“THE UNITED STATES is not seeking war with the Iranian regime,” declared John Bolton, America’s national security adviser, when he announced on May 5th the deployment of an aircraft-carrier strike group from the Mediterranean to waters near Iran. It would be led by the USS Abraham Lincoln. A separate bomber task-force was also being deployed to the region. The move, Mr Bolton said, was a response to “troubling and escalatory” intelligence warnings about Iran’s behaviour. Few believed Mr Bolton’s peaceable intent. The accusations against Iran—unnamed officials let it be known that it might have been planning to attack America’s forces or its allies—was suspiciously unspecific. Mr Bolton was the man, after all, who in 2015 penned an op-ed article in the New York Times entitled “To Stop Iran’s Bomb, Bomb Iran”. More worrying, and perhaps of greater consequence, Iran’s president, Hassan Rouhani, appeared to play into Mr Bolton’s hands on May 8th by declaring that Iran would stop complying with some of its commitments under the nuclear deal it signed with America and other world powers in 2015. The accord, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), placed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear programme, for a decade or more, in exchange for the partial lifting of Western sanctions. Mr Trump ripped up the accord in 2018, calling it “the worst deal in the world”, and reimposed sanctions on Iran. America also threatened harsh penalties against firms that traded with it. American waivers for some countries to continue buying Iranian oil were halted this week. Until now, Iran has abided by the terms of the JCPOA, in the hope that European states would shield it from the worst of the economic pain. They failed to do that, and it is surely no accident that Mr Rouhani chose the first anniversary of Mr Trump’s withdrawal from the accord to announce a calibrated response. He claimed Iran would be acting within the dispute-resolutions of the JCPOA, without breaching it. “The path we have chosen today is not the path of war, it is the path of diplomacy,” he declared in a televised speech. “But diplomacy with a new language and a new logic.” Mr Rouhani said Iran would begin to build up its stockpiles of low-enriched uranium and of heavy water, which are used in different types of nuclear reactors, thereby threatening to breach limits set by the JCPOA. He told European powers that it would reverse these measures if they found ways to shield Iran’s economy (particularly its oil and banking sectors) within 60 days. If they did not, Iran would also end the limits on the level of uranium enrichment. Under the JCPOA it is producing enriched uranium at a concentration below 4%, used for nuclear reactors, far below the 90% or higher level required for nuclear weapons. Iran also warned that it could rebuild the Arak nuclear reactor, which had been disabled under the JCPOA. Far from being a new diplomatic concept, this appears to be an old Iranian logic of pushing ahead with its nuclear programme—and so moving closer to the option of building a nuclear bomb—in response to rising pressure from the West. Iran has always claimed to be seeking to develop nuclear technology only for civilian power generation. But much of the same technology can be used to build nuclear bombs. And UN nuclear inspectors had found enough evidence in the past of weapons-related activity to raise serious concerns about Iran’s ultimate goal. Israel had openly considered unilateral military action against Iran, but was dissuaded from it by American pressure. Mr Bolton had been prominent among hawks who believed in using economic pressure to remove the clerical regime, and American (or Israeli) military action to set back the nuclear programme if necessary. Diplomacy with Iran under Barack Obama was intended to break this escalatory cycle leading to the grim choice of an Iranian nuclear bomb or bombing Iran. The JCPOA pushed back Iran’s nuclear programme from being perhaps a few months away from being able to build a bomb to requiring more than a year. But critics said it placed only temporary restraints on Iran, did not restrict missile technology and, by releasing frozen Iranian funds, gave the regime greater means to spread its influence in the Middle East—notably in the wars in Iraq, Syria and Yemen—and fund allied militant groups such as Hizbullah, the Shia militia-cum-party in Lebanon. Mr Trump’s decision to abandon the JCPOA, despite pressure from European allies and many of his own advisers to reconsider, all but killed the deal. European efforts to keep it on life support are failing; most European firms have chosen to abide by the sanctions despite a European mechanism designed to protect those trading in “humanitarian” supplies with Iran. Now Mr Rouhani may bury the accord altogether. The Iranian president has been under pressure from his own hawks who detested the JCPOA and pressed him to act more forcefully. His announcement is also an attempt to split the Europeans from America. But it is a risky strategy. Breaching the JCPOA and moving towards a nuclear capability would alienate the Europeans, and give America a clear cause to take harsher action. In the past, Iran appeared almost to be daring America to take military action, perhaps believing that it would not dare to do so at a time when American troops were deeply entangled in the war in Iraq and vulnerable to retaliatory attacks by Iran’s proxy militias. That risk has lessened somewhat as the war in Iraq has wound down. And violence by Iran’s proxies may be just the sort of provocation that hawks like Mr Bolton are looking for to justify a military campaign. Mr Trump, a harsh critic of America’s wars in the Middle East, who has wanted to withdraw American forces from the region, probably does not want war. Neither does Mr Rouhani. But hawks on both sides are taking control. Strange as it may seem, next to Mr Bolton it is the president who now seems the cautious grown-up in the White House.<doc-sep>>> Update: Two Saudi oil tankers targeted in Sunday's 'sabotage attack' near Iran The warning lights are flashing more brightly than ever. There are growing signs that there could be escalation at the edge - provocative attacks by pro-Iranian Shia forces operating in the Wild West of Iraq. How will America handle this form of escalation with Iran? Haaretz Weekly Ep. 27 0:00 -- : -- 15 Skip 15 seconds backwards Play audio 15 Skip 15 seconds ahead 1 X Change playback rate from 1 to 1 Mute audio Will a direct, premeditated attack on U.S. troops by Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria draw the United States into a conflict at the core: a major, all-out U.S. war against Iran? It’s becoming more conceivable by the day. Indeed, there's potentially a lot more than just good old-fashioned "gunboat diplomacy" and deterrence-posturing going on when it comes to recent, very loud and very visible moves by the Trump administration, which this week cited intelligence pointing to a threat to U.S. forces from Iranian proxies. National Security Advisor John Bolton raised the alarm last week and announced the rapid deployment of both a U.S. carrier strike group and a bomber task force to the region. "The United States is not seeking war with the Iranian regime, but we are fully prepared to respond to any attack, whether by proxy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or regular Iranian forces," he stated. Open gallery view U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrives in Baghdad, late on Tuesday, May 7, 2019. Credit: Mandel Ngan,AP >> America Must Not Back Down Against Iran // Emily B. Landau And Secretary of State Mike Pompeo made an unannounced trip to Iraq the day after Bolton's statement, declaring: "There's escalation that may be taking place, and so we're taking all the appropriate actions, both from a security perspective, as well as [to ensure]...the president has a wide range of options in the event that something should actually take place." Here's what behind war drums: The U.S. is muscularly tightening the screws with effective oil sanctions against Tehran, and, if Iran’s oil lifeline is all but cut off amid an already atrophying economy, the regime could strike back: with a first strike at scattered U.S. forces on the ground in Iran-dominated Iraq. Were it to transpire, make no mistake, this would be a very big war, one that could rapidly escalate into a conflict that would unfold in a much more violent and costly way than the two Gulf Wars involving the United States and Iraq from previous decades. Iran, with a population of some 80 million, has a very large military (including an estimated 550,000 active personnel), a growing armory of increasingly accurate land-based ballistic and cruise missiles, plus a scrappy navy that includes a contingent of hard-to-detect "midget" submarines. Today the nation’s geopolitical sphere, indeed, its military reach, extends from Tehran, through Baghdad, into Damascus and terminates in Beirut: a highly strategic corridor all the way to the Mediterranean. Open gallery view Supporters of Hezbollah brigades march on an Israeli flag with a portrait of late Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini and Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Baghdad, Iraq, June 23, 2017. Credit: Hadi Mizban/AP This strategic "crescent," or land-bridge, is something that the radical Iranian leadership has coveted for decades and has now achieved, via both boots on the ground and influence-by-other-means: influence that reaches deep into such remote spots as Yemen, Venezuela and North Korea. And just a week ago, Iran's proxy in the Gaza Strip, Islamic Jihad, in coordination with Hamas, unleashed a targeted barrage of more than 600 rockets on Israel, in an effort to keep Israel's military focused on this threat from one direction while more significant preparatory operations to the east, in Syria and Iraq, were underway by Tehran's proxies there. Under Putin, Russia has notably shown itself to be interested in reconstituting the geography of the former Soviet Union. In turn, Moscow has condoned the pursuit by the authoritarian Tehran regime of Iran’s own "historic" and, indeed, expansive sphere of influence. Russia, to be sure, has played at best an inconsistent role in urging restraint by its allies in Tehran, particularly when it comes to Israel’s heightened concerns of an encroaching Iranian missile threat. The U.S. Congress, focused on what could well become all-engrossing fact-finding hearings on alleged misdeeds by President Donald Trump post-Mueller Report, must pause and turn its gaze to the real and immediate danger of escalation at the edge. Complacency about "over there," now that the last ISIS enclave has been wiped off the map by U.S.-supported forces, is misplaced. The regional chessboard is now very much U.S. v Iran, and the first major moves in that square-off already are in motion. In the past - despite Iranian proxies being responsible for seeding Iraqi battlefields and villages with IEDs that killed hundreds of U.S. military personnel during the Iraq War - the United States has largely avoided any direct "kinetic" conflict with Iran or its operatives in the field. Open gallery view Iranian President Hassan Rohani delivers a speech during the annual military parade marking in Tehran, Iran, September 22, 2018. Credit: Tasnim News Agency/REUTERS At this critical juncture, America's elected representatives in both chambers will need to soberly consider the nation's carefully worded 1973 War Powers Act. A landmark piece of legislation rarely enforced, it strives to balance the power placed in Congress to declare war with the need for the Commander and Chief to have utmost flexibility in meeting the national security exigencies of the United States in confronting any real or imminent military conflict – conflicts that could have long and significant impact on the nation as a whole. The War Powers Act, becoming law despite a veto by then-President Richard Nixon, provides that the U.S. president can send American troops into conflict overseas only by declaration of war by Congress, "statutory authorization" or in the event of a "national emergency created by attack upon the United Sates, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces." The recent designation by the Trump administration of the Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization theoretically gives the White House some legalistic air-cover to attack those IRGC units in Iraq and Syria without Congressional approval, or a declaration of war in the event of suspected or real hostile activities threatening U.S. or allied forces in the area. Here’s the current equation, and it would be unsurprising to start seeing media reports of U.S. ground forces being reinforced in Iraq, following recent comments by President Trump about his desire to keep America's eyes on Iran in Iraq: * Iran, feeling intense pressure from U.S.-imposed oil and economic sanctions, wants the U.S. out of its way in Iraq and Syria and will use plausible-deniability proxy militias to move history in its direction and to deter further attempts at strangulation-by-sanction; Open gallery view U.S. President Donald Trump receives a briefing from senior military leadership accompanied by his new National Security Adviser John Bolton in Washington, DC Credit: \ CARLOS BARRIA/ REUTERS * Russia is giving a yellow light to Tehran, or perhaps even a veiled green light, when it comes to Iran’s pressing its agenda on the regional battlefield, all the way up to Iran’s embedded positions along the Golan border with Israel. * The U.S. president, with his stark anti-Iran views and policies, is supported by anti-Iran hawks, namely Bolton and Pompeo. Until recently, former Secretary of Defense and highly-decorated Marine General Jim Mattis was a voice of caution on aggressive moves toward Iran, but that voice, following his resignation, is no longer heard in the Trump White House. The same could be said about Trump's former NSC Advisor, H.R. McMaster. * Israel is increasingly on edge as Iran becomes entrenched in Syria with advanced missile capability, and this on the heels of Tehran’s decade-long policy of supplying Hezbollah forces in Lebanon with tens of thousands of missiles aimed at Israel. The hardline Netanyahu government, recently re-elected, has made it explicit: it will not countenance Iran’s military presence in Syria. Rocket bombardment from Islamic Jihad in the Gaza Strip - meant to terrorize those Israelis living within range - seriously heightens the Israel v. Iran cross-border tensions. The question then becomes: Will America, preoccupied with pregnant questions surrounding both Russian interference in the 2016 election, and possible obstruction of justice by President Trump, be tested by opportunistic moves by Iranian proxies in Iraq and Syria in the near future? There’s a good possibility of that coming to pass. At the least, the current security environment in the region has become, as analysts at the Center for Strategic and International Studies here in Washington note, "increasingly fragile and dangerous." The United States, traditionally slow to anger, must prepare for a potentially dire "trip wire" event, one aimed at American troops in Iraq and Syria, and at the hands of Shia militias controlled by Tehran. If that were to happen, at time when America has become exceedingly inwardly focused, the stakes will be very high. A more dramatic move by Tehran, such as blocking the strategic Straits of Hormuz to oil traffic, could also transpire…and then all bets are off. With a president under siege at home (not unlike Nixon during Watergate and Vietnam) will Congress have the calm wisdom and unencumbered focus to deal with escalation at the edge? Will it duly exercise the checks-and-balances powers enshrined in the Constitution? Recent votes on the National Emergency border wall and the Yemen conflagration reveal that a number of Republicans in the Senate are willing to stand up with a loud "No." When it comes to a major confrontation with Iran and its proxies, the stakes will be far higher. As a nation, Americans collectively pull together at vital moments when American lives and treasure are at stake. No foreign adversary should doubt American resolve in responding to threats abroad, even during times of domestic uncertainty. Warren Getler, based in Washington, D.C., writes on national security affairs. Previously he served as a New York-based financial reporter for The Wall Street Journal, as a London and Frankfurt correspondent of the International Herald Tribune, and as editor-at-large for Bloomberg in Washington<doc-sep>
The United States seriously fears an imminent attack on its troops by Iran or its proxies. Iran signaled it may restart parts of its nuclear program in direct defiance of a landmark 2015 deal. If tensions between Washington and Tehran were already high in the Trump era, they just increased substantially. Starting on Sunday, the Trump administration indicated it had credible intelligence that Iran and groups it supports in the Middle East might attack US personnel based there. Two days later, reports of Iran’s specific plans surfaced: They apparently intended to target US troops in Iraq and Syria, or use drones against Americans in a key waterway near Yemen. A US defense official confirmed to me the existence of credible intelligence of specific Iranian threats, but wouldn’t expand further. As a result, the Trump administration has sent a US aircraft carrier and bombers to the region in an effort to deter an assault. Meanwhile, Iran is poised to announce on Wednesday that it will resume small parts of its nuclear program. That’s a big deal: The 2015 nuclear agreement between Iran and the US, as well as some European countries, put tight restrictions on Tehran’s nuclear efforts in exchange for sanctions relief. But on May 8, 2018 — exactly one year ago this Wednesday — President Donald Trump withdrew the US from the agreement, saying it only paved Iran’s path to the bomb. Iran abided by the deal even after Trump’s announcement, but now it seems the most predictable scenario has come true: Tehran wants to kick-start its nuclear program once again. This a fraught, delicate, and dangerous situation that could easily spiral out of control if not carefully managed in Washington and Tehran. Some experts are worried that cooler heads won’t prevail. “Moments like these are when institutions should matter: leadership at the cabinet level, a serious policy-making process, intelligence standards, professional ethics. All those have been eroded by the Trump administration,” Suzanne Maloney, an Iran expert at the Brookings Institution in Washington, tweeted on Monday. The US says it has intelligence that points to an imminent Iranian attack on Americans In a stunning Sunday statement, National Security Adviser John Bolton announced a military move by the US in response to what it says are Iranian threats. It’s worth reading his short message in its entirety: In response to a number of troubling and escalatory indications and warnings, the United States is deploying the USS Abraham Lincoln Carrier Strike Group and a bomber task force to the US Central Command region to send a clear and unmistakable message to the Iranian regime that any attack on United States interests or on those of our allies will be met with unrelenting force. The United States is not seeking war with the Iranian regime, but we are fully prepared to respond to any attack, whether by proxy, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, or regular Iranian forces. Acting Pentagon chief Patrick Shanahan added his own warnings the next day, saying the decision to send those weapons to the Middle East “represents a prudent repositioning of assets in response to indications of a credible threat by Iranian regime forces. ... We call on the Iranian regime to cease all provocation.” Though it might seem sudden, an escalation like this was always possible. US-Iranian relations, which have historically been pretty bad, tanked even further when America left the nuclear deal last year and reimposed tough sanctions on the country. Last month, the Trump administration took things a step further when they decided to label the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps — Iran’s hugely influential security and military organization responsible for the protection and survival of the regime — as a “foreign terrorist organization.” That’s the first time the US named any part of another government as terrorists. It’s therefore not a surprise to some analysts that Iran is apparently considering retaliating in a severe manner. “To counterattack in response to pressure is a standard part of the Iranian playbook,” Maloney also tweeted on Monday. Phillip Smyth, an Iran expert at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told me that major threats from Tehran’s proxies have continued since early 2018. “There have been maneuvers in the past that sent a signal to the Americans” of a worsening regional situation, he said. But he noted that just because there are indications that an attack could happen doesn’t mean an Iranian proxy will launch one soon.