The question then becomes, of course, well, what restrictions on rights do we place? How can we justify restricting some and not others? The answer, I think, must surely lie in the nature of the penalty. We lock people up so that they are no longer a danger to others for a certain period of time and also themselves. We also have the opportunity to rehabilitate them and so on. So what, then, is the justification, for restricting the ability of such a person to vote? The answer is surely that with, almost invariably, multiple offences against the criminal law, law to which they have to have offended at least to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt, with the onus being on the other side to have proved it and so on, we don't lock people up lightly—that's the short point. To have reached a point where, on average, a person who is incarcerated, perhaps incarcerated for three years—I forget the detail, but in any case, an average of 24 convictions before a person has got to the point of losing their right to vote shows that the social contract has readily enough been torn up by that person. Why it should be a matter of logic for the other side to say that they should be allowed to continue to participate in a process which they've already withdrawn from, to their own benefit, seems to me entirely baffling.