So that's what we invented back in 2002, but when we brought it in today, when we were looking for it, and Ms Upston will remember—when we were looking at this quite vital part of the rights of personhood of a victim in this context, because that's what it is, it's not just about the usefulness of the statement, because that is the cloak we've kind of put over it, but really; it's an assertion of the rights of personhood of the victim. It was difficult to find where we would put it, because the excuse for getting a victim in to give a statement normally is that it's going to be useful to the sentencing process. We don't have a sentencing process here. We had no room to play with. We had to, essentially, invent an option that the victim would be there at the disposition hearing when the decision is made that the person be committed for treatment. And that in itself has always seemed to me really quite significant and a bold move by the member in writing this bill. It recognised that final piece of the puzzle or that—it's not the final piece of the puzzle; the middle piece of the puzzle, which is allowing them the right to stand and have their say in a courtroom that they otherwise do not have, pretty much unmediated provided they stayed within those bounds of civility. I would like the member to discuss why that was important to her from the beginning and to people who were the victims who came to her for representation in this matter.