But what it does create is an inconsistency in terms of the basic principles of criminal accountability. It doubles the maximum penalty for one type of assault—injuring with intent to injure—but not for other assault offences. That leaves a huge inconsistency in terms of the law, because offences not only need to be proportionate to the crime—and this is just in response to my colleague Mark Mitchell from across the floor, who wanted a further explanation to this. So it is not just that the sentence needs to be proportionate to the crime, crimes also need to be considered across the board so that there is consistency between life offences. So doubling an offence like this because of the nature of the victim would be extremely unusual in terms of criminal principles. It wouldn't be unusual for it to be an aggravating factor, which it currently is, but it would in terms of doubling the offence. So in terms of the inappropriate outcome in this respect, injuring a first responder or a prison officer with an intent to injure would be considered twice as bad in terms of penalties. So that is the hierarchy in comparison. That doesn't sit right in terms of criminal principles.