So the idea that we are strengthening the Reserve Bank by removing the authority of the governor and placing that authority of an appointed board—a board appointed by the Government; a board appointed by the Minister—is somehow protecting, preserving, and enhancing the independence of the governor. Now, I think there are a number of little changes in here that the Finance and Expenditure Committee has sort of worked on, but, I think, underlying it all, they must themselves have wondered whether or not the purpose of the bill was truly to do that: provide for the enhanced independence of the governor. It's not evident that the governor having to go to his board and go through the board process, where the great and good who are appointed by the Government of the day—in this case Minister Robertson—will tell him whether or not they are on the right track—that's not an enhanced independence; that is enhanced oversight from the Government of the day, nothing surer than that. 