# Question
Title: On what basis do professionals who recognize gender dysphoria support risky and permanent medical intervention for those seeking gender re-assignment?
Before I pose my question, here are some statements from a slideshow on "Understanding Gender Nonconformity in Childhood and Adolescence" by Robert Garofalo, attributed to the Children's Hospital of Chicago, and hosted by the American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP). They officially support affirming gender change in children, however there is a group of pediatricians who actively reject that position.

According to this slideshow, gender is a social construct (page 7), which *"\[v\]aries by place, time period"* .

Next I'd like to list the slideshow's listed side effects and irreversible effects of hormone therapy. Pages 39-41 show the side effects of testosterone therapy.

> **Irreversible Effect of Testosterone Therapy**
>
> * Lower voice pitch
> * Increased hair growth (arms, legs, chest, ab)
> * Mustache/beard growth
> * Male pattern hair loss (temples, crown) and possibly baldness
> Genital Changes
> * Genital changes (clitoral growth and vaginal dryness/fragility)
> * Fertility?
>
> **Side Effects/Risks: Testosterone**
>
> * Increased cardiovascular risk
>     + Increased weight
>     + Decreased HDL, Increased Triglycerides
>     + Increased BP
> * Increased insulin resistance
> * Hepatotoxicity
> * Mood changes: irritability, aggression
> * Headaches
> * Acne
> * Polycythemia
> * Theoretical risk: breast/endometrial cancer

Given these side effects, on what medical basis do health professional support this?

If a person doesn't like themselves they get help with their self-value. They learn the valuable things about their unique identity and also identify why they began to devalue themselves and deal with those root issues. People with phobia's are taught to manage and improve their phobia, not embrace it.

My point is not to compare one disorder to another, but to show that regardless of the type of disorder that the standard treatment is not acceptance, but rather to reveal deeper issues and otherwise manage and overcome the disorder.

Gender Dysphoria is treated categorically different, but there has been no new category defined on which to base that decision.

I know this is a sensitive topic and has many personal stories, but I'd like to focus on the professional medical position and reasoning for that position.

# Answer
> 7 votes
**TL;DR**: Multiple approaches have been tried over many years. Current medical evidence strongly supports an "affirming approach" to alleviate gender dysphoria. "Corrective approaches" are considered unethical, and withholding treatment is not considered neutral. It's explained in the referenced AAP slides, e.g.:

> Children rejected and not supported are at increased risk of the following during adolescence:
>
> * Depressive symptoms, low life satisfaction, self-harm, isolation, posttraumatic stress, incarceration, homelessness, and suicidality

More up to date is:

> This is the first study to examine mental health in these children, finding that they have low levels of anxiety and depression.
> Olson, Durwood, DeMeules, and McLaughlin, *Mental Health of Transgender Children Who Are Supported in Their Identities*, Pediatrics, 2016

Also note that medical treatment is not as easy to obtain as commonly believed: Typically, prior to medical treatment is *social* transitioning. Reversible puberty blockers are used until the patient is legally an adult (with bodily autonomy). Real-life experience is typically required before hormones and surgery.

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The answer to the question is on page 27 of the linked AAP slides, including 7 references.

> ***Why do we believe in Affirming approach?***
>
> * Affirming does not mean encouraging or pushing gender transition
> * Children rejected and not supported are at increased risk of the following during adolescence:–
>
> Depressive symptoms, low life satisfaction, self-harm, isolation, posttraumatic stress, incarceration, homelessness, and suicidality
> * Family acceptance and support during adolescence is tied to the following in young adults:
>
> Positive self-esteem, high social support, positive mental health, less depressive symptoms, greater self-esteem, greater life satisfaction (compared with youth whose families were non-supportive)

The references included are as follows (I include links to facilitate access):

I'm not 100% sure what "Travers et al., 2012" refers to. But I guess it's this:

---

Continuing on...

1. > The AAP admits that Gender is man made, not real, but a social construct (see page 7).
>
> Based on the American Academy of Pediatrics understanding of Gender, it is a completely arbitrary social construct that varies by place and time(page 7 in the PDF linked above).

Their talk slides (page 7) actually say:

> Gender
>
> Attitudes, feelings, and behaviors that a given culture associates with a person’s biological sex (APA, 2011):
>
> * Gender expression
>     * Gender roles/behaviors
>     * Gender identity
>     * Varies by place, time period
>
> Social construct

This absolutely does not say nor imply "man made" nor "not real". Whether or not you call gender, sexuality, etc., a "social construct" is a matter for feminism and gender studies. In any case, the AAP are clearly not saying gender is unimportant.

A more reliable source than random talk slides from the same institute is:

> Whether talking about children or adults, it is helpful to think of gender in three parts:
>
> 1. **Sex**, the combinations of physical characteristics (including but not limited to genitals, chromosomes, and sex hormone levels) typical of males or females.
>     2. **Gender identity**, a person’s internal sense of being male, female, or, for some people, a blend of both or neither.
>     3. **Gender expression**, the many ways people show their gender to others, such as the clothing and haircuts they wear or the roles and activities they choose.
>
> *Supporting and Caring for Transgender Children*, AAP, 2016.

I highlight how *gender* is closely tied to one's internal sense of self (including one's brain and thought processes). Moreover, **everything psychological is simultaneously biological**, so you can't cleanly separate *gender* from *sex*. (See: Ainsworth, *Sex redefined*, Nature, 2015.)

For a description of the history of sex vs. gender, see: Muehlenhard and Peterson, *Distinguishing Between Sex and Gender*, Sex Roles, 2011.
2. > Gender Dysphoria is treated categorically different, but there has been no new category defined on which to base that decision.
>
> regardless of the type of disorder that the standard treatment is not acceptance

In 2013, the DSM V renamed "gender identity disorder" to gender dysphoria. This seems to be the result of the discovery of multiple types of evidence for of biological causes of transsexuality (too many references to include here). (Although the terminology is more complex than that; see Davy and Toze *What Is Gender Dysphoria? A Critical Systematic Narrative Review*, Transgender Health, 2018. The DSM V critera are available here.)

*Gender dysphoria* typically either comes from the person themselves (e.g., a dislike of their own body), or from society (see *Injustice at Every Turn*, 2012). Saying "pro-Gender Dysphoria" and "mutilation" is loaded language and misleading: medical professionals instead try to *minimize* gender dysphoria. They might provide medical means for transgender people to become more satisfied with their bodies, and help them become a more functional member of society.
3. > Pages 39-41 show the side effects of testosterone therapy.

According to the WPATH *Standards of Care*, there's no *medical* treatment until puberty. (However, *social* transition is recommended.) After reaching puberty:

> Fully Reversible Interventions ... Adolescents may be eligible for puberty-suppressing hormones as soon as pubertal changes have begun. ... Adolescents may be eligible to begin feminizing/masculinizing hormone therapy, preferably with parental consent.
>
> As the level of gender-related abuse is strongly associated with the degree of psychiatric distress during adolescence (Nuttbrock et al., 2010), **withholding puberty suppression and subsequent feminizing or masculinizing hormone therapy is not a neutral option for adolescents**.
> *Standards of Care*, version 7, WPATH, 2012.

Medical treatment is not as easy to obtain as commonly believed (it's not like on TV): It varies from patient to patient, but typically first comes social transitioning, and reversible puberty blockers, and the real-life experience. Side-effects (which occur in virtually all medical treatments) are ordinarily discussed in detail among doctors and guardians.

As one example of why withholding treatment is not neutral: suicide rates for transgender adolescents are alarming (Williams Institute, 2014; Toomey et al. 2018) but are massively reduced when being supported in one's gender identity (Bauer et al. 2015; Olson et al., 2016).

(To give a mental picture of why the difference is so extreme: imagine a doctor singling out a non-transgender adolescent male, and encouraging/coercing him to live as a woman. Most people would say *it's wrong on so many levels*. Now replace "non-transgender" with "transgender". From the transgender adolescent male's perspective, there is no change in these two scenarios: he too will feel *it's wrong on so many levels*. \[It gets worse too: his family joins in, etc.\])
4. > People with phobia's are taught to manage and improve their phobia, not embrace it.

This is what the AAP describe as "rejected and not supported", which leads to the aforementioned consequences. *Corrective Approaches* are considered unethical:

> Treatment aimed at trying to change a person’s gender identity and lived gender expression to become more congruent with sex assigned at birth has been attempted in the past (Gelder & Marks, 1969; Greenson, 1964), yet without success, particularly in the long-term (Cohen-Kettenis & Kuiper, 1984; Pauly, 1965). **Such treatment is no longer considered ethical.**
> *Standards of Care*, version 7, WPATH, 2012.

I didn't find the Cohen-Kettenis & Kuiper (1984) reference, but the following refrence seems more up-to-date and closely related: Cohen-Kettenis, van Goozen, Sex Reassignment of Adolescent Transsexuals: A Follow-up Study, Journal of the American Academy of Child & Adolescent Psychiatry, 1997.

The UN also considers corrective approaches contrary to *bodily autonomy*, a human right.

# Answer
> 4 votes
I hope I am qualified to answer this question. I am not a psychologist but have worked with transgender persons in volunteering positions a number of times and am fairly well researched on the topic.

The biggest key point as I have studied simply is based on health outcomes as opposed to comparing this to mental illness.

This page talks about the practical health outcomes of the treatments. Individuals who identify as transgender already often suffer from a variety of issues that reduce both their quality of life and in some cases health. These can include developing mental disorders if they do not get treatment and even self harm or suicide. Overall most of the linked studies in that article showed that the benefits largely outweighed the risks in an overall health decision.

Now you imply that other treatments are used for most conditions which have effects on mental health, usually either "talking cures" or medications. The difference being in almost all cases these treatments are ineffective or even make the situation worse in transgender individuals.

I cannot find a study to link to this which is publicly available right now but in short, treating transgender individuals with treatments used for mental illness usually makes the condition worse. In many cases it causes additional depressive disorders to form as well as long term self image problems and self hatred, as well as increasing the risks of self harm or suicide.

So in summary, it is not to say the treatments used for transgender persons are risk free, but merely that they are better than the alternatives both of doing nothing and of trying to use a purely psychiatric method to treat. As both of those tend to make the condition gradually worse and no other treatments are known which produce a consistent improvement.

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Tags: social-psychology, psychiatry, gender
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title: Principles of grouping neurons

text:
# Question
Title: Principles of grouping neurons
This is an overview question. I wonder which principles of grouping neurons into higher units are there, and which principles I have overseen.

* **neurotransmitter systems**: all neurons that release or react on a given (class or set of) neurotransmitters
* **functional systems**: all neurons (and groups of neurons) that are involved in performing a given task or function
* **regions**: all neurons in a given 3-dimensional volume of the brain, e.g. a voxel
* **nuclei** etc: a group of nearby neurons which somehow belong to each other (morphologically or synaptically, possibly encapsulated by some "membrane")
* **clusters**: a group of neurons (nearby or not) that are strongly interconnected by synapses
* **independent sets**: of a multipartite subgraph of the brain network
* groups defined **by other graph-theoretical measures**
* **pathways**: a somehow distinguished (e.g. shortest) synaptical route from neuron (group) A to neuron (group) B
* **cortical layers**
* **cortical columns**

To make my question specific and not too broad, let me just ask the following:

> **Which principles of grouping neurons is missing in the list above?**

(There should be not so many.)

For each classified group of neurons some numbers will be interesting to know:

* How many neurons do they typically comprise?
* How many groups of the same kind are there?
* How strongly do they overlap?

# Answer
In anatomy/physiology, there are 2 major categorizations of the nervous system:

1. **Central nervous system** (brain + spinal cord) and **peripheral nervous system** (all other neural structures)
2. **Somatic nervous system,** which controls skeletal muscles and skin, and and **autonomic n. system,** which controls internal organs, blood vessels and glands and is further divided to **sympathetic** and **parasympathetic system.** Both the somatic and autonomic system have **motor** neurons that control muscles and **sensory** neurons that convey sensory signals.

Image source: Wikipedia, creative commons license

Neurons can be further categorized by neurotransmitters involved (dopamine system, acetylcholine system, etc.), and by various anatomical and functional subsystems.

Examples of anatomical and functional structures formed by neurons:

* **Cortical areas** (functional areas of the brain cortex) (Lumen)
* **Main parts of the brain:** cerebrum, cerebellum and brainstem, some of which can be further divided into hemispheres, lobes and folds
* **Deep structures of the brain:** thalamus, hypotalamus, hypocampus, amygdala, corpus callosum, limbic system, pituitary gland, pineal gland, and structures collectivelly called **basal ganglia,** which include the caudate, putamen, and globus pallidus in the cerebrum, the substantia nigra in the midbrain, and the subthalamic nucleus in the diencephalon (Mayfield Clinic).
* **Areas containing either neuron cell bodies or axons:** gray matter (cell bodies) and white matter (axons) of the brain and spinal cord (Indiana.edu)
* **Histological areas of the brain:** layers and columns (Wikipedia)
* **Nuclei** of the cranial nerves (Wikipedia)
* **Centers** (cardiovascular center, reflex center for cough, vomiting, etc.) in medulla oblongata (Wikipedia)
* **Corticospinal tracts** (Wikipedia)
* **Pathways** \- the term is usually used for cranial nerves: visual pathway, auditory pathway, etc.
* **Ganglia** \- anatomical structures containing neuron body cells in the peripheral nervous system (Wikipedia)
* **Nerve plexuses** \- branching networks of intersecting nerves (Wikipedia)
* **Reflex arcs** (Wikipedia)
> 1 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, methodology, cognitive-modeling, neuroanatomy
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# Question
Title: Relationship and differences between psychosomatic, somatoform and idiopathic disorders
I'm really confused because it seems to me these terms overlap to some extent.

Psychosomatic disorder

> psychosomatic
> adj. 1. of or pertaining to a physical disorder that is caused or notably influenced by emotional factors.
> American Heritage Dictionary
>
> psychosomatic
> 1. (Psychology) of or relating to disorders, such as stomach ulcers, thought to be caused or aggravated by psychological factors such as stress
> Collins English Dictionary

somatoform disorder (called somatic symptom disorder since DSM-V)

> denoting physical symptoms that can not be attributed to organic disease and appear to be of psychic origin.
> Miller-Keane Encyclopedia and Dictionary of Medicine, Nursing, and Allied Health
>
> denoting physical symptoms that cannot be attributed to organic disease and appear to be psychogenic.
> Dorland's Medical Dictionary for Health Consumers

In both cases these terms seem to be used for physical symptoms which rather than being attributed to physical conditions, are based on mental factors, ie., psychogenic.

Also, three of these definitions are framed in terms of "thought to be caused by psychological factors", "appear to be of psychic origin" and "appear to be psychogenic." Given that these three terms imply cause is not known with certainty they are idiopathic, right?

> idiopathic
> adj.
> Of, relating to, or designating a disease having no known cause.
> American Heritage Dictionary

From looking at these two meanings of psychosomatic disorder and somatoform disorder, am I mistaken in perceiving them the same way, or at least confusingly almost the same thing? One says "relating to disorders ... thought to be caused or aggravated by psychological factors" and the other says "denoting physical symptoms ... (that) appear to be of psychic origin."

Could someone clarify what the differences are in light of the definitions, which seem quite the same to me?

# Answer
> 4 votes
This is purely all about terminology.

*Somatic* means of the body; bodily; physical. whereas the *psycho* part of *psychosomatic* refers to the fact that the somatic problem (symptom or disorder) is created through psychological means (with no medical evidence of a physical problem e.g. broken bone and/or torn ligaments).

**Symptom** refers to an observable behaviour or state, whilst **disorder** refers to a cluster of symptoms.

*Somatoform* refers to a physical symptom that cannot be attributed to organic disease and appears to be psychogenic (Dorland's Medical Dictionary for Health Consumers, 2007).

*Somatoform **disorder*** refers to a set of psychosomatic symptoms (somatoforms) (Smith & Józefowicz, 2012).

Idiopathic, as you pointed out is

> Of, relating to, or designating a disease having no known cause.

## Further clarification

Psychosomatic is a word describing a somatoform. A psychological problem is a somatised (Al Busaidi, 2010), and therefore is producing the experience of somatic symptoms, which are in fact psychogenic.

If a medical problem is considered *idiopathic*, the issue of whether it is somatic or psychosomatic is not determined. It **cannot be both *psychosomatic* and *idiopathic* at the same time**.

## References

Al Busaidi, Z. Q. (2010). The concept of somatisation: a cross-cultural perspective. *Sultan Qaboos University Medical Journal*, 10(2), 180. Pubmed: PMC3074701

Dorland's Medical Dictionary for Health Consumers. (2007). Retrieved from: https://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/somatoform

Smith, J. K., & Józefowicz, R. F. (2012). Diagnosis and treatment of somatoform disorders. *Neurology: Clinical Practice*, 2(2), 94-102. doi: 10.1212/CPJ.0b013e31825a6183

# Answer
> 0 votes
Psychosomatic is a disease that is both physical and psychological and can cause increase in symptoms such as eczema, psoriasis, ulcers, etc. They can cause serious physical problems. Somatic is a symptom of a physical symptom with no possible reasons for such like a woman being appearing pregnant with all the symptoms while not being pregnant. A somatic disorder is when is goes on too long. Idiopathic means there is a possible physical cause or psychological cause but neither is known. For example fibromyalgia used to be considered idiopathic and is now a known disease although we’re still uncertain if it is somatic or if it is psychosomatic, HIV used to be considered idiopathic as well. This is just the tip of the iceberg and doesn’t fully explain the similarities and differences. Proper research and understanding should be done.

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Tags: terminology, psychiatry, psychology
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title: Probiotics and Mental Health

text:
# Question
Title: Probiotics and Mental Health
While trying to find research articles within the realm of Psychosynthesis, I have been looking at the "collective unconscious"

Image Source: Wikipedia Commons \- (CC BY-SA 3.0)

1. Lower Unconscious
2. Middle Unconscious
3. Higher Unconscious
4. Field of Consciousness
5. Conscious Self or "I"
6. Higher Self
7. Collective Unconscious

Conducting a Google Scholar search for "collective unconscious" I stumbled on an article by Dinan, et al. (2015) which states:

> * Gut microbes are part of the unconscious system influencing behavior.
> * Microbes majorly impact on cognitive function and fundamental behavior patterns.
> * Disorganisation of the gut microbiota can negatively impact on mental health.
> * Psychobiotics are probiotics with a potential mental health benefit.

they also talk about bidirectional communication between gut microbes and the brain occuring via a number of routes including the vagus nerve (cranial nerve X), the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis (HPA) and cytokines produced by the immune system.

> Bacteria also have the capacity to generate many neurotransmitters and neuromodulators. For example, certain *Lactobacillus* and *Bifidobacterium* species produce gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA); *Escherichia*, *Bacillus* and *Saccharomyces* spp. produce norepinephrine (NE); *Candida*, *Streptococcus*, *Escherichia* and *Enterococcus* spp. produce 5HT; *Bacillus* produces dopamine (DA); and *Lactobacillus* produces acetylcholine (Lyte, 2011, Lyte, 2013, Wikoff et al., 2009). Some probiotics can modulate the concentrations of opioid and cannabinoid receptors in the gut epithelium (Rousseaux et al., 2007). However, how this local effect occurs or translates to the anti-nociceptive effects seen in animal models of visceral pain is currently unclear.

My question is **can poor mental health affect the bidirectional communication between gut microbes and the brain, and can consuming products containing probiotics be used to help with mental health problems? If so, will consuming products containing probiotics when well cause mental health problems?**

## References

Dinan, T. G., Stilling, R. M., Stanton, C., & Cryan, J. F. (2015). Collective unconscious: how gut microbes shape human behavior. *Journal of psychiatric research*, 63, 1-9.
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpsychires.2015.02.021

Lyte, M. (2011). Probiotics function mechanistically as delivery vehicles for neuroactive compounds: microbial endocrinology in the design and use of probiotics. *Bioessays*, 33(8), 574-581.
DOI: 10.1002/bies.201100024 Free PDF: Semantic Scholar

Lyte, M. (2013). Microbial endocrinology in the microbiome-gut-brain axis: how bacterial production and utilization of neurochemicals influence behavior. *PLoS pathogens*, 9(11), e1003726.
DOI: 10.1371/journal.ppat.1003726

Rousseaux, C., Thuru, X., Gelot, A., Barnich, N., Neut, C., Dubuquoy, L., ... & Ouwehand, A. (2007). Lactobacillus acidophilus modulates intestinal pain and induces opioid and cannabinoid receptors. *Nature medicine*, 13(1), 35.
DOI: 10.1038/nm1521

Wikoff, W. R., Anfora, A. T., Liu, J., Schultz, P. G., Lesley, S. A., Peters, E. C., & Siuzdak, G. (2009). Metabolomics analysis reveals large effects of gut microflora on mammalian blood metabolites. *Proceedings of the national academy of sciences*, 106(10), 3698-3703.
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.0812874106

# Answer
The following, and more, is available at my blog article *Microbiome and Probiotics: Gut bacteria can affect your mental health?*

# Answer to Question 1:

> Can poor mental health affect the bidirectional communication between gut microbes and the brain?

Even though there is cross talk between your enteric nervous system (ENS) and your brain, researchers assumed that microbes did not play into it. But recent breakthroughs are challenging that assumption, and changing our understanding of how the blood brain barrier works, because the microbiome can affect your brain in some pretty big ways.

The ENS is a massive web spread over your entire digestive tract made up of more than 500 million neurons that control your guts. This *second brain* as it is sometimes called, is pretty much self sufficient, and can take care of most of its jobs by itself. But it is connected to the CNS through your vagus nerve, which is an information superhighway between your gut and your brain.

## Stress affects your microbiome

Early research starting in the 1970s (Tannock & Savage, 1974) showed that stress could affect the kind of microbes found in the guts of mice. One group found that stressing mice by depriving them of food or water, caused them to have more coliform bacteria like E.coli, and less of another form of bacteria called lactobacilli in their intestines.

Another group found that the stress of dealing with an aggressive cage mate led to changes in amounts of other kinds of bacteria. They found increased numbers of Bacteriodes and Clostridium, along with decreased numbers of Coprococcus, Pseudobutyrivibrio and Dorea.

But even though it was clear that stress could affect the kinds of microbes in the intestines, it wasn’t clear if that was a 2 way relationship.

## Could Gut microbes be affecting psychological stress levels?

The first big break on this question came when some scientists from Kyushu University, Japan (Sudo, et al. 2004), discovered that exposure to certain kinds of microbes had dramatic effects on brain chemical levels.

For this study, the scientists used germ free mice. These were mice delivered by C section and immediately put into super clean cages, so they were barely exposed to microbes at all. They also made comparisons with specific pathogen free mice. These were mice only exposed to a known set of microbes.

The germ free mice got a lot more stressed when they were restrained, so it was something about the bacteria in the specific pathogen free mice that was helping them with their stress levels.

The team found that the germ free mice had less of a protein called Brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF). BDNF is important for learning, memory, and higher order thinking. The germ free mice had less of it in the brain regions that determine how an animal reacts to stress.

# Answer to Question 2 and 3:

> Can consuming products containing probiotics be used to help with mental health problems? If so, can consuming products containing probiotics when well cause mental health problems?

There is not a lot of research that is very clear on the relationship between the gut and the brain in humans. These discoveries are so new that nobody has been able to do any large scale studies in humans yet. But along with prebiotics (fibre suppliments designed to feed good bacteria), small studies have tried treating volunteers with probiotics, deliberately introducing new microbes in to there guts, and the microbes and fibre affected the subjects mood and cognition.

So there might be a relationship between your microbiome and your mental health. But the studies have not been able to look closely enough at what exactly the prebiotics and probiotics are doing to the microbes in the gut, or how that may be translating in to changes in mood.

## What does this mean?

Researchers will be getting more into the nitty gritty of these relationships and trying to work out whether these discoveries can translate into medical treatments.

Other scientists are trying to work out how to humanize the mouse microbiome, making the mouse microbiome more human like. They are doing this by taking faecal matter from sick and healthy human patients and inserting them into mice to study the effects.

That kind of experiment can let researcher pick apart how differences in the microbiomes connects with changes in mental health. They can also get right into the brains of mice in ways they can’t with human patients, using dissected tissues to look directly at the structures of brain cells and how they connect.

## Can we tailor our microbiome for maximum benefit?

Some researchers are also trying to figure out how specific kinds of microbes are affecting our brains and how we can tailor our microbiomes to maximize the health benefits.

Others are starting to ask questions about how other things that affect our microbiomes like antibiotics could be affecting our mental health and cognition.

So there is still a lot we don’t know about how our microbiome can affect our brain. But there are a lot of new studies in the works and scientists and doctors are hoping that as our knowledge of how our Brain-Gut-Microbiome Axis grows, so will our ability to tweak it and hopefully improve some lives along the way.

# Further Reading

Bailey, M. T., Dowd, S. E., Galley, J. D., Hufnagle, A. R., Allen, R. G., & Lyte, M. (2011). Exposure to a social stressor alters the structure of the intestinal microbiota: implications for stressor-induced immunomodulation. *Brain, behavior, and immunity, 25*(3), 397–407. doi: 10.1016/j.bbi.2010.10.023 Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3039072/pdf/nihms253984.pdf

Bercik, P., Denou, E., Collins, J., Jackson, W., Lu, J., Jury, J., … & Verdu, E. F. (2011). The intestinal microbiota affect central levels of brain-derived neurotropic factor and behavior in mice. *Gastroenterology, 141*(2), 599-609. doi: 10.1053/j.gastro.2011.04.052 Free PDF: https://www.gastrojournal.org/article/S0016-5085(11)00607-X/pdf

Carabotti, M., Scirocco, A., Maselli, M. A., & Severi, C. (2015). The gut-brain axis: interactions between enteric microbiota, central and enteric nervous systems. *Annals of gastroenterology, 28*(2), 203–209. pmcid: PMC4367209 Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4367209/pdf/AnnGastroenterol-28-203.pdf

Furness J.B., Callaghan B.P., Rivera L.R., Cho HJ. (2014) The Enteric Nervous System and Gastrointestinal Innervation: Integrated Local and Central Control. In: Lyte M., Cryan J. (eds) *Microbial Endocrinology: The Microbiota-Gut-Brain Axis in Health and Disease. Advances in Experimental Medicine and Biology, vol 817*. New York, NY: Springer. doi: 10.1007/978-1-4939-0897-4\_3

Human Microbiome Project Consortium (2012). Structure, function and diversity of the healthy human microbiome. *Nature, 486*(7402), 207–214. doi: 10.1038/nature11234 Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3564958/pdf/nihms378076.pdf

Mayer, E. A., Knight, R., Mazmanian, S. K., Cryan, J. F., & Tillisch, K. (2014). Gut microbes and the brain: paradigm shift in neuroscience. *The Journal of neuroscience : the official journal of the Society for Neuroscience, 34*(46), 15490–15496. doi: 10.1523/JNEUROSCI.3299-14.2014 Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4228144/pdf/zns15490.pdf

Mayer, E. A., Tillisch, K., & Gupta, A. (2015). Gut/brain axis and the microbiota. *The Journal of clinical investigation, 125*(3), 926–938. doi: 10.1172/JCI76304 Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4362231/pdf/JCI76304.pdf

Reardon, S. (2014). Gut–brain link grabs neuroscientists. *Nature News, 515*(7526), 175. doi: 10.1038/515175a Free PDF: https://www.nature.com/news/polopoly\_fs/1.16316!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/515175a.pdf

Smith, P. A. (2015). The tantalizing links between gut microbes and the brain. *Nature News, 526*(7573), 312. doi: 10.1038/526312a Free PDF: https://www.nature.com/news/polopoly\_fs/1.18557!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/526312a%20corrected.pdf

# References

Sudo, N., Chida, Y., Aiba, Y., Sonoda, J., Oyama, N., Yu, X. N., … Koga, Y. (2004). Postnatal microbial colonization programs the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal system for stress response in mice. *The Journal of physiology, 558*(Pt 1), 263–275. doi: 10.1113/jphysiol.2004.063388 Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1664925/pdf/tjp0558-0263.pdf

Tannock, G. W., & Savage, D. C. (1974). Influences of dietary and environmental stress on microbial populations in the murine gastrointestinal tract. *Infection and immunity, 9*(3), 591–598. pmcid: PMC414848 Free PDF: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC414848/pdf/iai00243-0111.pdf
> 2 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, depression, autism
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# Question
Title: Cognitive bias with trial and error problem solving
I found through self-observation that while solving some problem I am more inclined sometimes to first try and manipulate the variables that require the least amount of effort to manipulate, rather than the ones that might appear the most salient to the problem. Is there any research in this type of bias. I do not know what is the name for this type of phenomena or whether it has been operationalized or published yet.

To give an example sometimes when I am debugging when coding I try some very inefficient changes like changes the syntax from " to ', even though this does not matter.

# Answer
This sort of experience is probably better termed a *heuristic* rather than a *bias*. The two can be related in some cases (as heuristics can cause bias when the underlying model does not fit the real situation).

From the Wikipedia page linked above, a heuristic is:

> any approach to problem solving or self-discovery that employs a practical method that is not guaranteed to be optimal, perfect or rational, but which is nevertheless sufficient for reaching an immediate, short-term goal

Choosing to manipulate the easiest variables to manipulate first is an example this. It is practical, but may not be optimal. Since there is a low cost to manipulating the easiest variables, you might save some time and effort if one of those manipulations does happen to work, even if it was improbable. Not only do you avoid trying to more complex solutions, but you also avoid expending the mental effort of determining which one to invest in trying.

A well-known and often-lamented example of this sort of heuristic is in tech support decision trees that often start with steps like "Is the power on?" and "Have you tried turning it on and off again?" These steps seem a bit silly, and often have nothing to do with the symptoms of the problem, but if they happen to work it saves the support representative a lot of further time and effort investigating the problem.

Of course, this heuristic will fail if you manipulate a lot of "easy" variables - in that case, the sum time to try all the easy steps might be more effort than it would have taken to use some mental effort in the first place.
> 2 votes

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Tags: cognitive-psychology, terminology, bias, problem-solving
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# Question
Title: Terror management theory: Is this a valid conclusion based on the conducted experiment?
I am currently reading the book ‘The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life’. I have to say that I am a bit skeptical about many of the statements posed, and I’m trying to identify why that is, so I decided to dive into some of the articles they reference.

One of the things I encountered was a reference to a paper by Schimel et al. (2007): *"Is Death Really the Worm at the Core? Converging Evidence That Worldview Threat Increases Death-Thought Accessibility."* In Study 5, they state:

> The results of Study 5 demonstrate, once again, that exposure to worldview-threatening information causes thoughts of death to become more accessible

They base this on an experiment in which they compare the DTA (death-thought accesibility) in three groups:

* creationist/anti-creation, creationists who read anti-creation material (n=20, M=2.75)
* evolutionist/anti-creation, evolutionists who read anti-creation material (n=20, M=1.95)
* creationist/control, creationists who read neutral material (n=20, M=1.90)

I have trouble to see the validity of the conclusion based on the experiment. Might it not also just be the case that creationists in general think more about death? And that reading a passage about the theory of evolution (which is inherently about life and death), makes everyone, regardless of their point of view on evolution, think more about death? I think the problem with this experiment is that there is a group missing in the experiment; the evolutionist/control group. It might be very well possible that this group has a DTA of 0.95 and a low SD. If that were the case, reading the passage has increased the DTA of both the creationists and the evolutionists and thus nothing can be said about the effect of worldview-threatening information. All we would then conclude, is that reading about evolution increases DTA.

I am not a researcher myself, nor am I very familiar with social sciences. I hope someone with more experience in these fields could explain to me if my train of thought is correct, or if not, where the fallacy in this train of thought is.

I would also be interested to find references to articles that contain experiments that substantiate the statement cited above.

<sub> Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2015). The worm at the core: On the role of death in life. Random House.
Schimel, J., Hayes, J., Williams, T., & Jahrig, J. (2007). Is death really the worm at the core? Converging evidence that worldview threat increases death-thought accessibility. Journal of personality and social psychology, 92(5), 789. (Free PDF) </sub>

# Answer
> 1 votes
Interestingly, the authors appear to have been aware of your concern:

> Given that the only difference between these groups involved a subject variable for which there could be preexisting differences in DTA, we included a third group of creationists who read a nonthreatening essay.

Since the evolutionist/anti-creation and creationist/control groups had very similar scores, there was seemingly no reason to suspect different baselines. However, I agree with you that adding this third group may not have been sufficient to eliminate the potential for preexisting differences in DTA.

**Dispositional DTA:**

The study of preexisting differences in DTA baselines is relatively recent, and is called dispositional DTA. This line of research is indeed showing significant variation in DTA between different groups in control conditions, variation in reaction to primes, and even variation in reaction to delay - see Mikulincer & Florian (2000) for examples of all 3. So in light of this, I would not take it for granted that evolutionists and creationists should necessarily have the same dispositions.

Curiously, a study by Friedman and Rholes (2009) found religious fundamentalism to be negatively correlated with dispositional DTA (ie, greater fundamentalism = reduced effects on DTA). Although fundamentalism is not the same measure as creationism, it does suggest that evolutionists may even have higher dispositional DTAs.

Ultimately however, a (not independent) partial replication of Study 5 is reported in Hayes (2011) Study 4, in which pro-evolution participants are subjected to an anti-evolution prime or the same control material used in Study 5, and the same DTA measure is used immediately thereafter. While not having the creationist contrast, this experiment measures the evolutionists/control baseline missing from Study 5, as well as the effect of anti-evolution material on evolutionists. I do note that the criteria for selecting participants was slightly different than Study 5, but not substantially different (n=93).

> DTA was higher in the Threat condition (M = 2.26, SD = 0.98) than in the Control condition (M = 1.68, SD = 0.96).

The results seem to indicate that the authors' assumptions about evolutionists' preexisting DTA may be valid.

**Implicit primes:**

The alternative explanation that reading about evolution might raise DTA in all participants due to the nature of the topic does not fit well within the context of existing DTA research. Explicit primes increase DTA only after a delay or distraction. For the immediate effects on DTA found in Study 5, an implicit prime must be used - ie, one that does not directly elicit thoughts of death. This is presumably what Studies 1-4 establish. Also see Steinman & Updegraff (2015) for a comprehensive review on the effects of explicit vs implicit primes on the need for delay.

In that context, had Study 5 not included evolutionists at all, the data gathered would have still been sufficient to conclude that reading about evolution increases DTA in creationists, substantiating the statement cited in your question. The study's novel inclusion of a group with an opposing worldview adds some valuable information from which to consider additional conclusions. That said, it would not be prudent in any case to make strong conclusions from a single, small, poorly controlled, unreplicated experiment. In my view, this study has many flaws that I won't rant about here. All I will say is:

1. Good on you for checking references, that is rare and commendable.
2. Good on you for applying critical thinking and questioning conclusions.

Re further references, the DTA hypothesis Wikipedia article contains many references to literature both supporting the cited statement and questioning the evidence for it. Lots more on Google of course.

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Tags: social-psychology, methodology, experimental-psychology
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# Question
Title: Understanding Carl Rogers' Concepts. What are inconsistent experiences? what is self-structure?
Long story short, I am a psychology student interesting in counselling. I've been reading all the major psychotherapy theories and Carl Roger's person centered approach intrigues me. I am one of those guys who understand terms and knows how to use them in general, but struggle immensely when asked to give a fundamental, understandable definition. This is not for a school assignment but for my own understanding. I kind of understand the concepts I am about to list below but perhaps it's the language barrier (I'm mainland Chinese) or the nature of Rogers writing and the nature of his thoughts, it's hard for me to materialize a concise, fundamental definition.

The two terms that I struggle to define:

1. "Inconsistent" experiences. Experiences which are"inconsistent" to the concept of self
2. Self-structure. Self-construction. How a person organizes and maintain itself (of experiences)

My attempt to define it:

1. Inconsistent experiences are those that is unexpected and challenges how you view yourself or how you view reality. For eg, in childhood, the world seems all about having fun, things seem peaceful. But the experience of working (having new responsibilities, realizing life is hard) and having a dispute with a co-worker (the world is not always peaceful), directly challenge that.
2. Self-structure is how a person organizes all their experiences, knowledge, values and beliefs. Ie what is the typical protocol when dealing with new information, new experiences, etc and how do they compact that in their short/long term cognition. How do they accept, challenge or deny new info?

If you have a good understanding of Carl Roger's or if you have something to add, interject, or correct, please feel free to comment. Thanks

# Answer
> 1 votes
## Short answer

Your attempt to define **self-structure** is almost there.

> Self-structure is how a person organizes all their experiences, knowledge, values and beliefs. Ie what is the typical protocol when dealing with new information, new experiences, etc and how do they compact that in their short/long term cognition. How do they accept, challenge or deny new info?

You have one half of its definition in a sense, because self-structure is not just about **how** a person organises all their experiences etc.

Rogers' concept of self-structure is also about the actual structure of the self. What **are** the core values and beliefs within the person's experiential world? Are they congruent with the real world or are they incongruent? I will go into that in a moment.

Your attempt to define **inconsistent experiences** is almost there

> Inconsistent experiences are those that is unexpected and challenges how you view yourself or how you view reality. For eg, in childhood, the world seems all about having fun, things seem peaceful. But the experience of working (having new responsibilities, realizing life is hard) and having a dispute with a co-worker (the world is not always peaceful), directly challenge that.

Inconsistent experiences can be unexpected, but they can be expected sometimes.

Take for example, you could have a belief that a certain other person is a good person and would not harm anyone, although you keep getting little hints that this belief may be wrong.

The first few times could be unexpected, but after a while you may pick up a pattern to when you notice these little hints. You can expect these little hints to come up during those moments and therefore they will not be *totally* unexpected.

Inconsistent experiences can challenge you or not. It is all down to how you choose to deal with the inconsistency. If you choose to take notice of the inconsistencies and examine them, they can challenge your structure of self, and in certain situations, they can alter your structure of self slightly, or even drastically. In my example your belief regarding that person could change, but it may not change your structure of self. It could do both in the sense that you could take it that you are not a good judge of character and therefore judge everyone else with suspicion. If you choose to ignore the inconsistent experience(s), they will not challenge the structure of self at all.

## Longer answer with further clarification

Self-structure and inconsistency with experiences are covered in Carl Rogers' 19 propositions (Rogers, 1951). These propositions form the basis of Rogers' concept of the self.

They state that everyone exists in a continually changing world of experience, and they are at the centre of their experiential world.

**The structure of the self** is formed as a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of evaluating all interaction with others — an organised, fluid but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the "I" or the "me", together with values attached to these concepts.

This is because:

* The person reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. This the person's perceived "reality".
* The person reacts as an organized whole to this experiential world.
* A portion of the experiential world gradually becomes differentiated as the self.

The structure of the self involves the concepts of who they are — where they believe are in society, who they are as a person, their core values and beliefs.

Notice that this involves the **perceived** reality, because what is perceived can be, to varying extents, very different to **actual** reality (See Johari Window for a cognitive psychology example of what I am referring to here)

Now the self has been formed, the person has one basic tendency and striving — to actualise, maintain and enhance themselves (See Maslow's concept on this).

Your behaviour can be seen to help or hinder self-actualisation, and the best vantage point for understanding your own behaviour is from your own internal frame of reference.

Behaviour, according to Rogers' theory of the self, is basically the goal-directed attempt of the person to satisfy their needs as experienced, in their experiential world.

Again, this is experiential world as opposed to the real world which potentially can be different.

Emotion accompanies, and in general facilitates, such goal directed behaviour. It is the kind of emotion related to the perceived significance of their behaviour for the maintenance and enhancement of their self.

The values attached to experiences, and the values that are a part of the self-structure, in some instances, are values experienced directly by the person, and in some instances are values introjected or taken over from others. The values can be perceived in a distorted fashion, as if they had been experienced directly.

As experiences occur in life, they are either:

* symbolised, perceived and organised into some relation to the self,
* denied symbolisation and ignored because there is no perceived relationship to the self structure,
* or given distorted symbolisation, because there is a perceived relationship to the self structure but experience is **inconsistent in some way with the structure of the self**.

Most thoughts and beliefs that are adopted by the person are those that are consistent with the experiential world; and, most of the ways of behaving that are adopted by the person are those that are consistent with the concept of self.

> What exact properties makes an experience "inconsistent" (to the self-structure)?

Your new attempt to define *inconsistent experience* is correct

> An experience is said to be inconsistent when the experience appears to demonstrate to the individual some values or qualities (of people, reality, themselves) that differs to what they have stored in their self-structure.

A shorter definition can be that an experience will be inconsistent when the experience does not agree with your self-structure.

Remember that your self-structure is built from your experiential world which can be different to the real world.

Your self-structure is built from past experiences, knowledge, values and/or beliefs.

If you are experiencing something which is different to your self-structure, the experience is inconsistent with your self-structure.

## Your requests for further clarification

> What are some good examples of inconsistent experiences (given a person's self concept)?

## One example from my work with the abused

A lot of men believe that they will never be attacked and raped, and if anyone was to try, they would be able to fight them off and prevent it.

Many of those who have been raped believe that because they could not fight them off, they must have "somehow" or "for some reason" allowed it to happen and therefore it is their fault.

> What are some examples of a person's self-structure in terms of how?

Your example is part of the story.

> An individual categorizes information from conversations and media in categories such as information on friends, on world events, on politics...

The self-structure is formed not just from conversations they have had and from the news and other media, but also from personal experiences.

Let's again use my example of these men who are now blaming themselves for being raped.

This is where the choice I mentioned in the short answer comes in. You can choose to ignore the inconsistencies and carry on believing your self-structure is correct, or you can stop and examine the inconsistencies and adjust your self-structure to suit.

These men examined the experience, interpreted the events and adjusted their self-structure accordingly.

Their previous self-structure contained the belief that they could prevent it, but **they now believe** that the inconsistent experience shows they couldn't.

Their attacker(s) managed to rape them even though the person "should have been able to prevent it and fight them off".

They chose to look at this experience and see it that they must have let them do it.

Their adjusted self-structure now contains the belief that if anyone was to try again, they will not be able to prevent it and, in fact, they may allow it to happen again.

Their self-structure has been severely compromised and maladjusted, to the point that they are now living with feelings of guilt and shame which is not theirs to bear.

> Do experiences also demonstrate inconsistency with how a person organizes themselves? If "inconsistency" refers to that aspect as well, what is a good example?

This is a very good question which therapy gives the answer.

In very simplified terms, the previous inconsistent experience within their **experiential world** and resulting adjustment would need to be examined in therapy in order for the **real world** interpretation (they did not willing allow it to happen and it is not their fault) to be taken as fact.

The reason for believing it is their fault will be examined by re-examining the events in a safe environment, and challenging how this belief was formed.

It is by challenging this altered belief that the maladjusted self-structure can be altered to be more accurate and helpful.

For a more in depth take on the theory of the self, Rogers (1951) is a recommended read.

### References

Rogers, C. (1951). *Client-centered therapy: Its current practice, implications and theory*. London: Constable. ISBN 978-1-84119-840-8.

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Tags: psychology, therapy, person-centered-therapy
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# Question
Title: Books on Statistics in R for behavioral data analysis
Are there any statistics books geared towards teaching behavioral data analysis especially in psycholinguistics?

# Answer
> 2 votes
Just to add a few other options that I consider relevant:

-Longitudinal Data Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences Using R

-Behavioral Research Data Analysis with R

-Methods for the Behavioral, Educational, and Social Sciences: An R package (an interesting paper).

# Answer
> 1 votes
There are lots of resources out there for learning R and many of the general ones are useful for people in psychology.

For example, see the R contributed documentation: https://cran.r-project.org/other-docs.html

I really like the Quick-R site: https://www.statmethods.net/

That said, in terms of psychology-specific resources, check out:

In terms of books that are psychology specific, here are a couple:

* *Learning Statistics with R*: https://learningstatisticswithr.com/ This book is available for free online thanks to Danielle Navarro's use of a CC-BY-SA licence.
* *Discovering Statistics Using R*. If you like Andy Field's accessible style, then you'll like this book.

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Tags: methodology, statistics, language
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# Question
Title: Freud defense mechanisms combinations with jung Anima/animus archetype
In correlation between carl jung for famous archetypes like the Self, the Persona, the Shadow and the Anima/Animus, and Freud defense mechanism, are done any tracking human sexual algorithms and its upgrading or downgrading?

For example in adult pornography behaviors and thus the reactions which downgrading or upgrading, could we classifying these in Freud's defense mechanism levels that change the user's Anxiety and stress, with. Combination this classification by looking into Jung anima and animus developments growing and downgrading levels?

If not is there any paper on discussion via internet, or ... and which discussed about correlation between those (Freud defence mechanism and Jung archetype. Anima/animus growing levels ?

***Update:***

i am looking somethings like this:

but in correlation about Freud defense mechanism with Jung, archetypes (specially anima and animus) also better for describing the levels of growing for example the growing levels of anima which is this kind :

Thanks for your attention to this hard question.

# Answer
> 2 votes
> is there any paper on discussion via internet, or ... and which discussed about correlation between those (Freud defence mechanism and Jung archetype. Anima/animus growing levels?

Elements of your question discusses 3 very different theories which do not correlate directly with each other.

Yes, Jung came up with the different levels of development for the anima and animus, but this is very different to Freud's Psychosexual Stages of Development which is briefly covered in your image.

Neither of these theories correlate with each other and neither correlate at all with Freud's Defense Mechanisms as they have nothing to do with development, although they can affect development.

There are many different theories of development which some are discussed in my answer at https://psychology.stackexchange.com/a/17211/7604. If all these theories are taken on board together, they can form an integrative theory of human development, but where some are similar, some differ greatly.

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Tags: jung, freud
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# Question
Title: Situation Awareness - what is it good for?
I was looking into Situation Awareness (SA), but have problems understanding its general use. I am aware of the work by Mica Endsley and a few others. This question is related, but I find the answer not satisfying.

My current understanding is this: if I know everything I need to know to achieve some goal, then I am situation-aware. In that case, I would need SA for *everything* I do. Is that correct?

More specifically: what does Situation Awareness allow me to do that I couldn't do without it?

# Answer
You said:

> My current understanding is this: if I know everything I need to know to achieve some goal, then I am situation-aware.

That is correct. Situation Awareness (SA) is described quite well in Wikipedia.

> **Situational awareness** or **situation awareness (SA)** is the perception of environmental elements and events with respect to time or space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their future status.
>
> Situation awareness has been recognized as a critical, yet often elusive, foundation for successful decision-making across a broad range of situations, including aviation, air traffic control, ship navigation, health care, emergency response, military command and control operations, and offshore oil and nuclear power plant management. Lacking or inadequate situation awareness has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error.

Basically, if you have situation awareness, you are aware of **every single possible aspect** involved in a situation and therefore you have a much better chance of predicting the future outcome of a given method of moving forward.

You also asked if you would need SA for **everything** you do and the answer is no, but ideally you would need at least some SA.

As Wikipedia points out in the link and quote above,

> Lacking or inadequate situation awareness has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error.

For an example, if you were to cut yourself deeply, and you were bleeding out, without any SA you would more than likely die. With some SA, you would know that you have a better chance of survival if you try to stem the flow of blood somehow, but how?

You may think that just putting your hand over it is enough, but if it is an arterial bleed, would it really be enough? If emergency medical assistance comes quickly enough, then maybe, but maybe not.

A tourniquet would stop the flow completely, but that can also cause issues but do you know that and what can you do to mitigate those issues (if at all).

Knowing all the possible methods and pitfalls of carrying out a task will provide the very best possible outcome; but if you really need to make a decision right there and then, you can always make an educated guess if you have some idea of how things can go.
> 1 votes

# Answer
> My current understanding is this: if I know everything I need to know to achieve some goal, then I am situation-aware. In that case, I would need SA for everything I do. Is that correct?

Not entirely. The original definition is much more specific and you seem to over-generalize here. One of the traditional cited papers for situation awareness (SA) seems to be by Endsley, M. R. (1995) (emphasis mine):

> SA is **an understanding of the state of the environment** (including relevant parameters of the system). It provides the **primary basis for subsequent decision making and performance in the operation of complex, dynamic systems**. SA is formally defined as a person's "perception of the elements of the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future" (Endsley, 1988, p. 97). At the lowest level of SA, a person needs to perceive relevant information (Level 1 SA). Integrating various pieces of data in conjunction with operator goals provides an understanding of the meaning of that information, forming Level 2 SA. Based on this understanding, future events and system states can be predicted (Level 3), allowing for timely and effective decision making.

Specifically, note that the definition is confined to the *"operation of complex, dynamic systems"*. Also note that what you describe implies Level 3 SA according to the previously mentioned definition. There is also no claim you need to know *everything*; situation awareness allows for *"timely and effective decision making"*.

<sub> Endsley, M. R. (1995). Measurement of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human factors, 37(1), 65-84. </sub>
> 1 votes

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Tags: situation-awareness
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# Question
Title: What can coma patients report about their experiences - if anything?
Coma is correlated to a significant inactivity of the cerebral cortex and the reticular activating system, while other parts of the brain - e.g. the limbic system - might still show considerable activity.

My question is:

> Are there cases where people recovered from a coma and could later plausibly report experiences they made during the coma?

What kind of experiences would they typically report - if any? And how fine-grained can descriptions of such experiences be?

Examples:

* "I felt that I were alive."
* "I felt horrible/relaxed."
* "I sometimes felt hungry."
* "I felt that my mother was there."
* "I somehow felt she touched me."
* "I somehow heard her say my name."

Most surely, elaborate thoughts and complex emotions can not be recalled and plausibly reported (because they could not take place).

> What would such reports tell us about the neural basis of consciousness?

Are there forms of recoverable coma where the cerebral cortex and/or the reticular activating system is completely mute, i.e. without any measurable coordinated neural activity?

Do other parts of the brain necessarily show no measurable coordinated neural activity when the cerebral cortex and/or the reticular activating system doesn't?

# Answer
The majority of people who recovered from coma did not report any experiences that occurred while they were in coma (clinically unresponsive, with absent or minimal brainstem reflexes, and with severely abnormal EEG). However, some people who had cardiac arrest or came very close to clinical death but were successfully revived reported later that they had conscious perceptual experiences during these critical periods, when they were in coma. This kind of experiences is called “near-death experience (NDE)” by Moody \[1\]. About 10% to 20% of such critical individuals reported near-death experiences (NDEs) \[2\]. NDEs include many experiences, such as seeing tunnel, light, and stars; out-of-body experiences; pleasant feelings; entering a door/gate, heaven, or hell; seeing deceased relatives, religious figures, or god; a life review; a conscious return into the body; etc. \[2-5\]

However, NDE is still an unsettled subject. Some believe that cumulated evidence so far shows that NDEs are real, that the mind and consciousness can exist without and outside the brain, and that the current understanding that the brain is the basis of consciousness and the mind is not correct \[6-10\].

Others believe that NDEs are neurophysiologic phenomena that occur while the brain is functioning in an abnormal state \[5,11\]. Evidence is that many mental phenomena that occur in NDEs can occur or be induced to occur in other non-coma, neurophysiologic states, such as sleep \[4\], meditation \[12\], simple partial seizures \[13\], certain drug-induced altered states of consciousness \[11,14\], and electrical stimulation and transcranial magnetic stimulation of the brain\[15\]. Interestingly, some investigators found that a surge of neurophysiological coherence and connectivity occurred within the first 30 sec after cardiac arrest and preceded isoelectric electroencephalogram in experimental rats \[16\]. Whether this also occurs in humans and is the basis of NDE occurrences or not needs further investigations.

The most crucial aspect of NDEs is whether the reported experiences occurred during coma/cardiac arrest or not. It is possible that those experiences occurred when the patients have recovered but were still in a confused or dream-like state and that the patients wrongly attributed the time of those experiences to when they were still in coma/had cardiac arrest; their reports were just sincere fallacy. However, this can be investigated in NDE experiencers who have out-of-body experiences and report seeing the scene and event when they are in coma/have cardiac arrest. If these NDE experiencers report (without the help from other people) the scene and events where and when they are in coma/have cardiac arrest correctly, it means their NDEs indeed occur during coma/cardiac arrest and, indeed, normal consciousness can exist without and outside a normally functioning brain – our understanding of the neural basis of consciousness has to be greatly revised from the root. AWARE \[17\] was the study that was designed to investigate this. Its results, however, were inconclusive. AWAREII \[18\] is a similar study that is expected to finish this year (2020). It is interesting to see how its results will come out.

So far, however, our present understanding of the neural basis of consciousness has been vindicated in clinical and experimental settings all around the world every day for a long time. It predicts that no conscious experiences, complex thoughts, or complex emotions can occur when one is in coma (clinically unresponsive, with absent or minimal brainstem reflexes, and with severely abnormal EEG), and no definite incidents of conscious experiences during coma have ever been reported.

**References.**

1. Moody, R. A. (1975). Life After Life. New York, NY: Bantam Press.
2. Kopel J. Near-death experiences in medicine. Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent). 2019 Jan;32(1):163-164. doi: 10.1080/08998280.2018.1542478.
3. Belanti J, Perera M, Jagadheesan K. Phenomenology of near-death experiences: A cross-cultural perspective. Transcult Psychiatry. 2008 Mar;45(1):121-33. doi: 10.1177/1363461507088001.
4. Charland-Verville V, Jourdan JP, Thonnard M, Ledoux D, Donneau AF, Quertemont E, et al. Near-death experiences in non-life-threatening events and coma of different etiologies. Front Hum Neurosci. 2014;8:203. doi: 10.3389/fnhum.2014.00203.
5. Nelson K. Near-death experiences: Neuroscience perspectives on near-death experiences. Mo Med. 2015 Mar-Apr;112(2): 92-96.
6. Alexander E. Near-death experiences, The mind-body debate & the nature of reality. Mo Med. 2015 Jan-Feb;112(1):17-21.
7. Greyson B. Getting comfortable with near death experiences: An overview of near-death experiences. Mo Med. 2013 Nov-Dec;110(6):475-481.
8. Hagan JC III. Near-death experiences: I hope you are comfortable with them by now! Mo Med. 2015 Mar-Apr;112(2): 88-91.
9. Long J. Near-death experiences evidence for their reality. Mo Med. 2014 Sep-Oct;111(5):372-380.
10. van Lommel P. Near-death experiences: The experience of the self as real and not as an illusion. Ann N Y Acad Sci. 2011 Oct;1234:19-28. doi: 10.1111/j.1749-6632.2011.06080.x.
11. Martial C, Cassol H, Charland-Verville V, Pallavicini C, Sanz C, Zamberlan F, et al. Neurochemical models of near-death experiences: A large-scale study based on the semantic similarity of written reports. Conscious Cogn. 2019 Mar;69:52-69. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2019.01.011.
12. Gordon WV, Shonin E, Dunn TJ, Sheffield D, Garcia-Campayo J, Griffiths MD. Meditation-induced near-death experiences: A 3-year longitudinal study. Mindfulness (N Y). 2018;9(6): 1794-1806. doi: 10.1007/s12671-018-0922-3.
13. Hoepner R, Labudda K, May TW, Schoendienst M, Woermann FG, Bien CG, et al. Ictal autoscopic phenomena and near death experiences: A study of five patients with ictal autoscopies. J Neurol. 2013 Mar;260(3):742-749. doi: 10.1007/s00415-012-6689-x.
14. Timmermann C, Roseman L, Williams L, Erritzoe D, Martial C, Cassol H, et al. DMT Models the Near-Death Experience. Front Psychol. 2018 Aug 15;9:1424. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01424.
15. Blanke O, Thut G. Chapter 26. Inducing Out-of-body Experience. In: oup–Tall Tales about Mind and Brain (Typeset by SPi, Delhi). 2006 Jul 12.
16. Borjigin J, Lee U, Liu T, Pal D, Huff S, Klarr D, et al. Surge of neurophysiological coherence and connectivity in the dying brain. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2013 Aug 27;110(35):14432-7. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1308285110. /
17. Parnia S, Spearpoint K, de Vos G, Fenwick P, Goldberg D, Yang J, et al. AWARE - AWAreness during REsuscitation-a prospective study. Resuscitation. 2014 Dec;85(12):1799-1805. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.resuscitation.2014.09.004.
18. AWARE II. NHS Health Research Authority.
> 3 votes

# Answer
From a German non-scientific magazine:

> Patients react very differently to the artificial coma. "Many of them have nightmares, but not everyone can remember them later," says Meermeier.

Put up for discussion here.
> 0 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, cognitive-neuroscience, consciousness, philosophy-of-mind, unconscious
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# Question
Title: What is the name for this form of "influence"?
I have found that people are often "roused to action," activism and even zealotry by attributing either extreme of "nobleness" or "despicability" to their self or group identity.

I don't know if there is a name for this phenomena. I'll give two examples to help pin this down.

## Attribution of Despicability

For example, Fred is an evangelical who has an axe to grind with Catholicism. Fred encounters an apathetic Catholic named Phil, who neither knows or cares anything about his alleged Catholic faith, and yet Fred proceeds to blast Phil verbally (under the appellation "you Catholics") for how despicable and anti-biblical their beliefs are.

Phil becomes very unsettled and defensive from this encounter, and subsequently chooses not just to learn his faith - but to defend it as well. Ironically Phil grows into a zealot for his Catholic faith due to Fred's negative outburst. It could be said that Phil has (subconsciously?) resolved to prove Fred wrong or *perhaps to attain a form of revenge*?

## Attribution of Nobleness

Jake, a young man, is an athletic but wayward soul. He encounters a decorated army veteran named Gabe who says "I've been watching you for several days now lad, and I can tell you that in you is a greatness that is meant to be released." The subsequent conversation inspires Jake to join the military and, indeed, Jake subsequently has a stellar military career that proves Gabe was right!

## Wrapping Up

I realize that not every dynamic has a specific name in psychology, but it troubles me that the overall phenomena I'm outlining isn't represented in public dialogue, particularly when it comes to politics. I believe the nation is becoming increasingly polarized and hostile because "attribution of despicability" is counter-productively generating the wrong kind of zealotry and thus ever-deepening unproductive contrasts.

* **"You leftists just want to destroy democracy"**. Well, the "leftist" did not have an opinion about democracy before the accusation, but due to the judgmental accusation...the leftist began to study and embrace arguments of why democracy is evil.
* **"You rightists just want to subjugate minorities"**. Well the "rightest" who had no particular sentiment before now adopts a passive-aggressive attitude about those who claim to support minorities and perhaps against minorities as well.

In short, both positive and negative accusation(s) have a catalytic or causal power. Seen this way, in the case of negative accusations which we use to judge and condemn, the reality is that "we have met the enemy, and it is ourselves."

I wouldn't be surprised if psychology has two names which treat both the "attribution of nobleness" and the "attribution of despicability" as two different things, even though I see them as flip-sides of the same coin.

Any ideas?

## Update

Until I learn more about this, and understand it better, I'm going to call the overall phenomenon "Manifest Testimony"...intentionally echoing the phonetics of the otherwise unrelated "Manifest Destiny."

# Answer
I have some ideas about your first example. During my course of social psychology a learned about self/social categorization, two concepts that shape how individuals perceive groups. Here are some quick definitions.

**Self categorization**:

> the process of seeing oneself as a member of a social group (Smith, Mackie & Claypool, 2014)

**Social categorization**:

> The perceptual classification of people, including the self, into categories (Forsyth, 2014).

According to self and social categorization people automatically view themselves as part of a group and others as part of a group also. I think Phil in your example still views himself as part of the group "catholics" (even though he does not know much about it) and Fred as part of the group "Evangelics". After that there are quite a view phenomenons that suggest people care about their beliefs and about their group status. One good example in this context is the **ingroup-outgroup bias**:

> The tendency to view the in-group, its members, and its products more positively than other groups, their members, and their products. Ingroup favoritism is more common than outgroup rejection (Forsyth, 2014). So, Phil might realize that he is part of the group "catholics" and subsequently becomes more defensive.

Also it could be possible that Phil experiences some form of **cognitive dissonance** (an adverse psychological state that occurs when an individual simultaneously holds two conflicting cognitions (Forsyth, 2014)), because he claims he is part of the catholic group but is blatantly confronted that he barely knows anything about his group. This might lead to the attitude change you suggest, that he wants to learn more about catholicism.

Of course this is more a description of how processes in groups can work and how people influence each other based on these processes. It is in no way a description of a scientifically backed up process/theory, although the terms used in my description are of course backed by science.

As for the second example, I personally believe there could be a lot of factors that lead to Jake's decision of joining the army. I think it would be hard to pin it down on the few words of the army veteran.

However, I am not an expert on social psychology. So I hope this information helps understanding social processes but it might not be a complete and conclusive answer. If you are interested in social psychology and group dynamics then I recommend to check out Forsyth's book *Group dynamics*. It explains concepts wihtin the field very well and uses informative examples. Hope this helps in some way.

# References

Forsyth, D.R. (2014). Group dynamics (6th ed.). Belmont, CA: Cengage Learning. ISBN- 13 9781133956532

Smith, E.R., Mackie, D.M., & Claypool, H.M. (2014). Social Psychology (4th ed.). New York, NY: Psychology Press. ISBN 978-1-84872-894-3
> 1 votes

# Answer
The fact that positively-reinforcing is causing a self-fulfilling prophecy, the second one seems like the observer-expectancy/Rosenthal/Pygmalion effect to me. There could be a more particular form of it but generally, I think it fits the scenario.

The name comes from the famous Rosenthal-Jacobson study:

Rosenthal, Robert; Jacobson, Lenore (1992). Pygmalion in the classroom : teacher expectation and pupils' intellectual development

Wikipedia: Pygmalion/Rosenthal Effect
> 0 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, terminology, bias
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# Question
Title: How effective is lying down with eyes closed as a substitute for sleep?
Resting, as opposed to sleeping, helps with physical recovery and relaxation, but much of the benefit of real sleep is mental.

If I can't sleep, how much, if any, sleep-related benefit is gained by lying down for 6 hours with my eyes closed?

# Answer
> 1 votes
I believe the important⁽¹⁾ point is paradoxical sleep. If you cannot sleep, you should try to defocus your thought, in order to allow neurones to "run freely"⁽²⁾.

(1) It has be shown that rats deprived of paradoxical sleep died in 16-54 day.

(2) I don't know if this will work, but I've been taught at university that neurons can die from sub or over stimulation. For this reason I've come to the conclusion that one of the objectives of dreaming is to allow neurons to fire action potentials in regards with their own physiological needs, instead of coordinated thoughts needs of the brain.

# Answer
> -1 votes
If you lie down under certain circumstances (for 6 hours, eyes closed, comfy, in a quiet place and several hours after the last real sleep), I doubt you will stay awake the whole time.

First, there's is microsleep. Indeed, even if you were driving or in any other dangerous situation, your brain would manage to enter sleep mode for some seconds. So, these microsleep periods will happen and contribute to your rest.

Second, if an insomniac does that, there's a good chance that they are misjudging the amount of sleep they get. They might be entering several periods of low quality sleep, but won't be aware of it.

Third, the amount of sleep you need varies when exposed to stress, stimulus, new activities and so on during the day. Spending 6 hours in a low stress environment will reduce the amount needed.

In summary, it's better than nothing, but if it came close to real sleep, some people would manage to live with 6 hours of resting with closed eyes instead of sleeping.

# Answer
> -1 votes
Lying down for 6 hours with your eyes closed and not claiming that you have slept, you are very likely in Stage 1 of the sleep cycle. This is a restful state that transits from wakefulness to sleep \[1\].

How effective? Much less effective than if you would fall into further stages of sleep because it is called sleep restriction, which impairs daily functioning \[2\].

\[1\] Stages of Sleep - Non-REM and REM Sleep Cycles. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.tuck.com/stages/ \[2\]Van Dongen HP, Maislin G, Mullington JM, Dinges DF Sleep. 2003 Mar 15; 26(2):117-26.

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Tags: sleep
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title: Mean brainwave amplitude

text:
# Question
Title: Mean brainwave amplitude
When measuring nocturnal sleep for a person that has narcolepsy using an EEG a distinctive lack or reduction of slow wave sleep activity is indicated. Slow wave sleep brainwaves are the brainwaves with the highest amplitude. Given a 24 hour day, can I infer that the brain of a narcoleptic general operates at a lower mean amplitude than a “normal” brain?

# Answer
I would not recommend phrasing it that way.

> the brain of a narcoleptic generally operates at a lower mean amplitude than a “normal” brain

is very misleading and imprecise, because it suggests the amplitude is lower overall, which it may not be, whereas

> a distinctive lack or reduction of slow wave activity

is precise and clear: it is talking about a specific type of brain activity at a particular time of day.

Additionally, the second statement implies nothing about the rest of the day. It could be that there is an increase in slow oscillations during other parts of the day that offsets the change at night, for example. Additionally, it is not typical to talk about "mean amplitude" over a 24 hour period. There is simply no good reason to rephrase it the way you are suggesting.
> 1 votes

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Tags: sleep, brain-waves
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# Question
Title: Death caused by "Failure to Thrive" (FTT)
This question, whilst to a degree can be seen as "common sense" in some respects, has puzzled me in other ways.

Looking at the situations where *Failure to Thrive* (FTT) can cause death, even the Wikipedia article for it mentions mental issues as an endogenous cause, while there can also be one or more of both endogenous and exogenous causes.

I am intrigued by the mental issues for FTT deaths. What kind of mental issues, other than the obvious such as anorexia, can cause death due to FTT.

I am particularly interested in the cases where babies die due to FTT even though they have been fed, such as in orphanages.

Looking at a situation in Romania, I remember news reports during the dictatorship of Nicolae Ceaușescu, where there were large numbers of young children under 5 dying in orphanages due to FTT. I cannot find any reference to this online, however there is an APA report (Weir, 2014) which mentions institutional neglect causing developmental delays.

As well as developmental delays, can neglect through lack of emotional care be the cause of death through FTT? If so, how does the death occur even if nutritional needs are met?

## References

Weir, K. (2014). The lasting impact of neglect. *Monitor on Psychology 45*(6), 36. Retrieved from: https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/06/neglect

# Answer
The reason for failure to thrive other than insufficient nutrition, can be suppressed growth hormone secretion due to emotional neglect. In the following example, both the emotional neglect and insufficient nutrition were combined, though:

Psychosocially stunted growth masked as growth hormone deficiency, (Klinische Pediatrie, 1999):

> Short stature is a common reason for presenting a child to the pediatrician. **Emotional deprivation may cause short stature and may simulate growth hormone deficiency.** Diagnosis of emotional deprivation as the cause of growth retardation is difficult and misdiagnosed frequently despite of suspicious clinical signs. We report on 2 patients with growth retardation because of emotional deprivation. At the age of 5 years both children had a severe growth hormone deficiency. They received therapy with growth hormone and showed an increase of growth velocity to \> or = 8 cm in the first year of treatment. But in the third year of treatment both patients showed a diminished response to the growth hormone therapy. During the period of observation the features of emotional deprivation became obvious through the extreme behavioural abnormalities. Both children showed disturbances in their social behaviour, and striking disorders concerning eating and digestion. The families of these children had severe social problems; alcoholism, low income and rejection of the child were risk factors. **Removal from the current environment led to a characteristic increase of the growth velocity. Growth hormone deficiency was spontaneously reversible, so that treatment with growth hormone was terminated.** The social environment and the psychical prosperity are essential growth factors in childhood and adolescence. The common features and risk factors of emotional deprivation are described. **Spontaneous catch-up growth after removal from the current environment distinguishes this form of short stature from the other organic growth disorders.**

Hopkins Medicine says that:

> Other factors that may lead to failure to thrive:
>
> * Emotional deprivation as a result of parental withdrawal, rejection or hostility

and

> Problems with the endocrine system, such as thyroid hormone deficiency, growth hormone deficiency or other hormone deficiencies...

...some of which might be triggered by emotional neglect despite proper nutrition:

Failure to grow: lack of food or lack of love? (Professional Care of Mother and Child, 1994):

> One of the most important criteria for good health in childhood is normal growth. Taking regular accurate measurements of length and plotting them on a centile chart is essential to spot early signs of growth disorders. Be alert for a "zig-zag" pattern on the chart: it could indicate **psychosocial dwarfism** (see opposite). Length is more important than weight for identifying growth disorders. **Lack of love, or an adverse emotional or social environment, can cause growth failure even in a child who is eating enough.** Such children have a condition called psychosocial dwarfism, which is due to **hypopituitarism (too little growth hormone secretion from the pituitary gland). This condition does not respond to growth hormone treatment. Once the child is placed in an alternative environment, eg a good foster home, the hypopituitarism is reversed and rapid "catch-up" growth takes place.** It often emerges that such children have been physically, emotionally or sexually abused.

I'm not aware of any case in which psychological reasons alone in a properly fed child would result in death associated with failure to thrive. When it comes to failure to thrive in certain orphanges, I would not ascribe it solely to psychological reasons...
> 4 votes

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Tags: social-psychology, developmental-psychology, brain-development, cognitive-development
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# Question
Title: Which characteristics of neural activity patterns underlie conscious experience?
Which specific characteristics of neural activity patterns are unique for the cortex and neocortex as the presumed "seat of consciousness" and can only be observed there? Activity patterns having these characteristics would be candidates for "neural correlates of consciousness" and so to speak are responsible for or underlie conscious experience. Furthermore, it would be "explained" why neural activity in other parts of the brain don't (directly) affect conscious experience.

I especially wonder on which level of description and observation and on which spatio-temporal scales these activity patterns (and their characteristics) would be found. It could be

* on a subneuronal level
* on the level of single neurons
* on the level of small groups of neurons, e.g. cortical columns
* on a voxel level
* on a ROI level

With "characteristic" I mean something like

* "reentrant signaling states in some specific forms" source
* some forms of synchrony, resonance, or general structuredness

but it would have to be defined in a specific way such that it is unique and characteristic for the cortex and would not be found in other areas of the brain.

Are there at least some preliminary and not too abstract answers around? Known neural-based explanations of consciousness I am aware of (and that are summarized for example here or here) don't give explicit answers to my question but often remain rather abstract and often don't explicitly argue that the processes they describe only do and can occur in the cortex - let alone what is "really characteristic" for them as spatio-temporal processes.

If experts here would say that this question in this form is unanswerable or otherwise ill-posed it would be great to know. Thanks a lot in advance.

# Answer
As discussed previously in this thread, information (specifically, information that exists in the neural circuits), is probably the physical quantity that correlates perfectly with consciousness and, I would like to add, qualia. This is because information can have the same complexity, dynamicity, and content as consciousness and qualia do.

Now, what is the specific neural activity that is or contains information among neural circuits. When a neural circuit is functioning, there are many activities going on in and around that neural circuit: signal processing activities, metabolic activities, structural maintaining (of membranes, organelles, cytoskeletons, etc.) activities, circuit modifying (of synapses, dendrites, axons) activities, changes in supplying blood circulation, oxygen, and other blood constituents, changes in its physical constitutions (temperature, mass, entropy, etc.), etc. But the only activity that has the complexity, dynamicity, content containing capacity as the information does is the signal processing activity. Moreover, it’s the only activity that can communicate locally and extensively with its counterparts in other neural circuits.

So, from current evidence, it is to be concluded that neural processing activities, with its correct spatio-temproal and other profiles, underly the brain’s information-related functions, including consciousness and qualia. Clinical and experimental evidence strongly supports this concept. Anything (such as a certain disease or drug, brain electrical stimulation, or transcranial magnetic stimulation) that mainly affects neural transmissions and significantly interferes with the signal processing activities but does not significantly interfere with other activities significantly interferes the brain’s information-related functions, such as consciousness and qualia. Moreover, the change that occurs in the signal processing activity and that in the brain’s information-related functions (such as consciousness and qualia) occur **simultaneously!** For more detailed discussion about this matter, please read ref 1 and ref 2.

Now, why do some signal processing activities have qualia or consciousness, why some don’t? There are different explanations for this from some existing theories. The Integrated Information Theory \[IIT\]\[3-6\] asserts that a conscious experience is a maximally irreducible conceptual structure (MICS), which corresponds to **a local maximum of integrated conceptual information** (or a local maximum of Φ or Φmax) and provides mathematical formulations to calculate Φ. So, according to this theory, for any signal processing activity to be conscious, it **must be complex in a certain way enough for its Φ to reach Φmax there**. For example, from its calculations, there is no consciousness during sleeps, generalized seizures, or in the cerebellum – which are all true – even if, in the last two examples, active and complex processing activities are going on. It also calculates that processing activities in computers or robots, no matter how complex, can’t become conscious because they function from fixed software, which isn’t really complex in the IIT way.

According to The Basic Theory of the Mind \[1,2\], not all signal processing activities can be qualia or consciousness. To be qualia or consciousness, the signals from signal processing activities not only **must be accessible by the consciousness neural process** but also **must be in some specific forms that mean qualia or mean consciousness in the nervous system language**, that is, the signals must be in some specific forms that, when processed by neural circuits in the nervous system, will be interpreted to be qualia or consciousness. The theory called this kind of signals “Special signaling pattern” and “Special signaling state”. This is like why all words, except the word is this specific form “consciousness”, do not mean consciousness in English. However, although the theory gives some preliminary characteristics of these special signaling forms, it admits that the complete characteristics of these special signaling forms are not known at present but predicts that these specific forms exist and can be found by investigations.

According to the Adaptive Resonance Theory (ART)\[7,8\], “**all conscious states are resonant states, but not all resonant states are conscious states**”. The resonance states **must be accessible to consciousness to be conscious**. “Indeed, some resonant states, such as the storage of a sequence of events in working memory before rehearsal occurs, or the entorhinal–hippocampal resonances that may dynamically stabilize the learning of entorhinal grid cells and hippocampal place cells, are not accessible to consciousness.” So, they are not conscious. Also, the resonance states **must be in some forms to be conscious – they must involve the processes of learning, expectation, and attention**. For example, “What sort of resonance supports a conscious percept of surface brightness or color? As noted above, I have predicted that such a consciously visible percept is supported by a surface shroud resonance between visual cortical areas and the parietal cortex that is predicted to play a role in learning invariant object categories (Section17).This prediction illustrates how ART clarifies mechanistic relationships between the CLEARS processes of **c**onsciousness, **l**earning, **e**xpectation, **a**ttention, **r**esonance, and **s**ynchrony.”

I think these are some preliminary answers that I can gather from some existing theories. They are certainly not the widely-accepted, standard answers. And there are other theories that I’m not familiar with, such as ref 9-11, which may have the answers you’re looking for. So, if you are intereseted and have time, please examine them.

**References:**

1. Ukachoke C. Chapter 5 – Theorem IV: A Quale is a Special Kind of Signaling Pattern In: The Basic Theory of the Mind. 1st ed. Bangkok, Thailand; Charansanitwong Printing Co. 2018.
2. Ukachoke C. Chapter 6 – Theorem V: Consciousness is a Special Kind of Reentrant Signaling State In: The Basic Theory of the Mind. 1st ed. Bangkok, Thailand; Charansanitwong Printing Co. 2018.
3. Tononi G. An information integration theory of consciousness. BMC Neurosci 2004,5:42. DOI: 10.1186/1471-2202-5-42.
4. Tononi G. Integrated information theory of consciousness: An updated account. Arch Ital Biol. 2012 Jun-Sep;150(2-3):56-90. DOI: 10.4449/aib.v149i5.1388.
5. Oizumi M, Albantakis L, Tononi G. From the phenomenology to the mechanisms of consciousness: Integrated Information Theory 3.0. PLoS Comput Biol. 2014 May;10(5):e1003588. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003588.
6. Tononi G, Koch C. Consciousness: Here, there and everywhere? Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2015 May 19;370(1668):20140167. DOI: 10.1098/rstb.2014.0167.
7. Grossberg S. Adaptive Resonance Theory: How a brain learns to consciously attend, learn, and recognize a changing world. Neural Netw. 2013 Jan;37:1-47. DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2012.09.017.
8. Grossberg S. Towards solving the hard problem of consciousness: The varieties of brain resonances and the conscious experiences that they support. Neural Netw. 2017 Mar;87:38-95. DOI: 10.1016/j.neunet.2016.11.003.
9. McFadden J. The CEMI Field. Theory gestalt information and the meaning of meaning. J Conscious Stud. 2013;20(3-4):3-4.
10. Sevush S. Single-neuron Theory of Consciousness. Journal of Theoretical Biology. 2005.
11. Hameroff S, Penrose R. Consciousness in the universe: A review of the 'Orch OR' theory. Phys Life Rev. 2014 Mar;11(1):39-78. doi: 10.1016/j.plrev.2013.08.002.
> 1 votes

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Tags: neuroscience, consciousness, neuroimaging
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# Question
Title: List of research paper meta information sites
Note: So-called "big-list" questions are occasionally tolerated here; I'm hoping this one will pass muster.

I'm looking to compile a list of existing post-publication meta-sites. These would be sites that list research papers (as does any online publication), but instead of just linking to content, they list meta information about the articles.

Most online publications (eg, PsychNET) and search engines (eg, Google Scholar) already list a variety of common meta-information, such as: Abstract, authors, journal, date of publication, citations, etc. I'm not interested in meta-information already provided by authors upon submission, unless that information is listed on the site in a normalized, searchable format (eg, with a query API).

Rather, I'm looking for meta-information that requires analysis (typically involving human intervention) to compile. Examples might be: The list of experiments, the "n" of each experiment, the results and significance (p-values), the type of each experiment (RCT, blindness, population study, pre-registered, etc), research field search tags, responses and replications, meta-analyses that the paper is included in...

Examples that I'm aware of to get this list started:

* ShortScience.org: Lists layman abstracts for AI papers.
* scite\_: Check if papers have been supported or contradicted.

What else is out there?

# Answer
> 1 votes
Very interesting question! I would mention https://www.semanticscholar.org/, they do something similar to scite. They classify citations into e.g. "Cites Results" or "Cites Background", they describe their method in this paper.

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Tags: reference-request, experiment-design, meta-analysis, publication, replication
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