Friday, May 29, 2009












In Re Silver State Helicopters LLC (9th Cir. - May 28, 2009)

Doesn't everyone wish they had a job when, on occasion, you could say to someone: "Dude. I'm important. You may think you're question's important. But it's not. So stop bothering me."

That's another occasional benefit of being on the Ninth Circuit.

Thursday, May 28, 2009











Wednesday, May 27, 2009

Jazayeri v. Mao (Cal. Ct. App. - May 27, 2009)

Dead chickens. Hearsay. Authentication. Fraud. Admissibility disputes. And a judge (Judge Gutman, up in LA) who's apparently an evidentiary stickler, and wrongly so.

This case has got 'em all.


I'm definitely going to talk about this one.








Tuesday, May 26, 2009

People v. Hairston (Cal. Ct. App. - May 26, 2009)

A car pulls into the parking lot of your apartment complex with rap music blaring, and with the driver rapping and singing along. Three people exit the car. Do you really think it's a good idea, in such a context, to tell your friend -- out loud and within the hearing range of these people -- that the driver's singing sounded like a song that Elmo (from Sesame Street) had rapped? Will this really be the start of something good?! Especially when, in response to the driver's "question" as to whether you're trying to be funny, you make a point of calling him "boy"? Not good. Not good at all.

It actually sounds like the victim in this case was somewhat of the aggressor. That said, when the defendant and his friends (after substantial additional confrontation) got back into their car, and the victim leaned into the window of this vehicle, at which point the defendant produced a gun, I agree that this upped the ante, and that the roles were suddenly reversed.

I have very little relevant personal experience on this point, but even my limited knowledge of the mean streets inclines me to agree with Justice Nicholoson's conclusion that defendant was indeed guilty of making a criminal threat. Sure, the only thing defendant said at the relevant time was: "Is there a problem?," and in a wide variety of other contexts, I'm sure that wouldn't be a threat. But when you add "bitch" to the end of that sentence -- turning the statement into "Is there a fucking problem, bitch?" -- and when you repeat it by saying "Is there a fucking problem, bitch?", I think we know what you're saying. Especially if, when you're saying it, you and your two friends are holding and displaying handguns. I get the message. It's a threat.

Knappenberger v. City of Phoenix (9th Cir. - May 26, 2009)

I'm in the midst of reading the California's 170-plus page opinion in the gay marriage cases. Which was not so easy to even obtain given the crush on the court's server. I'll all say for now (and perhaps for a while) is that I have never seen Chief Justice George rely so heavily on italics. It's like a first draft of some of my briefs, before I go back and delete the emphases.

That said, he's most heavy on italics only in the first dozen or so pages, which seem to be written for the public and the press rather than for a purely legal audience. On the theory -- rightly so, I'm sure -- that only the truly dedicated will read all 100+ pages, and that everyone else could totally use a lot of emphasis on the important points of this very careful opinion.

Meanwhile, the Ninth Circuit wants us to learn a very simple lesson. Which is that a tough choice isn't an involuntary choice.

Seems clearly true. Both in life as well as in the law.

Friday, May 22, 2009

People v. Chaffin (Cal. Ct. App. - May 14, 2009)

I'ts a snoozer of a Friday as we head into the Memorial Day weekend. Nothing special in the Ninth Circuit or in the California Court of Appeal today, which mostly concerned themselves with making tiny amendments to previous decisions.

So I thought I'd just float this one out for your consideration:

Mike gets into a verbal altercation with his baby mama that escalates into a physical confrontation after she slaps him. The Bama Mama gets into her car -- in which she's strapped Baby in his car seat -- and starts down the driveway, Mike throws some golf-ball sized rocks at the car and BM. A rock shatters the rear window and two rocks enter the car, and some glass shards end up in Baby's hair.

Mike's clearly guilty of domestic battery and vandalism. Is he also guilty of felony child endangerment? That offense requires proof that Mike engaged in acts "under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death" to a child. Is throwing golfball-sized rocks under the circumstances described above an act that was "likely" to produce great bodily harm or death to Baby?

What do you think? And do you agree with Justice Gaut (and the rest of the panel) here?

Enjoy the long three-day weekend,all. Stay thirsty.

Thursday, May 21, 2009

In Re Estate of Beckel (Cal. Ct. App. - May 21, 2009)

Here's a good question for the California Bar Exam. One which, I might add, the lower court got wrong. It's a Trusts & Estates question -- a class I never took (anywhere) -- but I nonetheless was able to intuit the answer. See if you can do the same. (Or at least learn the answer now.)

Decedent dies intestate in California. Decedent has no living parents, siblings, etc., but does have some living first cousins. So the first cousins definitely get a share (indeed, equal shares) of the estate.

What about the dead first cousins? Obviously they don't get any of the estate. But what about their issue? In particular, what about the living children of the deceased first cousins -- i.e., first cousins once removed? Do they get a share?

So say you have three living first cousins, and one dead first cousin who had two children who are still alive. Do your three first cousins each get one-third of the estate, or do they each get one-fourth, with the two living first cousins once removed children getting one-eighth each (i.e., collectively, the share of their parent)?

Let's make it even more complicated. What about living grandchildren -- or even great-grandchildren -- of a first cousin; e.g., first cousins twice- or thrice-removed? Do they get a share?

These questions underlie our ultimate hypothetical. Which is this:

Decedent dies. She had four first cousins, only one of whom (FC #1) survived Decedent. The second first cousin (FC #2) had two children, only one of whom survived Decedent. The third first cousin (FC #3) had three children, none of whom survived Decedent, but two of those children of FC #3 each had two children of their own (FC #3's grandchildren) who survived Decedent. Finally, to make things easy, FC #4 had no surviving children or grandchildren, but had one surviving great-grandchild.

What share (if any) does each of the survivors get? Do only the most closely-related family members (i.e., the surviving first cousins) get a share? Do only the surviving first cousins and surviving children of first cousins get a share, with the rest cut off? Does everyone alive get a share, regardless of how removed they are? Does the degree of removal affect the amount of the share; e.g., the thrice-removed people getting one-fourth of the share of the first-removed people?

Draw a chart. Who gets what in our hypothetical? You have ten minutes.

Okay, okay. I hear ya. You aren't in law school anymore. The Socratic method -- and exams in general -- are dead to you. You just want the answer. Here it is:

Each survivor shares equally the share of their respective first cousin heir, living or dead. So surviving FC #1 gets 25% of the estate, the surviving child of FC #2 gets 25% of the estate, the four surviving grandchildren of FC #3 each get 6.25% of the estate, and the surviving great-grandchild of FC #4 gets 25% of the estate.

The trial court, by the way, thought that only the FCs and children of FCs got to share. But Justice Levy says: "Wrong. I'll give you a B- for effort, but the correct answer is as described above."

People v. Cadogan (Cal. Ct. App. - May 20, 2009)

So I'm reading this case, and my eyes flitter to the line that contains the name of counsel for the defendant. I notice that it's another case where the appellate counsel is appointed by the court -- nothing unusual there -- and I read the name: Marcia R. Clark.

Wait a minute. You mean that Marcia R. Clark? (Who looks like this now, not this.) Yep, the one and only. No longer prosecuting O.J., or writing books, but instead doing court-appointed appellate work.

So that's a big lifestyle change, eh? Which obviously is what it is. But what I further thought was: How long has she been doing it, and how good is she? Since obviously prosecuting high-profile cases at trial is quite a piece different than doing appointed appellate work.

So I checked it out. This is only her third case in which she's had a published opinion, but she's had a ton of unpublished decisions. Her first appellate case (to which, again, she was appointed, as she was in most of 'em) was back in 2006. So she's been doing this for roughly three years. And, in that time, she's had 52 cases in the Court of Appeal.

So that answers the first question. She's apparently doing this a lot, and had been doing so for a while. What about the second question? What's her track record?

She's won three cases, in whole or in part, in which the Attorney General has admitted that the defendant was entitled to relief. So at least she can win when the other side rolls over. She's also obtained minor relief in five of the cases; i.e., getting one of four counts dismissed, getting an enhancement dismissed and so cutting a year off her client's 28-year sentence, etec. Today's case is one of those: Like the others, she largely loses, but she's at least able to win on a particular issue that cuts off 3 years from her client's 37-year sentence. So that's the result in five cases; which, parenthetically, is smaller than the number of cases in which she filed a Wende brief (basically, "Here are the facts: I don't see anything even arguable, but you decide") and lost.

So what about the rest of the cases? Of the 52 cases in the Court of Appeal, how many wins?


Back in 2007, she got a reversal in a case where a guy had his car towed from Scripps Clinic down here in San Diego, went into the reception area to figure out what happened ("Dude, where's my car?), got pissed off, and ended up throwing a glass flowerpot near the receptionist. Remanded for a new trial on the ground the court should have given a lesser-included offense instruction.

So if you've got a flowerpot case, Marcia Clark's apparently the attorney of choice. Bloody glove? Not so much.

So welcome back, Marcia. I probably should have noticed your name in one of the other couple of cases, but missed it. Regardless: Glad to see you're in the California Court of Appeal in addition to on E.T. Less glamor and fun, but at least the possibility -- however theoretical -- of victory.

Wednesday, May 20, 2009






Tuesday, May 19, 2009

U.S. v. Maness (9th Cir. - May 19, 2009)

You reside -- and are hanging out -- in Wasilla, Alaska. There are less than 6000 of you in the town. It's June 2001, so your mayor is Sarah Palin: someone as yet largely unknown to the rest of the universe. Perhaps you voted for her, perhaps you didn't. There's just one thing for certain: You're nutty. So nutty, in fact, that your wife rats out out, and Alaska state troopers come to your house to involuntarily commit you to a psychiatric institution.

But this is Alaska, for Christ's sake. Wasilla, Alaska at that. You're having none of it. So you flee from the troopers and, when they eventually catch up with you, point a handgun at one of the officers, who promptly wings you in the shoulder. Could be a lot worse.

But you're facing, inter alia, a federal charge of illegally possessing firearms, including a MAK-90. Even Alaska ain't the home of the entirely free in that regard. You're then sentenced to ten years, and you appeal, getting a limited sentencing remand.

At which point you want to represent yourself. 'Cause you've done so wonderfully in your regular life on your own. The district court says: Nope. And the Ninth Circuit affirms.

Just another day in Wasilla.

People v. Burgener (Cal. Supreme Ct. - May 7, 2009)

Tell me it makes sense to keep pushing this one.

This is already the third time the case has been back up to the California Supreme Court, not to mention the time in the California Court of Appeal. Justice Baxters says this appeal "may not be the last," but I can add to that: It definitely won't be the last.

It's a death penalty case. The conviction was almost three decades ago, back in 1981. The California Supreme Court has reversed and remanded twice previously, and this time makes Number Three (unanimously). Which will only give yet another appeal to the California Supreme Court after the present remand has concluded. If not multiple appeals, depending on what transpires below.

None of this even mentions the state habeas petitions, the federal habeas petition(s), and all the other stuff that you totally know will come in the future with any reimposed death sentence.

I'm telling you this right now: Michael Burgener will die in prison, but it won't be from an antiseptic needle in the arm. At this point, it'll be 40+ years after the conviction before there'd actually be an execution. And the justice of such a penalty -- though understandable in all its individual components -- seems far from clear.

Burgener shot and killed a 7-11 clerk an emptied the cash register of $50. He's not a nice man. He deserves to live the remainder of his life behind bars, and that's what will happen. Why -- at this point -- we're spending the millions and millions of dollars I'm sure is being spent to keep this one going is beyond me.

I know the counterarguments. They're not frivolous. I appreciate them. I truly do. But this one, in my view, you let go.

Throw away the key, declare victory, and be done with it.

Monday, May 18, 2009

Manhattan Loft LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (Cal. Ct. App. - May 18, 2009)

Sometimes cooling off makes a difference.

Take, for example, today's modification. Just reading it, you wouldn't think it was anything special, much less worth noting. It just changed a couple of minor lines of an opinion by Justice Ashmann-Gerst, after all. Like this change: "The paragraph commencing at the bottom of page 12, second full sentence, line 3, beginning 'However, in so arguing' and ending at the top of page 13 with '(a) of that statute' is modified to read as follow: However, that argument overlooks the definition of "‘provisional remedy,’" as set forth in subdivision (a) of that statute." (Sure, a snarky perfectionist might note the grammatical flaw of using the word "follow" rather than "follows," but put that to one side.)

Compare the original opinion, however, to see what the changes actually entail. They essentially delete some pretty serious -- harsh -- slams on the attorneys at Bingham McCutchen. For example, Justice Ashmann-Gerst changes "Respondents attempt to avoid this result through certain misrepresentations in their appellate brief" by deleting the "mis" and changing it to "representations". And also changes the quick -- and, in context, harsh -- rejoinder "Not true" in the original to "Not entirely true." The final change is of similar effect. All of 'em serve solely to tone down the slam on respondent's counsel.

So a good start of the week for Bruce Friedman, Roland Tellis, and Heather Ristau. They still lose, of course. But at least they have a lot fewer black marks in the eternal pages of the California Reporter.

Friday, May 15, 2009

Mazda Motors v. M/V Cougar Ace (9th Cir. - May 8, 2009)

This is how Judge Fisher begins this opinion: "This in rem admiralty action requires us to decide whether the defendant ocean vessel may invoke a forum selection clause in the bills of lading governing ocean carriage on that vessel."

Oooh! Sexy!

You had me at "in rem admiralty," Ray. And I went totally over the top once I saw "forum selection clause" and "bill of lading." Baby!

What's the age-old technique of the "Himalaya Clause," you might ask? You wish. I'll take the secret with me to my grave.

It's my job to read every single published Ninth Circuit case. Sometimes, I read 'em so you don't have to. Like here.

Thursday, May 14, 2009

Balzaga v. Fox News Network (Cal. Ct. App. - May 14, 2009)

On the one side we have the plaintiffs, who are several immigrant day laborers. On the other side we have the defendant, the Fox News Network. Lots of people are going to make up their mind right there -- without any of the facts at all -- about who should win.

Let me nonetheless describe the case for you. No, wait, I've got a better idea. I'll let Justice Aaron do it. Here are the first three paragraphs of her dissent, which encapsulate quite well both the facts of the case as well as the issues upon which the members of the panel disagree:

"MANHUNT AT THE BORDER" is blazoned across the bottom of the television screen. A "Wanted" poster displaying photographs of plaintiffs is shown. The caption on the poster says: "Wanted [—] Robbery, Assault and Battery." In introducing the segment, Alan Colmes, one of the two anchors of the telecast, states, "The San Diego Police are investigating an attack on an anti-illegal immigration advocate [John Monti] near a migrant's encampment close to the San Diego/Mexico border."

In spite of these facts, the majority reaches the remarkable conclusion that no reasonable person viewing this telecast would have concluded that plaintiffs were the subjects of a manhunt being conducted by law enforcement officers. Further, notwithstanding the absence of any other express or implied reference to a manhunt throughout the remainder of the telecast, the majority concludes, "[T]he only reasonable conclusion is that the caption ['MANHUNT AT THE BORDER'] refers to Monti's own search for plaintiffs and his belief that they should be charged with an assault crime."

The majority's conclusion is based on the notion that any reasonable viewer of the telecast would interpret the word "manhunt" in a manner that is inconsistent with any known definition of the term, and inconsonant with the context in which the term is used in the telecast. Because I cannot agree with the majority's reasoning or its conclusions, I dissent.

P.S. - The facts of the case are also pretty interesting, and leave one with a pretty lingering question as to how nutty (if at all) this guy Monti is -- or whether he's instead a guy who's repeatedly gotten the very short end of the stick.

P.P.S. - Can I also just say that I had to smile when I saw that one of Fox New's primary defenses was that the stuff it says in its news show is "merely hyperbole". Let me just put those various words together again. Fox News Network. Hyperbole. News. Hyperbole. Fox.

United States v. Iribe (9th Cir. - May 6, 2009)

Especially for those of us down here in San Diego: Next time your friend asks you to have a fun time with 'em down in TJ, make sure they're really a friend.

Wednesday, May 13, 2009

Doody v. Schiro (9th Cir. - May 12, 2009)

This is what I said.

See why?

Not looking good for him.

Catz v. Chalker (9th Cir. - May 13, 2009)

Here's a nice little opinion. Short. Clear. Good.

Admittedly, it's about a totally hypertechnical procedural matter: Whether a Rule 60(a) motion filed within 10 days of the judgment tolls the time for filing an appeal. A question, I might add, which has a simple answer, which you can fairly rapidly discern from FRAP 4, which says: "If a party timely files in the district court any of the following motions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the ime to file an appeal runs for all parties from the entry of the order disposing of the last such remaining motion. . . . for relief under Rule 60 if the motion is filed no later than 10 days after the judgment is entered." Pretty explicit, huh?

So the panel just follows the express language of the rule. Which, parenthetically, is what every other court to address the issue has done as well.

Still, the panel adds some additional -- nice -- touches that make the proper outcome even clearer. It's a nice opinion that reaches an obviously correct result.

Tuesday, May 12, 2009

People v. Zambia (Cal. Ct. App. - May 12, 2009)

I agree with Justice Kriegler that Jomo Zambia is guilty of pandering. It seems like a pretty broad statute, and the evidence shows that he was indeed trying to become Officer Cruz's pimp.

Let me ask a somewhat related question. Imagine I make the following statement to my readers: "Being a prostitute isn't such a bad thing. The pay and the working conditions are better than a lot of jobs, and it's not qualitatively different than many other business and personal exchanges."

Am I also thereby guilty of pandering, and subject to four-plus years in prison? California's pandering statute punishes anyone who "encourages another person to become a prostitute” by “promises, threats, violence, or by any device or scheme,” so it sems that if one of my goals in making the statement was to encourage people to think about prostitution rather than some other job, I'm guilty, right?

More analogously to the present case, what about if I make the following statement to my friend Laura, who -- against my counsel -- is working as a prostitute on a dangerous street, without any backup or support: "Laura, you're putting your life at risk. Stop being a prostitute. Or, if you remain one, at least get a reliable, safe pimp for support. Not an insane dude like Frank down the street, but rather someone who's gentle and respectful like Dave." Seems like I'm guilty of pandering in that situation as well given Justice Kriegler's holding in this case, which concludes that even trying (as here) to convince an existing prostitute counts as pandering; e.g., as precedent reflects, that a "substantial potential for social harm is revealed even by the act of encouraging an established prostitute to alter her business relations.

This may be another one of those areas where we deliberately pass statutes that are infinitely broad and that cover a plethora of innocent and/or socially beneficial conduct within their scope and rely exclusively upon prosecutorial discretion to separate the "real" bad guys from people like "us". Whether that's a good or bad idea as a policy matter is obviously subject to substantial dispute. But my sense is that that's what's going on here.

Keener v. Jen-Weld (Cal. Supreme Ct. - May 7, 2009)

It's not always so easy to count to 9.

Monday, May 11, 2009


I know, I know.



















Ileto v. Glock (9th Cir. - May 11, 2009)

It's Monday. Let's play a game.

Go to this opinion. It's about the liability of firearms manufacturers, and is interesting (and important) on the merits. But don't read it yet. And cover up the caption when you boot it up. Turn directly instead to pages 5578-80 of the slip opinion, which is where the majority responds to the dissent. Take a read.

A pretty classic -- tough -- response to a dissent, right? You might well get the following message from reading that portion of the opinion; essentially: "Ah, my pointy-headed liberal friend. Always anti-gun. Always trying to impose liability. Even when the best stuff you can find to support your view are isolated sentences from a concurring opinion by Justice Marshall and a dissent from a denial by White. Not even close. I'm totally right, you're totally wrong, and it shows."

So a classic conservative-liberal dialogue, right?

Well, yes. Sort of. Judge Berzon does author the dissent. But who's in the majority? O'Scannlain? Kleinfeld? Kozinski?

Nope. Judges Graber and Reinhardt. (!)

Can you tell that there's at least a little love there? Sure. If only from the sentence that opens the attack on the dissent, which reads: "We respond briefly to the thoughtful views of our dissenting colleague on the topic of constitutional avoidance." A sentence -- or at least the word "thoughtful" -- that was, I'm confident, added to the draft opinion by Judge Berzon or Reinhardt themselves, and that at least begins the salvo more softly than you might ordinarily see.

But then goes on, as usual, to leave few holds barred.

So a neat lineup to begin the week.

Friday, May 08, 2009

People v. Mays (Cal. Ct. App. - May 8, 2009)

What can we learn from today's opinions, heading into a warm and wonderful weekend?

Here's something: Never believe the police.

Yes, we know, as a matter of doctrine, the police are allowed to lie. To suspects, to witnesses, to anyone. It doesn't make statements involuntary.

At some point, though, this has to take a toll on law enforcement's credibility, right? Unless, of course, you're of the belief that the police only lie to "other" people -- never to someone you care about.

Thursday, May 07, 2009







Nope. We can do what we want to you.





Fries v. Rite-Aid Group (Cal. Ct. App. - April 22, 2009)

Never assume something's true just because the Rutter Group says so.

Wednesday, May 06, 2009

321 Henderson Receivables v. Sioteco (Cal. Ct. App. - May 6, 2009)

You've seen the ads on late-night television: "We want to take advantage of your misfortune and rip you off when we buy your structured settlement! Call us now: J.G. Wentworth."

Okay, so they leave out the words between "to" and "we". Still, they want to buy your structured settlement. And I got the other part of the message by implication. (P.S. - Any company with the slogan "Get Cash Now" pretty much screams "Predator" to me.)

I didn't know all that much about the gory details of this industry, but thanks to this opinion, now I do. Fascinating stuff. As is the Court of Appeal's slapdown of a judge (Judge Simpson, up in Fresno) who was trying to do something about what he concluded was a manifestly abusive process. Reversed.

I will say one other thing as well: The tax angle on this stuff is also intriguing, and not something I previously fully understood. Sure, I knew that if you get a lump sum in a personal injury settlement, that amount is not taxable, but that any future returns on that amount (interest, dividends, etc.) are. Lest that be it, Congress then gets convinced to let people avoid taxation on all of it by entering into a structured settlement, so now your $500,000 tax-free is $1.5 million tax-free (including appreciation) over time. Sweet loophole. On the theory that if you don't have the right to the $1.5 million now, it's not really "yours" yet, and it's all on account of personal injury. Then, of course, people want to buy and sell the stuff. So we let them do that as well, since capitalism rocks. But that threatens the tax dodge. So Congress passes a new law: Even if you have the right to (or get) all the money now, it's still not taxable. Sweet!

Ever get the sense that there's -- oh, I don't know -- an industry somewhere pushing all these favorable tax rulings? Nah. Couldn't happen in a democracy. It's all neutral, publicly beneficial principles.










Tuesday, May 05, 2009

People v. Henning (Cal. Ct. App. - April 29, 2009)

Ten years for defrauding lots of vulnerable, disabled elderly people.

Seems about right to me. And no, I'm not being sarcastic. I'm happy to have that guy peddle his wares in prison rather than on the streets.

Monday, May 04, 2009








Sentry Select Ins. Co. v. Fidelity & Guarantee Ins. Co. (Cal. Supreme Ct. - May 4, 2009)

As I've occasionally mentioned (e.g., here and here), the Ninth Circuit has been on a certification tear recently. Which has a lot of things going for it. (Plus, they add yet another one to the list today.)

But there are downsides. As today's decision from the California Supreme Court reflects.

Here's shorthand for what the California Supreme Court said:

"The Ninth Circuit asked us a question on an issue about which the lower California appellate courts were split. A month later, the California Legislature amended the relevant statute. As a result, we don't especially feel like answering the question, so we won't. Moreover, on the facts of this particular case, it's crystal clear that X should win regardless of what the answer is. So there you have it."

Which is helpful, of course. And potentially entirely appropriate?

But what's the downside? How long did it take the California Supreme Court to not answer the question in this totally easy case?

Three years.

Imagine how long it'd take if it was a close case and they actually had to come up with an answer.

U.S. v. Park Place Assocs. (9th Cir. - April 22, 2009)

Did you know that the United States once (and recently, at that) owned and operated a casino in Los Angeles? It did.

The resulting litigation has been a byzantine nightmare. The latest installment of which is this opinion by the Ninth Circuit.

But fear not. There will be more.

The case is a good reason to pay attention in your upper-year class on Federal Courts. Because the stuff is incredibly, incredibly complicated. As well as exceptionally valuable. Here, it's a $100+ million issue.

So think about that the next time you're considering blowing off class and/or skimming those difficult Ninth Circuit opinions. Sometimes, this stuff matters. A ton.

Friday, May 01, 2009

In Re Boyajian (9th Cir. - May 1, 2009)

Is it a new Ninth Circuit thing? Or is it Willie?

Today brings something new -- or at least new to me -- in the list of counsel in the Ninth Circuit. In both of the published panel cases today, the opinion lists the name of the relevant law firms or legal organizations involved (but not the attorneys) in ALL CAPS. So, for example, in this case, the listing for "John Randall Dudrey (argued), Williams Fredrickson, Portland, Oregon" becomes "John Randall Dudrey (argued), WILLIAMS FREDRICKSON, Portland, Oregon."

Attorneys often do a similar thing on the caption, so maybe this makes some sense. Though in a written opinion it does abnormally stand out, AND IS ALMOST LIKE WE'RE SHOUTING OUT THE LAW FIRM'S NAME. So it's a bit weird.

Plus, it does lead to some perhaps unexpected difficulties. For example, check out the other published panel opinion today, this one. Who represented the appellant? Howard N. Madris; Alan G. Tippie, SULMEYERKUPETZ. "Sulmeyerkupetz"?! What the hell is that? A jumble of letters in German? Makes more sense in traditional lower case. SulmeyerKupetz. No space so we're cool. But when it's in all caps, you don't know where the gap would ordinarily be.

I say I don't know whether this is a Ninth Circuit or Willie thing because, on the one hand, it's the first day of May, so maybe we're starting a new thing. Alternately, however, all of the opinions published by panels today are authored by Judge William Fletcher, so maybe that's just how he's doing it. The en banc opinion published today, authored by Chief Judge Kozinski, doesn't use all caps. So I guess we'll find out on Monday whether this is a new thing or merely an anomaly.