16. 特别报告员会见了许多政府官员，这些官员声称他们开展的旨在防止和打击暴力极端主义的方案行之有效。当他们被要求提供证据、方法和评估办法时，很快就发现，对这类方案和做法很少或根本不存在有力的监测和评价，27 这些方案的实地影响评估存在切实缺陷。联合国支助的旨在防止和打击暴力极端主义的项目也存在同样缺陷，这至少意味着存在系统性地不遵守联合国尽职调查政策的行为。正如一个人道主义非政府组织指出：“发展干预措施是否真的减少了暴力极端主义，充其量未经证实。很少有证据能够证明有意识的[打击暴力极端主义]办法成功减少了极端主义。但这并不妨碍某些干预措施的可能效果被夸大，尤其是在教育部门。”28 事实上，特别报告员发现，尽管扩大了对暴力极端主义驱动因
16. The Special Rapporteur has met with many government officials who claim that their programmes aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism work. When they are pressed for evidence, methodology and assessment methods, it quickly becomes clear that there is little or no robust monitoring and evaluation of such programmes and practices,27 leaving a real gap in assessment of their impact on the ground. The same lacuna is true for projects supported by the United Nations aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, which implies, at a minimum, a systematic lack of adherence to the United Nations due diligence policy. As one humanitarian non-governmental organization noted: “whether development interventions actually reduce violent extremism is at best unproven. Evidence that conscious [countering violent extremism] approaches have successfully reduced extremism is scarce. This does not prevent exaggerated claims being made as to the likely efficacy of particular interventions, especially in the education sector.”