But the point I want to make is that this attack occurs in the context of a long period of under-investment in district health board information technology. Let me tell you a little bit about my experience as a consultant physician in the DHB system. On a regular day, I could interact with at least 20 information systems. There was the emergency department system that contains the patient's triage data; the x-ray system, where we would look up x-rays; the clinical information system that might contain the clinical notes, sometimes—they're often also on paper—as well as investigation results. That system had patchy linkage to primary care data, so it was hard to know, if your patient was too unwell to tell you what medicines they were on, what their general practitioner had prescribed them, which creates a risk, obviously, in terms of safe prescriptions of medicines. We had no system for electronic ordering within the hospital, and a patchy one for outpatients. Vital signs were measured by electronic monitoring systems, but this was not captured in any sort of data system that might, for example, allow us to identify deteriorating patients early. That's not to mention the hundreds of bespoke systems that clinicians set up in order to get particular parts of their work done—for example, the systems to make sure that kidney patients were monitored adequately, or the type of system described by Dr Reti earlier for calculating chemotherapy doses. In other words, after decades of under-investment, we have a patchwork of IT systems in the health system that are, in many cases, old, and as a result of under-investment they can cease to be serviced, in some cases, by their provider, which does create a cyber-security risk.