If you want another example of that, we had the Commerce Commission's blocking of the StuffMe merger. The knowledge that the commission assumed—it assumed it knew whether or not either of the existing entities would survive or whether the merged entity could survive; nobody knew that. Nobody envisaged the developments that have subsequently taken place. If you'd bought into NZME around the end of the lockdown last year, you would have made a lot of money because, actually, NZME have done very well, but I couldn't have predicted that. I wish I had—I might be richer not standing here. But the point is that when you look at interventions the commission's made, often it's intervened in markets where things change very rapidly, they don't have a lot of power to anticipate what developments will happen in the future, and, therefore, the assumptions behind their findings often turn out to be false before they are delivered or before their reports are delivered, and their ability to actually improve competition or improve overall welfare is much more modest than those in the commission who lobby the Ministers to bring legislation to this House to get more power will concede. 