The other change which seems to have caused the most concern is the restrictions on evidence about the complainant's sexual history with the defendant. Currently, this evidence can be admitted on the usual standard. Under the bill, evidence about the details of that sexual history could still be admitted but only if it is so directly relevant that excluding it would be contrary to the interests of justice. The judge will usually make that decision before the trial, which gives the complainant some warning about questioning that can be particularly difficult and what to expect. Again, despite similar laws existing in most comparable jurisdictions, some remain concerned about those same fundamental criminal justice rights. It has been argued that the new restrictions will mean that juries will be deprived of hearing crucial evidence, but, as the bill permits clearly, if the evidence is crucial, it will be admitted. We've always trusted judges to determine the value of proposed evidence to the usual standard and to this higher standard, which already applies to evidence of other parts of the complainant's sex life. In any particular case, there might be some really important context and history, and, in those cases, the evidence will be admissible, but if the evidence can be presented without considering if it is actually relevant, we risk reinforcing those outdated ideas of continuing consent that we supposedly moved on from when we outlawed marital rape in 1985.