I'd like to talk about a number of those matters because they all add up to a scenario which is not shared by the submitters. Those are the submitters who will be bidding for millions and millions of units which they must secure in order to then fulfil their obligations under the emissions trading scheme. They want the emissions trading scheme to succeed, and the reason they want it to succeed is because, if it doesn't, they fear—and this is a genuine fear—that the Government will simply move to policy mechanisms to direct interventions in the market. They doubt whether this Government actually believes in markets. They're not entirely confident that this Government wants a market place solution to succeed. So perhaps if an auction did fail and then businesses were scrambling to secure units from the secondary market, there were price spikes and then commentary around that in the media and in markets, then that could be a legitimate justification for the Government to say, "Look, markets don't work." But, again, any market that has a floor, a ceiling, and a confidential reserve price—which is what we're here to discuss at this stage of the committee—is already if not rigged then extremely tightly controlled by those running the market.