You know, I don't know how many people have ever drafted or litigated an energy contract in this House. We hear from the other side, many times, that we don't know what we're doing, we don't know what we're talking about, but you know what? I've actually done a bit of work in this area, and the fact of the matter is—[Multiple interjections] Yeah, I know, how about that! There they are over the other side of the House pretending they know all about business and none of them have even seen an energy contract. Well, bonds and indemnities—we heard all this pooh-poohing about bonds and indemnities; they are fundamental to these arrangements. These arrangements last 20, 30, and 50 years sometimes, and the idea of a chain of liability—because the main evil we're trying to attack here is the difficulty when people sell an asset to a less robust company, a company that doesn't have the financial strength of the original licence holder. And that can happen down a chain across the life of a mine or of a well—it can happen many times: every five or 10 or 12 years. Now, what we don't want to see is the weakest party being held holding the baby, a well with huge decommissioning costs, when all of a sudden, as we saw in the Tamarind situation, they go broke and they run for cover and the taxpayer bears the burden, whereas there's people who have been extracting minerals for profit over a long period of time who get away with paying nothing. You know what? That's not fair. We won't have it.