Now, we work in this House as a democracy, and so—in this case, at least—did the Supreme Court. They were 3:2 in favour of allowing the appeal. They were 2:1:1 on the matter of whether the individual, the appellant, should have been given relief from a registration order. So I reconcile the apparent constitutional conundrum, where this House is being asked to consider the deletion of this clause, by applying the same democratic process that the Justices did. We have a choice now to determine whether or not, on the balance of our view of this case, a registration order should be made. As I said in my first reading speech, the idea of us passing legislation effectively expunging, potentially, part of the registration order—the Supreme Court has, effectively, done that. If indeed that's the case, then this is a clause that isn't necessary. But, actually, I think when one looks at the legislation and the offending and asks oneself whether or not this was a case that members of Parliament foresaw would have qualified for a registration order, I think the answer is yes.