CHRIS PENK (National—Kaipara ki Mahurangi): Thank you, Mr Chair. I just want to pick up within Part 2 some points around this notion of independence. The Minister's covered that from her perspective in terms of the value of independence. We can acknowledge that lack of interference might seem on the face of it a good thing—I'm not here to argue against that—but I do just want to test the Minister on how she would explain the balancing exercise whereby independence in some sense is the reverse of accountability. So if we look, for example, at new clause 16A—as proposed within the Government Supplementary Order Paper (SOP) that relates at the moment to Part 2—Duty to act independently. So there at the second part of that, we see that "A Minister of the Crown must not direct the Monitor to stop carrying out an activity, or prevent the Monitor from carrying out an activity, that the Monitor considers is necessary to enable them to perform or exercise their functions, duties, or powers under this Act." So it seems to me—and I'd be grateful if the Minister can explain perhaps that I've misunderstood—that if there's not ministerial accountability and if in fact that's precisely precluded from the operation of the monitor and we don't have an oversight in a ministerial sense, then to what extent can we say that we have a system that's accountable ultimately in a political way? So, it's a genuine question, just how those two things can be reconciled, and it might be that it's somewhere else within the bill. I'd be happy to be pointed to that if there's some sort of safety mechanism there. 