Oxford Analytica

Oxford Analytica

5/09/2006 @ 6:00AM

Cheney Strikes At Moscow Policies

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney last week reiterated his criticism of Russia’s “internal developments” and its use of energy resources to influence its neighbors.

Cheney’s initial broadside against Moscow’s clampdown on human rights and freedoms, delivered at a security conference with Eastern European leaders in Vilnius, Lithuania, highlighted the deteriorating state of U.S.-Russian relations. However, he emphasized that there is room for cooperation in many areas and that Russia could be “a strategic partner.”

Cheney’s Vilnius address ranged beyond Russia, and he discussed the difficulty of consolidating democratic institutions in the post-Communist world. However, it was his blunt characterization of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s political regime that made headlines.

He accused unspecified “opponents of reform” of attempting to restrict human freedoms in many areas of civil society. He also said Moscow’s “counterproductive” energy policy–which had allegedly used gas resources to “blackmail” neighboring countries–was harming its international standing.

Cheney’s rhetoric attracted strong criticism from some elements of the Western media–and a more measured response from Russian officials–but the speech signaled a more significant change in the tone, rather than the substance, of U.S. policy:

–Kremlin view. Moscow preferred to ignore the address and suggested that Cheney was simply ill-informed. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov thought that ignorant “aides” had misled the vice president.

–Alarmist reaction. Others in Moscow and the West called the speech a return to the Cold War.

–Dismissive reaction. A different set of experts and officials in Moscow and Washington dismissed the vice president’s remarks as inconsequential and tangential to the real, important business of U.S.-Russian relations.

None of these interpretations captures the true dimensions of the present U.S.-Russian relationship. Cheney’s speech does not signal a return to Cold War politics. Washington still wishes to pursue a close “strategic partnership” with Moscow, but it has been frustrated by the Kremlin’s “managed democracy.”

Cheney’s interpretation of Russian domestic developments is now widely shared within the Bush administration and in the wider U.S. foreign policy community. The bipartisan task force on Russia at the Council on Foreign Relations, chaired by Republican Jack Kemp and Democrat John Edwards, made almost the same diagnosis of Russia’s internal ills. Cheney made the speech not to spark a debate about Russia at home, but because administration officials believed that Putin and his officials were not hearing this consensus message.

The vice president’s critical assessment of the erosion of Russian democracy does not mean the Bush administration will cease pursuing issues of mutual interest with their Russian counterparts. On the contrary, the White House understands that Russia’s cooperation on Iran, counter-proliferation and energy security is vital. Washington has a long history of cooperating with autocracies when it has served U.S. national interests.

However, relations between the United States and these autocracies are never as close or enduring as relations with most democracies. As Russia becomes more autocratic, the strains in bilateral relations have become more apparent.

In addition to being frustrated by the limited tangible benefits for Russia of earlier cooperation with the United States, Kremlin officials seem bewildered by the U.S. push for democratic values and practices. Its behavior is confusing to Moscow because it is so full of apparent contradictions, such as pushing hard for democracy in Iraq, while adopting a patient approach in Saudi Arabia, and animated denunciations of fraudulent elections in Belarus, compared with a relatively composed reaction to similar events in Azerbaijan.

Even Cheney’s second stop on his tour of the region, a friendly visit to autocratic Kazakhstan, seemed to cloud the message of the Vilnius speech.

Yet U.S. leaders have simultaneously pursued agendas focusing on both values and interests for many years. When dealing with autocracies, these overlapping priorities sometimes limit the depth of cooperation. This has gradually become a feature of the Bush administration’s Russia policy. The question has become whether Putin can learn to live with a more limited, but still cooperative, partner in Washington.

Continued comity may require both parties to abandon their self-deceptions about the nature of the relationship. Just as Bush and Cheney have stopped pretending that Russia is a democracy, Putin and his foreign policy team may need to abandon their wish that the United States respond only to the logic of realpolitik.

Therefore, Cheney’s démarche may help establish a more pragmatic foundation for U.S.-Russian relations, provided both sides can abandon the soaring expectations that prevailed several years ago and work to establish a more pragmatic partnership.



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