# Question
Title: Does the time required to read a word grow linearly with the number of characters?
I recently installed a speed reader on my tablet. Now I wonder how the minimal time needed to read an $N$-letter word grows.

There was this previous question on the relationship between sentence length and reading time. However, I'm particularly interested in the relationship between word length and reading specific words.

**Does the time required to read an $N$-letter word grow linearly?**

# Answer
The average response times for single words in a lexical decision task (depart real words from nonsense words) is plotted below.

The curve follows a **U-shape and span over several dozens of milliseconds**.

Figure 2. Average reaction time and 95% confidence interval for words with lengths from 3 to 13 letters if length was the only factor having an influence (all other factors have been partialled out).

*Ref*: New et al., PBR (2006). Reexamining the word length effect in visual word recognition: New evidence from the English Lexicon Project
> 1 votes

# Answer
To answer your question, we must first understand what you mean with "read". Since you ask in the context of speed reading, you appear to be interested in *extracting meaning from written text*. So we can rephrase your question as:

**Does the time to recognize and understand a word increase with word length?**

The effect of word length has been studied for two tasks, lexical decision and naming. In a lexical decision task participants are presented with words or nonwords (e.g. "dftrpg") and have to quickly press one specific key for words, and another for nonwords, on the keyboard. The time between the presentation of the stimulus and the key press (the reaction time) is registered. Since you are reading a text in which there are no nonwords, lexical decision is irrelevant in the context of your question.

A naming task is similar to a lexical decision task, with the exception that participants read the words aloud, and their responses trigger the computer via a microphone ("voice key"). Again, the reaction times between the presentation of the stimulus and the spoken word are registered. Since we cannot directly measure understanding, we assume that naming reflects understanding. (Of course you can speak words that you do not know, and even nonwords, but the reactions times would be significantly longer, so we would notice the difference. As long as RT is reasonably short, we may probably assume that the participant knows that word and has understood it.)

Not every time a participant names a word will he or she do so in the exact same time. Sometimes someone will be a bit slower to react, sometimes a bit faster. So we calculate the average reaction time for each word. What we note is that these average reactions times are not the same for different words, that is: the reaction times vary. Now, what we want to do, is explain this variance. Is it in some way related to word length? Or does it correlate to other characteristics of the words, such as number of syllables, word type (noun, verb, adjective), word frequency (how often a word is actually used in everyday spoken language), and so on.

After a number of calculations on the data, we find that all these aspects explain a part of the variance in reaction times (Baayen, Feldman & Schreuder, 2006). Here is a table of the different word characteristics (the predictors), and how much of the variance in naming speed they predict. Only those predictors are listed that had a significant effect. The numbers are adjusted *R2* × 100, i.e. the percentage of variance uniquely accounted for by each predictor over and above all other predictors. You don't have to understand the meaning of these numbers, but they show the relative strength of the effect each predictor has on naming speed.

```
Lower bounds for the percentage of variance (adjusted R2 × 100)
explained by the significant predictors in word naming

Frequency                           6.08
Initial diphone 2                   4.33
Initial diphone (syllable-based)    3.88
Frication/Length first phoneme      2.24
Voicedness first phoneme            1.73
PC2 Consistency                     1.28
Length                              1.14
PC1 Consistency                     0.91
Written-to-spoken ratio             0.59
Neighborhood density                0.36
PC3 Consistency                     0.36
Inflectional entropy                0.34
Residual familiarity                0.31

```

In all, the results are:

* The overall variance in reaction times is small. In young adults they range from around 300 to around 700 ms, with about two thirds of the RTs falling into a narrow slot of only 100 ms.
* All the predictors together explain only half of the variance in reaction time (*R2* = 0.4999), the rest of the variance must be attributed to unknown predictors or, more likely, are artifacts of the testing situation (distraction, boredom, etc.).
* **The single strongest predictor of naming speed is word frequency**.
* The contribution of each of the other single predictors is tiny (a few microseconds each).
* **Word length predicts only a few microseconds in variance.**
* **There is a word length effect only if words are presented individually, not in a text context** (Meyer, Roelofs & Levelt, 2003).

> To answer your question, we can say that the length of the words has probably no noticeable effect on your text reading speed.

---

Sources:

* Baayen, R. H., Feldman, L. B., & Schreuder, R. (2006). Morphological influences on the recognition of monosyllabic monomorphemic words. Journal of Memory and Language, 55(2), 290-313.
* Balota, D. A., Cortese, M. J., Sergent-Marshall, S. D., Spieler, D. H., & Yap, M. (2004). Visual word recognition of single-syllable words. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 133(2), 283.
* Meyer, A. S., Roelofs, A., & Levelt, W. J. (2003). Word length effects in object naming: The role of a response criterion. Journal of Memory and Language, 48(1), 131-147.
> 4 votes

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Tags: perception, performance, reading
---


# Question
Title: Reading vs. watching a lecture: which activity results in higher knowledge retention?
I teach calculus to freshmen and currently spend most of the classroom time lecturing. To make classes more interactive I'd like to shift this phase of "knowledge transfer" outside of classes. Either by giving students reading assignments, or by giving them videos to watch.

So I was wondering if *reading* as opposed to *watching a video* of someone explaining the same thing, results in different learning outcomes.

An attempt to make the question more narrow: is there a difference in brain activity or knowledge retention between reading a text vs. watching another person reciting the same text?

# Answer
> 5 votes
Consider this, communication is more than 50% nonverbal. Studies vary (from 93% nonverbal to 75%) and the actual percentage is difficult to interpret, but it is generally accepted that most of the communication is nonverbal.

That being said, a book is only written word and content, whereas a lecture is dynamic, versatile, and incorporates much of the nonverbal content.

Moreover, a lecture and video has much more stimulus going to the brain and this does have an impact on memory retention. Consider how PTSD cases arise; they are due to an individual experiencing hyper-stimulation (from the emotional brain) which in turn creates very strong memories. The same would hold true when comparing learning through reading and learning through a lecture.

## However

This depends on many things:

* For example if the lecturer is boring and monotone, it's the same or worse (boring lectures can put people to sleep) than giving a student something to read.
* It also depends on the student's ability and motivation. If he or she is motivated and enjoys the subject, they will retain a lot of information from reading and working on their own due to their sense of joy in the subject--an emotional response will in turn encode memories more strongly.
* Lastly it depends on how well the concept is explained. If a student does not understand a concept then for them to perform the calculations it will require a lot more memory work. If they understand something, then the actual memory work will be less, because they need not recall as much information in order to solve the problem.

In general though I would say that videos and lectures have more potential of creating memory retention due to providing more stimuli for the student.

---
Tags: learning, educational-psychology, reading
---


# Question
Title: Does a more ergonomic and user friendly interface/device make the human brain work less?
There was an interesting discussion on UX.StackExchange related to washing machines and their front windows. I was very surprised that it took me like 2 minutes or so to figure out why the washing machine has a window, but most of the answers or comments (including those with many votes) don't express the real reason, which would be similar to this:

> For front-loaders without viewing windows on the door, it is possible to accidentally pinch fabric between the door and the drum, resulting in tearing and damage to the pinched clothing during tumbling and spinning. - Wikipedia.

**Question**: Does a more ergonomic and user friendly interface make the human brain work less, or less intensive, so it can not see the initial purpose of an improvement made in a system or on one of its elements?

# Answer
> 5 votes
ISO 9241, a standard covering ergonomics of human-computer interaction, defines in its subsection 9241-110, "Dialogue Principles", that the interface in information systems should be (among other things):

* suitable for the task
* facilitate learning
* conform with user expectations
* describe its own purpose and functioning

You could translate all this to:

> Don't make the user think too hard about what he has to do

Shneiderman, in his "Eight Golden Rules of Interface Design" and Nielsen in his "10 Usability Heuristics of User Interface Design" (also on Wikipedia), make this even more explicit:

* Shneiderman, Rule 8: Reduce short-term memory load
* Nielsen, Heuristic 6: Recognition rather than recall

**Reducing cognitive load is part of the industry definition of usability. By that definition a usable product "makes the human brain work less".**

---

Sources:

# Answer
> 4 votes
The answer is "yes." The entire field of Human Factors and Ergonomics is devoted to enhancing the experience of the human user. Cognitive engineering is the branch of human factors that focuses specifically on how people perceive and respond to system interfaces. Engineers and scientists in this field try to design components, systems, interfaces, and even training to be the best fit for the users. By exploiting built-in capabilities and navigating around known pitfalls with human cognitive abilities, we can design systems that are more natural and thereby safer and more effective to operate.

Now, as to whether the design of the interface has anything to do with people failing to see possible improvement(s) - I think this is unrelated. If you read Donald Norman's *The Design of Everyday Things*, he makes a big deal about how people blame themselves for the ergonomic shortfalls of a poorly designed thing.

Take a push-pull door with pull handles on both sides of the door. The natural action is to walk up and pull on the handle, because handles afford pulling (regardless of what side of the door they are on). So, you pull on the "push side," then blame yourself for not reading the sign that said "Push," when in fact it was a bad design that led you to pull in the first place. And you carry on without a second thought, nevermind the fact that it was the designer, not you, who is an imbecile.

So, the short answer to the second part of the question is people don't generally think about improving the system, they think about how to avoid making mistakes in using the system.

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Tags: intelligence, attention, human-factors
---


# Question
Title: Is there a scientific term for when you fall asleep because you can't handle something?
**I'm wondering if there is a scientific term that describes when you fall asleep or pass out after some traumatic event?**

This effect happens when people witness something gruesome (a friend being killed, for instance), have some major upheaval in their life, or experience some other trauma (eg. a bad breakup, losing a job, etc.). When the mind can't cope it simply shuts off and they fall asleep or pass out. A decent example I just though of can be seen in the first Matrix movie (not the first place I would have thought of to look for an example) when Neo finds out about the matrix and promptly vomits and passes out for a few hours.

The closest term I'm aware of is a dissociative fugue or fugue state, though I'm unsure if that's related (possibly it's simply a more extreme version of the effect I tried to describe above).

# Answer
> 3 votes
The specific event you mention (my paraphrasing: **loss of consciousness and motor control leading to a sleep/coma-like state due to acute circumstantial stress**) might best be classified according to @Monacraft's excellent answer. To build on that somewhat, we've discussed in chat that there might be important distinctions among various levels of consciousness, such that, per your example, "sleep" might be usefully different from "passed out." I've noted my own vague familiarity with theories of consciousness that model it in terms of discrete *levels of awareness*. My off-the-cuff proposal for such a model was as follows: $$\text{fully alert \> calm}\ge\text{trance}\ge\text{drowsy} \\ \text{\> REM sleep \> deep sleep \> "KO'd" unconscious}\\\text{\> deep coma}\ge\text{Near-death experience}\ge\text{vegetative \> kaput}$$ I see that Wikipedia has its own page about *levels of consciousness* as well, which lists the following levels as a summary (using GRE-level vocab), for which it cites Porth (2007):

$$\text{conscious \> confused \> delirious \> somnolent \> obtunded \> stuporous \> comatose}$$

The above Wikipedia page even mentions and links to a separate page about the Glasgow Coma Scale (cf. Gill, Reiley, & Green, 2004), which is one of apparently many scales in medical use for measuring differences among unconscious states, so it seems one could take an even finer-grained or fully **continuous approach to modeling individual differences in degree of conscious awareness**. A Google image search for "levels of consciousness" also leads to a lot of rather suspicious-looking diagrams of levels of consciousness above sleep, so a continuous dimensional model would probably help reduce a lot of this theoretical mess if theorists could somehow be made to agree with it unanimously. Then again, one strong counterargument would be the often sudden loss of muscle tension that can occur in rapid transitions from awake to unconscious. That might better support a model with at least one such discrete state change.

Anyway, this reminds me of *general adaptation syndrome* (GAS), which describes normative stress response in terms of a **curvilinear model of resistance as a continuous dependent variable changing over time**: Thus another conceivable, more general answer might simply be "**exhaustion**", as above. One source on GAS that I was able to find online just now mentions "passing out" explicitly in association with the exhaustion stage, so this at least tentatively supports the interpretation of **exhaustion as potentially leading to unconscious, sleep-like levels of consciousness**, though maybe more authoritative references than this could be found to provide such support (please comment or edit if you find any). Another parallel worth drawing here is between "resistance to stress" and emotional arousal, the vertical axis on the circumplex model of emotion I mentioned in another answer here. Given a stressful circumstance, we'd of course be looking at the left side of that diagram, and reinterpreting the rise and fall of resistance as the transition from neutral, to nervous, to gloomy, and finally sluggish or tired. This might help explain why depression is a related issue. Long-term depression (such as in people suffering a major depressive episode) naturally leaves a person exhausted, and maybe more likely to just pass out when overwhelmed by stress, because such a person is probably closer to "overwhelmed" from the outset.

In our chat, we've discussed some other complexities on the *diathesis* side of the stress response model; I think some of that is worth re-posting here. First, a handy (if simplistic) diagram from Wikipedia on the **diathesis-stress model**:
To apply this here, let's define the `negative outcome` as that described in the OP; the `positive outcome` as simply retaining consciousness, self-control, and effective coping capability; the `negative environment/experience` as the class of traumatic events described in the OP; the `positive environment/experience` as ordinary experience; the `resilient individual` as the subpopulation of people who would score at least one standard deviation (*SD*) above average on measures of protective characteristics and one *SD* below average on diathesis-exacerbating characteristics; the `vulnerable individual` as the opposite subpopulation; and both lines as oversimplified predictions of average tendencies subject to probabilistic error. This allows us to accommodate a potentially endless list of **individual differences that could moderate the normative tendency** to change one's level of conscious awareness in response to extremely shocking, traumatic stress. For now, I'll limit myself to mentioning only two, particularly relevant differences:

* **Hardiness** is the prototypical stress-resistance trait; you'd expect a resilient individual to have lots.
* **Neuroticism**, the opposite of emotional stability, characterizes individuals with tendencies toward negative emotionality and stronger stress response. This would make an individual more reactive, likely to experience depression, and thus more likely to suffer chronic exhaustion and be vulnerable.
    + It relates to psychiatric illness in general, which **relates to syncope** (Oh & Kapoor, 1997).
    + It's **negatively related to hardiness**, but partially distinct (Sinclair & Tetrick, 2000), so a neurotic person who also lacks hardiness would be especially vulnerable, and vice versa.

**References**

Gill, M. R., Reiley, D. G., & Green, S. M. (2004). Interrater reliability of Glasgow Coma Scale scores in the emergency department. *Annals of Emergency Medicine, 43*(2), 215–223.

Oh, J. H., & Kapoor, W. N. (1997). Psychiatric illness and syncope. *Cardiology Clinics, 15*(2), 269–275.

Porth, C. (2007). *Essentials of pathophysiology: Concepts of altered health states*, pp. 835. Hagerstown, MD: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. ISBN 0-7817-7087-4. Retrieved July 3, 2008.

Sinclair, R. R., & Tetrick, L. E. (2000). Implications of item wording for hardiness structure, relation with neuroticism, and stress buffering. *Journal of Research in Personality, 34*(1), 1–25.

# Answer
> 6 votes
I'm not completely sure, but you may be referring to Syncope, a medical term which describes events such as fainting or passing out which occurs upon low blood flow to the brain. As a result it can occur when under shock or trauma or a post-effect of stress.

Obviously, one would expect the opposite to happen in half the events, such as after vomiting, however when you said

> have some major upheaval in their life, or experience some other trauma (e.g., a bad breakup, losing a job, etc.). When the mind can't cope it simply shuts off and they fall asleep or pass out.

I realised you may be relating to someone feeling a depressed, in which case lowering of blood pressure is possible and thus he or she could suffer from syncope.

In all honesty it is simply a technical term for fainting, and is more commonly used for people who suffer a disorder which will cause them to faint often.

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, terminology, sleep
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# Question
Title: Can time be perceived differently depending on a user's feeling?
You often hear that time passes more quickly when you're having fun. And the opposite is also "true" in common belief, that when you're bored time is very slow. But we know that time is almost linear and constant.

Is there any scientific proof of that time is perceived differently depending on feeling or mood?

# Answer
> 5 votes
There's definitely scientific evidence that one's perception of time can be influenced by actions which in no way something's duration.

It's not *quite* the happy/sad affect you're asking about, but it definitely suggests that one's perception of time can be meaningfully influenced by wholly unrelated information:

2010 Study: When doctors sit for patient consultations, they are perceived as staying longer, providing higher quality care

Patients consistently overestimated the time doctors spent with them *much more* when the doctors sat down while talking to them then when they remained standing. (The multiple was about 85% higher relative to the actual for the doctors who sat.)

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Tags: perception, emotion, time
---


# Question
Title: Why does regular repetition become a habit?
Humans have the tendency to develop habits. Habits of an individual can be different, same, or unique.

Some have a habit of talking too much (chatty), drawing a box around the answer of mathematical problem, etc.

Why does *regular repetition become automatic or habitual*?

# Answer
Here are some excerpts from Wikipedia you might find helpful for the (somewhat too-) general question:

> A habit...tends to occur subconsciously.\[(Butler & Hope, 1995)\]...\[Andrews (1903)\]...defined \[habits as\]: "...acquired through previous repetition of a mental experience." Habitual behavior often goes unnoticed in persons exhibiting it, because a person does not need to engage in self-analysis when undertaking routine tasks. Habits are sometimes compulsory...Old habits are hard to break and new habits are hard to form because the behavioural patterns we repeat are imprinted in our neural pathways...but it is possible to form new habits through repetition \[(Rosenthal / Psychology Today)\].
>
> As behaviors are repeated in a consistent context, there is an incremental increase in the link between the context and the action. This increases the automaticity of the behavior in that context \[(Wood & Neal, 2007)\]...
>
> Habit formation can be slow. Lally\[, Van Jaarsveld, Potts, and Wardle\] (2010) found the average time for participants to reach the asymptote of automaticity was 66 days with a range of 18–254 days...

**References**

Andrews, B. R. (1908). Habit. *American Journal of Psychology, 14*(2), 121–149. Available online, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1412711.

Butler, G., & Hope, T. (1995). *Managing your mind: The mental fitness guide*. Oxford Paperbacks.

Lally, P., Van Jaarsveld, C. H., Potts, H. W., & Wardle, J. (2010). How are habits formed: Modelling habit formation in the real world. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 40*(6), 998–1009.

Wood, W., & Neal, D. T. (2007). A new look at habits and the habit-goal interface. *Psychological Review, 114*(4), 843–863. Available online, URL: http://dornsife.usc.edu/assets/sites/545/docs/Wendy\_Wood\_Research\_Articles/Habits/wood.neal.2007psychrev\_a\_new\_look\_at\_habits\_and\_the\_interface\_between\_habits\_and\_goals.pdf.
> 2 votes

# Answer
**Why do often repeated behaviors become automatic?**

=\> Because that is efficient.

Human behavior is often modelled in a dual process theory:

1. if possible, act without thinking
2. only if necessary, carefully consider the situation at hand and think about the best reaction

If you do the same thing over and over again, then obviously it is either the best possible or a sufficient reaction to the situation in which it occurs. To free some of the limited and valuable cognitive capacity, that behavior becomes automatic. Only if the situation is different and the habitual behavior does not properly fit, will you have to think.

The best known dual process theories are
> 2 votes

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Tags: developmental-psychology, habituation
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# Question
Title: Why is storytelling an effective way to transmit information between people?
Parables, fables, myths, whatever you might call them, stories have always been part of human consciousness. Within recent decades, storytelling is recognized as a big component of advertising and marketing. Stories can capture our attention, motivate us, and make us feel.

Is there any scientific research which provides an explanation as to why humans are so cognitively responsive to stories?

# Answer
> 13 votes
Narrative psychology is probably the go-to domain of research and theory for questions about the power and popularity of stories. Here's an excerpt from the Wikipedia page (with added emphasis):

> *Narrative psychology* is...concerned with the "storied nature of human conduct" \[(Sarbin, 1986)\] or...how human\[s\]...deal with experience by constructing stories and listening to the stories of others. Operating under the assumption that **human activity and experience are filled with "meaning" and stories, rather than logical arguments or lawful formulations**...\[this\] dichotomy...\[appears (Bruner, 1990)\] as a distinction between "paradigmatic" and "narrative" forms of thought, in his understanding they are both fundamental but irreducible one to the another.
>
> According to Sarbin (1986) "narrative" is a root metaphor for psychology that should replace the mechanistic and organic metaphors which shaped so much theory and research in the discipline over the past century. The **indisputable physical events of a personal occurrence** are different from a story that results from the storied cause and effect relationships. (McKinnon) \[citation unavailable\]
>
> ...**Independent of any fiction in the actual physical matter told, are physical events that are as unequivocal as quantum mechanics and human chemistry.**

I'm unfamiliar with examples of narrative psychological research of the sort you're looking for specifically, but the above seems to argue from psychological theory at least that narratives gain appeal and influence from their apparent factuality. Narratives may not claim to apply their principles generally, let alone acknowledge any limits to their generality, but maybe people naturally infer generality anyway, and are less likely to recognize limits on their own when they aren't mentioned...This is just speculation though.

One other idea that's at least equally worth mentioning (which may not be saying much) is that narratives are particularly influential in the study of identity. Tying negative events in one's life into a redemptive life narrative relates to well-being, though causality isn't clear in this relationship (McAdams & McLean, 2013). Maybe a similar principle applies from an observer's perspective: maybe consumers of stories "create meaning" vicariously by putting both good and bad events in the shared context of others' lives. Maybe advertisers' messages are more subtly appealing (and less overbearing) when embedded in the narratives of relatable, likable characters that seem to have more to say than just what their favorite shampoo is. Again, this is speculation; I'm no advertiser. I mostly hope I've given you some ideas to follow up on in study of the areas of psychological research with which I am somewhat familiar: narrative identity, and narrative psychology in general.

---

**References**
**·** Bruner, J. S. (1990). *Acts of meaning*. Harvard University Press.
**·** McAdams, D. P., & McLean, K. C. (2013). Narrative identity. *Current Directions in Psychological Science, 22*(3), 233–238.
**·** Sarbin, T. R. (1986). *Narrative psychology: The storied nature of human conduct*. Praeger Publishers / Greenwood Publishing Group.

# Answer
> 2 votes
Stories are an effective means for conveying ideas or messages and captivating our attention as it gives meaning to those idea's and messages, while also linking it to a themes and emotions, hence allowing us to reflect our own lives in these stories you hear.

For example, imagine your self in the latter stone age where story telling was the most effective medium for passing down techniques. If you were told that to start a fire you had to simply collect and number of materials and stratch a piece of flint and steel to create sparks on the tinder, some may remember the process but for most a lot of effort and concentration would be required to memorise all of these items.

Meanwhile, if you were told this process through a story with characters (for example a story of how fire was discovered that was most likely fictional) suddenly you are relating characters, themes and experiences to events in your own life, which would significantly increase the chance of you remembering it.

Similarly, for the story teller, instead of having to remember a list of items required, all they would have to remember is a short story and the best part is the details of the characters do not have to be specific. Thus it would be much more enjoyable.

Clearly sotry telling is much more effective then memorisation, which is why it is being used up to this day.

Hope this helped, Mona.

# Answer
> 0 votes
I think that when a human being listen to a story then listener get some sympathy or emotional attraction towards some character and as you said that it motivates us, stories motivate us because we thing that we are equivalent to some character and we try ourselves to become like that or to achieve what the character have achieved.

You even said that stories capture our attention, in this case I am not with you. Take an example, you yourself will not like(not being in attention) because you have some categories(like- love stories, horror, adventure etc.) let say that you like horror stories then I am sure that you can not give the same attention to stories other than horror.

This just the role of genes that decide the mood, likes, dislikes etc.

You will like to know that you pay more attention in watching a horror movies than any other movie.

# Answer
> 0 votes
No research can **prove** any explanation as to why humans are so cognitively responsive to stories.

Moreover, while one may be able to find evidence to support a plausible theory, such evidence will only be correlative, and as such cannot prove cause.

That said, there have been many studies about correlating emotional stress with with long term memorization.

**While the comprehension of bare facts does not require emotion, the full comprehension of a story does.**

It has also been shown, that when presented with a story, your mirror neurons are activated, and you become more susceptible to suggestions of feeling. You then take on the emotions presented to you, and these emotions, much like the ones in the stress studies, are thought to help solidify memories in your mind.

Despite all of these insights of **how** stories affect us, the "why" still cannot addressed.

One might theorize about an "explanation" of how it might be evolutionary advantageous to remember things with strong emotional ties vs information without such context. However, it is prudent understand that such explanations provide no testable hypotheses, and thus should not to be confused with "scientific explanations".

As such, **"Why" questions are generally the realm of philosophy and religion**.

# Answer
> 0 votes
Maybe because episodic memory is better developed then semantic.

Here is a nice study on how to teach virtual agent to use episodic memory: http://www.techfak.uni-bielefeld.de/~frabe/publications/Rabe2012-EpisodicMemory-ICAART2012-CameraReady.pdf

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Tags: social-psychology, memory, communication, neuromarketing
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title: Why do we scream in pain and fear?

text:
# Question
Title: Why do we scream in pain and fear?
Why do humans (other living things too, but not sure) scream and make high pitched sounds when in pain*  or when in fear that something painful* will imminently be inflicted upon them?

*  both physical and emotional.

# Answer
This question came up in our tri-monthly site evaluation queue (Let's get critical: Feb 2014 Site Self-Evaluation), and I marked it as "needs improvement," so here's an indication why, and my attempt to do so.

The next-highest Google hit for this question's title, "Science: why we scream" (Highfield, 2008) seems pretty useful. Telegraph's terms and conditions are a little scary though, so I'll paraphrase some ideas rather than quoting directly.

Darwin himself argued that emotional expressions may improve selective fitness. This could explain the relatively universal uniformity of fear expressions, which generally include widened eyes and nostrils, lifted eyebrows, and maybe some inclination to scream (Susskind et al., 2008). This may improve olfactory and visual sensory intake and motion tracking. Pragmatic benefits aside, William James, another prominent historical figure in psychology, was well ahead of his time in pointing out that expressions affect emotions; they also affect neural circulation!

However, there are limits to the universality of fear expressions, and even to the uniformity of facial muscular anatomy (Waller, Cray, & Burrows, 2008)! Basic expressions like "happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise, and disgust" are handled pretty well by five essentially ubiquitous facial muscles, but people differ in the number of additional, facially expressive muscles they have (19 may be the maximum). I've edited this summary of Waller and colleagues' results into the Wikipedia page on the risorius muscle just now:

> A study of 18 Caucasian cadavers found individual differences in the presence and bilateral symmetry of risorius muscles. Seven of these individuals (both men and women) clearly lacked the muscle; two were inconclusive; only four were conclusively symmetric.

Highfield (2008) associates the risorius muscle with "expressions of extreme fear," but Wikipedia only associates it with an "insincere-looking" smile; Waller and colleagues (2008) associate no expressions explicitly with the risorius muscle, which they don't really discuss in specific depth. However, Highfield quotes Waller directly (suggesting further unpublished discussion that may have supported his interpretation of risorius' function) as follows:

> Everyone communicates using a set of common signals...so we would expect to find that the muscles do not vary. The results are surprising. Some less common facial expressions may be unique to certain people.

Other quick Google Scholar results for "scream fear" ("scream pain" didn't produce anything promising at first glance) seem useful to mention here too. A study of rats and 160 undergrads found (in the human research) that a "yell, scream, or call for help...was frequent for females, rare for males" (Blanchard, Hynd, Minke, Minemoto, & Blanchard, 2001). A more general discussion of the function of fear screams in humans and other animals has also been published (Högstedt, 1983), so you may want to check that out too. It includes some literature review, so its references could probably lead much deeper into the question than you may wish to pursue it... ;)

**References**

Caroline Blanchard, D., Hynd, A. L., Minke, K. A., Minemoto, T., & Blanchard, R. J. (2001). Human defensive behaviors to threat scenarios show parallels to fear-and anxiety-related defense patterns of non-human mammals. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 25*(7), 761–770. Available online, URL: http://www.researchgate.net/publication/11558273\_Human\_defensive\_behaviors\_to\_threat\_scenarios\_show\_parallels\_to\_fear-\_and\_anxiety-related\_defense\_patterns\_of\_non-human\_mammals/file/9fcfd50c755e22230b.pdf. Retrieved February 8, 2014.

Highfield, R. (2008, June 17). Science: Why we scream. *The Telegraph: Science News*. Retrieved from http://www.telegraph.co.uk/science/science-news/3344701/Science-why-we-scream.html.

Högstedt, G. (1983). Adaptation unto death: Function of fear screams. *American Naturalist, 121*(4), 562–570. Available online, URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/2460982.

Susskind, J. M., Lee, D. H., Cusi, A., Feiman, R., Grabski, W., & Anderson, A. K. (2008). Expressing fear enhances sensory acquisition. *Nature Neuroscience, 11*(7), 843–850. Available online, URL: http://www.yorku.ca/khoffman/Psyc6253/Susskind%2708\_Meotions4perception.pdf. Retrieved February 8, 2014.

Waller, B. M., Cray Jr, J. J., & Burrows, A. M. (2008). Selection for universal facial emotion. *Emotion, 8*(3), 435–439. Available online, URL: http://eprints.port.ac.uk/1629/1/WALLERetal2008b.pdf. Retrieved February 8, 2014.
> 6 votes

# Answer
As every evolved mechanism, scream must give some advances over non screamers. The most important are:

* signal to other beings that they've hurt other being able to use violence in self protection
* signal the danger to other group members, sharing the same genes
* signal the danger to parents, which will come to rescue the child
> 2 votes

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Tags: emotion, pain
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# Question
Title: How do people perceive subjective scales?
Let's take a picture of apples:

Are there experiments conducted that study the distribution of the following answers to the question "How many apples are on this picture?":

* Very little
* Little
* Normal
* Many
* Lots of

Well, of course, this specific picture doesn't matter, but this *type* of questions is important for many applications, like in surveys, when people rate things on subjective scales, so that in particular situations we can compare neither across questions with the same scale nor across persons answered the same question.

For example, think of 360-degree surveys when a person rates himself and is rated by others, so to compare in the end the two ratings.

# Answer
If I understand you correctly, you are trying to learn about good practice in designing studies involving subjective scales? Then getting actual answers to such surveys might not be very helpful. You might rather want to know the impact of your survey design and the answering-environment on the answers of the respondent.

These are broad questions. Neither do I have the expertise nor the space to give you comprehensive answers here. Some suggestions though. As far as study design is concerned, you may want to consult Survey Methodology. In particular, section 5.3.5 deals with the implications of the type of scales used as possible answers. In fact, any other Survey Methodology textbook should cover this topic.

A lot of experiments also study the impact of social environment on perceptions and the construction of subjective opinions. Among others, Solomon Asch is a pioneer of experimental investigations of subjective perception. His most famous experiment is related to the conformity effect. He shows that people tend to conform to the perception of the group they are put in, even when this goes against strong visual evidences, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnT2FcuZaYI.

In another famous experiment, Asch studied the "recency" and the "primacy" effect. The subject of the experiment where enumerated a list of personality traits (generous, peaceful, wise, mean,...) and subsequently asked to described the person. Asch question was whether, in describing the fictitious individual, people would rely more heavily on the first enumerated traits (the "primacy" effect), or would rather focus on the last ones they where presented (the "recency" effect). Asch results tend to show a dominance of the "primacy" effect.

Again, it would be too long to present a list of the numerous experiments and theoretical attempt to grasp perceptions mechanisms here. The literature is broad but the topic is classical. If you read french, it is notably covered in chapter two of "Psychologie Sociale" by Jacques-Philippe Leyens and Vincent Yzerbyt, but it should be covered in any good (social) psychology textbook. Unless you have a more specific question, this might be the right way to start learning about it.
> 4 votes

# Answer
> Well, of course, this specific picture doesn't matter, but this type of questions is important for many applications, like in surveys, when people rate things on subjective scales, so that **in particular situations we can compare neither across questions with the same scale nor across persons answered the same question**.

But we can, and do. Note that the point is not really to assess how many apples there are based on subjective answers. Usually the point is to see whether the type of people who say that there are many apples are also the type that will say something else (e.g. that the sky is blue). You are just looking for a relationship in the way a person answers different types of questions, and whether there are some general patterns that people follow when doing this. Then you go on to conclude something very general (and bold) about people, for example that they can be divided into optimists and pessimists.

Usually tests like this explain very little variance in actual behaviour, so there is a lot of measurement noise - and a large part of it stems from subjectivity. But still there may be some patterns underneath all this noise, and those are of interest to psychologists.

Note also that you would probably not get just one question aiming to measure one construct. If the construct is ability to discern amounts of apples, you would get a series of questions with pictures. In this case, you would go through a process of scaling based on the pictures you saw: you'd say there are many apples on the pictures that show the most apples in the series, and few on pictures that show the fewest. So your subjective inner scale adjusts to the scale presented to you. This takes away some measurement noise.
> 3 votes

# Answer
Schwarz (1999) reviews a variety of research on frequency estimation scales. That's not exactly the same kind of scale, but both request estimation of a count variable by choice among ordered, polytomized response options. Spector (1976, 1980, 1992) may also have something useful to say on this topic: he researched the effect of providing even vs. uneven interval categories for rating scales of frequency. Meanwhile, Moskowitz and a different Schwarz (1982) have compared the reliability and validity of behavior counts and ratings in personality research.

Getting somewhat off-topic, culture may be important to consider for Likert scale response interpretation in general (see for example Lee, Jones, Mineyama, & Zhang, 2002).

**Reference**

Lee, J. W., Jones, P. S., Mineyama, Y., & Zhang, X. E. (2002). Cultural differences in responses to a Likert scale. *Research in Nursing & Health, 25*(4), 295–306.

Moskowitz, D. S., & Schwarz, J. C. (1982). Validity comparison of behavior counts and ratings by knowledgeable informants. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 42*(3), 518–528.

Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers. *American Psychologist, 54*(2), 93–105. Available online, URL: https://edit.ethz.ch/oat/education/material/material\_06\_07/material\_empirical\_methods\_06\_07/American\_Psychologist\_Self-Reports.pdf.

Spector, P. E. (1976). Choosing response categories for summated rating scales. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 61*(3), 374–375.

Spector, P. E. (1980). Ratings of equal and unequal response choice intervals. *The Journal of Social Psychology, 112*(1), 115–119.

Spector, P. E. (Ed.). (1992). *Summated rating scale construction: An introduction* (No. 82). Sage.
> 2 votes

# Answer
I'd narrow this question: how people perceive different things in different situations (as well as set of things is narrowly specified). Because there is no simple answer - it is a cognitive function of the state in the states.

As for that picture (or similar), when I'm hungry I tend to see *little* apples (cause driven by the instincts I'm worring about me to be not satisfied) so when I had a king-size meal I'd say *a lot* when looking at that basket.
> 1 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology
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# Question
Title: What is an effective metric of complexity for an Artificial Neural Network?
After asking the question What is the most complex neural network... I realized I don't really have a good metric of "complexity" in a general sense. The simplest measure would likely be count of neurons or number of synapses, but that fails to take into account the structure of the network.

A couple measures of complexity are discussed in the paper Complexity of Predictive Neural Networks but they are very specific to a single task. One is the amount of work needed to learn a certain thing, and the other is how many neurons are needed to approximate a certain function.

Rough, animal based measures are often employees for the sake of grabbing headlines; such as the incorrect claims that The Blue Brain Project had emulated a neural network "as complex as" a cat's brain. C. elegans is a common and seemingly attainable level of complexity for an artificial neural network.

Animal based measures are relateable to the layman but seem questionable, especially when comparing a neural network to that of an animal who's neural network has not been completely mapped (as C. elegans has).

What is a meaningful measure by which artificial neural networks can be measured? How are such networks currently compared? Can any such metric appropriately measure complexity of such a system?

# Answer
> 15 votes
The standard complexity metric in theoretical computer science and machine learning, in particular in statistical learning theory, is the Vapnik–Chervonenkis (VC) dimension. It is of interest because it gives us a very good tool to measure the learning ability of a neural network (or any other statistical learner, in general).

A good introduction to the use of VC dimension for studying neural nets is:

Eduardo D. Sontag \[1998\] "VC dimension of neural networks" \[pdf\].

There, the author shows (for instance) that a network with one hidden layer, $n$ inputs, and $\tanh$ neurons has VC dimension of $n + 1$. He also explain some basic technique for how to upper-bound the VC dimension, and for how to use it for dynamic neural nets.

# Answer
> 1 votes
Venturing a contrasting view: VC dimension as cited by AK is a good/solid theoretical measurement of ANN complexity but would be unlikely to be applied to any real constructed ANN except as an estimate, and researchers/papers in large applied ANNs do not currently estimate VC dimension.

In a sense, how to measure complexity of an ANN is an open question that researchers are currently attempting to answer ("work in progress") and won't be solved until there is some more general theory of "feature detection" which seems to be slowly emerging at the moment e.g., in deep learning research. such a theory is likely a long time in the making if it is even possible & ever is obtained. Roughly, in this view, a "more complex" ANN recognizes "more complex" features across different dimensions (spatial, temporal, different sensory modalities such as auditory, kinesthetic (robotics), etc).

It is worthwhile & fairly objective however in the meantime to just consider a "black box" or "operational" style estimate based on intelligent functionality exhibited by the ANN. in other words, what can the ANN accomplish, and how does this compare to our only other benchmark of intelligence, namely biological?

You tend to rule this out in the question, but there is already a commonly used informal "sliding scale" of biological intelligence, e.g., with say small organisms at one end, moving through insects and mammals, etc., and humans at the other end. In animal science there are fairly conclusive questions & study to, e.g., "which is smarter, a dog, a pig, or a cat" with fairly nuanced/definitive answers (also with understanding that "context matters" & there are some various aspects of incomparability).

This approach basically dates to the Turing test and the Turing test is still a very valid scientific measurement of intelligence, still applied, e.g., in the Loebner contest, & seems to have roots also in behavioralist psychology principles. it involves the basic aspects of a scientific test such as a control & blind sampling etcetera.

Moreover, there are aspects of intelligence that are unique to humans such as speech recognition, image recognition, language translation, etc., and these lead to good benchmarks of ANNs that are targeted at human-like functionality as far as how well the ANN compares to human performance. it can even lead to measurements of supra-human performance in various cases.

This does not lead to a single quantifiable/numerical estimate of intelligence but in psychology, that premise is starting to be quite seriously questioned anyway, e.g., theory of multiple intelligences & perhaps even refuted somewhat at this point.

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Tags: terminology, measurement, neural-network, theoretical-neuroscience
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title: Is there psychoactive music?

text:
# Question
Title: Is there psychoactive music?
**Listen to this music for X minutes to observe Y result**. Is there something like that that has been demonstrated to work for general public?

The only example of an experiment that is similar that attempted to find out that I could find is: http://www.zlab.mcgill.ca/home.html

> Music, an abstract stimulus, can arouse feelings of euphoria and craving, similar to tangible rewards that involve the striatal dopaminergic system. Using the neurochemical specificity of \[11C\]raclopride positron emission tomography (PET) scanning, combined with psychophysiological measures of autonomic nervous system activity, we provide direct evidence for endogenous dopamine release in the striatum at peak emotional arousal during music listening.
>
> (Anatomically distinct dopamine release during anticipation and experience of peak emotion to music)

I know that there's a field of psychology called **music therapy** that attempts to help people with music. But from what I hear, people's responses to music are hard to quantify and are very subjective. **I'm interested if there's a music track out there that has been demonstrated to "entrain" brain activity (shift it from one state to another.)** That is, psychoactive music that has been developed not to *express an emotion of the artist*, but to *change cognition and consciousness*.

# Answer
> 1 votes
Also see Brainwave audio recordings and beta waves: how do they affect positivity and Is there evidence to suggest that music can trigger release of a particular kind of neurotransmitter??

In short, yes. All forms of stimulation result perceptions based on psychology and culture. It is, however, difficult to predict the way in which even the most *simple* tones like binaural beats will affect emotions and behaviour, because of past associations and cultural biases.

A recent study not posted on Wikipedia (sorry for lack of citation) shows that binaural beats have no effects on the tested traits of visual attention and task switching by the Color Trails Tests or an ADHD test called "test of variables of attention" when compared with placebo.

> Repeated measures analysis of variance was used to analyze pre- and postintervention scores on the Color Trails Tests, Homework Problem Checklist, and the TOVA. The effect of time was significant on the Color Trails Test. However, there were no significant group differences on the Color Trails Test or the TOVA scores postintervention. Parents reported that the study participants had fewer homework problems postintervention.

-Pilot Feasibility Study of Binaural Auditory Beats for Reducing Symptoms of Inattention in Children and Adolescents with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder

This does not exactly answer your question, as binaural beats may have an effect on the brain which does not have to do with attention or task switching. In that case, further study would need to be done under controls of placebo, multinational and multiculturalism.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, perception, music
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# Question
Title: What is mindful focused self-awareness from a cognitive science perspective?
Focused mindful self-awareness (Google talk Jon Kabat-Zinn) are common activities, used to help patients of a variety of mental illness of different degrees - with some evidence of healing (Dr. Jeffery Schwartz).

From a cognitive science perspective, what is this focused mindful self-awareness?

# Answer
I think your asking a psychologically healthy spiritual question. Psychologist are told to promote spirituality and many concepts from religion have affected current day therapies.

> Bishop, Lau, and colleagues (2004) offered a two-component model of mindfulness:
>
> The first component *of mindfulness* involves the self-regulation of attention so that it is maintained on immediate experience, thereby allowing for increased recognition of mental events in the present moment. The second component involves adopting a particular orientation toward one’s experiences in the present moment, an orientation that is characterized by curiosity, openness, and acceptance.
>
> In this two-component model, self-regulated attention (the first component) involves conscious awareness of one's current thoughts, feelings, and surroundings, which can result in metacognitive skills for controlling concentration. Orientation to experience (the second component) involves accepting one's mindstream, maintaining open and curious attitudes, and thinking in alternative categories (developing upon Ellen Langer's research on decision-making).

-wikipedia mindfulness

As a student of psychology, psychiatry and neuroscience I will give you my perspective of the cognitive science understanding of mindfulness. Then I'll give a less biased published view of a professor of psychology.

When I was 14 the church I belong to at the time was helped to be run by my Father. He built a pool for the church and right before the beginning of the High School semester we laid down concrete. For some reason the baseball coach decided to help us in exchange for some extra concrete for his field. I did not like laying concrete. The raking, bull float and constant worry that it would harden in an untenable way. To make matters worse the coach talked my dad into removing his partitions which would have made many small slabs around the pool into one giant slab. Anyone who knows about concrete in the south would immediately know that this means its going to crack and have to be sealed eventually. At the end of the day my muscles were give out and i lost my balance and my hand went into the crete a couple of times. In addition even though I count that day one of the times I worked extremely hard for no pay the coach had decided to call me various names and stuff. On the way home my father lost his temper with me. My grandparents put things into perspective.

Thier common way of doing it is consistent with Acceptance and commitment therapy (ACT) which uses mindfulness:

> 1. Cognitive defusion: Learning methods to reduce the tendency to reify *(inforce negative and self defeating schema see this example from The Help)* thoughts, images, emotions, and memories.
> 2. Acceptance: Allowing thoughts to come and go without struggling with them.
> 3. Contact with the present moment: Awareness of the here and now, experienced with openness, interest, and receptiveness.
> 4. Observing the self: Accessing a transcendent sense of self, a continuity of consciousness which is unchanging.
> 5. Values: Discovering what is most important to one's true self.
> 6. Committed action: Setting goals according to values and carrying them out responsibly.

-wikipedia ACT

They said, God loves you we love you don't worry *(Observing the self,Contact with the present moment,Values)*, don't be upset at him *(Committed action)* he's tired and isn't thinking clearly *(Acceptance)*, of course you worked extremely hard today but your father wasn't watching you I was *(Cognitive defusion)*, everyone loses their balance at some point especially during the last few hours it was easily correctable *(Cognitive defusion)*. This common sense, non-judgemental, encouraged me to consider the situation rationally, accept the fact that I was limited and my father was limited and not hold ill feelings toward him.

Evangelical Christianity is all about "Contact with the present moment", "Observing the self", and "Values". Services are chocked full of religious based phrases which lead people to experience a contact with the present moment through experiencing forgiveness, justification and cleansing of the past. God loves you it doesn't matter what you've done in the past your forgiven now, forget the past, your a new person in Christ now, there is hope for you, "Everything is working out for my good and for God's Glory". While we don't have all of ACT down if you go to such a church you will certainly learn to live in the present by allowing God to deal with you past. Such may be the case in other religions but I do not know.

The following is an exerpt from Dr. McFadden's Mindfulness, vulnerability, and love: Spiritual lessons from frail elders, earnest young pilgrims, and middle aged rockers:

> Raised a nominal Roman Catholic, with no concrete plans for entering the ministry, John McFadden went on to serve as senior pastor of two large United Church of Christ (Congregational) faith communities for a total of 32 years. As a result, I became a “minister's wife” and received the blessings of friendship with many older men and women who were my first teachers about aging with grace. These lessons accrued through the years and inspired my academic exploration of the psychology of religion and aging. From the beginning, when we were 23 years old with no clue how to be a minister or a minister's wife, to the time my husband retired from ministry to a beloved congregation in 2006, it was the old people who reached out to us with a multitude of kind and generous acts. In our age-segregated society, if I had married an accountant, a dentist, or a professor, I probably never would have developed such treasured friendships with older adults.
>
> My sense of time stops, and my identity as “Susan McFadden, Ph.D., Psychology Professor, wife, mother, blah blah blah” disappears as I crouch to grasp a hand, gaze at a face, and say “peace be with you.” Regardless of whether the person whose hands I hold can reply with a verbal blessing, the moment feels powerfully imbued with holiness. I face my own vulnerability, for one day I may be demented or immobilized by stroke. In that large, crowded room at the nursing home, I am uplifted by love given and love received.
>
> Although we cherish our worship experiences at the nursing home, most of the time we worship in a bar with pierced and tattooed young adults. The service starts at “10:30-ish,” the pastor sits on a barstool like everyone else, and music consists of everything from alt-rock to bluegrass. This bar is a long way from the staid Presbyterian church of my youth and the Congregational churches John served in his ministry. We decided that his leaving the ministry afforded us the possibility of doing something completely different and exploring a new way of being in Christian community. Called the “emergent church” by some scholars, these groups attract people who have been described as “avant-garde youth and aging hippies” (Byassee, 2006: 20). Many have fled “big box” Evangelical churches with their “Jesus goes to Vegas” style of worship and their political allegiance to conservative causes. They are seeking an authentic way of holding one another accountable to love God and one another.
>
> Like worship at the county nursing home, worship at the bar evokes feelings of mindfulness, vulnerability, and love. The mindfulness derives from the desire to be fully present to the mostly young adults worshipping in that odd place, with its pool tables and dart machines. John and I do not want to play the role of know-it-all baby boomers, but rather to join these persons as fellow pilgrims. On the other hand, he is often asked to schedule a time for coffee and theological conversation, while I am frequently asked for advice about academic matters. Thus, mindfulness involves intentional awareness of how best to be respectfully present to others and to humbly offer whatever we have gained from our experiences that might be helpful. Vulnerability is located in the conviction that we have much to learn from these young adults, and that our own faith can grow as a result of knowing them and hearing their tales of spiritual journeys that sometimes have moved through treacherous territories of drug abuse and lost-ness. This little community often speaks about love, and the challenge of following Jesus' commandment to “love one another” in a world full of enticements to love self first and foremost, as well as repeated messages that the self is not good enough, attractive enough, rich enough, or sane enough to be loved by another person.
>
> All of these people—old and young—have taught me about relational mindfulness, vulnerability, and love. Their intensity, whether born of their conscious decisions to live by different values than those of the prevailing culture, or their un-chosen suffering, invites mindful engagement. All remind me about my various vulnerabilities, ranging from the existential reality of my finitude to my everyday struggles to live faithfully. Most importantly, they teach me new ways of giving and receiving love.

McFadden, S. H. (2008). Mindfulness, vulnerability, and love: Spiritual lessons from frail elders, earnest young pilgrims, and middle aged rockers. Journal of aging studies, 22(2), 132-139.
> 1 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology
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# Question
Title: Is there a precise definition of "attitude"?
After going through some literature on values, beliefs and attitudes, I am confused. Values and beliefs are somewhat more clear, but what exactly is an attitude? What does it contain?

Is "I like X" already an attitude towards X? Is anything beyond "like" also an attitude, such as "I find X boring"? If yes, then where is the border to related concepts (and which concepts are related - is an emotion towards an object an attitude)? If an attitude is only restricted to being a positive or negative disposition towards an object, how does it differ from a preference?

**Update** Nick Stauner's answer includes a citation claiming that an attitude is not affect. But the same citation insists that an attitude is about favorability, and if we reduce attitudes to "I like X", how is "like" not considered affect?

# Answer
Have you considered Wikipedia's *Definitions of attitude* page? Here are some excerpts with which I agree...

> **An attitude can be defined as a positive or negative evaluation of people, objects, event, activities, ideas, or just about anything in your environment, but there is debate about precise definitions.** Eagly and Chaiken \[(1998)\], for example, define an attitude "**a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favor or disfavor**." Though it is sometimes common to define an **attitude as affect toward an object**, affect (i.e., discrete emotions or overall arousal) is generally understood to be distinct from attitude as a measure of favorability \[(Ajzen, 2001)\]. \[Emphasis added.\]

To me, this distinction means that affect exists apart from attitudes at the level of the person (e.g., "I feel \[insert affect word $X$ here\]"), but is influenced by affect at the level of the object (e.g., "I feel \[insert affect word $Y$ here\] toward \[insert object $Z$ here\]"). Thus affect at the object level would more or less constitute an attitude, yet remain distinct from affect per se, which can occur at many levels, and not necessarily be directed toward any specific object. Examples of $X,\ Y,\ \\&\ Z\ $ could include:

$$X=Y=\text{"resentful"};\ Z=\text{"Obama"}$$

Thus, "I feel resentful," states an affect, whereas, "I feel resentful toward Obama" states an attitude. However, you might prefer to consult Ajzen's (2001) own reasoning on the matter (TBH, I haven't).

Further considerations from Wikipedia:

> This definition of attitude allows for one's evaluation of an attitude object to vary from extremely negative to extremely positive, but also admits that people can also be conflicted or ambivalent toward an object meaning that they might at different times express both positive and negative attitude toward the same object. This has led to some discussion of whether individual can hold multiple attitudes toward the same object \[(Wood, 2000)\].
>
> Whether attitudes are explicit (i.e., deliberately formed) versus implicit (i.e., subconscious) has been a topic of considerable research. Research on implicit attitudes, which are generally unacknowledged or outside of awareness, uses sophisticated methods involving people's response times to stimuli to show that implicit attitudes exist (perhaps in tandem with explicit attitudes of the same object). Implicit and explicit attitudes seem to affect people's behavior, though in different ways. They tend not to be strongly associated with each other, although in some cases they are. The relationship between them is poorly understood.

**References**

Ajzen, I. k. (2001). Nature and operation of attitudes. *Annual Review of Psychology, 52*, 27–58.

Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1998). Attitude structure and function. In D.T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fisk, and G. Lindsey (Eds.), *Handbook of Social Psychology*, pp. 269–322. New York: McGowan-Hill.

Wood, W. (2000). Attitude change: Persuasion and social influence. *Annual Review of Psychology, 51*: 539–570.
> 3 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, attitudes
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# Question
Title: What is the current consensus on if fMRI studies in blood flow actually match brain activity?
How good is blood flow (BOLD signal) as a measure of actual neural activity? What deficiencies exist?

# Answer
> 2 votes
From Wikipedia's page on criticism and limitations of BOLD:

> Although most fMRI research uses BOLD contrast imaging as a method to determine which parts of the brain is most active, because **the signals are relative, and not individually quantitative**, some question its rigor. Other methods which propose to measure neural activity directly have been attempted (for example, measurement of the Oxygen Extraction Fraction, or OEF, in regions of the brain, which measures how much of the oxyhemoglobin in the blood has been converted to deoxyhemoglobin\[(Yablonskiy & Haacke, 1994)\]), but because the electromagnetic fields created by an active or firing neuron are so weak, the signal-to-noise ratio is extremely low and statistical methods used to extract quantitative data have been largely unsuccessful so far.
>
> The wisdom of discarding the low-frequency signals in BOLD-contrast imaging came into question in 1995, when it was observed that the **“noise” in the area of the brain that controls right-hand movement fluctuated in unison with similar activity in the area on the opposite side of the brain associated with left-hand movement \[(Raichle, 2006, 2010)\]. BOLD-contrast imaging is only sensitive to differences between two brain states**.

**Reference**

Raichle, M. E. (2006). The brain's dark energy. *Science, 314*, 1249–1250.

Raichle, M. E. (March 2010). The brain's dark energy. *Scientific American: Mind & Brain*. Retrieved from: http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-brains-dark-energy/.

Yablonskiy, D. A., & Haacke, E. M. (1994). Theory of NMR signal behavior in magnetically inhomogeneous tissues: The static dephasing regime. *Magnetic Resonance in Medicine, 32*(6), 749–763. Retrieved from: http://siba.unipv.it/fisica/articoli/M/MagneticResonanceInMedicine1994\_32\_6\_749.pdf.

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Tags: neuroscience
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# Question
Title: Is rationalization needed for learning human behaviors?
What's the purpose of rationalization, specifically in modeling human behaviors?

It is true that people use rationalization to prevent/avoid/justify disappointment?

# Answer
> 1 votes
I've commented to request clarification of your first question, but would like to edit this answer to address it too if you can clarify for us.

As for your second question, I'll begin where I often do when researching simple questions: with Wikipedia. Within our psychological context, it defines rationalization as a defense mechanism (citing Schimelpfening, 2011). By definition, defense mechanisms exist "to **manipulate, deny, or distort reality** in order to **defend** against feelings of **anxiety and unacceptable impulses** to maintain one's self schema." (I found the cited link broken here, FWIW.) Further, "When anxiety becomes overwhelming, it is the ego's place to protect the person by employing defence mechanisms. **Guilt, embarrassment and shame** often accompany anxiety." Disappointment might be similar enough to anxiety for your purposes, but I would say it's a lower-arousal form of negative affect (see the circumplex model of affect I mentioned in a previous answer). Disappointment may be a bit closer to guilt, embarrassment, or shame in terms of relatively neutral / non-specific arousal, but that's just an educated guess / intuitive judgment.

If disappointment $\approx$ these other negative emotions, let's return to Schimelpfening (2011): "An unconscious defense mechanism in which irrational or unacceptable **behavior**, motives, or feelings are logically **justified** or made consciously tolerable by plausible means." Clearly behavioral justification is definitional. "Post-decisional **regret**" – which sounds just about as similar to disappointment as any affect word I've mentioned yet – is avoided in the act of justifying a decision and prevented thereafter, according to cognitive dissonace theory (see Smith & Mackie, 2007; I may be interpreting loosely).

If this satisfies you that rationalization serves the purpose of preventing/avoiding/justifying negative emotion $\approx$ disappointment, the only remaining question (aside from your first one) is whether people use it. Burton (2012) offers some pretty good examples from literature and history, so as @rmayer06 said, the answer is "yes \[more or less\]".

**References**

Burton, N. (2012). Self-deception I: Rationalization: Human beings are not rational, but rationalizing animals. *Psychology Today: Hide and Seek.* Retrieved from: http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/hide-and-seek/201203/self-deception-i-rationalization.

Schimelpfening, N. (2011). Rationalization. *About.com: Health: Depression: Glossary.* Retrieved from: http://depression.about.com/od/glossary/g/rationalization.htm

Smith, E. R., & Mackie, D. M. (2007). *Social psychology*. Psychology Press/Taylor & Francis (UK). Retrieved from: http://psypress.co.uk/smithandmackie/resources/topic.asp?topic=ch08-tp-01.

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Tags: emotion, cognitive-modeling
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# Question
Title: Can learning be facilitated by transcranial magnetic stimulation?
I read a book a while ago called **The Brain that Changes Itself** by Norman Doidge (2007), and it brought to my attention a machine known as a transcranial magnetic stimulator (TMS) which can noninvasively excite neurons in someone's brain. Doidge mentioned an experiment that used TMS to excite the neurons in patients' pleasure centers, which caused them so much enjoyment that some actually begged the researchers to do it again.

I have also learned about PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder) and how it happens when overly excited neurons are firing, creating a strong memory.

What if the TMS was made to excite the part of the brain that stores memory (the amygdala I believe) in a fashion similar to PTSD's inadvertently created states, and during the hyper-excited state, the subject was given accurate information to memorize? I specify "accurate" because whatever would be learned or observed in this state would be powerfully etched into memory.

I am not a neuroscientist, so please give answers in layman's terms.

I would like to know if it is possible, what the mechanism would be that would allow us to experience improved learning and what the possible side effects would be.

**Reference**

Doidge, N. (2007). The brain that changes itself: Stories of personal triumph from the frontiers of brain science. Official website: http://www.normandoidge.com/normandoidge.com/MAIN.html.

# Answer
> 7 votes
Sadly (or should I be happy that Google is this awesome? Not to mention the rate of scientific progress!), all I really had to do to come up with an answer was perform a Google search for "learning transcranial magnetic stimulation". The first hit, a ScienceDaily page (Ruhr-University Bochum, 2011) page, lists some journal references (Mix, Benali, Eysel, & Funke, 2010; Benali et al., 2011) that effectively say (in laymen's terms), "**Yes!**" Here's ScienceDaily's summary (I'll let you read the rest at the source):

> What sounds like science fiction is actually possible: thanks to **magnetic stimulation**, the activity of certain brain nerve cells can be deliberately influenced. What happens in the brain in this context has been unclear up to now. Medical experts have now shown that various stimulus patterns changed the activity of distinct neuronal cell types. In addition, certain stimulus patterns **led to rats learning more easily**. \[Emphasis added.\]

To show how hard I'm working to really earn that bounty of yours, here's the summary from the second Google hit, a review article on this very topic (Reis et al., 2008; again, plenty more info at the source):

> In summary, the scarce studies performed so far point to the encouraging conclusion that **noninvasive brain stimulation can** contribute to the understanding of mechanisms underlying motor learning and motor memory formation and raise the exciting hypothesis that this increased understanding could in the future result in the development of new strategies to **enhance specific stages of learning** and memory processing in healthy humans and in patients with brain lesions (see chapter by Gerloff et al.). \[Gerloff et al. doesn't appear in the references; emphasis added.\]

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**Edit:** I see from your comment that you want me to explain the mechanism. Since you offer a bounty, I'll play along and dance for it a bit. Here's another excerpt from Reis and colleagues (2008, page 6 of 16):

> It would be theoretically possible to facilitate motor learning processes in which \[the primary motor cortex\] is involved by **enhancing excitability in the “learning” \[primary motor cortex** (Pascual–Leone, Valls–Solé, Wassermann, & Hallett, 1994)\] or by **decreasing excitability in the “resting” \[primary motor cortex** (Schambra, Sawaki, & Cohen, 2003; Plewnia, Lotze, & Gerloff, 2003)\], but see also Wassermann\[, Wedegaertner, Ziemann, George, & Chen (1998)\]. The intrinsic intracortical mechanisms by which these oversimplified models may operate remain to be identified (\[Perez & Cohen, 2008; Daskalakis, Paradiso, Christensen, Fitzgerald, Gunraj, & Chen, 2004; Koch, Franca, Mochizuki, Marconi, Caltagirone, & Rothwell, 2007;\] see for discussion chapters by Walsh et al., Di Lazzaro et al., Berardelli et al.). \[References unavailable for these three discussion chapters; emphasis added.\]

You may want to read the review further for yourself or ask follow-up questions if this is an unsatisfactory explanation of the mechanism.

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Since that review was a little hesitant to conclude conclusively, and it's five years old now, I'll also throw in a brand-new bit of original research (Wall et al., 2013) that demonstrates the supportive trend continues:

> **Conclusion:** These preliminary findings suggest **rTMS** does not adversely impact neurocognitive functioning in adolescents and **may provide subtle enhancement of verbal memory** as measured by the CAVLT. Further controlled investigations with larger sample sizes and rigorous trial designs are warranted to confirm and extend these findings. \[Emphasis added.\]

$\uparrow$ That $\uparrow$ was the fifth Google hit! Also, the seventh (Jelić et al., 2013) says it's not a placebo effect!

Going a little wide, transcranial ***direct current*** stimulation (which is ***somewhat different from magnetic stimulation***, though maybe not in ways that concern you) works too (Fields, 2011; Kincses, Antal, Nitsche, Bártfai, & Paulus, 2004; Fregni et al., 2005; Nitsche et al., 2003; Ohn et al., 2008; Flöel, Rösser, Michka, Knecht, & Breitenstein, 2008; Chi & Snyder, 2012)—you can even try it yourself for $249 or £179! I just had to follow a few links from the 14th Google hit (Mims, 2012) to find all that. I'm a little shocked (pardon the pun) at how legit this actually seems...

Edit (by Fizz): Note that a more recent (2017) meta-analysis of tDCS studies found significant problems with their p-curves, making the authors of this meta-analysis conclude that

> Using a p-curve analysis, we found no evidence that the tDCS studies had evidential value (33% power or greater), with the estimate of statistical power of these studies being approximately 14% for the cognitive studies, and 5% (what would be expected from randomly generated data) for the working memory studies.

*Also* (16th Google hit), it looks like the U.S. National Institutes of Health Clinical Center is currently recruiting participants for their study, "The Effect of Transcranial **Magnetic** Stimulation on Learning With Reward in Healthy Humans", so maybe you could even get Uncle Sam to pay you (for testing *magnetic, not electrical* stimulation)! However, if I'm reading that right, it's a study of learning **disruption**, which is another potential (and maybe not-so-desirable) application of TMS, according to the 18th hit (De Weerd et al., 2012).

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**Edit:** Reis and colleagues (2008) also review this disruptive process somewhat; I get the impression that disruption is much easier than enhancement to achieve with magnetic stimulation (not sure whether this applies to direct electrical current as well). It seems TMS has been used mostly to knock out brain function temporarily in localized areas to simulate the effects of brain lesions. Use of TMS to enhance excitability rather than inhibit it seems to be the more recent innovation, and maybe a separable effect (i.e., it may be possible to excite the brain using TMS without causing inhibition).

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In anticipation of the next question, "Is it safe?" I feel I should add that this is definitely not my area of expertise – I got a B- in biopsych as an undergrad – so again, I'll let the experts speak for themselves (Poreisz, Boros, Antal, & Paulus, 2007), but as a fan of dystopian sci-fi, I will at least say that the short-term dangers seem like they could've been much worse! Same for the ethical ramifications, more or less (Hamilton, Messing, & Chatterjee, 2011). It's reassuring to see so much thought going into this already; I might otherwise be worried about how far behind the times we seem to be here! BTW, these last revelations come thanks in part to the 33rd Google hit (Oremus, 2013). I'm afraid no amount of tDCS will allow us to keep up with Google...

P.S. From what I've seen in skimming some of these, it doesn't have anything in particular to do with the limbic system (which includes the amygdala). I saw a brief explanation suggesting it affects myelination, which is basically the process by which the brain speeds up electrical signal transmission. Myelin is a sort of segmented coating for the axons of neurons, which can be quite long individually. Myelin allows electrical signals (*action potentials*) to jump across myelinated segments quickly, rather than propagating *relatively* slowly across every millimeter in the normal fashion. I also saw some indication that transcranial electromagnetic (didn't note which) stimulation might speed up other aspects of neural construction, such as the rate at which connections form (not just the rate at which they upgrade from the neural equivalents of a dial-up modem to fiber-optic).

**References**

<sub> Benali, A., Trippe, J., Weiler, E., Mix, A., Petrasch–Parwez, E., Girzalsky, W., ... & Funke, K. (2011). Theta-burst transcranial magnetic stimulation alters cortical inhibition. *The Journal of Neuroscience, 31*(4), 1193–1203.
Boggio, P. S., Ferrucci, R., Rigonatti, S. P., Covre, P., Nitsche, M., Pascual–Leone, A., & Fregni, F. (2006). Effects of transcranial direct current stimulation on working memory in patients with Parkinson's disease. *Journal of the Neurological Sciences, 249*(1), 31–38. Retrieved from http://www.tmslab.org/publications/154.pdf.
Chi, R. P., & Snyder, A. W. (2012). Brain stimulation enables the solution of an inherently difficult problem. *Neuroscience Letters, 515*(2), 121–124. Retrieved from http://ingienous.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/snyder-9-dots-paper.pdf.
Daskalakis, Z. J., Paradiso, G. O., Christensen, B. K., Fitzgerald, Gunraj, & Chen. (2004). Exploring the connectivity between the cerebellum and motor cortex in humans. Journal of Physiology, 557, 689–700. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1665103/.
De Weerd, P., Reithler, J., van de Ven, V., Been, M., Jacobs, C., & Sack, A. T. (2012). Posttraining transcranial magnetic stimulation of striate cortex disrupts consolidation early in visual skill learning. *The Journal of Neuroscience, 32*(6), 1981–1988. Retrieved from http://www.jneurosci.org/content/32/6/1981.long.
Fields, R. D. (2011, November 25). Amping up brain function: Transcranial stimulation shows promise in speeding up learning. *Scientific American: Mind & Brain.* Retrieved from http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/amping-up-brain-function/.
Flöel, A., Rösser, N., Michka, O., Knecht, S., & Breitenstein, C. (2008). Noninvasive brain stimulation improves language learning. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 20*(8), 1415–1422. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/5548486\_Noninvasive\_brain\_stimulation\_improves\_language\_learning/file/5046351db1c615613a.pdf.
Fregni, F., Boggio, P. S., Nitsche, M., Bermpohl, F., Antal, A., Feredoes, E., ... & Pascual–Leone, A. (2005). Anodal transcranial direct current stimulation of prefrontal cortex enhances working memory. *Experimental Brain Research, 166*(1), 23–30. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/7745540\_Anodal\_transcranial\_direct\_current\_stimulation\_of\_prefrontal\_cortex\_enhances\_working\_memory/file/9fcfd50a3483033595.pdf.
Hamilton, R., Messing, S., & Chatterjee, A. (2011). Rethinking the thinking cap Ethics of neural enhancement using noninvasive brain stimulation. *Neurology, 76*(2), 187–193. Retrieved from http://wernicke.ccn.upenn.edu/~chatterjee/anjan\_pdfs/Neurology\_2011\_HamiltonMessing\_Chatterjee.pdf.
Jelić, M. B., Stevanović, V. B., Milanović, S. D., Ljubisavljević, M. R., & Filipović, S. R. (2013). Transcranial magnetic stimulation has no placebo effect on motor learning. *Clinical Neurophysiology, 124*(8). 1646–1651.
Kincses, T. Z., Antal, A., Nitsche, M. A., Bártfai, O., & Paulus, W. (2004). Facilitation of probabilistic classification learning by transcranial direct current stimulation of the prefrontal cortex in the human. *Neuropsychologia, 42*(1), 113–117. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/9011312\_Facilitation\_of\_probabilistic\_classification\_learning\_by\_transcranial\_direct\_current\_stimulation\_of\_the\_prefrontal\_cortex\_in\_the\_human/file/d912f50597d44df446.pdf.
Koch, G., Franca, M., Mochizuki, H., Marconi, Caltagirone, & Rothwell. (2007). Interactions between pairs of transcranial magnetic stimuli over the human left dorsal premotor cortex differ from those seen in primary motor cortex. *Journal of Physiology, 578*, 551–562. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2075160/.
Mims, C. (2012, March 8). DIY kit overclocks your brain with direct current. *Technology Review: View.* Retrieved from http://www.technologyreview.com/view/427177/diy-kit-overclocks-your-brain-with-direct-current/.
Mix, A., Benali, A., Eysel, U. T., & Funke, K. (2010). Continuous and intermittent transcranial magnetic theta burst stimulation modify tactile learning performance and cortical protein expression in the rat differently. European Journal of Neuroscience, 32(9), 1575–1586.
Nitsche, M. A., Schauenburg, A., Lang, N., Liebetanz, D., Exner, C., Paulus, W., & Tergau, F. (2003). Facilitation of implicit motor learning by weak transcranial direct current stimulation of the primary motor cortex in the human. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 15*(4), 619–626. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/10710628\_Facilitation\_of\_implicit\_motor\_learning\_by\_weak\_transcranial\_direct\_current\_stimulation\_of\_the\_primary\_motor\_cortex\_in\_the\_human/file/79e4150ae2024da0f0.pdf.
Ohn, S. H., Park, C. I., Yoo, W. K., Ko, M. H., Choi, K. P., Kim, G. M., ... & Kim, Y. H. (2008). Time-dependent effect of transcranial direct current stimulation on the enhancement of working memory. *Neuroreport, 19*(1), 43–47. Retrieved from http://diyhpl.us/~bryan/papers2/neuro/Time-dependent%20effect%20of%20transcranial%20direct%20current%20stimulation%20on%20the%20enhancement%20of%20working%20memory.pdf.
Oremus, W. (2013, April 1). Spark of genius. *Slate: Technology: Superman.* Retrieved from http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/superman/2013/04/tdcs\_and\_rtms\_is\_brain\_stimulation\_safe\_and\_effective.html.
Pascual–Leone, A., Valls–Solé, J., Wassermann, E. M., & Hallett, M. (1994). Responses to rapid-rate transcranial magnetic stimulation of the human motor cortex. *Brain. 117*(4), 847–858.
Perez, M. A., & Cohen, L. G. (in press as cited in Reis et al., 2008). Mechanisms underlying functional changes in the primary motor cortex ipsilateral to an active hand. *Journal of Neuroscience*.
Plewnia, C., Lotze, M., & Gerloff, C. (2003). Disinhibition of the contralateral motor cortex by low-frequency rTMS. *Neuroreport, 14*, 609–612.
Poreisz, C., Boros, K., Antal, A., & Paulus, W. (2007). Safety aspects of transcranial direct current stimulation concerning healthy subjects and patients. Brain Research Bulletin, 72(4), 208–214. Retrieved from http://www.researchgate.net/publication/6377248\_Safety\_aspects\_of\_transcranial\_direct\_current\_stimulation\_concerning\_healthy\_subjects\_and\_patients/file/9fcfd50a34830ccb05.pdf.
Reis, J., Robertson, E. M., Krakauer, J. W., Rothwell, J., Marshall, L., Gerloff, C., ... & Cohen, L. G. (2008). Consensus: Can transcranial direct current stimulation and transcranial magnetic stimulation enhance motor learning and memory formation?. *Brain Stimulation, 1*(4), 363–369. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2621080/.
Ruhr-University Bochum. (2011, January 29). Learn more quickly by transcranial magnetic brain stimulation, study in rats suggests. *ScienceDaily*. Retrieved February 10, 2014 from http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/01/110128121629.htm.
Schambra, H. M., Sawaki, L., & Cohen, L. G. (2003). Modulation of excitability of human motor cortex (M1) by 1 Hz transcranial magnetic stimulation of the contralateral M1. *Clinical Neurophysiology, 114*, 130–133.
Wall, C. A., Croarkin, P. E., McClintock, S. M., Murphy, L. L., Bandel, L. A., Sim, L. A., & Sampson, S. M. (2013). Neurocognitive effects of repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation in adolescents with major depressive disorder. *Frontiers in Psychiatry, 4*(165). Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3859914/.
Wassermann, E. M., Wedegaertner, F. R., Ziemann, U., et al. (1998). Crossed reduction of human motor cortex excitability by 1-Hz transcranial magnetic stimulation. *Neuroscience Letters, 250*, 141–144. </sub>

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Tags: learning, plasticity, cognitive-enhancement, tms
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# Question
Title: If we concentrate on our disappointment do we really get more disappointment?
On the blog, Positive Psychology Review, I read the following:

> TRAIN YOUR BRAIN - LAW OF ATTRACTION
> Dwelling on disappointments mentally and physically trains your brain to attract more disappointment vibrations. When coping with disappointment, it’s significant to note that your thoughts multiple \[sic\]. So, if you are fixated on a disappointment, instead of harnessing the positive power of your brain to find answers, you’re actually “sentencing” your brain to being imprisoned thinking about disappointment. Of greater significance is the fact that your brain is also putting out “addictive” chemicals that keep your body craving disappointment. Instead, notice when you’re thinking about disappointment and interrupt this thought pattern by thinking of something else… Perhaps congratulating yourself!

Is there a scientific basis for this?

# Answer
I think some scientific insights on this can come from a couple of sources:

**Cognitive therapy**

This is a branch of psychological therapy that interprets the human experience as follows. There is an event, then the evaluation of that event, and then the emotion. Disappointment would be the end result, the emotion. Regular therapy might focus on avoiding the event, the trigger. In cognitive therapy one would try to change the evaluation of the event, and as a result, change the triggered emotion.

To put it simply by example, if you were once bitten by a dog, you evaluate seeing a dog as a threat, and therefore experience fear when you see one. By learning to evaluate dogs as friendly and nice, the fear goes away.

So, this seems to imply that there might be things you can concentrate on that make it more likely for negative emotions to go away. But you would have to look into the details of cognitive therapy to figure out how exactly this works.

**Learned optimism**

Diener and Seligman have done quite some research on learned optimism. This includes the question of whether it's possible to "teach" a pessimist to become an optimist. In one of their studies (Diener & Seligman, 2002), they have identified the 10% of happiest people in a group of 222 undergraduates, and compared them to the unhappiest students. Both experienced the same amount of negative emotions, but the happy people got over it much faster because they had different cognitive interpretations of the events.

There are also some studies, not sure by who, that have shown that applying simple techniques can turn you into an "optimist" \[citation needed\]. A few studies (e.g., Johnstone, van Reekum, Urry, Kalin, & Davidson, 2007; Ochsner, Bunge, Gross, & Gabrieli, 2002; McRae et al., 2012; Hecht, 2013) were able to see brain activity changes and brain-density changes in the prefrontal cortex. In "optimists" the left side is more active. In "pessimists" the right side is more active. So this might support the brain and "chemicals" claims. But you'd have to Google the exact reference.

**Broaden and build**

Barbara Fredrickson has some interesting research (e.g., Fredrickson, B.L., 2001) on how negative emotional states limit your range of reactions to "choose" from in response to a situation. And how positive emotions increase this range. She calls it the broaden and build theory. The most limited range on this spectrum is the fight or flight reaction in times of great stress and danger.

She does describe some "spiral" effects, where the negative emotional states (e.g. disappointment) can lead to cumulatively more restricted mindsets.

**Meditation**

Also, maybe this is worth mentioning. There is a lot of research supporting the claim that meditation increases emotional stability. Mindfulness meditation specifically has been associated with the same changes in the brain as described earlier, associated with optimists. The "technique" taught here is to observe all events and emotions as if looking at them in third-person perspective, letting emotions rise and fall as they come without clinging to them.

This would indicate that it's not the "concentrating on disappointment" that is the problem, but it is the "type" of concentrating.

I think on most of the above topics you should be able to find references quickly on Google. I don't have time to look up the actual papers...

**References**

Diener, E., Seligman M.E., (2002). Very happy people. Psychological Science, 13(1):81-4. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11894851

Fredrickson, B. L. (2001). The Role of Positive Emotions in Positive Psychology: The Broadenand-Build Theory of Positive Emotions. American Psychologist, 56, 218-226. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3122271/

Hecht, D. (2013). The neural basis of optimism and pessimism. *Experimental Neurobiology, 22*(3), 173–199. Retrieved from http://synapse.koreamed.org/search.php?where=aview&id=10.5607/en.2013.22.3.173&code=0142EN&vmode=FULL.

Johnstone, T., van Reekum, C. M., Urry, H. L., Kalin, N. H., & Davidson, R. J. (2007). Failure to regulate: Counterproductive recruitment of top-down prefrontal-subcortical circuitry in major depression. *The Journal of Neuroscience, 27*(33), 8877–8884. Retrieved from http://www.jneurosci.org/content/27/33/8877.full.

McRae, K., Gross, J. J., Weber, J., Robertson, E. R., Sokol–Hessner, P., Ray, R. D., Gabrieli, J. D., & Ochsner, K. N. (2012). The development of emotion regulation: an fMRI study of cognitive reappraisal in children, adolescents and young adults. *Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 7*(1), 11–22. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3252634/.

Ochsner, K. N., Bunge, S. A., Gross, J. J., & Gabrieli, J. D. (2002). Rethinking feelings: An fMRI study of the cognitive regulation of emotion. *Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 14*(8), 1215–1229. Retrieved from http://brainimaging.waisman.wisc.edu/~perlman/0903-EmoPaper/CogRegEmoOschner.2002.pdf.
> 10 votes

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Tags: positive-psychology
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