# Question
Title: What does "diffuse slowing" mean in the context of EEG and Alzheimer's?
Horvath *et al*. (2018) mention that:

> The disappearance of posterior dominant alpha rhythm and the diffuse slowing in AD (alzheimer disease) are easily detectable EEG signs for the experienced eyes.

What does diffuse slowing mean in this context? I tried searching it up online but I only found papers that take its meaning for granted.

**Reference**
1. Horvath, A., Szucs, A., Csukly, G., Sakovics, A., Stefanics, G. and Kamondi, A., 2018. EEG and ERP biomarkers of Alzheimer's disease: a critical review. Frontiers in bioscience (Landmark edition), 23, pp.183-220

# Answer
> 4 votes
Medscape defines diffuse as **generalized**, in the context of EEG. Generalized means activity recorded across large portions of the cortex. This opposes **focal** patterns, that occur locally. In turn this is reflected in generalized epilepsy and focal epilepsy. Generalized epilepsias are characterized by gross paroxysmal activity across the cortex, associated with a loss of consciousness. Focal epilepsy is localized in the cortex and stays restricted to one hemisphere and is not associated with a loss of consciousness.

Britton *et al*. (2016) explain **generalized and focal slowing** in the EEG as follows:

> The two main types of slowing are focal and generalized slowing. As previously discussed, generalized background slowing in the theta and delta frequency ranges is a normal finding on EEG when it represents developmental slowing \[\] or the evolution of drowsiness and sleep activity. However, when there is intermittent or persistent focal slowing seen consistently over one head region, or persistent, unvarying, and unreactive focal or generalized slow wave activity in a vigilant adult patient, this slow wave activity should be considered pathologic and indicates corresponding focal or generalized cerebral dysfunction or both.

<sub>**Reference**
**-** Britton *et al*. The Abnormal EEG. In: St. Louis & Frey (eds). *Electroencephalography (EEG): An Introductory Text and Atlas of Normal and Abnormal Findings in Adults, Children, and Infants*. Chicago: American Epilepsy Society; 2016</sub>

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Tags: neuroscience, terminology, eeg, electrophysiology, alzheimer
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# Question
Title: Is the Flynn effect related to the discovery of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome?
Is it possible that the measured rise in average IQ in the last century is related to the discovery that drinking alcohol during pregnancy can result in birth defects, including issues with brain development?

Has any work been done on this question?

# Answer
> 2 votes
## TL;DR

The story is not that clear cut. The hyposthesis is possible, however the incidence levels of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) has risen over the years. Speculation might say that the higher IQ averages would indicate that the average severity of FAS has decreased, but I cannot find any study to back that up.

## Full answer

I would say that in order to answer this question you need to look at the framework of your question and the whole question centres on IQ (Intelligence Quotient) and Fetal Alcohol Syndome. So let's break this up into the 2 components.

## IQ (Intelligence Quotient)

The Intelligence Quotient is a total score derived from several standardised tests designed to assess human intelligence, and human intelligence involves the cognitive abilities to learn, form concepts, understand, apply logic, and reason, including the capacities to recognize patterns, comprehend ideas, plan, solve problems, make decisions, retain information, and use language to communicate. Intelligence enables humans to experience and think.

## Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS)

A baby exposed to alcohol in the womb may have learning difficulties such as problems with thinking, speech, maths or memory (NHS, 2017) — all needed for high intelligence — and foetal alcohol syndrome is a type of foetal alcohol spectrum disorder (FASD), the name for all the various problems that can affect children if their mother drinks alcohol in pregnancy (CDC, 2018).

CDC (2018) also states that a person with an FASD might have:

* Difficulty with attention
* Poor memory
* Difficulty in school (especially with math)
* Learning disabilities
* Speech and language delays
* Poor reasoning and judgment skills, and
* **Intellectual disability or low IQ**

With all this in mind, it is possible that with lower incidences of FAS due to lower numbers of drinking pregnant mothers, comes higher average IQ numbers.

## The following studies looked at this hypothesis

### FAS and corresponding IQ levels

> **Riikonen, R., Salonen, I., Partanen, K., & Verho, S. (1999). Brain perfusion SPECT and MRI in foetal alcohol syndrome.**
>
> Eleven children with a diagnosis of FAS (six boys and five girls), with a mean age of 8.6 (range 3 to 13) years, participated in the study. **\[...\]** Tests showed moderate learning disability in two children (IQ 40 and 46, respectively) (subjects 2 and 11) and mild learning disability (IQ 68 to 85) or normal intelligence (IQ \>85) in the others.

> **Streissguth, A. P., Herman, C. S., & Smith, D. W. (1978). Intelligence, behavior, and dysmorphogenesis in the fetal alcohol syndrome: A report on 20 patients.**
>
> In a sample of 20 patients with the fetal alcohol syndrome, ages 9 months to 21 years, the average IQ was 65, with a range of 16 to 105; 60% of the patients had IQ's more than two standard deviations below the mean. The sample included patients who ranged in severity of dysmorphogenesis from mild to severe. The severity of the dysmorphic features was related to degree of mental deficiency; children with the most severe manifestations of FAS had an average IQ of 55, whereas children with lesser manifestations had an average IQ of 82. All children were growth deficient for height and/or head circumference, but in this study only height was significantly correlated with IQ.

### Incidence levels of FAS

> **Abel, E. L. (1995). An update on incidence of FAS: FAS is not an equal opportunity birth defect.**
>
> In a previous survey (Abel & Sokol, 1991), the incidence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) in the Western world was estimated at 0.33 cases per 1,000 live born, with a higher incidence among low SES/ African Americans than among middle-high SES/Caucasians. That eariier survey was based on 15 prospective studies of general obstetric populations appearing for prenatal care. Since that analysis, there has been almost a two-fold increase in such studies, allowing for a more up-to-date estimate of the incidence of this anomaly and a clearer perspective of at-risk populations.
>
> The incidence of Fetal Alcohol Syndrome is now estimated at 0.97 cases per 1,000 live births in the general obstetric population and 4.3% among “heavy” drinkers. The general incidence is more than 20 times higher in the United States (1.95 per 1,000) compared to Europe and other countries (0.08 per 1,000). Within the United States, the incidence at sites characterized by low socioeconomic status, and African American or Native American background are about 10 times higher (2.29 cases per 1,000) compared to sites with a predominant middle/upper SES and Caucasian background (0.26 per 1,000). Based on racial background, the number of pregnant women in the U.S. giving birth to FAS children is 2,043 per year; if based on socioeconomic status, the number is slightly higher 2,366. Although race and SES are confounded in the U.S. studies, an examination of U.S. and European studies suggests that the major factor associated with FAS is low SES rather than racial background.

> **Habbick, B. F., Nanson, J. L., Snyder, R. E., Casey, R. E., & Schulman, A. L. (1996). Foetal alcohol syndrome in Saskatchewan: unchanged incidence in a 20-year period.**
>
> Despite major initiatives in public and professional education about foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) in Saskatchewan in the last 20 years, its incidence rate has not fallen. The rate was 0.515 per 1,000 live births in 1973-1977 and 0.589 in 1988-1992.

## Conclusion

The story is not that clear cut. The hyposthesis is possible, however the incidence levels of Foetal Alcohol Syndrome (FAS) has risen over the years. Speculation might say that the higher IQ averages would indicate that the average severity of FAS has decreased, but I cannot find any study to back that up.

## References

Abel, E. L., & Sokol, R. J. (1991). A revised conservative estimate of the incidence of FAS and its economic impact. *Alcoholism: Clinical and experimental research*, 15(3), 514-524. doi: 10.1111/j.1530-0277.1991.tb00553.x

Abel, E. L. (1995). An update on incidence of FAS: FAS is not an equal opportunity birth defect. *Neurotoxicology and teratology*, 17(4), 437-443. doi: 10.1016/0892-0362(95)00005-C

CDC (2018). *Fetal alcohol spectrum disorders (FASDs)* \[Online\]
Retrieved from: https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/fasd/facts.html

Habbick, B., Nanson, J., Snyder, R., Casey, R., & Schulman, A. (1996). Foetal Alcohol Syndrome in Saskatchewan: Unchanged Incidence in a 20-year Period. *Canadian Journal of Public Health / Revue Canadienne De Sante'e Publique*, 87(3), 204-207. Retrieved from: http://www.jstor.org/stable/41991432 PMID: 8771927

NHS (2017). *Foetal alcohol syndrome* \[Online\]
Retrieved from: https://www.nhs.uk/conditions/foetal-alcohol-syndrome

Riikonen, R., Salonen, I., Partanen, K., & Verho, S. (1999). Brain perfusion SPECT and MRI in foetal alcohol syndrome. *Developmental Medicine & Child Neurology*, 41(10), 652-659. doi: 10.1111/j.1469-8749.1999.tb00518.x

Streissguth, A. P., Herman, C. S., & Smith, D. W. (1978). Intelligence, behavior, and dysmorphogenesis in the fetal alcohol syndrome: A report on 20 patients. *The Journal of pediatrics*, 92(3), 363-367. doi: 10.1016/S0022-3476(78)80420-X

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, intelligence
---


title: Term for Trance During Violent Episodes

text:
# Question
Title: Term for Trance During Violent Episodes
I recently read the book, Violent Mind, The 1976 Psychological Assessment of Ted Bundy" : Dr. Al Carlisle.

In the book Dr. Carlisle mentions that Ted Bundy went into trance like states during his killing sprees. Bundy would later explain that he couldn't recall specific details of his killings and how he would feel instant remorse thereafter. Bundy went on say that even though he felt remorseful and disturbed for what he did, he would repeat the same violent patterns, killing more.

I found it fascinating how the brain can go into these trance like states for some of these killers, as if it overrides their cognitive empathy, guilt.

I am looking for a scientific term similar to "trance".

# Answer
> 2 votes
## The hypothesis

The idea that

> Ted Bundy went into trance like states during his killing sprees

is an anecdotal observation which can be true or it may be false. If we are to be considering it to be true, you could say that what is being described is a **severe** pathological form of dissociation or compartmentalisation.

I covered the idea of compartmentalisation in a totally unrelated question whereby;

> Compartmentalisation is often employed, for example, by people within the emergency services (fire officers, paramedics, police officers, coastguard etc.) in order for them to concentrate on the immediate task whilst temporarily isolating themselves from their emotions.

Compartmentalisation is a form of dissociation in a sense because dissociation is a psychological defence mechanism (Cardeña, 1994) which helps the person to get through the situation with as little harm as possible. The difference between compartmentalisation and dissociation is that when you are compartmentalising, you are very much aware of what you are doing.

## So in conclusion

What is being described fits the description of dissociation but it would have to be a **severe** pathological form of dissociation.

If Ted Bundy did have **real** empathy, dissociation would have helped him to disconnect from conscious reasoning and empathy with what he was doing. During the state of dissociation, you can appear to be in a trance because you are "throwing a switch on conscious awareness" so that you cannot connect with the event alone at any time after the event.

## References

Cardeña, E. (1994) The domain of dissociation. In: *Dissociation: Clinical and theoretical aspects*, Edited by: Lynn, S. J. and Rhue, J. W. 5–31. New York, NY: Guildford Press.

---
Tags: abnormal-psychology
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# Question
Title: What are good introductory books on mathematical psychology?
I have a background in physics and has enough knowledge in Fourier analysis, group & representation theory, projective geometry, complexity theory, and dynamical systems theory. What introductory textbooks on mathematical psychology should I read?

# Answer
> 5 votes
I also like https://bayesmodels.com/.

I posted the question on twitter, you could check out the responses.

Joachim Vandekerckhove suggested:

Edgar Kausel suggested the following classic that is still good to read:

* Coombs, C. H., Dawes, R. M., & Tversky, A. (1970). Mathematical psychology: An elementary introduction.

Daniel Litted mentioned his list that includes over 15 recommendations https://www.goodreads.com/list/show/121661.Best\_Mathematical\_Psychology\_Books

Here are the first few:

# Answer
> 3 votes
I hold a Bachelor's in Applied Mathematics and, for my Master's in Neuroscience, I have used mainly the classic one from Kandel Principles of Neural Science. With regard to Mathematical Psychology I would suggest Oxford Handbook on Computational and Mathematical Psychology

# Answer
> 3 votes
I really like https://bayesmodels.com/ There's also a lot of fun you can have at http://probmods.org/ that feeds into a bunch of current cognitive modeling work, see also http://agentmodels.org/

You might enjoy "Complex probabilistic inference: From cognition to neural computation" by Samuel Gershman and Jeffery Beck.

With the background you describe, you probably want to jump straight into the deep end and get stuck into some journal articles pretty quickly. If you can find a BBS (Behavioral and Brain Sciences) target article close to your interests you'll get an instant overview from a diverse group of commentators, it's an awesome format. "Trends in cognitive sciences" also aims for pretty readable overviews (and they're a lot shorter!). You'll probably have to narrow down your focus a little to get mileage out of either of them though, 'mathematical psychology' is pretty broad.

# Answer
> 0 votes
Louis Narens has a theory of meaningfulness based on the axiom of choice and Erlanger program, which is a unification between projective geometry and group theory.

There is also a review on the whole field: Mathematical Psychology: Prospects For The 21st Century: A Guest Editorial, J Math Psychol. 2008 Oct; 52(5): 269–280.

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Tags: reference-request, computational-modeling, mathematical-psychology
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# Question
Title: Are societies capable of sacrificing time and energy exclusively for the benefit of future generations?
I was thinking on how environment conservation efforts might be enhanced or enforced and I was reflecting that people have to develop a colective conscience that would allow them to spend extra time and work for the good of the community and for the future generations, and not necessarily for an immediate benefit.

The question I keep asking myself is whether people are actually capable of this mindset. Are there any documented cases in history where a society has altruistically created or conserved something exclusively for the benefit of next generations?

An good example of such behavior would be the following: the inhabitants of a region discover a deposit of gold and instead of going full force with the extraction, they rationalize thinking that the gold might benefit their children.

I regard building cities as a method for the aim of satisfying day to day needs and art as a mean to not be forgotten.

Can this type of altruistic behavior propagate even in a society that doesn’t meet the best quality of life standards and where most members are not highly educated?

# Answer
> 2 votes
**Short answer**
Yes

**Background**
Consider the following organizations solely acting for preservation:

One way they do this is by outreach to local communities and educate them on the value of stretches of land. For example see

So yes, I don't know if this is what you're after, but of course communities can be put to work for the greater cause.

Further, as others have pointed out, this is borderline ontopic here imo, but it is an interesting and hot issue nonetheless.

**Reference**
**-** Nicholls, *Sci Am*, April 2017)

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Tags: social-psychology, motivation
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# Question
Title: Human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games
### Background

A **one-shot game** is one where two participants have some set of actions $\\{1, ... , n\\}$, they make their decision on which option to take (without knowing the decision of their partner, or in sequence depending on game). Based on the action $i$ of the first player and $j$ of the second player, they receive some reward (or punishment) $G(i,j)$. The participants never play again, and are made aware of this before the interaction happens. There is no communication allowed between the participants except making their action choice.

The game is **perfect information** if the participants are made aware of all possible outcomes of the game ahead of time (they are shown and explained the payoff matrix $G$ at least implicitly). The final result depends solely on the mutual decision of the players. From the perspective of the participant, there is no hidden state or chance apart in the action of the opponent.

### Question

Game theory makes predictions on how rational players will behave in such settings. The fun part of psychology is that **humans often don't follow these predictions**. They cooperate more than they should in Prisoner's dillema (PD), violate the sure-thing principle in turn-based PD (Shafir & Tversky, 1992), reject unfair offers in ultimatum game (Guth et al., 1982), vary across cultures in their propensity to punish in public goods games (Herrmann, et al. 2008), and many other things that game theory doesn't predict.

The experimental literature is vast and divided between anthropology, economics, psychology, and law (just sampling from my own library). **Is there a reliable current or canonical survey/summary/meta-analysis of well-controlled laboratory based experiments of human behaviour in one-shot perfect information games?**

### Notes

* I prefer artificial well-controlled experiments with a large number of participants over natural or in-the-field experiments.
* The previous point means that I am alright with data just from WEIRD participants, even for games where cultural variation is known to be significant. However, discussions of known cross-cultural effects is welcome.
* Bonus if the summary looks at many different games in very similar experimental setting, and shows games where there is both agreement and disagreement from game-theoretic predictions.
* I am not interested in papers about a single experiments, unless you want to provide a detailed survey of many such papers, their results, and methodology in your answer.

### References

Guth, W., Schmittberger, R., & Schwarze, B. (1982) An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 3(4): 367-388.

Herrmann, B., Thoni, C., & Gachter, S. (2008) Antisocial punishment across societies. *Science* 319(5868): 1362-1367.

Shafir, E., & Tversky, A. (1992). Thinking through uncertainty: Nonconsequential reasoning and choice. *Cognitive Psychology* 24:449-474.

# Answer
The question seems to ask for reviews; well, a Google Scholar search on...

> **one-shot + game + review**

...yields:

...among a host of other hits (65k+), so enough out there!

The Hagen & Hammerstein (2006) provides a critical review that seems to be matching your 'bonus' question (you're going to upvote my answer twice? :-)

<sub>**References**
**-** Alessina, *American Econom Rev* (1988); **78**(4): 796-805
**-** Archettia & Scheuring, *J Theor Biol* (2012); **299** (2012); 9-20
**-** Hagen & Hammerstein, *Theor Pop Biol* (2006); **69**(3): 339-48
**-** Nagarajan & Sošić, *Eur J Operat Res* (2008); **187**(3): 719-45</sub>
> 1 votes

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Tags: reference-request, experimental-psychology, rationality, game-theory, meta-analysis
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# Question
Title: Are there advantages of psychopathic traits?
After watching a fairly engaging 2016 TEDx talk titled "Psychopaths and three reasons why we need them" I was hoping to read more systematic/traditional research output from its author, Armon Tamatea. But looking through his publications list I was rather disspointed there wasn't anything obvious since that talk. So, in my vague summary of the talk (I didn't take notes), he mentioned that psychopaths have some useful traits, including

* coolness under pressure
* being good at spotting vulnerabilities in people or organizations
* superficial charm that can oil the social machinery in many occasions

and probably some I've missed.

I see there's a pretty similar talk "Your Friendly Successful Psychopath", which makes reference to The Wisdom of Psychopaths, but I'm not familiar with the book... but a summary in The Guardian goes like:

> Dutton's book at any rate supports the idea that to thrive a society needs its share of psychopaths – about 10%. It not only shows the value of the emotionally detached mind in bomb disposal but also the uses of the psychopath's ability to intuit anxiety as demonstrated by, for example, customs officials. Along the way his analysis tends to reinforce the idea that the chemistry of megalomania which characterises the psychopathic criminal mind is a close cousin to the set of traits often best rewarded by capitalism. Dutton draws on a 2005 study that compared the profiles of business leaders with those of hospitalised criminals to reveal that a number of psychopathic attributes were arguably more common in the boardroom than the padded cell: notably superficial charm, egocentricity, independence and restricted focus. The key difference was that the MBAs and CEOs were encouraged to exhibit these qualities in social rather than antisocial contexts.

Of the one more clearly identified research, the analogy with the CEOs sounds a bit doubtful to me in view of research of Fred Kiel finding the opposite being true, i.e. psychopathic-like CEO traits producing negative outcomes in business. So, yeah, I'm curious of the meta-analytical status of such claims, assuming there's enough research for review-like works.

**Is there some systematic research that finds there \[or other potentially desirable traits\] are really more common in psychopaths?** Of course for some of the traits one needs to ask "advantageous for who?" or "in what context?", because they may be advantageous in the short run for the self, but might harmful for society/others, so there may be negative consequences for the self in the long run as a result. So I'm guessing a more sophisticated question would be if there's some kind of **evolutionary stable strategy** that favors a percentage of psychopathic traits...

# Answer
While the term *Psychopath* is often employed in common usage along with "crazy", "insane", and "mentally ill", according to criminal psychologist, Robert Hare, there is a distinction between those with psychosis and psychopathy (Hare, 1999).

Something to bear in mind though, is that no psychiatric or psychological organisation has sanctioned a diagnosis titled "psychopathy" (WikiPedia, n.d.), yet assessments of psychopathic characteristics are widely used in criminal justice settings in some nations and may have important consequences for individuals. In psychology and psychiatry, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) written by the American Psychological Association (APA) and International Classification of Diseases (ICD) written by the World Health Organisation (WHO) introduced the alternative and more accepted diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) (APA, 2013 p.659) and dissocial personality disorder (DPD) (WHO, 2010) which is also covered in ICD-11 under **6D10 Personality disorder** (WHO, 2018).

> Antisocial personality disorder is a pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the rights of others (APA, 2013 p.645).

Picking apart the Guardian's review (Adams, 2012) mentioned in the question talking about the book *The Wisdom of Psychopaths* (Dutton, 2013; Wisdom of Psychopaths, n.d.) the idea that they would be the only ones who can have an

> emotionally detached mind in bomb disposal

would brand all bomb disposal teams as psychopathic. The same could be said for doctors, nurses and paramedics dealing with medical emergencies, yet they "detatch" through the use of compartmentalisation.

> Compartmentalization is a **subconscious** psychological defense mechanism used to avoid cognitive dissonance, or the mental discomfort and anxiety caused by a person's having conflicting values, cognitions, emotions, beliefs, etc. within themselves.
>
> Compartmentalization allows these conflicting ideas to co-exist by inhibiting direct or explicit acknowledgement and interaction between separate compartmentalized self states (Leary & Tangney, 2011).

Carolin Showers (1992) described compartmentalisation as

> the tendency to organize positive and negative knowledge about the self into separate, uniformly valenced categories (self-aspects). As long as positive self-aspects are activated, access to negative information should be minimized.

Similarly the

> psychopath's ability to intuit anxiety as demonstrated by, for example, customs officials

could also brand doctors and therapists as psychopathic.

**Whilst questions like this opens up a good debate on psychopathy**, I also believe that just like the above, the idea of psychopaths in business hierarchy is open to opinion. I have also heard of the idea that there are narcissists in high ranking positions within organisations (Live Science, 2008).

These opinions form interesting debates as psychopathy may become accepted in more branches of psychology other than criminal psychology. It may also shape the criminal psychology viewpoint.

## References

APA (2013). *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 5th Edition (DSM–5)* Washington, DC: American Psychiatric Publishing

Dutton, K. *The Wisdom of Psychopaths*. London: Arrow Books.

Hare, R. D. (1999). *Without Conscience: The Disturbing World of the Psychopaths Among Us*. New York: Guilford Press. p. 22.

Leary, M. R., & Tangney, J. P. (Eds.). (2011). *Handbook of self and identity*. Guilford Press.

Live Science (2008). *Narcissists Tend to Become Leaders*. \[Online\]
Retrieved from: https://www.livescience.com/5128-narcissists-tend-leaders.html

Showers, C. (1992). Compartmentalization of positive and negative self-knowledge: Keeping bad apples out of the bunch. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 62(6), 1036-1049.
DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.62.6.1036

WHO (2010). *International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-10): 2010 Version* \[Online\]
Retrieved from: http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2010/en#/I

WHO (2018). \**International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems 11th Revision (ICD-11)\* \[Online\]
Retrieved from: https://icd.who.int/browse11/l-m/en#/http%3a%2f%2fid.who.int%2ficd%2fentity%2f941859884

WikiPedia (n.d.). *Psychopathy*. \[Online\]
Retrieved from: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psychopathy

Wisdom of Psychopaths (n.d.). *Are you a Psycopath?* \[Online\]
Retrieved from: http://wisdomofpsychopaths.com
> 4 votes

# Answer
Despite common belief, being a psychopath doesn’t necessarily mean that you’re a criminal, let alone a serial killer like Hannibal Lector. The characteristics of psychopaths are:

* Ruthlessness;
* Fearlessness;
* Mental toughness;
* Charm;
* Persuasiveness;
* Lack of conscience and empathy.

Combined with a violent personality and low intelligence, these characteristics will culminate in a dangerous psychopath. However, when this person is intelligent and peaceful, it becomes a different story. Then you’re more likely to make a killing in the market rather than anywhere else. Marked positive psychopath traits are:

* Assertiveness;
* Not procrastinating;
* Positive focus;
* Not taking things personally;
* Not sensitive to mistakes, even if they’re to blame;
* Insensitive to pressure.

Those kinds of characteristics aren’t just important in the business arena, but also in everyday life.

In a national survey in the UK, some professions tended to score particularly high on the psychopath scale:

* Navy seals;
* Surgeons (not doctors per se).

The above characteristics apply a great deal to these people. Surgeons should not blame themselves if a patient dies. Military personnel shouldn't be thinking about the well-being, or the poor family of an enemy in their vizier.

<sub>**Reference**
**-** Crawford, Smithsonian Magazine, 2012</sub>
> 3 votes

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, criminology
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# Question
Title: How can machine possibly possess consciousness if computation is a human idea?
Suppose a computer simulates a human brain so that it passes the Turing test. Suppose that this brain is given sensory stimuli that correspond to an experience of being in an Earth-like world. From my understanding, proponents of computationalism suppose that this simulated brain would have qualia.

The neural network, its state, and the program code are stored on a computer, and can only be observed if someone knows how to use this computer. How a neural network is represented in memory and on disk, depends on data structures, computer architecture, endianness, et cetera.

Suppose then that the last human on Earth dies, but the simulation keeps running on the computer. If there is no one in the Universe who understands how this particular computer works, then no one would be able to observe this simulated brain. In other words, this brain would be impossible to “decode”, and yet it would supposedly still experience qualia.

It follows that if this is the case, then nothing prevents other “invisible” brains from existing.

*We* know that a computer is a computational device, and it is running a complex neural network that corresponds to a human-like mind, but the Universe doesn't “know” it. It is *our* interpretation of what is happening. I can't stray from the conclusion that if the premise is true, then there may be different processes that isomorphically correspond to computations, some of which may isomorphically correspond to minds, but we won't know it because we don't see this isomorphism.

Why couldn't processes inside the Sun correspond to some computation (albeit in a non-straightforward way) which corresponds to a mind? By that logic, there could be infinitely many minds, all experiencing some sorts of qualia, “encoded” in different ways in all processes in the world.

Conversely, what if we replace a computer with a man (with a large lifespan) meticulously following the algorithm on paper. Would his computations somehow give rise to consciousness within a brain simulated on paper?

This just doesn't make sense to me. Do computationalists believe this, or do they have a counter-argument?

# Answer
> 7 votes
# Introduction

Your thoughts seem to straddle panpsychism and computationalism. It is also possible you are just raising a question about physicalism: "if mental thoughts are a result of physical interactions, then why would consciousness be limited to things with brains?". Well, the short answer is that it's fundamentally not, but neither is a fusion reaction and you don't see them popping up all over the place. They only appear (or "emerge", as it were) in specific places where the conditions are just right. So, the physicalist presumes, does the mind. I will also note that physicalism (a form of monism) is basically the mainstream scientific stance.

# Computationalism

Note that your suggestion:

> Would his computations somehow give rise to consciousness within a brain simulated on paper?

would be an extreme interpretation of computationalism. At it's core, computationalism just says that mental states are grounded in mental representations (semantics) operating on context (syntax): they are part of the cognitive process. Individual computationalists can interpret, to varying degree, how stringent the requirements are on the underlying hardware.

**Chomskian linguistics** and **David Marr's theory of vision** were two empirical studies that really influenced the perception of cognitive scientists in favor of computationalism in the 70's. More recent neuroscience literature has favored the connectionist view (note the two are not necessarily mutually exclusive).

A more recent literature review of consciousness, **Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework**, summarizes its empirical findings:

*Three fundamental empirical findings on consciousness*:

1. Cognitive processing is possible without consciousness
2. Attention is a prerequisite of consciousness
3. Consciousness is required for specific mental operations

3. would seem to be consistent with computationalism (the union of computation and consciousness). More support for the **computationalist** stance:

**The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?**

> Agents can suppress free energy by changing the two things it depends on: they can change sensory input by acting on the world or they can change their recognition density by changing their internal states. This distinction maps nicely onto action and perception

# Connectionism:

Yet another empirical perspective comes from another physicalist view called connectionism. Connectionism has gained popularity among neuroscientists as we develop technology to better probe brains and model neural mechanisms computationally.

**Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto**

> (i) the quantity of consciousness corresponds to the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements; (ii) the quality of experience is specified by the set of informational relationships generated within that complex.

Some literature that supports Tononi's idea:

**Breakdown of cortical effective connectivity during sleep.**

**A Theoretically Based Index of Consciousness Independent of Sensory Processing and Behavior**

More support for **connectionism**:

**The brainweb: Phase synchronization and large-scale integration**

> The emergence of a unified cognitive moment relies on the coordination of scattered mosaics of functionally specialized brain regions.

# Answer
> 3 votes
Short answer: This is formally known as the hard problem of consciousness \- if you can figure it out, then you'll probably win a Nobel Prize:

> The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of explaining how and why we have qualia or phenomenal experiences—how sensations acquire characteristics, such as colors and tastes.

Note that this problem assumes that "qualia" are valid constructs, which is not universally accepted (see another question for more on that). All variants of functionalism (including behaviorism, physicalism, and computationalism) have this problem if they accept qualia as valid.

```
what if we replace a computer with a man (with a large lifespan) meticulously
following the algorithm on paper. Would his computations somehow give
rise to consciousness within a brain simulated on paper?

```

Ironically, the term "computer" used to refer to a man. There was a time when "computers" were people who ... computed. Alan Turing referred to such "computers" processing symbols on "tape" (paper spools) when he described computing machines in his highly prescient papers on artificial intelligence and machine learning in the first half of the 20th century.

These "paper machines" led philosopher Ned Block to formulate the Chinese Nation thought experiment (1978):

> Suppose that the whole nation of China was reordered to simulate the workings of a single brain (that is, to act as a mind according to functionalism). Each Chinese person acts as (say) a neuron, and communicates by special two-way radio in the corresponding way to the other people. The current mental state of the China brain is displayed on satellites that may be seen from anywhere in China. The China brain would then be connected via radio to a body, one that provides the sensory inputs and behavioral outputs of the China brain.

Note that this differs from John Searle's Chinese Room argument, that focuses on whether the system "understands", while the Chinese Brain experiment focuses on whether the machine gives rise to phenomenology (qualia).

```
We know that a computer is a computational device, and it is running a complex
neural network that corresponds to a human-like mind, but the Universe doesn't
“know” it. It is our interpretation of what is happening.

```

Speaking of John Searle:

> ... informational processes are observer-relative: observers pick out certain patterns in the world and consider them information processes, but information processes are not things-in-the-world themselves. Since they do not exist at a physical level, Searle argues, they cannot have causal efficacy and thus cannot cause consciousness.

Note that this argument is by no means universally accepted (example, example).

```
Why couldn't processes inside the Sun correspond to some computation (albeit in
a non-straightforward way) which corresponds to a mind? By that logic, there
could be infinitely many minds, all experiencing some sorts of qualia,
“encoded” in different ways in all processes in the world.

```

This has been termed the "triviality argument". There are 4 well-known examples in the literature: Hinck's pail, Searle's (WordStar) wall, Putnam's rock, and Chalmers clock and dial. These philosophers argue that - far from needing a Sun - everyday objects such as walls, rocks, and pails of water have sufficient complexity to encode computationally conscious states.

A similar concept is a "Boltzmann brain":

> ... a self-aware entity that arises due to extremely rare random fluctuations out of a state of thermodynamic equilibrium. ... in many existing theories about the Universe, human brains in the current Universe appear to be vastly outnumbered by Boltzmann brains in the future Universe who, by chance, have the exact same perceptions that we do ...

Philosophers often use such thought experiments to argue by reductio ad absurdum. However, just because something seems absurd or doesn't make sense, doesn't necessarily mean that it's false (take for example, the Schrödinger's cat thought experiment), so this type of argument has limitations when applied to a mystery such as consciousness. The reality is that we don't know how or if machines can come to possess consciousness (see another question for more on that).

# Answer
> 2 votes
This being cogsci.SE, not philosophy.SE, we cannot simply accept a philosophical definition of consciousness. From the perspective of experimental science, there is no universally accepted operationalisation of "consciousness".

For example, it is impossible to measure consciousness directly. A usual approach is to let human subjects report their thoughts. But of course we do not know if they truthfully report (all of) their conscious thoughts, or if they are maybe even mistaken about what goes on in their minds. Also, we are thus unable to research the consciousness of beings that we cannot (reliably) communicate with, such as animals, children, and disabled persons. What we do is deduce from behavior that *appears* to us to reflect consciousness that consciousness must be present. But experiments have shown that even human subjects can show such (e.g. purposeful) behaviour while they are themselves completely unaware (i.e. not conscious) of this. The only consciousness that is directly available to a researcher is his or her own, but introspection has been largely abandoned as reliable scientific method more than a hundred years ago, because, of course, from the perspective of *other people* our reports are not trustworthy for the reasons outlined above.

What follows is that while the cognitive sciences *attempt* to study consciousness, they have not yet devised of a means to measure it. We, the cognitive scientists, are therefore unable to conclude if a computer, software or the sun have consciousness. Which makes discussions about the status of that consciousness after the disappearance of human beings rather futile for us.

But I am sure philosphers will be able to write whole books on the subject ;-) You might ask them.

---
Tags: computational-modeling, consciousness, philosophy-of-mind, qualia
---


# Question
Title: What is the neurophysiology of a thought?
**PURPOSE**

1) To find out if there is evidence in favor of one of Hebb's claim. In is book "The Organization of Behavior" he claimed that cell assemblies are the physiological foundation of thought. According to Sebastian Seung, in his book "Connectome: How The Brain's Wiring Makes Us Who We Are", a **thought** is an association of ideas.

> Is there evidence that support Hebb's claim?

2) In addition to (1) I want to know in which other ways Hebb has contributed to neuroscience. I have provided some examples below.

> So, please leave links to research papers that support any other claim he has made.

**BACKGROUND**

**The Organization of Behavior**

"The Organization of Behavior - A Neuropsychological Theory", by D.O. Hebb, is one of the classics in the field of neuroscience, as you may know.

Hebb wondered about the nature of thought, and how ideas might be represented in the brain.

He was puzzled as to why the intelligence of some individuals remained intact after brain surgeries, where a large part of their brain was destroyed.

In his book, it is suggested, that these high IQ scores were

> "due to a conceptual development which brain damage does not easily reverse."

Given these observations, Hebb asked:

> "... what is a concept physiologically ...?"

Which then prompt Hebb to claim that **cell assemblies** were the physiological basis of a concept/thought.

Hence, my question:

> Is there any scientific evidence that support that the cell assembly is the basis of thought/a concept?

**HEBB'S CONTRIBUTION TO NEUROSCIENCE**

Some of his ideas have been confirmed; for example, in "Biological Psychology",Breedlove, Watson, Rosenzweig, teach that memory storage requires neuronal remodeling. This finding is grounded on Hebb's observation, which was confirmed by Kelso and Brown, 1986, that

> "Ensembles of neurons, or **cell assemblies**, linked via synchronized activity of these **Hebbian synapses**, could then act together to store memory traces."

The above observation is related to the maxim:

> "cells that fire together wire together."

Hebb's hypothesis about how synaptic connections grow stronger or weaker in response to experience gave rise to the idea of Hebbian synapses.

A Hebbian synapse is a synapse whose strength depends on its effectiveness in driving the postsynaptic cell; for example, cells during visual deprivation do not fire together; consequently, they do not drive the postsynaptic cells. In turn, the synapses get weaker, i.e., less sensitive. In contrast, if cells are stimulated by the visual field, cells fire together, driving postsynaptic cells. This in turn strengths synapses.

**REFERENCES**

Biological Psychology: An Introduction to Behavioral, Cognitive, and Clinical Neuroscience, Sixth Edition, Breedlove

Organization of Behavior - A Neuropsychological Theory, Hebb

Connectome: How The Brain's Wiring Makes Us Who We Are, Sebastian Seung

# Answer
> 1 votes
***Hence, my question: Is there any scientific evidence that support that the cell assembly is the basis of thought/a concept?***

This paper Thinking in circuits reviews this matter in detail, and its references can provide more related scientific evidence.

***Question: What is the neurophysiology of a thought?***

I think the following papers can provide some current information about the neurophysiology of thought:

1.How neurons make meaning

2.Brain Networks and Cognitive Architectures

3.Language and thought are not the same thing

---
Tags: cognitive-psychology, neuroscience, thought
---


# Question
Title: Is writing ability associated with IQ or intelligence?
Is greater ability to write well i.e. analysis of books/literature/research papers associated with higher I.Q. scores? Statistically speaking, is writing ability normally distributed like I.Q. is?

# Answer
The second question (normality) is somewhat easier to answer because it depends less on the exact measures used.

> reading and writing abilities are normally distributed in the general education framework.

Meaning for people who are actually schooled and tested (in the US for the above study). The sample for the above was "316 boys and girls who were assessed annually in grades 1 through 4".

As for the first question (association between IQ and writing ability), the qualitative answer is obviously going to be yes. There is even one proposal to use samples of written text to estimate the writer's IQ!

> The primary focus of this research is to introduce a method of measuring an individual’s IQ by analyzing the vocabulary in said individual’s writing. In this paper, we show that the ratio of SAT words in a dataset of writing samples is roughly normally distributed, though with an obvious left skew. We go on to show a method that can be used to calculate an individual’s IQ with this ratio and provide samples with measured accuracy.

Alas, the claim isn't terribly well supported because the IQ was self-reported for the sample they used to test their assumption.

Found a study relating to 2nd laguage acquisition:

> The result of this study revealed that IQ made significant contribution in predicting reading comprehension (23.42%) and writing achievement (16.08%).

I don't have the full text, and the abstract isn't terribly clear, but presumably the amount of langauge education was standardized somehow... otherwise this result makes little sense.

From a more elaborate study (primary language) there are various intermediate factors affecting the various measures of writing quality... but most of these intermediate factors correlated with non-verbal IQ as well:

> As shown in Table 3, there were moderate correlations between the scores on the cognitive background tests, except for the measure of attention in dichotic listening which did not correlate significantly with any of the other variables. \[...\]
>
> While the narrative product measures were significantly correlated with a number of cognitive abilities, the narrative process measures were only correlated with reading and spelling skills (see Table 6). Children with better reading and spelling abilities made more online revisions than their peers. Moreover, children who were good spellers transcribed faster than their peers. The cognitive measure of selective attention was significantly associated with the ability to use capitalization and punctuation in writing.
>
> \[...\] Although narrative macrostructural quality was correlated with a number of cognitive measures, only oral language skills and spelling were significant predictors in the final model, implying that the other measures did not significantly add to the model’s prediction.
> 2 votes

---
Tags: intelligence, statistics, iq, writing
---


# Question
Title: What introductory textbook is available about the corticostriatal brain circuitry?
I want to understand the basal ganglia better. In particular, I want to understand the role of the corticostriatal brain circuitry for non-motor functions, including emotion and cognition. I have found some recent review papers that provide solid overviews e.g.

Haber, S. N. (2016). Corticostriatal circuitry. *Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience*, 18(1), 7–21. PCMCID: PMC4826773.

and

Shipp, S. (2017). The functional logic of corticostriatal connections. *Brain Structure and Function*, 222(2), 669-706. doi: 10.1007/s00429-016-1250-9

However, a more comprehensive textbook would be ideal - are there any introductory textbooks that cover the basal ganglia and the corticostriatal brain circuitry in detail?

# Answer
Although my formal training involved an element of neuroscience, it was not heavy on neuroscience so I am not aware of any specific neuroscience textbooks. However, another article you may be interested in is:

Mathai, A., & Smith, Y. (2011). The Corticostriatal and Corticosubthalamic Pathways: Two Entries, One Target. So What? *Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience, 5, 64*. doi: 10.3389/fnsys.2011.00064 pcmcid: PMC3149683

Just like the two articles you linked to, this article is also open access, therefore, free to view or download as PDF without a paywall.

> **Abstract**
>
> The basal ganglia receive cortical inputs through two main stations – the striatum and the subthalamic nucleus (STN). The information flowing along the corticostriatal system is transmitted to the basal ganglia circuitry via the “direct and indirect” striatofugal pathways, while information that flows through the STN is transmitted along the so-called “hyperdirect” pathway. The functional significance of this dual entry system is not clear. Although the corticostriatal system has been thoroughly characterized anatomically and electrophysiologically, such is not the case for the corticosubthalamic system. In order to provide further insights into the intricacy of this complex anatomical organization, this review examines and compares the anatomical and functional organization of the corticostriatal and corticosubthalamic systems, and highlights some key issues that must be addressed to better understand the mechanisms by which these two neural systems may interact to regulate basal ganglia functions and dysfunctions.
> 1 votes

---
Tags: cognitive-neuroscience, neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, brain, dopamine
---


# Question
Title: Is there a less colloquial term for the phenomenon known as "brain zaps"?
There is an unpleasant phenomenon, colloquially known as "brain zaps". It is generally associated with withdrawal from antidepressants, but this isn't always the trigger - I sometimes have it even though I've taken my mess that day.

I don't like referring to something so unpleasant and uncomfortable by such a silly name. Is there a proper medical term for this phenomenon?

# Answer
**Short answer**
Brain zaps are a colloquial term for certain symptoms of antidepressant discontinuation syndrome.

**Background**
'**Brain zaps**' are associated with sudden shakes, or vibrations, tremors, jolts, electric shocks, or 'zaps' of the head and/or brain. As SydneyMaples rightfully commented, these are scientifically recognized as symptoms of

> **Antidepressant discontinuation syndrome**, or **Antidepressant withdrawal syndrome**

Withdrawal from a wide range of antidepressants, including the tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs) and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) can produce somatic and psychological distress, influenza-like syndromes, gastrointestinal adverse effects, arrhythmias, anxiety, sleep disturbances, movement disorders, mania or hypomania, panic attacks and delirium (Lejoyeux *et al*., 1996).

<sub>**Reference**
**-** Lejoyeux *et al*. CNS Drugs (1996); **5**(4): 278–92</sub>
> 4 votes

# Answer
> I don't like referring to something so unpleasant and uncomfortable by such a silly name. Is there a proper medical term for this phenomenon?

In the literature, they're referred to as **shock-like paresthesias** and less commonly, **Lhermitte's sign** (pronounced Ler-meets).

However, the phenomenology of Lhermitte's sign is a little bit different to brain zaps and is typically seen in multiple sclerosis.

From **The SSRI discontinuation syndrome**:

$ \require{color} \hspace{0.5cm}Sensory\text{ }abnormalities.\text{These include paraesthesia (i.e.}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{tingling) and numbness, also described with TCA discon-}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{tinuation but less prominent, and brief ’electric shock-like’}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{sensations which appear unique to SSRI and venlafaxine}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{termination (Louie et al., 1996). The shocks may be}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{experienced as ’electrical sensations’ (Rosenstock, 1996)}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{running through the head, upper body, arms or legs or as}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{intense internal sensations within the head, for example a}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{’slamming’ within the head (Mallya et al., 1993), a ’whooshing}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{noise’ or a ’rush’ one could ’almost hear’ (Berlin, 1996).}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{Sometimes they are exacerbated by movement, particularly of}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{the head, and are associated with brief bursts of dizziness}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{(Frost and Lal, 1995). Ellison’s (1993) description of bursts of}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{dizziness as a ’jolt’, ’rush’, ’shock’, or ’buzz’ also suggests an}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{overlap between shocks and dizziness.} \colorbox{yellow}{Coupland et al. (1996)}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{regarded the shocks as a severe form of paraesthesia and}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{emphasized that they were distinct from anything patients had}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{experienced before.}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{Shocks have occurred following discontinuation from}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{sertraline (Rosenstock, 1996), paroxetine (Frost and Lal,}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{1995; Dominguez and Goodnick, 1996), fluoxetine (Berlin,}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\text{1996) and fluvoxamine (Mallya et al., 1993).} \colorbox{yellow}{Reeves and}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{Pinkofsky (1996) reported a paroxetine discontinuation}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{reaction in which shocks were consistently elicited by neck}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{flexion. They proposed that the sensations constituted}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{Lhermitte’s sign i.e. a neurological sign that usually indicates}\\ \hspace{0.5cm}\colorbox{yellow}{spinal cord disease.}\\ $
> 2 votes

---
Tags: neuroscience, abnormal-psychology, terminology, depression, psychopharmacology
---


# Question
Title: Is there any evidence for the cell assembly?
**What is a cell assembly?**

In *Principles of Neural Science* Eric Kandel, and colleagues wrote:

> After this strengthening has occurred, a group of three neurons that are strongly coupled by excitatory synapses form a cell assembly (Figure E–5C). Neuroscientists generally use this term rather imprecisely. One must look to mathematical models of networks for more precise definitions, which generally have some- thing to do with the presence of strong mutual excita- tory interactions within a group of neurons. The word “assembly” emphasizes that the group did not initially exist but was constructed through the strengthening of the synapses of the neurons in the group, which in turn was caused by the simultaneous activation of the neurons.

In \[1\] the cell assembly is defined as:

> A large group of cells that tend to be active at the same time because they have been activated simultaneously or in close succession in the past.

Sebastian Seung in \[2\] defines the cell assembly like this:

> ... the neurons are excitatory and are mutually connected by synapses into a structure known as a *cell assembly*.

**Hence, my question**;

What is the best evidence, if any, for the cell assembly?

Thanks!

\[1\]: Breedlove, Watson, Rosenberg, *Biological Psychology 6th Edition*

\[2\]: Seung, *Connectome - How the Brain's Wiring Makes Us Who We Are*

# Answer
> 5 votes
**EVIDENCE FOR THE CELL ASSEMBLY**

The idea of the cell assembly is grounded on the following 3 principles:

1. The neurophysiological basis of a concept is the cell assembly, ie population coding.
2. The neurons in a cell assembly continuously fire even after environmental stimulus ceases.
3. Learning gives rise to cell assemblies through the interaction between presynaptic and postsynaptic synapses.

**NOTE** I will briefly talk about the first two principles; however, there is evidence for all 3.

**EVIDENCE FOR PRINCIPLE 1**

In *The Organization of Behavior* Hebb observed that brain surgery did not affect intelligence. Given this he proposed that the cell assembly was the neurophysiology basis for a concept.

The studies that support this principle show this; different neurons get activated in response to the same feature, but, unless the neurons function collectively, an object is not identified.

(Averbeck 2006) reports that individual neurons count for little; as an example, he mentions the visual cortex. He says:

> visual discrimination in the primary visual cortex (V1) is much more accurate than would be predicted from the responses of single neurons.

**EVIDENCE FOR PRINCIPLE 2**

Principle 2 could explain why a stimulus triggers a memory. Consider this example from Seung, *Connectome*:

> It's a fine spring morning, and you are walking down the street on the way to work. You catch the scent of flowers; within a few steps the smell becomes overpowering. You're not yet conscious of the magnolia blooming at the side of the road, but all of the sudden you're transported far away. You remember standing next to a magnolia tree, outside the red brick house of your first sweetheart. He is holding you in his arms. You feel shy and embarrassed. A plane is flying overhead, and you hear his mother calling for you to come have a glass of lemonade.

He then goes on to explain why this might happen:

> How do these connections trigger the recollection of your first kiss? Since the neurons are assumed excitatory, the activation of the "magnolia neuron" excites the other neurons in the cell assembly to become active.

Since **neurons in a cell assembly continuously fire even after the stimulus ceases** you remain thinking about your first kiss.

Principle 2 is supported by the following studies:

(Funahashi 2001) (Assad 2000)

This post is not great, but I hope it helps someone.

Thanks.

---
Tags: neuroscience, cognitive-neuroscience, learning
---


# Question
Title: Is there a standard definition of a "hallucination"?
As far as I understand, there is a compelling sense of reality to sensory hallucinations. Do hallucinations (as, *e.g.* in the DSM) substitute for the *sense* and **experience** of a real reality?

For example, if a "hallucination" involves someone's face to be covered in maggots, would that entail a completely life-like, 'opaque', and entirely believable experience of that perception?

# Answer
> 5 votes
Elliot *et al*. (2008) define a **hallucination** as:

> A sensory experience which occurs **in the absence of corresponding external stimulation** of the relevant sensory organ, has sufficient sense of reality resemble a veridical perception (*i.e.* the perception seems to be "real"), over which the subject does not feel direct and voluntary control, and which occurs in the awake state.

They define **illusions** as:

> These are **false perceptions of a real external stimulus**, for example a change in shape, size, color or texture. In some cases, where the external stimulus is minimal, the differentiation nosologically (*nosology*: the classification of diseases) from hallucination can be difﬁcult, although illusions carry different aetiological and diagnostic implications.

and **delusions** as:

> \[A\]bnormalities of **thought rather than perception** (although they may develop from the latter) and may be defined as ‘fixed false beliefs, strongly held and immutable in the face of refuting evidence, that are not consonant with the person’s education, social and cultural background.' \[I\]ts exact meaning and usage have evolved continuously, reflecting trends in psychology. Delusional themes commonly include: guilt, worthlessness, ill-health, persecution, reference, grandeur, love, jealousy, poverty, infestation, and religion. \[...\]

Regarding the difference between a hallucination and an illusion, which are the most closely related ones among the three, the Stanford Encyclopedia gives a clear-cut example, namely:

> For example, when one has a visual experience as of a **red object**, it may be that one is **really seeing** an object and its red color (*veridical perception*), that one is seeing a **green object** (*illusion*), or that one is **not seeing an object at all** (*hallucination*).

<sub>**Reference**
**-** Elliot *et al*. *Epilepsy Research* (2009); **85**: 162-71</sub>

# Answer
> 2 votes
I really recommend *Hallucinations* by Oliver Sacks.

In this book, Oliver Sacks defines hallucination as:

> percepts arising in the absence of any external reality--seeing things or hearing things that are not there.

In other words, a hallucination mimics perception.

**Implanted-electrode studies**

Studies have shown that if the region of the brain involved in the perception of faces is abnormally activated, individuals may hallucinate faces.

Similarly, if the region of the brain employed in reading is activated, it may give rise to hallucinations of letters.

---
Tags: neuroscience, perception, abnormal-psychology, sensation
---


# Question
Title: Have any drugs been shown to increase the neuroplasticity of adult brains?
I read recently in the book "meet your happy chemicals" that the hormones of puberty are neurochemicals that cause your neurons to connect and myelinate more easily.

If this is true have any studies been done to see if injecting those same hormones into the body of an adult enables a similar rate of accelerated learning?

# Answer
> 3 votes
> I read recently in the book "meet your happy chemicals" that the hormones of puberty are neurochemicals that cause your neurons to connect and myelinate more easily.

I will presume that you're referring to brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) which is involved in neurogenesis and neuroplasticity.

> If this is true have any studies been done to see if injecting those same hormones into the body of an adult enables a similar rate of accelerated learning?

You may want to look into **Cerebrolysin** which is an injectable preparation of fractionate porcine brain. Essentially they take pig brains, spin them in a centrifuge and extract the heavy fraction that contains the neuropepties, including BDNF.

Enclosed is some of the research. There *is* evidence that Cerebrolysin facilitates neurogenesis and neuroplasticity, but to my knowledge, does not promote learning or cognitive performance in healthy individuals.

### Properties of Cerebrolysin

Here's a brief summary Cerebrolysin's effects on the brain:

> Cerebrolysin (Cbl) is the only drug available for clinical use containing active fragments of important neurotrophic factors. The active fragments are small neuropeptides which cross the blood-brain barrier (BBB) and mimic the action of endogenous neurotrophic factors such as BDNF, GDNF, CNTF and NGF and others. The neurotrophic action of the Cbl helps in the survival of neurons and prevents the cell death. In addition, several reports suggest that Cbl induces neuroprotection when there is a damage of the brain and also induce neurogenesis. These two actions (neuroprotection and neurogenesis) maintain... In addition, recent reports suggest that Cbl increases synaptic communication by increasing dendritic arborization as well as the number of dendritic spines in cortical regions such as PFC and hippocampus.

Flores, G., & Atzori, M. (2014). The potential of cerebrolysin in the treatment of schizophrenia. *Pharmacology & Pharmacy*, *5*, 691–704. https://doi.org/10.4236/pp.2014.57079

### Pharmacotherapy in Alzheimer's disease

Here's one on Alzheimer's disease:

> Cerebrolysin is a neuropeptide preparation mimicking the action of endogenous neurotrophic factors. Positive effects of Cerebrolysin on β-amyloid- and tau-related pathologies, neuroinflammation, neurotrophic factors, oxidative stress, excitotoxicity, neurotransmission, brain metabolism, neuroplasticity, neuronal apoptosis and degeneration, neurogenesis and cognition were demonstrated in experimental conditions... **The clinical efficacy of Cerebrolysin in Alzheimer's disease was evaluated in several randomized, double-blind, clinical trials, showing consistent benefits on global clinical function and cognition, improvements in behavior at high doses, and minor effects on daily living activities in patients with mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease, as well as in subgroups of moderate to moderately severe patients.**

Alvarez, X. A., & Fuentes, P. (2011). Cerebrolysin in Alzheimer’s disease. *Drugs of Today*, *47*, 487. https://doi.org/10.1358/dot.2011.47.7.1656496

The main problem with all the studies with Cerebrolysin or other candidate drugs is that even though the study findings may be statistically significant the effect sizes are nothing to write home about. Though granted, to some, even incremental benefit is better than no benefit at all.

### Recovery from stroke

This one demonstrates efficacy in recovery of motor control following stroke:

> Cerebrolysin is a neuropeptide preparation with neuroprotective and neurorestorative effects. Combining Cerebrolysin treatment with a standardized rehabilitation program may have a potential synergistic effect in the subacute stage of stroke. This study aims to evaluate whether Cerebrolysin provides additional motor recovery on top of rehabilitation therapy in the subacute stroke patients with moderate to severe motor impairment... **In the stroke patients with severe motor impairment, the Cerebrolysin group exhibited significantly more improvement in motor function compared with the placebo group.** Effects of Cerebrolysin were demonstrated as restricted increments of corticospinal diffusivity and as recovery of the sensorimotor connectivity... The combination of standard rehabilitation therapy with Cerebrolysin treatment in the subacute stroke has shown additional benefit on motor recovery and plastic changes of the corticospinal tract in patients with severe motor impairment.

Chang, W. H., Park, C., Kim, D. Y., Shin, Y.-I., Ko, M.-H., Lee, A., … Kim, Y.-H. (2016). Cerebrolysin combined with rehabilitation promotes motor recovery in patients with severe motor impairment after stroke. *BMC Neurology*, *16*. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12883-016-0553-z

### Recovery from traumatic brain injury

And it seems to improve recovery from TBI as well:

> Traumatic brain injury (TBI) is a leading cause of death and disability for which there is currently no effective drug therapy available. Because drugs targeting a single TBI pathological pathway have failed to show clinical efficacy to date, pleiotropic agents with effects on multiple mechanisms of secondary brain damage could represent an effective option to improve brain recovery and clinical outcome in TBI patients... **Compared to standard medical care alone (control group), both doses of Cerebrolysin were associated with improved clinical outcome scores at 10 days post-TBI in mild patients and at 10 and 30 days in moderate and severe cases. A dose-dependent effect of Cerebrolysin on TBI recovery was supported by the dose-related differences and the significant correlations with treatment duration observed for outcome measures**... In conclusion, the results of this large retrospective study revealed that early Cerebrolysin treatment is safe and is associated to improved TBI outcome.

Muresanu, D., Ciurea, A., Gorgan, R., Gheorghita, E., Florian, S., Stan, H., … Alvarez, A. (2015). A Retrospective, Multi-Center Cohort Study Evaluating the Severity- Related Effects of Cerebrolysin Treatment on Clinical Outcomes in Traumatic Brain Injury. *CNS & Neurological Disorders - Drug Targets*, *14*, 587–599. https://doi.org/10.2174/1871527314666150430162531

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Tags: neuroscience, learning, cognitive-neuroscience, developmental-psychology, plasticity
---


title: Is back-prop biologically plausible?

text:
# Question
Title: Is back-prop biologically plausible?
One of the common criticisms of Deep Learning is it's training algorithms, back-propagation of error (back-prop), has no biologically plausible implementation, despite evidence of something like it occurring in the brain. The default implementation is considered biologically implausible due to it's reliance on bi-directional synapses. However, there's been a lot of publications published showing implementations that should be plausible. Specifically, from section 2.2.2 of the review "Towards an integration of deep learning and neuroscience" and some discussion I've had:

1. Random synaptic feedback weights support error backpropagation for deep learning
2. Direct Feedback Alignment (related to the previous random weights idea) and it's inclusion in the Superspike algorithm
3. Deep learning with segregated dendrites
4. Spike timing dependent plasticity (STDP) with iterative inference and target propagation which is based off Difference Target Propagation
5. Kickback from "Kickback cuts Backprop's red-tape: Biologically plausible credit assignment in neural networks"
6. Generalized Recirculation from "Biologically Plausible Error-driven Learning using Local Activation Differences: The Generalized Recirculation Algorithm"
7. Contrastive Hebbian Learning from "Equivalence of backpropagation and contrastive Hebbian learning in a layered network"
8. Complex neurons from "Supervised and unsupervised learning with two sites of synaptic integration"
9. Using an attention mechanism from "A Biologically Plausible Learning Rule for Deep Learning in the Brain"
10. Layer-specific target from "GAIT-prop: A biologically plausible learning rulederived from backpropagation of error"

Are any of these implementable in spiking neurons, able to scale to more than two layers and have been shown to work on normal Deep Learning benchmarks such as MNIST or ImageNet?

# Answer
> 11 votes
# Biological Plausibility of Back-Prop

No, the algorithm of back-prop (BP) isn't biologically plausible. However, there are other means which involve propagating the error through multiple layers of neurons in a feed-forward network which are biologically plausible. But before we evaluate these substitutions, let's review why back-prop isn't biologically plausible \[1\]:

## 1. Weight Transport Problem

BP uses the same weights for forward-pass and backward error propagation. But synapses are uni-directional.

## 2. Derivative Transport Problem

The derivative of each neuron is used to modulate the error signal in BP. Additionally, the derivative is propagated through each layer. How this derivative calculated by neurons and then propagated, is unclear.

## 3. Linear Feedback Problem

The BP feedback path is linear, but neurons aren't linear.

## 4. Spiking Problem

Neurons spike. BP is defined for rates.

## 5. Timing Problem

The BP error signal is expected to propagate instantaneously. Calculations and signal transmission in the brain do not happen instantaneously.

## 6. Target Problem

Most applications of BP rely on many examples with given labels, but where do those labels come from?

# Replacements for Back-Prop

Most replacements for back-prop solve a subset of these problems, however none of them see to solve all of them. In "Spiking Deep Neural Networks: Engineered and Biological Approaches to Object Recognition", a method is constructed using the NEF that solves all problems except for the Target Problem. This means there are no replacements for BP that work for all cases where BP is applied, which is to be expected given this is what usually happens when biological plausibility is emphasized.

# Beyond Back-Prop

However, it should be noted that there is more than back-propagation through fully-connected networks involved in Deep Learning. Specifically, the are a number of different architectures used, such as Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) and Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs).

* CNNs aren't biologically plausible due to their reliance on weights being exactly equal across multiple locations.
* RNNs rely on Back-Propagation Through Time (BPTT), of which there is currently no biologically plausible analogue \[2\].

This confusion between Deep Learning, neural network architectures and back-prop is reason that Yann LeCunn is trying to get people to adopt the term "Differentiable Computing" instead of "Deep Learning". At which point, the question must shift from "Is Deep Learning biologically plausible?" into "What aspects of Differentiable Computing are biologically plausible?" Which is much harder to answer, but at least we have a better question than when we started!

\[1\] Summarized from Eric Hunsberger's PhD Thesis "Spiking Deep Neural Networks: Engineered and Biological Approaches to Object Recognition"

\[2\] That being said, there are other means of learning (supposedly) biologically plausible recurrent neural network weights (FORCE training, Conceptors), however they don't resemble BPTT in any way. The discussion of these methods is outside the scope of this question.

# Answer
> 3 votes
I don't know much about this, but here goes anyway.

I heard that the reason backprop isnt biologically plausible is that it requires global control/coordination for the propagation of the gradients. (verification of this would be nice...)

The decoupled neural interface seems to solve this problem by making gradient propagation local (using a finite difference approximation to break the dependency). So could be biologically plausible, while keeping much of the flavour of backprop.

Also, in my mind the bi-directional argument isnt much of an issue. As you can just have another neuron/path doing the backward step/propagation?

# Answer
> 0 votes
While a backpropagating action potential can presumably cause changes in the weight of the presynaptic connections, there is no simple mechanism for an error signal to propagate through multiple layers of neurons, as in the computer backpropagation algorithm. However, simple linear topologies have shown that effective computation is possible through signal backpropagation in this biological sense.

From wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural\_backpropagation

It is a matter of time and more precise research. I am sure that this is the main clue

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Tags: theoretical-neuroscience, computational-modeling, neural-network
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# Question
Title: Does anybody know a source having multi-electrode (several channels) recorded data of multiple Neurons (I prefer real data not artificial)?
I mean recorded data of multiple Neurons with multi-electrode. I need this data as the input for my experiment.

# Answer
> 3 votes
https://crcns.org has several openly available datasets with recordings from many different brain areas. Each recording will likely have multiple simultaneously recorded neurons.

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Tags: neuroscience, theoretical-neuroscience, neurophysiology, physiology
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# Question
Title: What are the neurological similarities between humans and primates?
I don't know exactly what primate specie is considered to be out ancestor. But the next question regards them.

Assuming that in the beginning \*we considered true the remnants of many trial & error tests, the question is straightforward:

Do we have some specific neural processes similar to primates - for example those involving:

* Simple comparisons\*,
* analogies\**
* you may add another?

Can we go even deeper in the animal's kingdom and find those similarities? How deep?

Any research study (paper) or essay is welcomed. I don't pretend a complete answer but some guidelines.

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* like "what is bigger A or B?"
\** like "if A is like they maybe B too".

# Answer
Primate brains are considered to be highly similar to ours. In terms of their structure, it's more appropriate to look for the differences than the similarities.

However, you're asking for cognitive skills and these are mediated by cortical structures, and especially the higher association areas. This is exactly where the similarities are starting to break down, as the cortex, and hence higher order processing has rapidly expanded in human evolution. Notably, the surface area of the cortex has greatly expanded in humanoids through a progressive increase in the number of gyri and sulci ('wrinkles') in the cortical surface. A greater cortical surface correlates with higher cognitive abilities in humans (Fig. 1). This is what sets us apart. **Cognition** being

> \[T\]he ability to interpret and connect information that is perceived in the world and to then apply this personal knowledge adaptively to future situations and problems.

While humanoids have exceptionally well-developed cognitive skills, non-humanoid primates do have been shown to exhibit quite sophisticated cognitive capabilities as well. In a review article, Hopper & Brosnan (2012) state that primates have been shown to:

* Recall serial lists of images
* Select purpose-specific tools and save them for later
* Manufacture purpose-specific tools, demonstrating an understanding of causal relations and physical properties
* Have intricate social interactions and are known to interact with and manipulate other group members

**Reference**
**-** Hopper & Brosnan. Nature Education Knowledge (2012); **5**(8): 3

Fig. 1. human brain (top) and chimp brains (bottom) are very similar. Especially the cortex is larger in humans. source: Tes Teach - Brain Project
> 3 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, cognitive-neuroscience, theoretical-neuroscience, anthropology
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# Question
Title: Dual systems theory: in what sense are the systems 'unreal'?
In the course of explain dual systems theory, Kahneman (2011) discusses the Heider study, in which:

> you see a large triangle, a small triangle, and a circle moving around a shape that looks like a schematic view of a house with an open door. Viewers see an aggressive large triangle bullying a smaller triangle, a terrified circle, the circle and the small triangle joining forces to defeat the bully.

Viewers perceive the movements of the shapes in causal terms. Kahneman then goes on to say:

> The psychology of causality was the basis of my decision to describe psychological processes by metaphors of agency, with little concern for consistency. I sometimes refer to System 1 as an agent with certain traits and preferences, and sometimes as an associative machine that represents reality by a complex pattern of links. The system and the machine are fictions; my reason for using them is that they fit the way we think about causes. Heider’s triangles and circles are not really agents—it is just very easy and natural to think of them that way. It is a matter of mental economy. I assume that you (like me) find it easier to think about the mind if we describe what happens in terms of traits and intentions (the two systems) and sometimes in terms of mechanical regularities (the associative machine). I do not intend to convince you that the systems are real, any more than Heider intended you to believe that the large triangle is really a bully.

I've never been able to understand the distinction he is trying to draw there. In what sense are the two systems 'unreal'?

Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Macmillan.

# Answer
What Kahneman means is that these are nothing but comparisons, or metaphors, to indirectly explain cognitive processing. Neither you nor I have physically seen these two systems exist, BUT the existence of such systems may be implicated through neural representations. Kahneman has used economic metaphors (concept of resources and their allocation) in his capacity model of attention (1973). (1)

The following excerpt from John B. Best's *Cognitive Psychology*, fifth edition (2) , might help. Here, he talks about the rationale behind using a metaphor (the information-processing or computer metaphor) in cognitive psychology:

> Because the information-processing viewpoint is necessarily abstract, why use it to study cognitive processes, especially when it might be possible to study the underlying neural processes directly? In other words, the students seem to suggest that we simply cut to the chase and study neural processes themselves. What stops us? Information-processing theories might argue that an abstract analysis is necessary because of discoverability problems at the neural level. It's true that specific relationships may always be discoverable between specific neural activities or locations, and particular cognitive or mental events... Despite this reservation, however, cognitive psychologists working in the information-processing tradition maintain that there are no guarantees that a general, discoverable neural representation inevitably underlies all specific cognitive events."

**TL;DR:** It's a metaphor, an indirect comparison to how cognitive processes occur, for ease of understanding.

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1) There has been considerable debate regarding whether the concept of using strict, dichotomous systems is a good way to represent cognitive processing and why and how dual-process theories like Kahneman's fail in some aspects. Highly recommend reading some of the highlighted points in *The Mythical Number Two* by Melnikoff and Bargh (2018), published in *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*.

2) An edition of the book is available to borrow on archive.org and you may find this quoted text in the first introductory chapter.
> 2 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology
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# Question
Title: Thesaurus for types of psychological projections
Thanks to Berne, there is an plethora of "games people play" between people based on pattern analysis of social interaction.

Now, is there a comparable approach to analysis of psychological projections in social interactions, to name, list and describe them?

Freudian Psychological Projection: "humans defend themselves against their own unconscious impulses or qualities (both positive and negative) by denying their existence in themselves while attributing them to others." (Wikipedia)

# Answer
## Preamble

Before I go into my answer, I should point out that where the theory of psychological projection originated from Sigmund Freud, his theories are considered by many as pseudoscientific. More can be read in my answer to this in meta

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## Definition of Projection

This is a psychological defence mechanism whereby beliefs, attitudes or other negative aspects from ourselves or the environment are attributed to others or other aspects of our environment (Reeves, 2013). Totem and Taboo by Sigmund Freud (Freud, 1913) contained his major thinking on the role of projection (Hurry, Novick, & Novick, 1976).

To list all possible forms of projection would be too broad for this site as it would fill a fairly thick book to do so with ample description. Below I will outline some examples which are on the WikiPedia pag linked in the question and alongside those examples will be references to books which you are free to read to gain more.

## Examples of Projection

* **Victim blaming**
The victim of someone else's actions or bad luck may be offered criticism, the theory being that the victim may be at fault for having attracted the other person's hostility (Bingham & Tamarkin, 1985).
* **Projection of marital guilt**
Thoughts of infidelity to a partner may be unconsciously projected in self-defence on to the partner in question, so that the guilt attached to the thoughts can be repudiated or turned to blame instead, in a process linked to denial.
* **Bullying**
A bully may project his/her own feelings of vulnerability onto the target(s) of the bullying activity. Despite the fact that a bully's typically denigrating activities are aimed at the bully's targets, the true source of such negativity is ultimately almost always found in the bully's own sense of personal insecurity and/or vulnerability. Such aggressive projections of displaced negative emotions can occur anywhere from the micro-level of interpersonal relationships, all the way up through to the macro-level of international politics, or even international armed conflict (Jung & von Franz, 1964).
* **Projection of general guilt**
Projection of a severe conscience\[26\] is another form of defense, one which may be linked to the making of false accusations, personal or political (Jung & von Franz, 1964).
* **Projection of hope**
Also, in a more positive light, a patient may sometimes project his or her feelings of hope onto the therapist (Casement, 1990).

## References

Bingham, J. & Tamarkin, N. (1985). *The Pursuit of Health: Your Mind, Your Body, Your Relationships & Your Environment*. New York: Walker Press

Casement, P. (1990). *Further Learning from the Patient: The Analytic Space and Process*. Hove, UK: Routledge.

Hurry, A., Novick, J. & Novick, K. K. (1976). Freud's concept of projection. *Journal of Child Psychotherapy*, 4(2), 75-88. DOI: 10.1080/00754177608254963

Freud, S. (1913). *Totem and Taboo: Resemblances Between the Psychic Lives of Savages and Neurotics* Translated by A. A. Brill, 1919 London: George Routledge & Sons Limited

Jung, C. G. & von Franz, M-L. (1964) *Man and his symbols*. Garden City, N.Y. : Doubleday

Reeves, A. (2013). *An Introduction to Counselling and Psychotherapy: From Theory to Practice*. London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
> 2 votes

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Tags: analysis, meta-analysis, freud, projection
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# Question
Title: Is "haptodysphoria" an urban legend or is there another term under which this studied?
I was googling for something like why some people don't like to touch velvet, and the top hit was https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/haptodysphoria where it's defined as

> An odd, disagreeable sensation felt by certain people when handling peaches, velvet or other fuzzy surfaces.

but there are zero hits on that term in pubmed. So is this phenomenon of dislinking to touch some materials something more seriously studied under some other terminology?

# Answer
> 5 votes
Apparently "sensory over-responsivity" is a more widely used term:

> Sensory over-responsivity, a subtype of sensory modulation disorder, is characterized by extreme negative reactions to normative sensory experiences. Individuals vary widely in their reactions to sensory stimuli, with some children and adults reporting aversive, even painful, responses to contact with everyday objects and exposure to everyday sounds. Some people find the sound of vacuum cleaners or sirens highly aversive, and some children fuss about stiff new clothes and labels sewn inside collars. They may dislike being lightly touched or vigorously protest brushing their teeth.

No mention of velvet though in that article.

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Tags: terminology, sensation
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# Question
Title: What percentage of those diagnosed with schizophrenia didn't have brain abnormalities?
Scientists in a wide study of subcortical brain abnormalities from the ENIGMA Consortium, Schizophrenia Working Group, published in Molecular Psychiatry, analyzed the brain scans of more than 2,000 people diagnosed with schizophrenia.

I doubt diagnosis is 100% accurate, so I'm thinking a percentage of those diagnosed didn't have abnormalities. What is that percentage? (There is a table in the Molecular Psychiatry article, with information which might or might not be related to my question, but I don't know how to read it).

# Answer
This ENIGMA study did not assess brain abnormalities at an individual level. Rather, it examined if the volumes of a range of subcortical brain structures differed between patients with schizophrenia and healthy control subjects at the group level, using a meta-analytic approach. The term "brain abnormalities" might be misleading in this context: The study was not about the type of brain abnormalities that would be detectable by a neuroradiological exam (for a study focusing on this, see Sommer et al, 2013, Schizophrenia Bulletin, doi: 10.1093.schbul.sbs037). It is therefore not possible to determine the percentage of patients who had brain abnormalities from the study.
> 1 votes

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Tags: abnormal-psychology, psychiatry, schizophrenia
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# Question
Title: Are there any types of meditation/mindfulness intervention not starting with breathing exercises?
It occurs to me that all meditation/mindfulness practice starts with focusing attention on breathing by either counting breaths or simply feel the sensation of the airflow (Baer, 2003). Eventually, this focusing attention on breathing is likely to induce deep, slow breathing, which can slow down the heart rate and calm down the nervous system. Is there any meditation practice starting with a different form other than focusing on breathing?

Baer, R. A. (2003). Mindfulness training as a clinical intervention: A conceptual and empirical review. Clinical psychology: Science and practice, 10(2), 125-143.

# Answer
> 4 votes
You can use key words (“body scan” combined with “meditation”) to get specific studies. Dr. Jon Kabat-Zinn’s book (titled "*Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness*”) describes this body-scan meditation and also you should be able to get youtube videos on it. Although it is typically described for lying down position, it can be done sitting or even standing. I found the following study by doing a quick web search – there could be newer studies:

Ditto, B., Eclache, M., & Goldman, N. (2006). Short-term autonomic and cardiovascular effects of mindfulness body scan meditation. Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 32(3), 227-234.

Walking meditation is also very good if one tends to fall asleep when meditating. Here’s a study that has used walking meditation:

Prakhinkit, S., Suppapitiporn, S., Tanaka, H., & Suksom, D. (2014). Effects of Buddhism walking meditation on depression, functional fitness, and endothelium-dependent vasodilation in depressed elderly. The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine, 20(5), 411-416.

Here’s ‘soles of the feet’ meditation – again, there could be newer references:

Singh, N. N., Wahler, R. G., Adkins, A. D., Myers, R. E., & Mindfulness Research Group. (2003). Soles of the feet: A mindfulness-based self-control intervention for aggression by an individual with mild mental retardation and mental illness. Research in Developmental Disabilities, 24(3), 158-169.

Another meditation technique is to be simply aware of sounds, etc., that come and go without getting entangled in thoughts – this is called choiceless awareness and this meditation is also described in the book of Kabat-Zinn I mentioned earlier. Here’s a reference for that as well:

Brewer, J. A., Worhunsky, P. D., Gray, J. R., Tang, Y. Y., Weber, J., & Kober, H. (2011). Meditation experience is associated with differences in default mode network activity and connectivity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 108(50), 20254-20259.

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, meditation
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# Question
Title: Has there been any studies of pathological "nomad-ness"?
I've spent some time trying to search for this but my lack of knowledge limits my ability to find any information about this subject.

I know someone who constantly sees another city as a "Grass is Greener" and will pack up and move about every eight months. This behavior of "loose-footing" that I'm trying to describe meets the 4 D's of Psychopathology:

1. **Deviance**: Moving to another town for an unacceptably bad reason that someone of their intelligence wouldn't accept if they heard it from someone else.
2. **Distress**: Forgoing valuable social and capital assets that causes hardship after the move. Feelings of loneliness after losing touch of newly created friendships before the move. Constant anxiety of not moving to a new city when they think they find a better one.
3. **Dysfunctional**: The person is in complete denial of the behavior trend and after moving to a new city will spend resources in material or non material assets that reflect an intention to not move again. Like signing a two-year lease or selling or buying a car or a city parking space. Or quitting a Top-100 University after two years and a 4.0GPA in engineering that gave them a full-ride, because of a unacceptably poor reason.
4. **Danger**: These self-imposed hardships give the person chronic depression and a danger to harm themselves.

I'm only talking about this when it is pathological. I am assuming this is common, but I'm unsure of how common it is as I can't find any info about it. Hence the motivation for the question. I'm not referring to a cultural group or a nomad as being pathological.

One could say that this is just depression and/or anxiety and while that is true. I would imagine that this behavior is unique or common enough to deserve its own study of this trend, its origins or treatment strategies. For example growing up with derelict parents or maybe moving too often during childhood.

# Answer
> 3 votes
Although not a clinical diagnosis for mental disorder, the term *Residential Instability* brings up many articles discussing psychological problems associated with it in Google and Google Scholar.

> **Cotton, B. P. & Schwartz-Barcott, D. (2016). Residential Instability Among Low-Income Families: A Concept Analysis. *Archives of Psychiatric Nursing* 30(2): 257-261. doi: 10.1016/j.apnu.2015.11.006 pmid: 26992880**
>
> Residential instability is relatively common among low-income families and is associated with a host of negative outcomes, especially for children and adolescents. Psychiatric nurses, especially those in the advanced practice role, observe the consequences of residential instability within the clinical setting. Yet, to-date, the concept is somewhat vague and its essential meaning and definition remain unclear.

# Answer
> 2 votes
If you're talking pathological, the behavior you mention may be related to bipolar disorder:

> “They can be quite distractible and may start a million things and never finish them,” says Don Malone, M.D., the director of the Center for Behavioral Health and chair of the Department of Psychiatry at Cleveland Clinic in Ohio.

I haven't found any actual clinical vignettes of people moving around in the pattern you mention (I only did a quick search though), but starting projects with great élan, which may include relocation, and never finishing them because depression kicks in sounds like a plausible scenario.

Also since you mention "spend resources in material or non material assets that reflect an intention to not move again"... spending sprees are somewhat common of during \[hypo\]mania.

Keep in mind that diagnosing someone without meeting them is quite risky and considered downright unethical in some professional societies.

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Tags: social-psychology, abnormal-psychology
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# Question
Title: Scientific articles linking personal-professional growth
I am writing an allegation letter to obtain funds to enroll in an activity for personal development, although the frame in which I ask for the finds is in "transversal activities related to research career". I am a PhD Student. The response to the first letter I wrote asking for funds states that the activity I requested is too related to personal growth. So I am writing the allegation to say that professional growth goes together with personal growth, that they are inseparable, for example, in creative mental estates. So, can anyone help me by pointing to scientific articles that correlate both? Or, if my supposition is wrong, articles that prove that I am wrong?

# Answer
> 1 votes
There is a difference between *personal development* and *professional development*, although they can cross over each other.

## Personal development

This can be achieved through

* clinical supervision which is **separate and completely different to line-management but necessary for effective line-management**,
* self-awareness through self-reflection and self-evaluation,
* counselling where required

## Professional Development

This is achieved through continuing training and learning, which is recognised by your governing body as training and learning which forms part of CPD (Continuous Personal Development).

Training and learning opportunities may range from formal classes and distance learning, perhaps working towards a qualification, to informal learning experiences, such as conferences, workshops, peer discussion groups, volunteering, and so on.

Some governing bodies award "CPD Points", for example, 1 hour of CPD may count as 1 point of CPD for the year.

The following are examples of CPD (not exhaustive):

* Keeping up-to-date with current research and new books in your area of work
* Expanding your knowledge outside your area of work (only if you intend on expanding the area of your work)
* Organising further training, where relevant or to update existing skills. Some of this can cross over into personal development where the knowledge and learning gained helps towards this.

## Minimum CPD Required

The minimum required depends on your governing body so if you do not know, get in contact with them or you could lose your license to practice if you fail to meet the requirements.

The British Association for Counselling and Psychotherapy (BACP), for example, expects all members to gain 30 hours of CPD per year as a minimum (BACP, n.d.) and the requirement forms part of their ethical framework everyone has to follow as a member of BACP.

## References

BACP (n.d.). *CPD Guidance for registered members* \[Online\]
Retreived from: https://www.bacp.co.uk/membership/registered-membership/guide-to-cpd

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, learning, behavior
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