The kind of board arrangements we're talking about are familiar in the sense that it looks like a Crown entity board but it is one that, obviously, has some differences to it. One of those differences—and it was the subject of discussion at the select committee—is around the membership of the governor of that board, and it is a pretty unique set of circumstances for a Reserve Bank Governor, or a central bank governor, and therefore that is reflected by the fact that they are actually a member of the board. This is, again, not unheard of, or not uncommon, in terms of other central banks around the world, to have the governor as a member of that governing board. I personally don't think the way we run monetary policy, the way we run financial policy in New Zealand, would work if the governor was not a member of the board, but, correctly, the committee analysed this idea quite closely and came up with some provisions that support how the governor can fulfil that role.