But this was of immense emotional importance, as I recall. This was—I remember Ms Upston saying, I remember the submitters saying that once you hear "not guilty", you don't hear anything else. You don't take in insanity, you don't take in the explanations. So our challenge was to craft a verdict which made it both clear to the justice system that we did not consider this person could be convicted of a crime, but also to the victim that we recognise that something was done to them and it was this person who did it. So we had to balance that. We had to balance the validation of that experience—"Yes, this person did this thing to you."—with the criminal law's inability to, I guess, bring that reality home to the person because they don't fit the definition, they don't fit our system. So what we did was to say the act is proven, the actus reus has occurred, but the person is not criminally responsible on account of insanity. Meaning, as we saw it, I think, insanity has rendered them—the mens rea element has gone so they are not criminally responsible, but they still did it, they just don't have the mens rea. Therefore, that is where we came to.