The fifth thing, and this was an element of much discussion at the committee of the whole House, here on this floor, is changes to the capital structure of the Reserve Bank. We have ended up with, in my view, a very unsophisticated approach in this bill, and the case in point is that the Reserve Bank has been out buying billions of dollars' worth of Treasury stock, Government stock, from the market. And the only reason that the Reserve Bank Governor went to Mr Robertson, as the finance Minister, was that he thought it would be advisable—he had absolutely no requirement to—to go to the Minister of Finance and seek an indemnity. And, because he did that, that gave Mr Robertson the opportunity to put some parameters around the nature of that spending. Now, if he hadn't gone to him, there would have been no ability for the Minister of Finance to put in place some controls around the Crown balance sheet. We said that there should be a much more sophisticated approach. We actually provided the wording from the Bank of England, and there's another example from the Canadian central bank that we provided to the Minister, that they recognise that things like derivatives, contingent liabilities, should be able to be captured, but, unfortunately Mr Robertson showed, on the floor at the committee of the whole House, he does not understand this. This bill is deficient in that regard.