In relation to clause 54, my interpretation of that clause differs from the member who's resumed her seat. When it says, "An officer must not agree to the society incurring an obligation unless the officer believes … on reasonable grounds that the society will be able to perform the obligation", I relay to the House—and I'll do it as anonymously as I can because I did know the person involved—that I witnessed a lived example of a member of a sport club who was on the committee and whose club was involved in a reasonably serious seasonal competition in their chosen code, and so frustrated were they after several summers—I give no hint of what the code is—of the performance of their lead team that this person, a committee member, went to the United Kingdom and spoke to a professional in this particular code and invited that professional to spend a summer or two in New Zealand, and clearly made some other promises, because what the committee later found, exercising its collective role in meeting, was that they are up for a range of obligations to support this professional person to do this. The person who, effectively, incurred those obligations had no authority to do so, and it seems to me that that is the mischief that clause 54 is trying to get to, and, again, I think that that is an appropriate signal to send in a modern incorporated society's statutory framework.