title: Does dopamine detox work?

text:
# Question
Title: Does dopamine detox work?
There are lot of videos on youtube like this which talk about dopamine detox for a week, month or so. Does it actually work? Don't we get distracted anymore or get less distracted? Is it necessary to give up on everything like even the favourite food along with other stuffs which you consider distracting?

# Answer
A Google Scholar search for "dopamine detox" returns only one paper of any type mentioning the term, and it does not provide any specific citation for it as a procedure.

A Google Scholar search for "dopamine fast" returns about 80 results, but most seem to be false-positives (that is, they are not talking about a "dopamine fast" at all but yet happened to hit on those keywords). The ones that do hit seem to be simply opinion articles referencing a blog post and a self-help book rather than any scientific study.

The blog post (which I'd prefer not to link to avoid promoting it) mentions cognitive behavioral therapy and claims that the "dopamine fast" they promote is a form of CBT. CBT is a reputable therapy approach with scientific backing, but that doesn't mean that everyone who claims their approach is CBT has any scientific study supporting it (nor is CBT any sort of magic that works for everyone).

It seems like this concept of "dopamine detox" itself is a blog/self-help fad without specific scientific support. I cannot identify any study where someone has defined an intervention as "dopamine detox" or a "dopamine fast" and then studied its efficacy against some other treatment or placebo/control condition.

Seems to me like a new fad name that makes no scientific sense (you don't "eat" dopamine, after all, it's a neurotransmitter released in your brain normally all the time, and absolutely necessary for normal function - just read about the mechanisms of Parkinson's disease, for example) for something otherwise pretty obvious and noncontroversial: if you're being distracted by something, try removing the distractor.
> 3 votes

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Tags: dopamine
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# Question
Title: Bias caused by the opinion of a famous person on matters they are not well-educated on?
What is the name of the bias caused by the fame of a person on subject matters they are not experts on?

E.g: If a celebrity they like talks about climate change, people might tend to read, discuss, and follow their views as opposed to that of an educated climate scientist.

# Answer
> 1 votes
See Wikipedia article "Argument from authority", section Appeal to false authority. That section notes an additional interesting angle, i.e., that it is also fallacious, in an ad hominem way, to discount someone's argument SOLELY because of who they are (even though we all know that "influencers" tend to opinionate ad nauseam, ad infinitum, and ad absurdum, as part of their PR strategies).

# Answer
> 0 votes
I don't believe that there is a cognitive bias that has been accepted by the scientific community that fits your fact pattern. You can look for a matching cognitive bias yourself in this list:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Overconfidence\_effect#Better-than-average\_effects

I don't see one. In fact, I don't even think people would believe a celebrity over an educated climate scientist on the current status of climate change. It may help the person remember the ad or public announcement because a celebrity was the one to announce it but I doubt the credibility of the celebrity exceeds that of the scientist.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, bias
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title: Does Golden Hammer really exist?

text:
# Question
Title: Does Golden Hammer really exist?
Note: I am *not* talking about Law of the instrument.

I am referring to the following (anti-)pattern of behavior:

> A person very competent in one area (say, Philosophy) peremptorily expressing his opinion on an unrelated area (say, Medicine) as if he were an expert there also (and he is not).

There are many prominent examples (e.g., an expert in finance making *sweeping assertions with great confidence and surrounded by insulting language ... \[about\] a field he palpably does not master*), but, obviously, *plural of "anecdote" is not "data"*.

**Does this pattern actually exist *statistically* or is it just a variant of the Dunning-Kruger effect ("Unskilled and Unaware of It")?**

One way to test this would be to plot the DK curve (actual expertise vs. self-assessment) for a given domain for

* the "general population" (people who have no significant expertise in other domains) and
* the "outside experts" (people who are experts in an unrelated domain)

and check whether they would be statistically significantly different.

E.g., one can try to use StackExchange as the source of data: measure the user expertise by the reputation and subjective assessment thereof by the "confidence level" of their posts (questions/answers/comments).

Has something like this been done? Does the question make sense to the practitioners in the field?

# Answer
A possible name for the effect is *"Nobel Disease"*, as in

where the authors

> offer brief descriptions of **eight** Nobel laureates in the sciences who embraced “weird” ideas. Following Shermer (2003), \[they\] define weird ideas as assertions that are (a) highly implausible in light of scientific knowledge; (b) roundly rejected by essentially all scientific experts; and (c) based mostly or exclusively on anecdotal or uncorroborated evidence.
> 2 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, experimental-psychology, bias, expertise
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# Question
Title: Does my cat ever "want" something or its behavior is mostly reactive?
A few days ago I and my spouse were trying to convince our male cat to come and sit next to us on the sofa. Our cat seemed undecided between staying and coming and my spouse mentioned that he does only what he "wants" anyway.

I wondered if a cat (or an animal with similar brain development) is able to "want" something or the behavior is the result of a very sophisticated biologic algorithm (maybe something similar to deep neural networks) that takes into account genetic factors and environmental factors that basically produces very similar outcomes in similar situations.

I have managed to find this article that mentions the existence of purpose in animals (my emphasis):

> There is a growing recognition that **behavior is agentic, purposive** (Dickinson, 1985), **generated endogenously by the animal** (Edelman, 2016), and has an intrinsic **spontaneity** and **indeterminacy** (Maye et al., 2007; Brembs, 2011). Such behavior can be based on internal predictive models (Clayton et al., 2003; Suddendorf and Corballis, 2010; Corballis, 2013) involving subjective assessment of the animal's state (Bubic et al., 2010; McNally et al., 2011; Clark, 2013)

One of the references mentioned in the above article seems to confirm that animals with enough complex nervous systems are more agentic rather than reactive. I am not sure that "agency" is a good enough synonym for "wanting" though.

# Answer
> 3 votes
I was cited in the above article and have recently argued that "reactive" nervous systems probably don't even exist, but that the impression arises from a bias inherent in many laboratory experiments. So far, there isn't even sufficient evidence for spinal reflexes being more reactive than active: https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/33317833/

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Tags: animal-cognition, agent-based-modeling
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# Question
Title: Why does a person not change their employment when they have the urge to do so?
This is a question I have been fighting for a long time. I thought it was an individual issue, but I've recently noticed, that it's common for a lot of people I know.

A person feels the need or urge to do something - change job, change profession, start a business, etc. However, never actually DOES something. Instead, the time that could be used to achieve a set goal, is spent on contemplating what could go wrong, rationalizing why not to do something, and wondering why he/she is not or has not done something to achieve set goal.

The result - the motivation TO do something keeps growing, but the motivation to DO something actually diminishes, until the urge to do something is swept aside by the thought, that since one has not done something - then one did not actually want to do it.

Is there a term for this? What are coping mechanisms to bring plans to action?

EDIT: Furthermore: https://www.lifehack.org/844018/action-plan

A person can even compile an action plan to achieve a goal, but never actually set out to do it.

# Answer
Motivation comes on a continuum, so one can possess enough to contemplate, but too little for action. One hypothetical name might be *avolitional motivation*. From Wikipedia:

> **Volition** or **will** is the cognitive process by which an individual decides on and commits to a particular course of action. It is defined as purposive striving and is one of the primary human psychological functions. Others include affect (feeling or emotion), motivation (goals and expectations), and cognition (thinking).

> According to the authors \[of *A Bias for Action*\], Ach claims that there is a certain threshold of desire that distinguishes motivation from volition: when desire lies below this threshold, it is motivation, and when it crosses over, it becomes volition.

A possibly related phenomenon is that of antidepressants and suicide risk, where in certain groups the chance of acting out previous suicidal ideation increases after starting antidepressants.

Naturally the more one thinks about something, the more invested one feels -- even if motivation never reaches the criticality needed for volitional action. But then as time passes, perhaps habituation, loss of novelty, and or learned helplessness set in, diminishing the urge.

As far as solutions to the problem of insufficient motivation, there are endless self-help resources out there, targeting all sorts of personalities and lifestyles. The possibilities for lack of motivation toward a particular action are many and often idiosyncratic.
> 1 votes

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Tags: motivation, behavior
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# Question
Title: How is sexual arousal different in men and women?
I was watching ASAPScience video on the Male vs Female Orgasms.

At 1:45 they say that PET scans of brain show that arousal of men and women are different.

How exactly are these different, as in what part of the brain is activated and how is arousal interpreted by brains of different sexes of cis straight people?

# Answer
> -1 votes
Well, for starters "sexual arousal" is both a physical and cultural phenomenon. Pheromones play a huge role in arousal. Men are known to lean toward the physical attractiveness of a woman, whilst a woman typically leans more towards getting "wooed" in order to open herself up to men; but both sexes do both of those things. The cultural aspects of being sexually aroused can be just as influential as the physical. For example, in a culture that idealizes blonde women, there are more men who will be turned on by blonde women. If society tells you men with dark hair are attractive, women will probably look for arousal in those men. If you live in a society that idealizes white or black skin, then that's probably what you will see on the billboards and on tv, and hence they become symbols of beauty. If you live in a society where finding the same gender is attractive, you will probably start looking for attractiveness in the same gender. The mind is a powerful thing, but in the end and to answer the question straightly: different people are turned on by different things because of how they have been influenced as well as how their hormones are sitting at that time and place, therefore to SCIENTIFICALLY answer your question, we have to separate cultural and physical influences and study each and figure out the natural magnetism that humans have instilled in them to continue their seed.

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Tags: brain, neurology, neuroscience
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# Question
Title: is there a well recognized bias towards observations that can be measured?
It seems that people and orgnaizations have a tendency to make decision that will improve a measurement when the downsides of this decisions cannot be measured or (alternatively) can be measured but cannot be directly attributed to this decision.

For instance, In Israel there was a (government bakced) scrappage program for old cars. After a few years it got discontinued.

In this case, discontuining the program had a direct, visible, and positive, effect on the budget (reduced spending). On the other hand, the numerous downsides -- fuel savings, reduced emissions, fewer casualties in accidents, reduced load on hospitals, etc. -- cannot be easily measured and even if measured (e.g., one can measure the government's spending on hospitals) the change cannot be easily attributed to the decision (because from the hospitals' point of view they are just more loaded. It's hard to say which part of the load is due to accidents involving old cars).

This phenomena resonates with Surrogation but, as far as I can tell, it is not the same.

Is this a well recognized bias? Is there a name for it?

# Answer
That described is similar, albeit depersonified, to identifiable victim effect. In both cases, whether the victim is personal or abstract, a large identifiable effect has more emotional weight than an equivalent set of smaller effects. From Wikipedia:

> The "**identifiable victim effect**" refers to the tendency of individuals to offer greater aid when a specific, identifiable person ("victim") is observed under hardship, as compared to a large, vaguely defined group with the same need. \[...\] Concrete images and representations are often more powerful sources of persuasion than are abstract statistics.

Two potentially significant factors biasing these decisions are *emotionality* and *cognitive effort*. An identifiable victim will naturally have more emotional salience than an abstract victim. Yet even if we seek a more logic-oriented thinking style, a tendency exists to avoid complex or algorithmically expensive decision strategies. Per this tendency, human thought is said to have bounded rationality. From Wikipedia:

> **Bounded rationality** is the idea that rationality is limited when individuals make decisions. In other words, humans' "preferences are determined by changes in outcomes relative to a certain reference level". Limitations include the difficulty of the problem requiring a decision, the cognitive capability of the mind, and the time available to make the decision. Decision-makers, in this view, act as satisficers, seeking a satisfactory solution, rather than an optimal solution. Therefore, humans do not undertake a full cost-benefit analysis to determine the optimal decision, but rather, choose an option that fulfills their adequacy criteria.

Another tendency that may be at play here is the availability heuristic. Specifically, a simple set of obvious effects are much easier to recall or consider than a complex set of obscure or difficult to measure effects. From Wikipedia:

> The availability heuristic operates on the notion that if something can be recalled, it must be important, or at least more important than alternative solutions which are not as readily recalled. \[...\] The availability of consequences associated with an action is positively related to perceptions of the magnitude of the consequences of that action.

While the availability heuristic seems to compare different actions and their respective consequences, presumably the same heuristic applies when comparing the various consequences of a single action. That is, consequences that come more readily to mind should appear more important. A question arises here on whether directly measurable effects are more mentally available than more tangential effects.
> 3 votes

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Tags: terminology, bias
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# Question
Title: The desire and expectation to see a situation escalate
Does this phenomenon have a name?

When there is a diagreement or conflict or scandal, sometimes instead of wanting the issue to be solved and left behind I want it to escalate and expand.

This can be for mere "entertainment" or breaking routine. Or not to see the people involved in it free from complications.

Does this have a name?

# Answer
> 2 votes
Overall, the described phenomenon sounds like a classic case of Schadenfreude. In this emotion, a person takes pleasure in seeing the misfortune of others, particularly those of an out-group. The essence in this emotion seems to be a relative rise in one's perceived well-being as compared to another's predicament. From Wikipedia:

> \[**Schadenfreude**\] is the experience of pleasure, joy, or self-satisfaction that comes from learning of or witnessing the troubles, failures, or humiliation of another. \[...\] *Schadenfreude* is borrowed from German. It is a compound of *Schaden*, "damage/harm", and *Freude*, "joy".

An important distinction ought to be given here to contrast with sadism. In this personality trait, satisfaction is found not only in *observing*, but also in actions *promoting*, the suffering of others. Moreover, in Schadenfreude, the focus is on social-status and circumstances, whereas in sadism, the focus is on pain and suffering. From Wikipedia:

> \[**Sadism**\] involves deriving pleasure through others undergoing discomfort or pain. \[...\] Individuals possessing sadistic personalities tend to display recurrent aggression and cruel behavior. Sadism can also include the use of emotional cruelty, purposefully manipulating others through the use of fear, and a preoccupation with violence.

A more indirect factor which could in theory modulate both of the above is sensation seeking. In this personality trait, a person may feel incomplete without higher levels of stimulation. From Wikipedia:

> **Sensation seeking** is a personality trait defined by the search for experiences and feelings, that are "varied, novel, complex and intense", and by the readiness to "take physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experiences." \[...\] \[Marvin Zuckerman\]'s research has found that high sensation seekers tend to seek high levels of stimulation in their daily lives.

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Tags: social-psychology, sentiment-analysis
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# Question
Title: Are brainwaves from an EEG meaningful measurements?
I realized that research describing the different stages of sleep all rely on the assumption that we can accurately determine the stage of sleep using an EEG. I wondered if brainwaves are anything more than arbitrary patterns that appear within EEG data and it's due to our tendency to look for patterns in data rather than these being intrinsic phenomena that actually "mean something". For example like inferring personality from facial structure (which while potentially possible doesn't hold value as personality isn't determined by facial structure).

Can we even say with certainty that extrapolations made from these measurements actually determines the presence of real phenomena? For example: That someone is truly asleep rather than their neurons electrical firings matches a pattern that we associate with sleep. As our only way of determining that is using this device?

# Answer
> 2 votes
Yes, EEG measurements are meaningful. The "slow" oscillations of sleep, for example, are tied to "UP" and "DOWN" states in neocortical neurons, the UP state being a period of coordinated activity, and the DOWN state being a period of coordinated inactivity. These have been measured in single neurons and groups of neurons simultaneously with EEG. For example from Steriade et al 1993:

From *Steriade, M., Nunez, A., & Amzica, F. (1993). A novel slow (\< 1 Hz) oscillation of neocortical neurons in vivo: depolarizing and hyperpolarizing components. Journal of neuroscience, 13(8), 3252-3265.*

The top is a single-cell recording, the bottom is EEG.

Sleep staging is more complicated than just using the EEG as it uses other features as well (EMG, for example). Sleep has many other characteristic features, as well, such as reduced thresholds to response to stimuli and molecular signatures, that allow us to identify sleep in other animals, including those that are quite different from humans. Some references to go deeper:

*Cirelli, C. (2009). The genetic and molecular regulation of sleep: from fruit flies to humans. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 10(8), 549-560.*

*Zimmerman, J. E., Naidoo, N., Raizen, D. M., & Pack, A. I. (2008). Conservation of sleep: insights from non-mammalian model systems. Trends in neurosciences, 31(7), 371-376.*

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Tags: eeg, sleep, electrophysiology, brain-waves
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# Question
Title: How can we get rid of the problems of misconception, assumption, and expectation?
I watched a TedX Talk that called "The Surprising Secret of Solving Problems Quickly" by Collins Key, about 3 problems that most greatly hinder our ability to solve intriguing problems. These 3 problems are Misconception, Assumption, and Expectation.

*Misconception*, as he explains, is when we misunderstand a certain part of a problem because of how we are used to seeing it or because of how it is presented.

*Assumption* is when we assume something about part of the solution that we have little reason to assume, but it seems to us as if we do have reason to assume this.

*Expectation* is when we expect the solution to go in a certain direction, thus stopping us from thinking in other directions.

If you do not understand the exact differences between the three in this context, please watch the Ted Talk.

My question: How can these complications be eliminated? How can we check to make sure we have no misconceptions? How can we block ourselves off from assuming something? And how can we "mindblank" ourselves enough to not expect anything, without entirely blocking off our thinking process?

# Answer
All three of these involve unchecked or blind use of heuristics. As such, one strategy is to slow down and formalise the logic chain, using more *reflective* and less *automatic* reasoning. Another strategy is to monitor or uncover one's motivation. From Wikipedia:

> A **heuristic** \[...\] is any approach to problem solving or self-discovery that employs a practical method that is not guaranteed to be optimal, perfect, or rational, but is nevertheless sufficient for reaching an immediate, short-term goal or approximation. \[...\] Heuristics are the strategies derived from previous experiences with similar problems. \[...\] These rules work well under most circumstances, but in certain cases can lead to systematic errors or cognitive biases.

In the case of **misconceptions**, attribute substitution replaces parts of the problem at hand with seemingly comparable substitutes that are better known from one's personal experience or education. If one is lucky, the relationship between the actual parts (of the current problem) and the substituted parts (of the known heuristic) will match sufficiently, giving a usable solution. But if by chance these apparent similarities are partly or wholly illusory, the solution is likely to be wrong and unusable. From Wikipedia:

> **Attribute substitution** \[...\] is a psychological process thought to underlie a number of cognitive biases and perceptual illusions. It occurs when an individual has to make a judgment (of a *target attribute*) that is computationally complex, and instead substitutes a more easily calculated *heuristic attribute*. This substitution is thought of as taking place in the automatic *intuitive* judgment system, rather than the more self-aware *reflective* system. Hence, when someone tries to answer a difficult question, they may actually answer a related but different question, without realizing that a substitution has taken place.

In the case of **assumptions** and **expectations**, the perceived familiarity of the current situation to prior experiences leads one to assume that results of prior actions will be found again if one acts similarly to before. Basically, if the situation looks similar to last time (*assumed* parameters), and one acts similarly to last time (*known* schema), the results should be similar to last time (*expected* effects). Here too, one may get lucky and find the assumed result. But an apparent familiarity can be misleading if significant variables are unknown or ignored. From Wikipedia:

> The **familiarity heuristic** was developed based on the discovery of the availability heuristic by psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman; it happens when the familiar is favored over novel places, people, or things. The familiarity heuristic can be applied to various situations that individuals experience in day-to-day life. When these situations appear similar to previous situations, especially if the individuals are experiencing a high cognitive load, they may regress to the state of mind in which they have felt or behaved before. \[...\] The familiarity heuristic is based on using schemas or past actions as a scaffold for behavior in a new (yet familiar) situation. \[...\] Individuals automatically assume that their previous behavior will yield the same results when a similar situation arises.

The underlying theme for heuristic errors in general is that our need for efficient operation leads us to make hasty mistakes of reason. Moreover, these mistakes are generally considered automatic and unconscious, coming from a brain system sometimes termed *System 1* (see dual process theory). A slower, more systematic and reflective brain system, called here *System 2*, is said to override or manage the automatically activated percepts and schemas. From Wikipedia (cognitive bias mitigation):

> \[Our\] reasoning mechanism \[can be\] segregated (approximately) into 'System 1' and 'System 2'. In this view, System 1 is the 'first line' of cognitive processing of all perceptions, including internally generated 'pseudo-perceptions' \[...\] By contrast, System 2 is responsible for 'executive control', taking System 1's judgments as advisories, \[...\] and then choosing which advisories, if any, to act on. In this view, System 2 is slow, simple-minded and lazy, usually defaulting to System 1 advisories and overriding them only when intensively trained to do so or when cognitive dissonance would result. \[...\] \[Our\] 'heuristic toolkit' resides largely in System 1 \[...\]

The higher our cognitive load, the higher the chance a heuristic will be applied without reflection. From Wikipedia (dual process theory):

> Tsujii and Watanabe did a follow-up study to Goel and Dolan's fMRI experiment. They examined the neural correlates on the inferior frontal cortex (IFC) activity in belief-bias reasoning \[...\] This study provided some evidence to enhance the fMRI results that the right IFC, specifically, is critical in resolving conflicting reasoning, but that it is also attention-demanding; its effectiveness decreases with loss of attention. The loss of effectiveness in System 2 following loss of attention makes the automatic heuristic System 1 take over, which results in belief bias.

Some newer perspectives are more bitter-sweet about our ability to filter out heuristic processing errors when the right motivation exists. Our default approach is said to be that of a cognitive miser, who takes the lowest effort path to solving problems, or basically who accepts the advice of System 1 without question. But desire has a tendency to direct the flow of reasoning, which can either increase or decrease the proclivity for bias, depending on what outcome we want to achieve, possibly at the unconscious level. A capacity thus exists for being a motivated tactician. From Wikipedia:

> In social psychology, a **motivated tactician** is someone who shifts between quick-and-dirty cognitively economical tactics and more thoughtful, thorough strategies when processing information, depending on the type and degree of motivation. Such behavior is a type of motivated reasoning. \[...\] Current research does not deny that people will be cognitively miserly in certain situations, but it takes into account that thorough analytic thought does occur in other situations.

> Researchers have divided preferred outcomes into two broad categories: directional and non-directional outcomes. \[...\] Individuals motivated by directional outcomes have the intention of accomplishing a specific goal \[-- particularly social and self-esteem goals\]. If someone is motivated by non-directional outcomes, he or she may wish to make the most logical and clear decision. \[...\] Confirmation bias is an example of thought-processing motivated by directional outcomes. The goal is to affirm previously held beliefs, so one will use less thorough thinking in order to reach that goal. A person motivated to get the best education \[...\] is motivated by a non-directional outcome.

Hence, when the goal is to confirm existing beliefs -- either to oneself or to others -- the outcome is more likely to be biased in a self-serving way. On the other hand, if one has a vested interest in the quality of outcome, such as for self-mastery or discovery, then a more robust, non-directional outcome may be sought. From Wikipedia (goal orientation):

> In general, an individual can be said to be *mastery* or *performance* oriented, based on whether one's goal is to develop one's ability or to demonstrate one's ability, respectively. \[...\] \[**Goal orientation**\] refers to how an individual interprets and reacts to tasks, resulting in different patterns of cognition, affect and behavior. \[...\] Individuals with a mastery orientation seek to develop their competence by acquiring new skills and mastering new situations. \[...\] Individuals with a performance orientation seek to demonstrate and validate the adequacy of their competence to receive favorable compliments while avoiding negative judgments. \[...\] A mastery orientation is characterized by the belief that success is the result of effort and use of the appropriate strategies. \[...\] A performance orientation is characterized by the belief that success is the result of superior ability and of surpassing one's peers.

Overall, the issue of avoiding biases and heuristic errors appears to be complicated, but as hinted above, certain mindsets and methods could in theory make a difference. Avoiding distractions, learning to improve one's focus, taking time to reflect, and striving for self-mastery and discovery, rather than validation, may help one to see more clearly.
> 1 votes

# Answer
I seem to have realized/learned part of the answer:

> For assumptions: the trick is not blocking what you assume; rather the inverse. Most assumptions are implicit. By making them explicit (consciously formulating them) they become more noticeable and open for scrutiny. Enter, rationality and science!

In other words, when solving a problem, you should realize and highlight any assumptions you might have, and then ridicule them (point out to yourself why or why not they hold).

Expectations: this is slightly more challenging (and more vague), but similarly to assumptions, you should analyze which direction you expect the solution to go in and formulate a few other possible hypotheses.

Misconceptions: the solution to this I do not fully understand yet, but maybe one should try to fiddle around with the problem and try to present it in a different way. (For example, with the candle problem, you can rearrange the elements. With a math problem, you can rephrase it or shift the expressions.)
> 0 votes

# Answer
This might not be an answer you're looking for, but getting 'rid of a problem' as in Turing machines, is impossible due to the undecidable nature of functional equivalence. ie: There is no general way to say if an arbitrary program (Human) would do something or not.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Halting\_problem
> 0 votes

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Tags: bias, problem-solving
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title: Wisdom of crowds vs group polarization

text:
# Question
Title: Wisdom of crowds vs group polarization
I'm having a hard time understanding two concepts: wisdom of crowds and group polarization, at the same time.

Wisdom of crowds states that aggregation of information or prediction, in groups, are often *better* than single member's.

Group polarization however, refers to the tendency that groups make *more extreme* decisions than single members.

It seems that group decisions, due to group polarization, should be *less accurate* than single member's since it's more extreme, which conflicts with the idea of wisdom of crowds. I assume there should be boundaries between two concepts and a case-by-case basis?

Any help is appreciated.

# Answer
Great question.

Wisdom of crowds happens when participants are motivated to find a "correct" answer. The classic example is counting jelly beans in a jar - where the average of guesses outperforms individual guesses. More practical applications include forecasting and prediction markets. In such contexts, aggregated forecasts / predictions outperform individuals (see Philip Tetlock's research for example). Presumably, democracy falls under this premise (with some evidence to support it), as do stock markets. Note that in this context, participants often do not make their individual decisions in group settings.

Group polarization in contrast, happens when participants are not motivated to find a correct answer. Rather, when individuals are motivated to reach group consensus, protect or build status, or satisfy some other agenda, then there is a tendency for opinions to polarize. This is common in debates (where participants are motivated to "win") and decision by committee (where the motivation is consensus). Presumably, arguments in court fall under this premise, as do parliaments. Note that in this context, participants do make their individual decisions in group settings.

Although aggregate results when participants are properly motivated tend to outperform those of badly motivated groups, this is not an inevitable outcome, and a paper by Mercier & Sperber (2011) argues that "argument" is adaptive, and can improve group decision-making under some circumstances, despite the tendency to polarize.
> 6 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, terminology, bias, decision-making, collaboration
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title: Waffles or pancakes?

text:
# Question
Title: Waffles or pancakes?
I'm a software engineer and in one of my interviews they asked me this question :

> Do you prefer waffles or pancakes?

I don't know whether they asked this question to reduce my stress level, or to probe my line of thinking. I tried to search, but to no avail, so I decided to ask it here. This question is interesting for me because I find that some other companies asked this question for product manager roles, or front-end developers, and my answer is 'waffles'.

PS. If this is not the right place of my question please let me know , I remove or move my question into another stack.

# Answer
This question might be borderline ontopic here, as it would fare better at Workplace.SE or similar sites. However, being involved in job interviews on a regular basis (in science) I became intrigued nonetheless. Whether it's applicable I can't tell, because I don't know in what area (of research?) you exactly applied for a job, but I found a *possible* answer on this blog site, and I quote (bolding and italicization mine):

> ***"What do you think of garden gnomes?"***
> This question, asked by Trader Joe's, is a ridiculous and silly question. More than anything else, it's **intended to loosen the candidate up, see a glimpse of their personality, and gain insight into culture fit**.
>
> There's **no right answer to this question**, but if your team likes to be sarcastic with one another, you might want a candidate to say, "If I could get a job as one then I probably wouldn't be here today talking to you."
>
> Ultimately, if your candidate is **able to handle** this curveball with ease, it shows an impressive **ability to react quickly** to bizarre circumstances.
> 1 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, test
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# Question
Title: Can an autistic person have very advance language skills?
Can an autistic person have very advanced language skills (Verbal communication, not about tonal nor body language skill, nor the written verbal language, I keep dyslexia out of this discussion for sake of specificity) and a very Early age of first talk, while having other autism symptoms?

Notably there are a few blogs and many social media posts that writes about "hyperverbal autistics" but I did not find scientific literature about hyperverbal autistic people.

# Answer
> 5 votes
They may be referring to hyperlexia (rather than hyperverbal ability):

> Hyperlexic children are characterized by word-reading ability well above what would be expected given their age. ... Some experts believe that most children with hyperlexia, or perhaps even all of them, lie on the autism spectrum.

But as far as verbal ability goes, since autism is a spectrum disorder, there is bound to be a spectrum of verbal abilities in those afflicted. Wikipedia summarizes:

> Language impairment is also common in children with autism, but it is not necessary for the diagnosis. ... It is also common for individuals with ASD to communicate strong interest in a specific topic, speaking in lesson-like monologues about their passion instead of enabling reciprocal communication with whomever they are speaking to.

In other words, "hyperverbal" autistics are hardly unusual. However, they often struggle with perspective-taking, and hence may speak out of turn, failing to assess their audience's level of interest.

For recent reviews of language acquisition and verbal abilities in individuals with ASD, see for example:

Eigsti et al (2011); "Language acquisition in autism spectrum disorders: A developmental review":

> ... early studies indicated that some 50% of affected individuals never acquire functional speech, though more recent estimates find a smaller proportion of non-verbal individuals, typically around 25%. Language acquisition in ASD is characterized by dramatic delays, with first words produced at age 38 months, on average, compared to 8–14 months in TD.

Volkers (2017); "Untangling the Language Challenges of Autism":

> ... on average, children on the spectrum produce their first word one to two years later than typically developing children. And we know that language ability among children on the spectrum varies greatly—some may be fluent conversationalists, while others can barely speak.

# Answer
> 2 votes
Yes, this may happen with Asperger subtype of autism.

> AS had already been described in 1981 by Lorna Wing, who first proposed the term to refer to a special subgroup of children who, according to Asperger’s original description, were characterized by: social isolation and lack of reciprocity in social interactions; normal or precocious language acquisition, with above-average linguistic skills but subtle abnormalities of verbal and non-verbal communication (e.g., atypical syntax, pedantic vocabulary and absent or stereotyped prosody); a narrow focus of interests, often restricted to unpragmatic and highly original themes; overachievement in specific cognitive domains; and motor clumsiness (Wing, 1981).

--- A Concise History of Asperger Syndrome: The Short Reign of a Troublesome Diagnosis; by J. B. Barahona-Corrêa and Carlos N. Filipe (PMC)

Some authors claimed that Asperger subtype is characterised by no obvious language delay.

> One approach to resolve this question has been to adopt the criterion of absence of clinically significant language or cognitive delay — essentially, the “absence of language delay.”

--- Can Asperger syndrome be distinguished from autism? An anatomic likelihood meta-analysis of MRI studies; by Kevin K. Yu, Charlton Cheung, Gráinne M. McAlonan (PMC)

I did not found research articles about very early talkers, but some internet article claims very early talkers sometimes experience social deficits but without explicite mention of ASD. such as https://www.huffpost.com/entry/9-truths-about-early-talk\_b\_8137426/amp

**Update:**

In Phonology and vocal behavior in toddlers with autism spectrum disorders (PMC full text) it has been said that

> In terms of phonological development, articulation is often reported to be normal or even precocious in children with ASD who speak (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 2001; Pierce & Bartolucci, 1977), although Rapin, Dunn, Allen, Stevens and Fein (2009) and Cleland, Gibbon, Peppé, O'Hare and Rutherford (2010) showed a range of patterns of speech and language behavior to be present in school-aged children with ASD.

(Although they discusses other anomalies in language development)

in Early language and communication development of infants later diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder it is said that

> Overall, this prospective study confirms that delays in communication and language development are apparent early in life in children with ASD, and emphasizes that developmental surveillance should include monitoring for delays in gesture, which may be among the earliest signs of ASD.

# Answer
> 2 votes
As an Autistic person myself, and as a person knowing many autistic people, I can assure you we indeed are capable of language. Even very low functioning autistic individuals are at least somewhat capable of speech, this is not true in all cases, of course; but it is not, in the majority of cases, to the degree of them being incapable of language comprehension or acquisition.

https://medicalnewstoday.com/articles/325239

https://cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/stories.html

Here are some examples, and also, the reason you cannot find scientific papers on it is because there is no reason whatsoever to make a peer reviewed paper on the topic of Autistic people being able to understand language, as we all already know that to be the case, and already know why it is the case.

That being, Autism is a Spectrum Disorder and can have various different intensities, and even than, like all Mental Disorders, it does not always manifest in the exact same manner. For example, look at the manner used for diagnoses in the DSM-V, (https://asatonline.org/for-parents/diagnosis/)

Criterion A: social communication deficits, consisting of three items, all of which must be met to satisfy this criterion;

Criterion B: fixated interests and repetitive behaviours consisting of four items, of which at least two must be met to satisfy this criterion;

Criterion C: symptoms existing in early childhood;

Criterion D: symptoms impairing functioning; and

Criterion E impairments are not better explained by intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) or global developmental delay (APA, 2011; CDC, 2014).

All five must be met, but they are all very wide in nature, and none of the criteria include impairment in general language comprehension ability, and, as the anecdotal evidence supports, one very much can have Autism and have high language ability

**References:**

American Psychiatric Association \[APA\] (2011). *DSM-5* https://www.dsm5.org

Centers for Disease Control \[CDC\] (2014). *Diagnostic Criteria for 299.00 Autism Spectrum Disorder* https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/autism/hcp-dsm.html.

# Answer
> 0 votes
1. There is very little if anything at all that an autistic can't learn once they've developed an intense interest in it.
2. Autism is a label reserved for people who demonstrate a socio-communication delay during early development.

The areas of language are phonology (speech sounds), semantic & orthographic (word knowledge), syntactic (grammar/morphology), discourse (conversation/narration), and pragmatic (socioemotional). Any and all areas of language (and speech) can be affected as well, but it ain't autism if there is not at least a history of pragmatic language delay at an early age.

It is not unusual for someone to present aspie-like with excellent vocabulary and grammar skills. Mine aren't "superior", but it is still surprizingly difficult for me to speak simply. Often the lack of precision almost feels like lying ;) I am enjoying the wisdom attributed to Mark Twain: *If I had had more time, I would have written a shorter letter.*

...Pls excuse my ODD for just an instant: Dyslexia can coexist with autism in much the same way you could stub your toe when you had a head cold. At risk of simplifying, dyslexia affects the language area of phonology, then literacy neglect obstructs the development of the higher language levels.

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Tags: developmental-psychology, language, autism, speech
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# Question
Title: Given unlimited time can any Raven's Matrix Reasoning problem be solved by anyone?
I know untimed tests exist, but they're still under the constraint of testing people that have lives to get to. People have jobs, loved ones, classes to go to, lives to live, and as such even untimed tests aren't really untimed, since you'd have to be really vain to spend 16 hours on an "untimed test with no rewards" just to get a better score. So the question is, as a mind experiment, if you take the ceiling item of a Raven's test and take an average Joe, then lock them in a room with a bed and nutrition for a week, and say if they don't solve it, they're gonna die akin to a Saw scenario, will they solve it or will they face their doom?

I've found the following relevant research:

1. Richard P. DeShon, David Chan, Daniel A. Weissbein, Verbal overshadowing effects on Raven's advanced progressive matrices: Evidence for multidimensional performance determinants, Intelligence, Volume 21, Issue 2, 1995,Pages 135-155, ISSN 0160-2896,
2. Bors, Douglas & Vigneau, François. (2001). The effect of practice on Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices. Learning and Individual Differences - LEARN INDIVID DIFFER. 13. 291-312. 10.1016/S1041-6080(03)00015-3.
3. Kunda, Maithilee. (2010). Taking a look (literally!) at the Raven's intelligence test: Two visual solution strategies. 1691-1696.

# Answer
> 1 votes
It sounds like you are asking about the functional relationship between time spent on a test item and the probability of answering that item correctly.

In general, the functional form of such relationships for a given individual is sigmoidal. I.e., if you imagine the x-axis is time spent, and the y axis is probability of answering the item correctly for a particular individual, then it will start at the guessing rate (e.g., typically 1 / k where k is the number of response options) and then after a certain period of time it will rise and then plateau.

You could average over individuals to represent a typical time-performance curve for a given item type.

For instance, vocabulary items (e.g., a target word and several response options, one of which has the same meaning) do not take very long to reach the rise and plateau. For the most part, people either know the meaning of the word or they do not know the word. A lot of trivia and general knowledge items would be similar.

In contrast, some items require a somewhat elaborate algorithm to be followed. For instance, some 3d rotation test items require comparison of lots of elements.

Some items are easy given enough time. Perhaps think about certain perceptual speed items, like finding all the "a's" in a grid of letters (e.g., think about Where's Waldo/Wally puzzles). These tests are usually structured as a timed test, in that the ability is really about the speed at which something can be done.

More generally, items can often solved with different strategies that vary in accuracy and in time required. For example, various arithmetic problems (e.g., 37 * 37) can be solved by some quick strategy (involving retrieval and mental manipulation), but spending longer and applying various checks will yield a more accurate answer.

Ultimately, there is a distinction between power and speed tests. Power test don't have a time limit (or the time limit is not meant to interfere with performance substantially), and on speed tests, the time limit is the defining factor. Of course, there are also tests that fall somewhere in between.

From what I know about the Raven's, I imagine having more time would help, but there would also be an upper bound. In some cases, people may think they have found the pattern and be wrong. In other cases, they just would not get it.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, intelligence
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# Question
Title: What are the steps to detect ErrP (Error related potentials) in EEG signals?
I have EEG recordings of an experiment. In some of these recordings subject made an error during the experiment. We know these error cause brain to output ErrP signals. I want to detect this. There are not many sources about single trial detection of ErrP's. What are the main steps to detect these error indicator signals?

> Error-related potentials (ErrPs) are neurophysiological signals associated with error processing. They are generated when wrong actions are perceived and have been reported in many contexts in the past two decades, namely when a subject perceives that he/she has committed an error and recognizes it immediately (‘response ErrP’), when a subject receives the feedback of a previous choice without knowing whether it was wrong (‘feedback ErrP’), when observing mistakes of another person or agent (‘observation ErrP’)’ or during the interaction with a brain-computer interface (BCI) when the feedback is not the expected one (‘interaction ErrP’). The components of an ErrP appear within a time window of 500 ms and are naturally elicited in the brain without the user’s explicit intention. Thus, its automatic detection can be used in myriad ways, in real-time, and in human-machine interaction processes. In particular, interaction and observation ErrPs have been applied as a proof-of-concept in several applications, for example, for detection and correction of BCI choices to increase reliability, to adapt BCI systems over the time, or to make intelligent systems (e.g., external agents) learn. There is also a growing interest for ErrPs in clinical applications for disorders where error monitoring is impaired.

# Answer
> 1 votes
An "error related potential" is just a difference in EEG traces between error and non-error trials.

To calculate an (anything)-related potential, you average trials with and without (anything), and subtract one from the other. It's possible to do this in time or frequency domains, though you'll likely get different answers due to evoked vs induced components (see *David, O., Kilner, J. M., & Friston, K. J. (2006). Mechanisms of evoked and induced responses in MEG/EEG. Neuroimage, 31(4), 1580-1591.* ). If you want to isolate *errors* specifically, you'll want to match trials where other things are constant. For example, if your subjects are choosing left or right, you may want to subtract trials where they chose left as a correct option from those where they chose left as an error. The exact way of doing this depends entirely on your experimental paradigm. Read the literature for ideas, but the specifics depend on *your* specifics.

Since you know which trials are errors, you do not need to detect errors on single trials to demonstrate if some error signal is present.

If you want to do single-trial detection, that will be a matter of finding the features in the average error signal in a single trial or identifying non-phase locked features (such as power changes) that don't show up well in averages. You might look for power in particular frequencies, voltage at a specific moment in time relative to a stimulus/decision, phase relationships on different channels, etc. You could train a neural network (or use other AI/ML approaches) to detect these features using standard approaches in those fields (cross-validation, etc).

Single-trial detection with EEG is very difficult. I suspect you will fail to distinguish on single trials from EEG with high accuracy despite what you've read, but you're welcome to try, and can probably exceed chance performance if the quality of recordings and strength of signal are good.

Here are a few papers where people have done similar things:

*Chavarriaga, R., & Millán, J. D. R. (2010). Learning from EEG error-related potentials in noninvasive brain-computer interfaces. IEEE transactions on neural systems and rehabilitation engineering, 18(4), 381-388.*

*Ferracuti, F., Casadei, V., Marcantoni, I., Iarlori, S., Burattini, L., Monteriù, A., & Porcaro, C. (2020). A functional source separation algorithm to enhance error-related potentials monitoring in noninvasive brain-computer interface. Computer Methods and Programs in Biomedicine, 191, 105419.*

*Salazar-Gomez, A. F., DelPreto, J., Gil, S., Guenther, F. H., & Rus, D. (2017, May). Correcting robot mistakes in real time using EEG signals. In 2017 IEEE international conference on robotics and automation (ICRA) (pp. 6570-6577). IEEE.*

None of their approaches are identical; there is no "right" answer here.

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Tags: eeg, error-related-negativity
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# Question
Title: When is it defendable to use manifest instead of latent variables in psychological research?
In psychology, most of the concepts, theories, ideas etc. of interest refer to *latent variables*, where a latent variable is one that can't be observed directly. Instead, one has to find a *manifest variable*, which can be observed directly and which can be used as an indicator for the latent variable. Unless there is a perfect indicator (which usually there is not), the measurement of the latent variable contains an error. To estimate the error, latent variable modelling techniques like CFA or Item Response Theory (among others) have been developed.

**Latent Variable Theory**

Now, it is generally agreed upon that variables like age and gender are manifest. But what is it that makes the difference between a latent and a manifest variable? Borsboom (2008) explicates this difference. In his *latent variable theory*, the distinction depends on the certainty, with which an inference can be made from the observed data to the variable in question. In this sense, a variable like gender is manifest, because one can infer with certainty if a subject is male or female from his or her answer on a questionnaire. Note that this is possible, even though one has not actually *observed* the gender of that subject. Borsboom's account of latent variable theory also implies that the status of a variable as latent vs. manifest can change over time, if for example more information becomes accessible. But as long as a variable has proven to be manifest, it remains latent.

It seems to me, then, that pretty much every researcher in psychology should use latent variable modelling techniques, since most of the time it is not at all possible to infer something with certainty. However, this is clearly not the case. There are numerous published articles that use manifest variables and analyze the relationships between them without accounting for measurement error, thereby implicitly making the latent variable in question a manifest variable. (If anyone wants citations for this claim, I will happily provide them.)

**Question: Under what circumstances is it defendable to use manifest instead of latent variables in psychological research, even if it is clear that the variables can only be measured with error?**

Borsboom, D. (2008). Latent variable theory. *Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspective*, 6(1-2), 25-53. PDF

# Answer
Experimental psychologists seem quite happy working with single item *ad hoc* self-report scales, physiological measures, etc. with very little psychometrical assessment so even before talking about a full-fledged latent variable modeling approach, confirmatory factor analysis and the like you might want to wonder why they appear relatively unconcerned with measurement issues in general and why there is still such a big gap between experimental psychology and psychometrics.

Some potential explanations (some of them are not very convincing *justifications* for not doing latent variable modeling but still explain why people are content using manifest variables):

* Experimentalist can create (relatively) strong effects. If you are doing an experiment in which you try to induce disgust by showing pictures of disgusting things to people and your pictures do not seem to produce a measurable effect, you could try to improve your measurement but you can also just use even more disgusting pictures or add a few additional trials in your experiment. On the other hand, when you are creating a personality test for recruitment purposes, you can't just wish candidates would be more different from each other to make your task easier or be happy with estimating the average of all candidates, you really need to assign a score to each candidate with a level of precision that allows you to discriminate between them.
* They rely on the nature of the manipulation and its effects on the response and not mainly on the correlation between different scales to interpret their results.
* They are often interested in group differences. (Inter-individual differences often dwarf any item-related error so why even care about that? Just add a few participants!)
* They still structure their experiments as a test of some ‘nil’ hypothesis (is there an effect or not?)
* They are not very interested in effect sizes as such, a consequence of the previous point (if they do compute some effect size measure, it's mostly with an eye for statistical power).

In short, if any statistically significant difference is regarded as an interesting result (i.e. your manipulation had an effect), you don't need to be too concerned about the reliability or meaning of the response.

Interestingly, you seem to be approaching the question from one camp, assuming that latent variable modeling is clearly useful and people need to actively defend themselves for not doing the obvious right thing. You might also turn the question around and ask “Is latent variable modeling all that useful? What does it buy us?” In the context I just highlighted, it might not be so easy to articulate a convincing answer.

And of course, in practice, many people just care about methodology to the smallest extent possible to go about their business, be published and do the things they regard as really interesting. Consequently, many researchers don't hear much about latent variable modeling after they finished their master and they don't even care about it one way or the other because it's just not the way things are done in their disciplines.
> 8 votes

# Answer
*It's an interesting question. Here are a bunch of thoughts that came to my mind for why researchers might focus on observed variables.*

* Many researchers report reliability and observed relationships between variables. By adopting a few assumptions, the **reader can estimate what the latent relationships** would be (see for example, the formula for correction of attenuation).
* Some **researchers interpret their effect sizes relative to other studies that have reported observed variables**. Thus, effect sizes are not interpreted in absolute terms. In areas where effect sizes are typically reported using observed variables, this frame of reference may make most sense. That said, this becomes problematic where reliability is varying between studies. In these cases, Hunter and Schmidt style meta-analytic corrections for unreliability generally lead to more comparable results.
* Modelling observed variables involves **fewer modelling choices** than modelling latent variables. In particular, estimates of relationships between latent variables are contingent on the assumptions for estimating latent variables. If, as a reader, you disagree with these assumptions, it can be difficult to recover the relationships between the observed variables.
* **Modelling observed variables is simpler** than modelling latent variables. This helps to explain why many researchers report correlation matrices and regressions in psychology, rather than latent variable equivalents. However, things can get much more complex as you step outside the standard multivariate normal SEM contexts: e.g., incorporating categorical variables, moderator effects, latent variables that are ill-defined, non-linear effects, non-normal error variance, correlated error variance, and so on. It's understandable that some social science researchers fall back on to the more familiar territory of modelling observed variables in a piece-wise fashion. However, while this is an explanation, researchers should still strive to model data in more integrated and realistic ways.
* Ultimately, **it is the researcher who decides whether they wish to draw inferences about relationships between observed or latent variables**. While some contexts suggest that the researcher should be interested in the underlying construct, it is still up to the researcher to decide.
* **Relationships between observed variables are sometimes primarily of interest**. Some examples: (a) experimental conditions; (b) when researchers are interested in applied prediction; (c) when researchers are interested in the observed variable itself.
* **Whether researchers model latent variables seems to be related to the domain**. In particular, modelling latent variables seems to be particularly popular in fields with large samples, observational designs, that use self-report or multiple choice psychological scales. In such contexts the assumption that the observed variables are random sample of possible observed variables and are a manifestation of a latent variable often seems more appropriate. It's easy to imagine the alternative items that could have been collected, and how the reliability could have been improved had more items been included. It is interesting to ponder why this is the case, and whether there are areas that would benefit from greater incorporation of latent variable modelling.
* **Often the latent variable of interest is not the variable implied by the intercorrelation of observed variables**. For example, the latent factor underlying a set of self-report extraversion items will not be true extraversion. I can conceptualise a true extraversion that might be calculated were it possible to integrate everything that could be known about a person's behaviour, their thoughts, their physiology, and their environmental regularities. However, the factor underlying the intercorrelations of self-report items would not be this factor. While there is value to estimating relationships had perfect reliability been obtained, this should not absolve us from trying to estimate the actual latent variable of interest.
* **Correcting for measurement error should not stop researchers from trying to increase the reliability and validity of measurement.** Correcting for unreliability is not as good as measuring reliably in the first place.
> 6 votes

# Answer
The meaning of latent variables have the unfortunate downside of changing between samples because they are fit to the observed correlation matrix (likely only jittering the meaning, but definitely changing from sample to sample).

With this, I would argue that it is best to use manifest variables when using a standard scale that you intend to compare your results to others using that standard scale.

The other reason to use manifest variables is if there are established cut points that you want to use.

I would use a latent variable for anything home brewed or for any construct where I collected multiple scales/other indicators on.
> 0 votes

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Tags: measurement, methodology, statistics
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# Question
Title: Term for this Manipulation tactic -- saying "we" instead of "i"
The term is for when a manipulator keeps saying "we" this, "we" that, when really they should be saying "I". It's a form of manipulation I believe is called "forced" something.

Youtubers do it a lot.

The term is not "royal we" or "majestic plural".

I cannot remember what this term was called.

EDIT: What I'm referring to is something like the use of plural first-person pronouns as a tactic for fostering parasocial relationships through "verbal immediacy".

Here is an article discussing the utility of this specific tactic itself.

Here is a study measuring pronoun use (among other things) in Celebrity tweets.

Sorry for the offhand style of the original question.

# Answer
> 2 votes
Fake/false consensus effect.

As the authors of the associated article in effectivology.com put it:

> The false-consensus effect is a cognitive bias that causes people to overestimate how much others are like them, in terms of sharing things such as their beliefs, values, characteristics, experiences, and behaviors. Essentially, this means that the false consensus effect leads people to assume that others are more similar to them than they actually are.
>
> For example, the false consensus effect can cause someone with extreme political beliefs to incorrectly assume that the majority of the population agrees with them and shares those beliefs, even though most people don’t.

A form of projection bias or egocentric bias, false consensus effect is displayed and gives the appearance of a consensus of opinion and in the cases of social media that the OP mentions, an impression of consensus can be given deliberately for the purpose of creating such consensus in the listener's minds. This is most apparent where the listeners strongly identify with the speaker via in-group bias.

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Tags: social-psychology, terminology, psychology
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# Question
Title: Human/social behavior when one emphasizes their own superior achievements over others'
I'm looking for a name/category/definition of (personality?) disorder(s) that can be described with the following traits in one's (imaginary person) social/human behavior:

* this person brings up and emphasizes his own, (according to him) superior achievements whenever another person around him mentions their own success/results/etc. (relevant fact: this person's statements about his own achievements are usually true, so there is no or little exaggeration);
* still, this person does this in a way that likely hurts other's feelings or self-esteem (this person does this regardless of who's the other half, like friends/partner/family), maybe even permanently;
* when this person has to do something with the achievements of others, he also emphasizes his own role behind the success of the other half (may even claim that the other person would not have been able to achieve their results without his assistance/inspiration);
* finally, though this may be a bit further from the previous points, this person may also inspire other people to start doing the same things that he's already started earlier (through which he may have an edge in terms of performance, quicker results, etc.) - e.g., a hobby or a sport.

As a follow-up question: what would be an ideal strategy to deal with (from friends/family perspective) such a person's behavior (preferably in a way that noone gets hurt)? Note please that I'm not looking for an answer/advice related to any personal issues or situation, the above scenarios are strictly hypothetical.

As a 2nd follow-up question: I'd be also interested in the origin of such a situation/traits (like how one would develop such a behavior, e.g. through childhood events or parental issues).

My research so far: tried to look for an answer online by summarizing the main points and got to "Narcissistic personality disorder" which (according to this site) is a mental condition in which people have an inflated sense of their own importance, a deep need for excessive attention and admiration.

However, I'm not 100% sure that the above traits completely match this definition since they emphasize one's superior results/role in other's success and usually are combined with mean/humiliating remarks. Also, this person rarely steers a conversation etc. in a way so that he'll have the attention/focus.

# Answer
It's possible to have one or more traits of a personality disorder without qualifying for that personality disorder itself (see Merck Manual Overview of Personality Disorders for definitions of traits). The person you're describing does have certain narcissistic traits, and would probably be ultrasensitive about being criticized for it. In the situations you're describing, the best way to help the other person not feel bad is to redirect the conversation gently back to that person (the one who was speaking about themselves originally).

A good way to think about someone with this kind of trait is to see them as insecure and needing reassurance that they matter. At least, this will help you not dislike them when they thoughtlessly hurt others.
> 3 votes

# Answer
I think it is narcissistic behaviour. I would suggest you take a look at a book called the laws of human nature. Such behaviour is shown there and it is mentioned repeatedly. It also explains where such behaviour comes from. Follow this link https://b-ok.org/
> 0 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, personality-disorder
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title: Isn’t nature caused by nurture?

text:
# Question
Title: Isn’t nature caused by nurture?
This seems like something that would have been asked already on the internet. However, I haven’t found it.

My understanding is that our biology is heavily influenced by the environment. Things like evolution and adaptation occur due to changes in the environment. I’m assuming that the idea of nurture is referring to things in the span of one person’s lifetime, whereas nature is something caused by the environment but takes effect over the course of multiple generations. Still, I feel like it would be better to put more emphasis on nurture since our nature does change. Perhaps this contradicts what ‘nature’ means. If nature means unchangeable, then I’m not sure what is something that would be considered nature. Perhaps someone could enlighten me on this subject. Or maybe I’m getting too philosophical and should post in the philosophy stack exchange.

# Answer
I think you are too focused on the words "nature" and "nurture". These words are imperfect labels, chosen for alliteration.

The "nature vs nurture" "debate" or balance (as few people really *debate* nature vs nurture except for the *degree* to which each is influential in a specific case) specifically refers to hereditary and non-hereditary (non-hereditary sometimes called "environmental") contributions to some trait.

You cannot understand the debate better by dissecting the words "nature" or "nurture". The "nature/nurture" phrasing is just a label, it does not contain intrinsic meaning besides being a cute linguistic phrase in simpler language; it's a lot like "survival of the fittest" in this way. It could have been labeled completely arbitrarily and there would not be any biological or underlying change in meaning. You could call hereditary factors "purple" and environmental factors "triangle" and refer to the "purple vs triangle" debate.

Importantly, estimating the influence of hereditary factors does not depend on the history of the evolution of those factors. Heredity is simply the portion of variation in people/animals/organisms that is explained by genetics. Natural selection is often an important contributor to changes in species, but evolution is influenced by other factors as well, like genetic drift, and "nature/nurture" is primarily about variation among *individuals* while evolution occurs *in populations*. The heritable factors that cause individual differences do not need to be adaptive.

There are of course different ways of defining what exactly it means to be hereditary, with some gray area around epigenetic factors, for example, but these must be addressed with more specific language in defining what exactly is meant by hereditary; you can't work backwards from the labels "nature" or "nurture" to understand what the boundaries should be, as those are merely labels.
> 6 votes

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Tags: nature-nurture
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# Question
Title: Measuring spike activity with an electrode: using the principles present in galvanic cells, can one explain how current flows in the electrode system?
Thank you for reading this.

In a galvanic cell setup and around each electrode in that setup, we have species that either undergo oxidation or reduction—resulting in the literal flow of electrons between the two electrodes. We can then use a voltmeter to calculate the electric potential difference between the two electrodes (using Ohm's law).

A similar situation also happens when we're doing voltammetry—fast scan or otherwise. The typical example is of dopamine. One electrode is placed in the solution containing dopamine. The other electrode can be electronically manipulated to create a certain potential difference between itself and the electrode submerged in the dopamine solution. At some point across this voltage manipulation, dopamine is oxidized to dopamine-o-quinone. There's a literal flow of electrons (two per dopamine oxidized) which then establishes a current—which then we can measure.

What's the "parallel" situation in measuring spike activity? Consider the following diagram:

What species (if any) are oxidized to provide the electrons needed to establish a current in the electrode system (which then can be used to calculate the voltage difference across the axonal membrane)? During the propagation of an action potential—where voltage gated sodium channels open—what species (again, if any) are oxidized?

Thank you.

# Answer
Most neurophysiological recordings use silver/silver chloride contacts; silver metal is being oxidized or silver chloride being reduced. Whichever occurs at the recording site, the opposite reaction is happening at the ground/reference contact.

Of course, silver isn't participating in the actual biology of producing action potentials, it's just in the electrode doing the measuring.
> 1 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, electrophysiology
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# Question
Title: Default Mode Network and: hyper-connectivity, hypo-connectivity, interconnectivity and intraconnectivity
I have been reading into DMN and its relationship to psychopathology. However, in some papers I have noticed terminology that mentioned hypo-,hyper-,inter-, and intra*connectivity*. While I understand what the prefixes mean, I fail to understand the actual functional relationship to the DMN. Could someone please provide me with the definition for each and an example which includes each of the terms?

I link some of the articles which mention hyperconnectivity in Schizophrenia and others.

Edit:

Upon recommendation from one of the comments, I will redefine the specific aspect of the question which I struggle with. What is hyperconnectivity (and the other 3 terms) in terms of DMN? What does the hyperconnectivity (to choose as an example from the selection) relate to?

A second question is, what does hypo-, and hyperconnectivity mean in terms of the relationship between ASD and DMN?

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/ppmc/articles/PMC2633557/

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8112713/

# Answer
> 3 votes
The default mode network (DMN) is a collection of brain structures identified in human functional neuroimaging.

Specifically, a type of neuroimaging called BOLD indirectly measures local metabolism in the brain; the assumption is that areas with a strong BOLD signal are active.

It's typical to use Pearson correlations of the BOLD signal over time between different brain regions to measure what is called "functional connectivity": regions are said to be functionally connected if they have high metabolism at the same time, and low metabolism at the same time. In other words, if their BOLD signals are positively correlated, they are said to be functionally connected.

The DMN is a particular collection of brain regions found to have high correlations among each other = high functional connectivity *at rest*, when people sit in the scanner doing nothing else. This is an *observation* that is very consistent and reliable in "normal" participants in fMRI studies.

Given this reliable signal, scientists have sought to connect the DMN to psychiatric disorders. If someone says "DMN hypoconnectivity in (condition A)", what they typically mean is "we measured Pearson correlations of BOLD signals in brain regions that people know are usually highly connected at rest; we found the strength of those connections was weaker in (condition A) than in participants without that condition". Hyperconnectivity would mean the opposite: higher correlations in (condition B) than in a control population.

Those are both examples of *intraconnectivity* in terms of the DMN: connections within=intra that network. It's possible to break the rest of the brain into other networks, or just one broad "not-DMN" network. If a paper talks about "interconnectivity" with the DMN, they are talking about the relationship between parts of the brain that are in the DMN and other parts of the brain.

Everything that comes after that is pure speculation, or needs to be supported by something else. In one of the papers you link, the authors write:

> Constant overengagement of the default network could lead to an exaggerated focus on one's own thoughts and feelings as well as an ambiguous integration between one's own thoughts and feelings with events in the environment. Thus, neutral events would seem to be imbued with exaggerated self-relevance, and the boundary between the internal world of reflection and feeling and the external world of perception and action would be weakened. Indeed, many symptoms of schizophrenia involve an exaggerated sense of self-relevance in the world, such as paranoid ideation that individuals and groups are conspiring against the patient, and a blurring of internal reflection and external perception, such as hallucinations.

That's all just the authors' speculation (which is perfectly appropriate for a discussion section; that's what they're doing, discussing the results). They are interpreting the result they found (DMN hyperconnectivity) in terms of other things they already know about the psychiatric condition they are interested in.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, neuroscience, abnormal-psychology, cognitive-modeling, clinical-psychology
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# Question
Title: What are the real motives of people helping to each other?
I'm wondering sometimes why people want to help someone. What are the real motives of it? The *Karpman drama triangle* says that 3 types of people exist and one of these types is *rescuer* and as I understand real motives of this type isn't really help to someone, but feed your own ego. Is all that humans do is really spin on feeding ego, or am I wrong?

# Answer
> 9 votes
## TLDR

While I have provided a full answer explaining Karpman's Drama Triangle, you can skip that and go to the last heading (Your question).

## Basis of my answer

If you are approaching this question as a therapist, you will be dealing with elements of Eric Berne's *Transactional Analysis*. And, depending on the therapeutic approach you provide, you may be drawing upon, for example, either

* Sigmund Freud's theory of ego-defence mechanisms or
* one concept within the key principle of Frederick (Fritz) Perls' Gestalt therapy, which is the *formation and destruction cycle* and the *contact boundary disturbances* which arise from it. This has similarities with Freud's ego-defence mechanisms. (See another answer of mine for information on the formation and destruction cycle).

Bear in mind though that, while I am a defender of Freudian and Neo-Freudian theories, some of the theories covered are considered by some here to be pseudoscientific.

## Transactional Analysis (TA)

In TA, the concept is that interactions – transactions – between different people in a given situation when communicating with each other, can be different and changing; and using TA you can **analyse these transactions** to give you an insight into what is happening. The philosophy behind TA is that

1. **People are ‘OK’** – We may not like or agree with other’s behaviour, but we can accept them as worthy individuals.
2. **People can think for themselves** and it is their responsibility to do so.
3. **People make decisions that decide their destiny, and these decisions can change**.

Berne (1966) said:

> I think most other therapies . . . talk about thinking and feeling. Our question to the patient is not what do you think or how do you feel, but what are you going to do about it?

## Karpman's Drama Triangle

This triangle, developed by Stephen Karpman (1968), is actually to do with **co-dependency**, which can be formed by well intentioned laypeople and trained therapists who are not bearing in mind some of the pitfalls that can come from therapy work.

If you think upon what Dr Eric Berne said, as quoted above, ethical therapy is about helping people to work out **for themselves**, what **they** are going to do, to **help themselves** through their issues. **Neither the person going through therapy, or the therapist, should become dependent on the other person**.

Visualising the triangle is a way used to analyse the "games" people sometimes play, hence the title of the video referenced, and Eric Berne's book *The Games People Play* (1964). Two people cannot hold the same position at once.

My representation of the triangle from Karpman (1968) PDF

One example of the use of the Drama Triangle is when the victim (through contact boundary disturbances such as *deflection* or *projection*) starts persecuting the rescuer, the victim has shifted to persecutor and so the rescuer then becomes the victim.

Reviewing the concept, David Emerald (2016) suggests that the Drama Triangle is problematic, calling it the DDT (Dreaded Drama Triangle), whereby “fixing and saving others, a rescuer believes others will appreciate and value them for their good deeds” and this can lead to problems, because

* the rescuer has a feeling of powerlessness once the problem has been solved, and then goes looking for more victims to save; plus
* if they don’t get the appreciation they feel they deserve, they can then go into victim mode.

David Emerald provides an alternative triangle which he called *the TED (The Empowerment Dynamic) Triangle*. This overpowers the DDT.

## The TED triangle

Changing Karpman's triangle, in the TED triangle, the victim is a Creator (taking responsibility and focusing on what they want to create). There is a Challenger (opposite of persecutor – provoking learning and growth with benevolent intent) and there is the Coach who is supporting the creator in their efforts by asking powerful questions (Emerald, 2017).

> Learning to transform everyday drama and opt for more growth-oriented solutions, is the priceless gift TED teaches.
>
> The Empowerment Dynamic accelerates your ability to self-observe and notice your inner conversation. By waking up to your ways of thinking and relating to yourself and others, you have a greater chance to choose a more positive response to life’s challenges and to create an empowered life.

## Your question

So, what are the real motives of people helping to each other?

Motives can vary from person to person, and so the answer would be subject to opinion. Your assumption that the motivation of a rescuer type isn't really to help someone, but feed your own ego, can be flawed. A rescuer can genuinely want to help a friend or work colleague to deal with a particular difficult situation (pure altruism — selfless concern for the well-being of others). It is just that Stephen Karpman suggests that while the rescuer is looking to help, they ought to ask themselves:

* Am I doing this for the right reasons?
* Am I seeking any recognition for providing the help?
* What happens once they have overcome their issues? Will I feel the need to help someone else?

## References

Berne, E. (1964). *Games People Play: The Psychology of Human Relationships*. London: Penguin Books Ltd..

Berne, E. (1966). *Games People Play – The Theory Video*. https://www.ericberne.com/videos/

Emerald, D. (2016). *Power of TED: The Empowerment Dynamic – 10th Anniversary Edition*. Bainbridge Island, WA: Polaris Publishing Group.

Emerald, D. (2017). *The Power of TED*. https://www.theempowermentdynamic.com/

Karpman, S. (1968). Fairy tales and script drama analysis. *Transactional analysis bulletin, 7*(26), 39-43. Free PDF: https://www.karpmandramatriangle.com/pdf/DramaTriangle.pdf

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Tags: emotion, personality, motivation, behavior
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# Question
Title: Is there a reason I cannot find those that specialize in psychiatry and psychology?
Any time I look this up, I only seem to find the differences between the two. I'm aware of the difference enough to know that one is generally someone you consult with to work out problems, while the other actually deals with the medical side of things.

What I want to know - and cannot find out - is why I cannot find one that specializes in *both*. I've always been under the impression that being well versed in both would allow one to better coordinate treatment with a patient. Would this not be the case?

As someone that is dealing with issues that could be useful to both talk through and take medicine for (and as someone that likes to have control over multiple facets of a challenge to better tackle it), there's an appeal to me to find someone that can do both - someone that, in theory, could both work with me to tackle my personal issues in the most efficient way, through a combination of medication and talking.

One reason I thought of - but haven't been able to confirm - is that each discipline requires substantial time to learn and be certified in, to the point that it wouldn't be feasible to practice both - either due to the amount of money required for schooling, or some other factor that I wouldn't be aware of.

Optionally, I'm wondering if they *do* exist, however I'm just unable to find any through my insurance (or any other service I use to find doctors) - but even when looking through google, I can only seem to find professionals that perform one *or* the other, as opposed to doing both.

Do they exist? Are they considered "unicorns" (and thus would just be rare finds, period, as say, a UX Engineer that specializes in multiple facets of the discipline) or is there some other reason that I'm not aware of?

Part of me feels there is a straightforward answer that I just can't seem to find - or perhaps I'm asking the wrong question. Part of me feels this is more of a subjective answer that'll result in an instantly-deleted question. I'm hoping the latter isn't the case, but I'm at a loss of where else to ask.

# Answer
Largely because in most (if not all) jurisdictions:

psychiatrist = medical doctor + psychologist

So psychiatrists believe that they are, in fact, "someone you consult with to work out problems" and "deals with the medical side of things."

However, in practice, having many years of medical training, and generally seeing clients for whom non-medicated (or GP pharmaceutical prescribed) solutions haven't had the desired effect; they tend to focus quite strongly on the "medical side of things."

Doctors in general often believe that the statistical evidence favours drugs over discussion.

All this said, psychiatrists who specialise in talking therapies ("psychotherapy") do exist.

I understand the original poster is resident in the United States. The American Psychiatric Association does not have a specialist college for them, nor does its "Find a Psychiatrist" service provide a method to find them. However, their web page https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/psychotherapy does provide links to notable psychotherapy organisations that their members may be members of. Of these, only one makes it easy to find members that are also psychiatrists - https://www.aapdp.org/new-membership/roster-of-members/. All it's members are so.

In Australia, http://www.ranzcp.org/membership/faculties-sections-and-networks/psychotherapy is the singular peak body for psychiatrists who are particularly interested in psychotherapy.
> 4 votes

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Tags: psychology, psychiatry
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# Question
Title: There an indirect causal effect of fluid intelligence on crystallize intelligence that is mediated by the manner in which people perceive the world
Evidently, the ability to abstract (fluid intelligence) has a causal effect on crystallize intelligence, that is, the greater the ability to abstract, the greater the acquired knowledge over time. However, knowledge is rather complex. It is defined as a familiarity or awareness, of someone or something, such as facts (**descriptive** knowledge), skills (**procedural** knowledge), or objects (**acquaintance** knowledge) contributing to ones understanding. It is not obvious that people of high fluid intellect tend to acquire all different types of knowledge, typically one develops a specific form of knowledge optimised for their objectives. In other words, the knowledge deemed as most meaningful with respect to their objectives will be the one the person develops most forcefully, and their fluid intelligence determines the extent to which they develop this, e.g., those who perceive the world in terms of objective facts will likely develop their descriptive knowledge and those who perceive the world as a place to exhibit skill will likely develop their procedural knowledge. Hence, there is an indirect causal effect of fluid intelligence on crystallize intelligence that is mediated by the manner in which people perceive the world, phenomenologically.

# Answer
> 1 votes
While I agree that individuals of different personalities will develop different skill-sets and aptitudes, I may disagree on the cause proposed in the question. The types of knowledge mentioned can all fit into schemas, which are developed by all intellectually healthy persons. From Wikipedia:

> In psychology and cognitive science, a **schema** (plural *schemata* or *schemas*) describes a pattern of thought or behavior that organizes categories of information and the relationships among them.\[\]\[\] It can also be described as a mental structure of preconceived ideas, a framework representing some aspect of the world, or a system of organizing and perceiving new information.\[\] \[...\] Examples of schemata include academic rubrics, social schemas, stereotypes, social roles, scripts, worldviews, and archetypes.

The associations listed in the question seem essentially as *object-feature* (part of a schema), *state-motion* (script; a type of schema), and *object-identity* (a one-off schema), which any competent person should possess in abundance. Which schemas are most accumulated and reinforced is a matter of experience; which experiences are partaken is a matter of priority; but all mentally healthy humans possess various manners of perception and attention.

Priorities change as *internal state* (e.g. hunger) and *external state* (e.g. threat) change. Handling various combinations of internal and external state is critical for survival. No doubt, the states and combinations (composite states) most experienced are likely to be the most developed in terms of having accurate schemas for their thoughts and actions.

General intelligence is about pattern matching (seeing similarities) and pattern distinction (seeing differences) -- that is, finding and refining schemas. Naturally, the essence of pattern is abstraction. A person of higher intelligence will tend to accumulate schemas faster; but which schemas are found first is heavily influenced by experiences (e.g. education) and priorities (e.g. survival).

Most people have the same basic set of priorities by birth; but internal differences, such as from genes and hormones, influence these priorities and hence the personality. External experience, especially in early childhood, further shapes this personality.

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Tags: intelligence
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# Question
Title: Is there a term to refer to humans' automatic belief of encountered information?
I believe there is a universal (or, highly regular in the mechanisms of cognition) human tendency to believe a proposition just because they encountered it. I mean this in a very specific way. It’s like they mistake someone asserting something for the discovery of a fact, from the oblivion. It’s almost like when propositions are placed somewhere free from context, the human mind through evolution has developed an (advantageous) tendency to absorb information / beliefs rapidly as they are transmitted. It would be way too much of an expense of cognitive energy to have to consider all logical factors necessary for a proposition to really be true. Even intelligent people must do it, it’s necessary for day to day functioning, and survival in / keeping up with a culture. You can imagine in paleolithic times, someone might say, "There are blackberries in X location," and it's almost like a computer sending a transmission which automatically gets received. The sort of "scrutiny" mechanisms of human thought are not always active. There are times where just because someone said something, you immediately assume it's true without realizing or thinking about it, to the extent that you might transmit that information to someone else with the sense that it is authoritative knowledge. It's almost like we can intuitively distinguish between reported knowledge vs. (at least what we consider) an absolute fact, except we don't do it accurately - we are biased in favor of absolute facts over reported knowledge.

In the extreme case it’s someone just believing anything they read online indiscriminately, but there are plenty of subtle everyday cases too. Sort of like Kahneman’s “WYSIWYG” concept (what you see is what you get), or could be an acronym such as the “I know it’s true because somebody said so” phenomenon. It’s meant to be more subtle and nuanced than just the general notion of being gullible.

Have any scientists discussed this aspect of human psychology?

Thank you

# Answer
While perhaps not of the seriousness sought, an apparently related term is truthiness. From Wikipedia:

> **Truthiness** is the belief or assertion that a particular statement is true based on the intuition or perceptions of some individual or individuals, without regard to evidence, logic, intellectual examination, or facts.\[\]\[\]

Three basic filtering mechanisms come to mind for the brain to recognise misinformation: imagination, intuition, and reason. If an idea or "fact" can be *imagined*, seems at least somewhat *intuitive*, and has no obvious *inconsistencies*, whether internally, or with existing beliefs, then presumably little cognitive dissonance will stand in the way of integrating the idea. A couple notable exceptions may be (1) when the source is known to be unreliable or (2) when deception is suspected.

One of the tips taught in persuasion is that if you can get someone to imagine a scenario, that scenario will be more likely believed as possible, or as having actually happened, even in the absence of proper evidence. This phenomenon may be due to processing fluency. From Wikipedia:

> **Processing fluency** is the ease with which information is processed. Perceptual fluency is the ease of processing stimuli based on manipulations to perceptual quality. Retrieval fluency is the ease with which information can be retrieved from memory.\[\]

> Other studies have shown that when presenting people with a factual statement, manipulations that make the statement easier to mentally process—even totally nonsubstantive changes like writing it in a cleaner font or making it rhyme or simply repeating it—can alter judgment of the truth of the statement, along with evaluation of the intelligence of the statement's author.\[15\] This is called the "illusion of truth effect". Multiple studies have found that subjects were more likely to judge easy-to-read statements as true.\[16\]\[17\]\[18\] This means that perceived beauty and judged truth have a common underlying experience, namely processing fluency. Indeed, experiments showed that beauty is used as an indication for the correctness of mathematical solutions. This supports the idea that beauty is intuitively seen as truth.\[19\] Processing fluency may be one of the foundations of intuition\[20\] and the "Aha!" experience.\[21\]\[22\]

A common theme seems to be that in the absence of dissonance or discomfort, encountered information is likely to be accepted. Perhaps this phenomenon follows from the brain's tendency to accept directly perceived stimuli as true and real. In a way, something imagined *becomes* seen, albeit in the mind's eye.
> 4 votes

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Tags: belief
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# Question
Title: Is there a term for grief triggered from merely seeing, or remembering, places that a griever enjoyed with loved ones?
***The loved ones don't have to be dead. The may simply be too ill or senile.*** The griever may be anticipating grief. I am not asking about nostalgia or wistfulness — the bleakness, forlornness are much gloomier here.

Consider an adult who — whenever he happens upon, or remembers, a venue that he as a child used to frequent with his parent — instantly gets sad and doleful because he no longer is a child, and his parent is much older. Examples can be past homes of theirs where they lived happily together, schools where his parents took him, places of recreation (a shopping mall or park or restaurant) that they frequented, and even streets and roads that they walked and drove together on. Upon sight, the same location triggers the adult to forthwith VIVIDLY remember and envision his parents with him. But then the adult saddens, because those memories hailed from a happier time. Perhaps now they can no longer enjoy those shared memories in the same way, shape, or form with their parents. Perhaps the aging parent can no longer be physical, walk, move, or drive. ***Again, the parent may still be alive.***

Further, consider a graver case where the adult cannot even bear or stomach seeing, revisiting or even envisaging these places. I have heard of patients who must muster up the courage to move to a new city, simply because almost everywhere in their old community triggers them to envision and remember themselves with their loved ones — and these envisages and remembrances trigger too much disconsolateness and grief!

My question may be similar to — but ISN'T — Is it okay to move away from a town or area because you have a lot of bad memories associated with it? Has moving to another city/state ever helped you get out of your depression/anxiety? Should I leave a city when there are too many bad memories and toxic circle of friends?

Why not? Because my question involves a clear determinate cause of the grief and woe — seeing or remembering places that you experienced with loved ones in the past.

I apologize if I am rambling, but I am unschooled in psychology and do not know the correct terms. Please do not hesitate to edit and improve my post.

# Answer
Desiderium, saudade.

Desiderium being dragged into English by Thomas Aquinas from the works of Aristotle: an intense desire or longing for that which is lost (such as a time) which may never be regained.

Saudade being adopted from Portuguese, first usage uncertain: a profound melancholic longing for someone or something cared about or loved, again carrying repressed knowledge that the object of longing may never be had again.

> The suffering coming from a happy memory.
> 2 votes

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Tags: depression
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