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German Army (1935–1945)

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

German Army
Deutsches Heer
Heer - decal for helmet 1942.svg
Helmet decal used by the German Army
Country Germany
Allegiance Adolf Hitler
TypeGround forces
SizeTotal served: 13,600,000[1]
Part ofWehrmacht
HeadquartersMaybach I, Wünsdorf
EquipmentList of army equipment
EngagementsSpanish Civil War
World War II
Supreme Commander-in-chiefAdolf Hitler
Commander-in-chief of the ArmySee list
Chief of the General StaffSee list
Ranks and insigniaRanks and insignia of the Army
Unit flag
Heeresfahne Infanterie.svg

The German Army (German: Deutsches Heer, German: [heːɐ̯] (About this soundlisten), lit.'German Army') was the land forces component of the Wehrmacht,[a] the regular German Armed Forces, from 1935 until it ceased to exist in 1945 and then was formally dissolved in August 1946.[2] During World War II, a total of about 13.6 million soldiers served in the German Army. Army personnel were made up of volunteers and conscripts.

Only 17 months after Adolf Hitler announced the German rearmament program in 1935, the army reached its projected goal of 36 divisions. During the autumn of 1937, two more corps were formed. In 1938 four additional corps were formed with the inclusion of the five divisions of the Austrian Army after the Anschluss in March.[3] During the period of its expansion under Hitler, the German Army continued to develop concepts pioneered during World War I, combining ground and air assets into combined arms forces. Coupled with operational and tactical methods such as encirclements and "battle of annihilation", the German military managed quick victories in the two initial years of World War II, a new style of warfare described as Blitzkrieg (lightning war) for its speed and destructive power.[4]


The Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) was Nazi Germany's Army High Command from 1936 to 1945. In theory, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) served as the military General Staff for the Reich's armed forces, coordinating the Wehrmacht (Heer, Kriegsmarine, and the Luftwaffe) operations. In practice, the OKW acted in a subordinate role to Hitler's personal military staff, translating his ideas into military plans and orders, and issuing them to the three services.[5] However, as World War II went on, the OKW found itself exercising an increasing amount of direct command authority over military units, particularly in the west. This meant that by 1942, the authority of the Army High Command (OKH) was limited to the Eastern Front.[6]

The Abwehr was the army intelligence organization from 1921 to 1944. The term Abwehr (German for "defense", here referring to counter-intelligence) had been created just after World War I as an ostensible concession to Allied demands that Germany's intelligence activities be for defensive purposes only. After 4 February 1938, the name Abwehr was changed to the Overseas Department/Office in Defense of the Armed Forces High Command (Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht).

Germany used a system of military districts (German: Wehrkreis) in order to relieve field commanders of as much administrative work as possible and to provide a regular flow of trained recruits and supplies to the field forces. The method OKW adopted was to separate the Field Army (OKH) from the Home Command (Heimatkriegsgebiet) and to entrust the responsibilities of training, conscription, supply, and equipment to Home Command.

Organization of field forces

German soldiers in Greece, April 1941
German soldiers in Greece, April 1941

The German Army was mainly structured in Army groups (Heeresgruppen) consisting of several armies that were relocated, restructured or renamed in the course of the war. Forces of allied states, as well as units made up of non-Germans, were also assigned to German units.


Below the army group level forces included field armiespanzer groups, which later became army level formations themselves, corps, and divisions. The army used the German term Kampfgruppe, which equates to battle group in English. These provisional combat groupings ranged from corps size, such as Army Detachment Kempf, to commands composed of companies or even platoons. They were named for their commanding officers.

Select arms of service

Doctrine and tactics

The German operational doctrine emphasized sweeping pincer and lateral movements meant to destroy the enemy forces as quickly as possible. This approach, referred to as Blitzkrieg, was an operational doctrine instrumental in the success of the offensives in Poland and France. Blitzkrieg has been considered by many historians as having its roots in precepts developed by Fuller, Liddel-Hart and von Seeckt, and even having ancient prototypes practiced by Alexander, Genghis Khan and Napoleon.[7][8] Recent studies of the Battle of France also suggest that the actions of either Rommel or Guderian or both of them (both had contributed to the theoretical development and early practices of what later became Blitzkrieg prior to World War II),[9][10] ignoring orders of superiors who had never foreseen such spectacular successes and thus prepared much more prudent plans, were conflated into a purposeful doctrine and created the first archetype of Blitzkrieg, which then gained a fearsome reputation that dominated the Allied leaders' minds.[11][12][13] Thus 'Blitzkrieg' was recognized after the fact, and while it became adopted by the Wehrmacht, it never became the official doctrine nor got used to its full potential because only a small part of the Wehrmacht was trained for it and key leaders at the highest levels either focused on only certain aspects or even did not understand it.[14][15][16]

Max Visser argues that the German army focused on achieving high combat performance rather than high organizational efficiency (like the US army). It emphasized adaptability, flexibility, and decentralized decision making. Officers and NCOs were selected based on character and trained towards decisive combat leadership. Good combat performance was rewarded. Visser argues this allowed the German army to achieve superior combat performance compared to a more traditional organizational doctrine like the American one; while this would be ultimately offset by the Allies' superior numerical and material advantage, Visser argues that this allowed the German army to resist far longer than if it had not adopted this method of organization and doctrine.[17] Peter Turchin reports a study by American colonel Trevor Dupuy found that German combat efficiency was higher than both the British and American armies - if a combat efficiency of 1 was assigned to the British, then the Americans had a combat efficiency of 1.1 and the Germans of 1.45. This would mean British forces would need to commit 45% more troops (or arm existing troops more heavily to the same proportion) to have an even chance of winning the battle, while the Americans would need to commit 30% more to have an even chance.[18]




A color photo of Hitler listening to a soldier
A color photo of Hitler listening to a soldier




The infantry remained foot soldiers throughout the war; artillery also remained primarily horse-drawn. The motorized formations received much attention in the world press in the opening years of the war, and were cited as the main reason for the success of the German invasions of Poland (September 1939), Denmark and Norway (1940), Belgium, France and Netherlands (May 1940), Yugoslavia (April 1941) and the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). However, their motorized and tank formations accounted for only 20% of the Heer's capacity at their peak strength.[19]The army's lack of trucks (and of petroleum to run them) severely limited infantry movement, especially during and after the Normandy invasion when Allied air-power devastated the French rail network north of the Loire. Panzer movements also depended on the rail, since driving a tank long distances wore out its tracks.[20][failed verification]



Contrary to popular belief the German Army in World War II was not a mechanized juggernaut as a whole. In 1941, between 74 and 80 percent of their forces were not motorized, relying on railroad for rapid movement and on horse-drawn transport cross country. The percentage of motorization decreased thereafter.[21] In 1944 approximately 85 percent was not motorized.[22] The standard uniform used by the German Army consisted of a Feldgrau (field grey) tunic and trousers, worn with a Stahlhelm.


"Above All Comes the German Infantry"—Nazi propaganda poster
"Above All Comes the German Infantry"—Nazi propaganda poster

The German Army was promoted by Nazi propaganda.[citation needed]

See also




  1. ^ Overmans 2000, p. 257.
  2. ^ Large 1996, p. 25.
  3. ^ Haskew 2011, p. 28.
  4. ^ Haskew 2011, pp. 61–62.
  5. ^ Haskew 2011, pp. 40–41.
  6. ^ Harrison 2002, p. 133.
  7. ^ Rice Jr. 2005, pp. 9, 11.
  8. ^ Paniccia 2014, p. ?.
  9. ^ Grossman 1993, p. 3.
  10. ^ Lonsdale 2007, p. ?.
  11. ^ Showalter 2006, p. ?.
  12. ^ Krause & Phillips 2006, p. 176.
  13. ^ Stroud 2013, pp. 33-34.
  14. ^ Caddick-Adams 2015, p. 17.
  15. ^ Vigor 1983, p. 96.
  16. ^ Zabecki 1999, p. 1175.
  17. ^ Visser, Max. "Configurations of human resource practices and battlefield performance: A comparison of two armies." Human Resource Management Review 20, no. 4 (2010): 340-349.
  18. ^ Turchin, P., 2007. War and peace and war: The rise and fall of empires. Penguin, pp.257-258
  19. ^ Balsamo, Larry T. (1991). "Germany's Armed Forces in the Second World War: Manpower, Armaments, and Supply". The History Teacher. 24 (3): 263–277. doi:10.2307/494616. ISSN 0018-2745. JSTOR 494616.
  20. ^ Keegan 1982, pp. 156–157.
  21. ^ Zeiler & DuBois 2012, pp. 171-172.
  22. ^ Tucker 2009, p. 1885.


External links

This page was last edited on 20 June 2021, at 16:14