hobbies with other focal purposes, at least to the extent that game designers are good at what they do. They've been getting better with the advent of affordable, portable, high-powered computers designed to optimize the user interface; the advent of education in programming and game design; and the economic prosperity of game designing and publishing companies. Drawing, sports, and board games are more often (but not always) tied to simpler mechanisms and traditional designs, so it may make sense if these pastimes haven't been keeping up with those that capitalize directly on modern trends in technological and educational progress.

Since there's enough literature out there on game studies to keep anyone busy, I'll only list a subset of specific ways that video games appeal to players that relate to psychological theories of motivation:

* Enjoyment is what intrinsic motivation is made of. Producing enjoyment is a primary purpose.
    + Extrinsic motivation also arises from the structure of requirements games impose upon players seeking their more intrinsically desirable rewards (e.g., you have to beat a boss before you get to watch a FMV, or "grind" to a higher level before you can use a spectacular new ability or exciting game mechanism)
* Scalable difficulty improves users' ability to optimize challenge, which leads to the flow experience in gaming when challenge is tuned just so to an individual's "Goldilocks zone": not too high or low.
* Social interaction is facilitated by multiplayer games in a variety of ways.
    + Cooperation satisfies the need for affiliation or relatedness, and promotes self-transcendence. Game objectives that require teamwork also play upon introjected motivation when a person plays to avoid the guilt of letting down a teammate. Social support has widely documented ramifications for well-being.
    + Competition satisfies the need for power or competence when it goes well for a player or promotes skill acquisition and refinement.
    + Both kinds may satisfy the need for achievement, especially when one can show off to others! The promise of approval or respect from others is another form of extrinsic motivation.
* Variety in general is the "spice of life" (Barrett, 2009; Kahn & Isen, 1993), and is readily available across the broad range of games.
* Investment in goals with long time frames may promote well-being and intrinsic motivation.
    + My own research (Stauner, 2013) demonstrates a weak, predictive relationship between the average time frame of students' goals (longer-term goals being rated higher) and change in well-being over an academic quarter $(\beta=.09, t\_{(267)}=2.61,p=.009)$, though this isn't necessarily a causal relationship.
    + Manderlink and Harackiewicz (1984) also claim that setting long-term goals can "enhance subsequent intrinsic motivation relative to conditions involving proximal goals or no goals."
    + Video games have surely been extending the time frames of their players' goals. In my own adolescence, I recall finding an RPG that required 60 hours to complete exceptional. Newer games—especially MMORPGs—have increasingly adopted an expand-and-patch strategy to keep new content flowing for years of (potentially endless!) goal pursuit. Blizzard Entertainment's *World of Warcraft* is a prime example of a game universe that's taken on a life of its own since its release in late 2004; I've "met" some players who have been around since then myself.
    + Long-term involvement in any goal or activity increases its relevance to a person's sense of identity, and may thereby affect the sense that the goal or activity is meaningful and important (*identified motivation*).
    + Behavioral economic principles like sunk costs and escalation of commitment also explain why people have a harder time stopping a longer-term habit.
    + Neurological bases of are also an ongoing area of research that longer-term involvement and routinization would naturally make increasingly relevant regardless of initial motives.

**References**

Barrett, L. F. (2009). Variety is the spice of life: A psychological construction approach to understanding variability in emotion. *Cognition and Emotion, 23*(7), 1284–1306. Available online, URL: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2835153/. Retrieved February 5, 2014.

Ferguson, C. J., Garza, A., Jerabeck, J., Ramos, R., & Galindo, M. (2013). Not worth the fuss after all? Cross-sectional and prospective data on violent video game influences on aggression, visuospatial cognition and mathematics ability in a sample of youth. *Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 42*(1), 109–122. Available online, URL: http://www.christopherjferguson.com/Not%20Worth%20the%20Fuss.pdf. Retrieved February 5, 2014.

Johnson, D., Jones, C., Scholes, L., & Colder Carras, M. (2013). *Video games and wellbeing: A comprehensive review*. Sydney: Young and Well Cooperative Research Centre. Available online, URL: http://www.youngandwellcrc.org.au/document/ea0e9511fce02b8be23990\_07ef7fc4c7/Videogames\_and\_Wellbeing.pdf. Retrieved February 4, 2014.

Kahn, B. E., & Isen, A. M. (1993). The influence of positive affect on variety seeking among safe, enjoyable products. *Journal of Consumer Research, 20*(2), 257–270.

Manderlink, G., & Harackiewicz, J. M. (1984). Proximal versus distal goal setting and intrinsic motivation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47*(4), 918–928.

Stauner, N. (2013). *Personal goal attainment, psychological well-being change, and meaning in life.* (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Riverside). Available online, URL: http://escholarship.org/uc/item/3t34c68w.
> 10 votes

---
Tags: motivation, personality, positive-psychology, addiction
---


# Question
Title: In measuring preferences, is the magnitude of the question wording effect topic-dependent?
I just read that in a survey on legalizing abortions:

> Responses depended strongly on the question wording.

But I have also seen cases where question wording is largely irrelevant. As long as there are no intentional "leading" phrases or general errors like ambiguity, respondents are likely to respond in a similar manner to questions with a similar content.

My hunch, based on personal experience in non-survey contexts, would be that in issues where people have already formed strong attitudes on the topic, a wording which is congruent with existing attitudes will elicit more agreement, and a wording which implies disagreement will elicit more disagreement. But in cases where people don't already have attitudes, the question wording won't be that important. But this is really just a hunch, I have never seen data on that.

Is there a good scientific overview on the factors which determine the relationship between the question topic, the respondent (whether his attitudes or other characteristics), and the likelihood that a difference in question wording will cause a difference in response?

# Answer
<sub>Self-report methodology was one of my qualifying exam topics as a doctoral student of social and personality psychology, so I've got a ton of references to offer, but I confess I haven't read most of them very thoroughly (if at all), and I've forgotten where exactly I've read some of this. It's really a very broad topic as well, so I won't list most I know of that might be relevant here, but I can probably offer more on specific subtopics per request. </sub>

Very many relationships exist between respondent characteristics and response biases that depend on survey design. It would be practically unimaginable if topic-in-question weren't a moderating factor for some of them. Social desirability in particular is a form of bias that depends heavily on survey design, participant characteristics, and topic of study. Wikipedia offers a pretty good intro-level summary:

> The tendency poses a serious problem with conducting research with **self-reports, especially questionnaires**. This bias interferes with the interpretation of average tendencies as well as individual differences.
>
> **Topics** where socially desirable responding (SDR) is of special concern are self-reports of **abilities, personality, sexual behavior, and drug use**. When confronted with the question "How often do you masturbate?", for example, respondents may be pressured by the societal taboo against masturbation, and either under-report the frequency or avoid answering the question. Therefore the mean rates of masturbation derived from self-report surveys are likely to be severe underestimates.
>
> When confronted with the question, "Do you use drugs/**illicit** substances?" the respondent may be influenced by the fact that controlled substances, including the more commonly used marijuana, are generally **illegal**. Respondents may feel pressured to deny any drug use or rationalize it, e.g., "I only smoke marijuana when my friends are around." The bias can also influence reports of **number of sexual partners**. In fact, the **bias may operate in opposite directions for different subgroups**: Whereas men tend to inflate the numbers, women tend to underestimate theirs. In either case, the mean reports from both groups are likely to be distorted by social desirability bias.
>
> **Other topics that are sensitive to social desirability bias:**
>
> * Personal income and earnings, often inflated when low and deflated when high.
> * Feelings of low self-worth and/or powerlessness, often denied.
> * Excretory functions, often approached uncomfortably, if discussed at all.
> * Compliance with medicinal dosing schedules, often inflated.
> * Religion, often either avoided or uncomfortably approached.
> * Patriotism, either inflated or, if denied, done so with a fear of other party's judgement.
> * Bigotry and intolerance, often denied, even if it exists within the responder.
> * Intellectual achievements, often inflated.
> * Physical appearance, either inflated or deflated
> * Acts of real or imagined physical violence, often denied.
> * Indicators of charity or "benevolence," often inflated.
> * Illegal acts, often denied.
> \[Emphasis added.\]

An arguable exception to the second-to-last appears in Smith (1987): people respond less generously and more negatively to "welfare" than "poor".

Wikipedia mentions one of many measures of socially desirable responding, but notes:

> The major concern with SDR scales is that they confound style with content. After all, people actually differ in the degree to which they possess desirable traits (e.g., nuns versus criminals).

Another concern is the potential multidimensionality of social desirability bias. Some arises in consciously deceptive responding; another kind arises from unconscious self-deception. These extent of each of these kinds of social desirability bias may depend differently on individual differences in respondents and question topic and wording.

Wikipedia also gives a brief overview of other response styles, including extreme response style, which relates to demographic (Song, 2007) and personality (Hamilton, 1968) factors. An opposite sort of style, the tendency toward neutral / "don't know" responses may be caused by personal uncertainty, item difficulty, or the sensitivity of the topic (Coombs & Coombs, 1976), so this seems to be a pretty complete example of a kind of bias that depends on all three factors. Another one of these response styles, acquiescence (and vice versa), is a somewhat interesting personality variable unto itself (Couch & Keniston, 1960); its influence can be limited by avoiding the "agree vs. disagree" format, but this may be harder in attitude research than in some other topics.

Below this, Wikipedia mentions that anonymity, confidentiality, and neutralized administration can reduce social desirability bias, so in this sense, contextual factors outside the question itself can affect biasing, especially where the judgment of others (e.g., parents, peers, employers, law enforcement) is of concern (e.g., children of authoritarian parents, friends of judgmental people, job applicants facing personality tests, parolees and prior convicts).

A particularly good review article I have on hand (Schwarz, 1999) discusses issues of "question wording, format, and context," including:

* Ambiguity, obscurity, and wordiness
* Open-ended responding (see also Geer, 1988) vs. frequency reporting and item rating
* Topical subjectivity, demand for expertise, and time-dependence

As this article is a review itself, you can also find plenty of other references through it. Another review article that might interest others here relates survey measurement issues to cognitive issues like memory, comprehension, and schema priming (Jobe & Mingay, 1991), each of which I could easily see being more or less relevant in certain contexts and for certain people in ways that would depend on how a question is worded. Again, another huge reference section to be mined for more specifics there too. Yet another review (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) pertains specifically to error (not necessarily systematic bias) in self-reported information about mental processes due to limited self-awareness / insight and the influence of prior theories or plausibility judgments. Good stuff to bring up here, if I do say so myself!

**References**

Coombs, C. H., & Coombs, L. C. (1976). “Don't Know” Item Ambiguity or Respondent Uncertainty?. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 40*(4), 497–514.

Couch, A., & Keniston, K. (1960). Yeasayers and naysayers: Agreeing response set as a personality variable. *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 60*(2), 151–174.

Geer, J. G. (1988). What do open-ended questions measure? *Public Opinion Quarterly, 52*(3), 365–367.

Hamilton, D.L. (1968). Personality attributes associated with extreme response style. *Psychological Bulletin, 69*(3), 192–203.

Jobe, J. B., & Mingay, D. J. (1991). Cognition and survey measurement: History and overview. *Applied Cognitive Psychology, 5*(3), 175–192.

Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes. *Psychological Review, 84*(3), 231–259. Available online, URL: http://www.apologeticsinthechurch.com/uploads/7/4/5/6/7456646/nisbettwilson.pdf. Retrieved February 5, 2014.

Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers. *American Psychologist, 54*(2), 93–105. Available online, URL: https://edit.ethz.ch/oat/education/material/material\_06\_07/material\_empirical\_methods\_06\_07/American\_Psychologist\_Self-Reports.pdf.

Smith, T. W. (1987). That which we call welfare by any other name would smell sweeter: An analysis of the impact of question wording on response patterns. *Public Opinion Quarterly, 51*(1), 75–83.

Song, X.-Y. (2007). Analysis of multisample structural equation models with applications to Quality of Life data. In S.-Y. Lee (Ed.), *Handbook of latent variable and related models*, pp. 279–302. North-Holland.
> 3 votes

---
Tags: measurement, language, bias, survey
---