Daily Papers

Quantum optimization holds promise for addressing classically intractable combinatorial problems, yet a standardized framework for benchmarking its performance, particularly in terms of solution quality, computational speed, and scalability is still lacking. In this work, we introduce a comprehensive benchmarking framework designed to systematically evaluate a range of quantum optimization techniques against well-established NP-hard combinatorial problems. Our framework focuses on key problem classes, including the Multi-Dimensional Knapsack Problem (MDKP), Maximum Independent Set (MIS), Quadratic Assignment Problem (QAP), and Market Share Problem (MSP). Our study evaluates gate-based quantum approaches, including the Variational Quantum Eigensolver (VQE) and its CVaR-enhanced variant, alongside advanced quantum algorithms such as the Quantum Approximate Optimization Algorithm (QAOA) and its extensions. To address resource constraints, we incorporate qubit compression techniques like Pauli Correlation Encoding (PCE) and Quantum Random Access Optimization (QRAO). Experimental results, obtained from simulated quantum environments and classical solvers, provide key insights into feasibility, optimality gaps, and scalability. Our findings highlight both the promise and current limitations of quantum optimization, offering a structured pathway for future research and practical applications in quantum-enhanced decision-making.

We seek to identify the most relevant benefits offered by Medicare Advantage Health Plans that drive membership and market share. As an example, we explore plans operating in a single county in New Jersey between 2018 and 2023. A dataset of benefits from publicly available data sources was created and the variance inflation factor was applied to identify the correlation between the extracted features, to avoid multicollinearity and overparameterization problems. We categorized the variable Market Share and used it as a multinomial response variable with three categories: less than 0.3\%, 0.3\% to 1.5\%, and over 1.5\%. Categories were chosen to achieve approximately uniform distribution of plans (47, 60, and 65 respectively). We built a multinomial Lasso model using 5-fold cross-validation to tune the penalty parameter. Lasso forced some features to be dropped from the model, which reduces the risk of overfitting and increases the interpretability of the results. For each category, important variables are different. Certain brands drive market share, as do PPO plans and prescription drug coverage. Benefits, particularly ancillary benefits that are not part of CMS's required benefits, appear to have little influence, while financial terms such as deductibles, copays, and out-of-pocket limits are associated with higher market share. Finally, we evaluated the predictive accuracy of the Lasso model with the test set. The accuracy is 0.76.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Designing an optimum portfolio for allocating suitable weights to its constituent assets so that the return and risk associated with the portfolio are optimized is a computationally hard problem. The seminal work of Markowitz that attempted to solve the problem by estimating the future returns of the stocks is found to perform sub-optimally on real-world stock market data. This is because the estimation task becomes extremely challenging due to the stochastic and volatile nature of stock prices. This work illustrates three approaches to portfolio design minimizing the risk, optimizing the risk, and assigning equal weights to the stocks of a portfolio. Thirteen critical sectors listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India are first chosen. Three portfolios are designed following the above approaches choosing the top ten stocks from each sector based on their free-float market capitalization. The portfolios are designed using the historical prices of the stocks from Jan 1, 2017, to Dec 31, 2022. The portfolios are evaluated on the stock price data from Jan 1, 2022, to Dec 31, 2022. The performances of the portfolios are compared, and the portfolio yielding the higher return for each sector is identified.

Based on principal-agent theory and optimal contract theory, companies use the method of increasing executives' shareholding to stimulate collaborative innovation. However, from the aspect of agency costs between management and shareholders (i.e. the first type) and between major shareholders and minority shareholders (i.e. the second type), the interests of management, shareholders and creditors will be unbalanced with the change of the marginal utility of executive equity incentives.In order to establish the correlation between the proportion of shares held by executives and investments in corporate innovation, we have chosen a range of publicly listed companies within China's A-share market as the focus of our study. Employing a multi-variable linear regression model, we aim to analyze this relationship thoroughly.The following models were developed: (1) the impact model of executive shareholding on corporate innovation investment; (2) the impact model of executive shareholding on two types of agency costs; (3)The model is employed to examine the mediating influence of the two categories of agency costs. Following both correlation and regression analyses, the findings confirm a meaningful and positive correlation between executives' shareholding and the augmentation of corporate innovation investments. Additionally, the results indicate that executive shareholding contributes to the reduction of the first type of agency cost, thereby fostering corporate innovation investment. However, simultaneously, it leads to an escalation in the second type of agency cost, thus impeding corporate innovation investment.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Designing data sharing mechanisms providing performance and strong privacy guarantees is a hot topic for the Online Advertising industry. Namely, a prominent proposal discussed under the Improving Web Advertising Business Group at W3C only allows sharing advertising signals through aggregated, differentially private reports of past displays. To study this proposal extensively, an open Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning Challenge took place at AdKDD'21, a premier workshop on Advertising Science with data provided by advertising company Criteo. In this paper, we describe the challenge tasks, the structure of the available datasets, report the challenge results, and enable its full reproducibility. A key finding is that learning models on large, aggregated data in the presence of a small set of unaggregated data points can be surprisingly efficient and cheap. We also run additional experiments to observe the sensitivity of winning methods to different parameters such as privacy budget or quantity of available privileged side information. We conclude that the industry needs either alternate designs for private data sharing or a breakthrough in learning with aggregated data only to keep ad relevance at a reasonable level.

Portfolio optimization is a challenging problem that has attracted considerable attention and effort from researchers. The optimization of stock portfolios is a particularly hard problem since the stock prices are volatile and estimation of their future volatilities and values, in most cases, is very difficult, if not impossible. This work uses three ratios, the Sharpe ratio, the Sortino ratio, and the Calmar ratio, for designing the mean-variance optimized portfolios for six important sectors listed in the National Stock Exchange (NSE) of India. Three portfolios are designed for each sector maximizing the ratios based on the historical prices of the ten most important stocks of each sector from Jan 1, 2017, to Dec 31, 2020. The evaluation of the portfolios is done based on their cumulative returns over the test period from Jan 1, 2021, to Dec 31, 2021. The ratio that yields the maximum cumulative returns for both the training and the test periods for the majority of the sectors is identified. The sectors that exhibit the maximum cumulative returns for the same ratio are also identified. The results provide useful insights for investors in the stock market in making their investment decisions based on the current return and risks associated with the six sectors and their stocks.

We study the perfect information Nash equilibrium between a broker and her clients -- an informed trader and an uniformed trader. In our model, the broker trades in the lit exchange where trades have instantaneous and transient price impact with exponential resilience, while both clients trade with the broker. The informed trader and the broker maximise expected wealth subject to inventory penalties, while the uninformed trader is not strategic and sends the broker random buy and sell orders. We characterise the Nash equilibrium of the trading strategies with the solution to a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations (FBSDEs). We solve this system explicitly and study the effect of information, profitability, and inventory control in the trading strategies of the broker and the informed trader.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

The global trade in electronic and electrical goods is complicated by the challenge of identifying e-waste, which is often misclassified to evade regulations. Traditional analysis methods struggle to discern the underlying patterns of this illicit trade within vast datasets. This research proposes and validates a robust, data-driven framework to segment products and identify goods exhibiting an anomalous "waste signature" a trade pattern defined by a clear 'inverse price-volume'. The core of the framework is an Outlier-Aware Segmentation method, an iterative K-Means approach that first isolates extreme outliers to prevent data skewing and then re-clusters the remaining products to reveal subtle market segments. To quantify risk, a "Waste Score" is developed using a Logistic Regression model that identifies products whose trade signatures are statistically similar to scrap. The findings reveal a consistent four-tier market hierarchy in both Malaysian and global datasets. A key pattern emerged from a comparative analysis: Malaysia's market structure is defined by high-volume bulk commodities, whereas the global market is shaped by high-value capital goods, indicating a unique national specialization. The framework successfully flags finished goods, such as electric generators (HS 8502), that are traded like scrap, providing a targeted list for regulatory scrutiny.

With various AI tools such as ChatGPT becoming increasingly popular, we are entering a true AI era. We can foresee that exceptional AI tools will soon reap considerable profits. A crucial question arise: should AI tools share revenue with their training data providers in additional to traditional stakeholders and shareholders? The answer is Yes. Large AI tools, such as large language models, always require more and better quality data to continuously improve, but current copyright laws limit their access to various types of data. Sharing revenue between AI tools and their data providers could transform the current hostile zero-sum game relationship between AI tools and a majority of copyrighted data owners into a collaborative and mutually beneficial one, which is necessary to facilitate the development of a virtuous cycle among AI tools, their users and data providers that drives forward AI technology and builds a healthy AI ecosystem. However, current revenue-sharing business models do not work for AI tools in the forthcoming AI era, since the most widely used metrics for website-based traffic and action, such as clicks, will be replaced by new metrics such as prompts and cost per prompt for generative AI tools. A completely new revenue-sharing business model, which must be almost independent of AI tools and be easily explained to data providers, needs to establish a prompt-based scoring system to measure data engagement of each data provider. This paper systematically discusses how to build such a scoring system for all data providers for AI tools based on classification and content similarity models, and outlines the requirements for AI tools or third parties to build it. Sharing revenue with data providers using such a scoring system would encourage more data owners to participate in the revenue-sharing program. This will be a utilitarian AI era where all parties benefit.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

In this case study, the renowned Travelling Salesmen problem has been studied. Travelling Salesman problem is a most demanding computational problem in Computer Science. The Travelling Salesmen problem has been solved by two different ways using Hopfield Network. The main theory of the problem is to find distance and connectedness between nodes in a graph having edges between the nodes. The basic algorithm used for this problem is Djikstra's Algorithm. But till now , a number of such algorithms have evolved. Among them(some other algorithms) , are distinct and have been proved to solve the travelling salesmen problem by graph theory.