We tested the maximum dynamic payload of the SO-ARM101 with our parallel gripper and a base servo replaced by a Feetech STS3250. The maximum load before failure was 630 g, at which point the Feetech STS3215 in joint 3 failed — its large brass output gear was completely worn down.
The Feetech STS3250 in the base with a metal gear train withstood a significantly higher load.
What if an AI agent could be tricked into stealing your data, just by reading a tool's description? A new paper reports it's possible.
The "Attractive Metadata Attack" paper details this stealthy new threat. To measure the real-world impact of their attack, the researchers needed a source of sensitive data for the agent to leak. We're proud that the AI4Privacy corpus was used to create the synthetic user profiles containing standardized PII for their experiments.
This is a perfect win-win. Our open-source data helped researchers Kanghua Mo, 龙昱丞, Zhihao Li from Guangzhou University and The Hong Kong Polytechnic University to not just demonstrate a new attack, but also quantify its potential for harm. This data-driven evidence is what pushes the community to build better, execution-level defenses for AI agents.
🔗 Check out their paper to see how easily an agent's trust in tool metadata could be exploited: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2508.02110