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Dharmamitra 46

etacca prasaṅgasādhanaṃ mayoktaṃ na svātantryeṇa

And this reductio ad absurdum was stated by me, not independently

ityevaṃ svavācaiva paro 'bhidhāsyatīti manyamānaḥ prasaṅgasādhanatvam eva tāvad asya prakṛtasya samarthayitum āha tatra cāhur ityādi

Thinking that the opponent would say this through his own words, [the author] states "tatra cāhur" etc. to establish that this is indeed a reductio ad absurdum of the matter at hand

tata ityādi

[The section beginning with] "tata" [follows]

tatrāpyabhidhīyate bhavatyevam āgamābhāvaḥ, ko 'tra virodhaḥ

Even regarding this, it is said: "Let there be no āgama [scripture], what contradiction is there in that?"

nahi bhavatāsau bruvāṇaḥ samupalabdho yena dṛṣṭa iti virodhaḥ syāt

Indeed, [that being] has not been observed by you speaking, by which there would be a contradiction with [something] seen.

pṛṣṭena tvayā sāmarthyādidam abhidhānīyam na mayā svayam āgamasya tat praṇītatvam upalabhya tasya vaktṛtvaṃ prasādhyate

When asked thus, you should say this based on [logical] capability: "I am not proving his speakership after having myself observed that scripture was composed by him."

kiṃ tarhi bhavadbhir evāgamasya tat praṇītatvam iṣṭam tacca bhavatāṃ nopapadyate yadi tasya vaktṛtvaṃ neṣyeta

Rather, it is you who accept that scripture was composed by him, and this is not possible for you if his speakership is not accepted.

tasmād avaśyamāgamasya tat praṇītatvam icchadbhir vaktṛtvam api tasyeṣṭavyam

Therefore, those who necessarily want [to maintain] that scripture was composed by him must also accept his speakership.

evaṃ prasaṅgasādhanatvaṃ samarthya sāmprataṃ prakṛtārthānurūpyānabhidhānaṃ yojayitum āha yadyevam ityādi

Having thus established the nature of reductio ad absurdum reasoning, [the author] now speaks to connect [this with] the non-assertion of conformity with the matter at hand, [beginning with] "if that is so."

yuktiprasiddhatāyāṃ ca svatantraṃ sādhanaṃ bhavet

And if [something] is established through reasoning, there would be independent proof.

īdṛśaś ca pareṇeṣṭas tat praṇītaḥ sa āgamaḥ

And such is the scripture accepted by the opponent as composed by him.

sambhārāvedhatas tasya puṃsaścintāmaṇeriva niḥsaranti yathākāmaṃ kuṭyādibhyo 'pi deśanāḥ

[Like] from a wish-fulfilling gem, his teachings emerge at will even from walls, without any preparation.

ādhipatyaprapattyātaḥ praṇetā so 'bhidhīyate

Therefore, through [mere] supervision he is called the composer.

vikalpānugataṃ tasya na vaktṛtvaṃ prasajyate

His speakership need not be connected with conceptual thought.

vayamaśraddadhānās tu ye yuktīḥ prārthayāmahe itīdaṃ gaditaṃ tasmāt prasaṅgārtham ajānatā

Thus when you say "we who lack faith seek reasons," this is said without understanding the purpose of reductio ad absurdum.

ya eva hi dharmaḥ pareṇāgamamātrād abhyupetaḥ sa eva prasaṅgasādhane 'bhidhīyata iti nyāyaḥ

For this is the principle: that very property which is accepted by the opponent solely on the basis of scripture alone should be used in reductio ad absurdum reasoning.

tatra yadi pareṇa vaktṛtvānugamena tat praṇītatvam āgamasyeṣṭaṃ syāt tadā bhaved vaktṛtvābhāvād āgamasyātat praṇītatvaprasaṅgaḥ yāvatādhipatyamātreṇāsau tasyāgamasya praṇetābhyupagato na vaktṛtvopagamāt /

If the opponent [Buddhist] had accepted the Scripture's being composed [by Buddha] on the grounds of [His] speakership, then there might be the undesirable consequence that due to absence of speakership, the Scripture would not be composed [by Him]. However, He is accepted as the composer of that Scripture merely through [His] supervision, not through [His] being accepted as the speaker.

ato yat tatpraṇītāgamopagamena vaktṛtvāpādanaṃ tat prasaṅgārthānabhijñena bhavatābhyadhāyi //

Therefore, your argument that "through accepting the Scripture as composed by Him, [His] speakership follows" has been stated by you without understanding the meaning of logical consequence.

yaccedam uktaṃ kuṭyādiniḥsṛtānām ityādi /

[As for] what was said regarding "[teachings] issuing from walls" and so forth...

tatrāha kuṭyādītyādi /

To this [he] responds with "[regarding] walls" and so forth.

yadi hi tadādhipatyena tāsāṃ deśanānāṃ na syāt pravṛttis tadāptopadiṣṭatā na bhavet /

If indeed these teachings did not proceed through His supervision, then they would not have the status of being taught by a reliable person.

yadā tu tadādhipatyena tāḥ pravartanta ityupagataṃ tadā kimiti tadupadiṣṭatvam āsāṃ na bhavet //

However, when it is accepted that they proceed through His supervision, then why should they not have the status of being taught by Him?

sambhinnālāpahiṃsādikutsitārthavivarjitāḥ / krīḍāśīlapiśācādipraṇītāḥ syuḥ kathaṃ ca tāḥ //

Being devoid of confused speech, violence and other reprehensible contents, how could these [teachings] be composed by playful spirits and others?

krīḍāśīlapiśācādikāryaṃ tāsu na vidyate //

The work of playful spirits and others is not found in them.

pramāṇadvayasaṃvādi mataṃ tadviṣaye 'khile /

[Their] doctrine accords with both means of valid cognition in its entire scope.

yasya bādhā pramāṇābhyām aṇīyasyāpi nekṣyate // yaccātyantaparokṣepi pūrvāparavibādhitam /

Not even the slightest contradiction to it is seen through the two means of valid cognition, and even regarding completely supersensible matters, [it is] not contradicted by past or future [evidence].

karuṇādiguṇotpattau sarvapuṃsāṃ prayujakam // sarvākāradharopetaṃ sadvṛttapratipādakam /

It prompts all men towards the manifestation of qualities such as compassion; [it is] endowed with all forms [and] expounds right conduct.

ihāmutra ca bhavyānāṃ vividhābhyudayāvaham //

[It is] conducive to various forms of prosperity for worthy beings both here and hereafter.

sarvānuśayasandohapratipakṣābhidhāyakam /

[It] teaches the antidotes to all accumulations of latent afflictions.

nirvāṇanagaradvārakapāṭapurabhedi ca //

And [it] breaks open the door-panels at the gate of the city of nirvāṇa.

taccetkrīḍanaśīlānāṃ rakṣasāṃ vā vaco bhavet / ta eva santu sambuddhāḥ sarvatallakṣaṇasthiteḥ //

If such teaching were to be the utterance of playful beings or rākṣasas, then let them themselves be [called] perfectly enlightened ones, since [they would possess] all the characteristics thereof!

nahi nāmāntaraklṛptau vasturūpaṃ nivartate /

Indeed, the real nature of a thing does not change merely through the attribution of a different name.

viśiṣṭe 'śiṣṭasaṃjñāṃ tu kurvannindyaḥ satāṃ bhavet //

But one who applies the term "uncultured" to [someone who is] cultured becomes worthy of censure by good people.

yadi hi nṛtyagītahiṃsāgamyagamanādeḥ tat kartavyatayā tatropadeśaḥ syāt tadā krīḍādyabhiratapiśācādikāryopalambhāt tāsāṃ tat praṇītatvaṃ sambhāvanāpathamavataret /

If there were teachings that dancing, singing, violence, [and] incest etc. should be performed, then, because [such] would be recognized as the work of playful goblins and such beings, it might enter the realm of possibility that these [teachings] were composed by them.

yāvatā pramāṇaviruddhamaparasparaparāhatamāryajanocitam karuṇādiguṇeṣu niyojayitṛ svargāpavargaphalavāhakam etad bhagavato vacanam ityupapāditam etat /

However, it has been established that these words of the Blessed Lord are not contradicted by valid means of knowledge, are free from mutual contradiction, are suitable for noble people, impel [one] towards qualities such as compassion, [and] bring the fruit of heaven and liberation.

tadīdṛśaṃ kathaṃ krīḍanaśīlasya piśādeḥ sambhāvyate / yadi nṛṇām api bhavatā piśāca iti nāma kriyate /

How could such [teaching] be imagined [to be the work] of a playful piśāca? Even if you give the name "piśāca" to humans [that does not make it so].

kāmaṃ kriyatāṃ nahi nāmakaraṇe vastusvabhāvahāniḥ /

Let [it] be done as one wishes; indeed, the mere act of naming does not [cause] the loss of a thing's inherent nature.

kintu bhavāneva viśiṣṭe bhagavatyaśiṣṭavyavahāraṃ kurvan satāṃ nindya āpadyeteti samāsārthaḥ /

But you yourself, by engaging in uncultured behavior towards the distinguished Blessed One, would become worthy of censure by good people—this is the meaning in brief.

avayavārthastūcyete sambhinnālāpo gītādyupadeśaḥ /

The meaning of the components is being stated: "sambhinnālāpa" [means] teachings of a mixed nature such as [those about] singing and so forth.

hiṃsā prāṇivadhaḥ / kutsitārthaḥ kāmamithyācārādiḥ /

"Hiṃsā" [means] the killing of living beings; "kutsitārtha" [means] evil things such as sensuality, misconduct, and so forth.

pramāṇadvayasaṃvādīti / pramāṇadvayam pratyakṣānumāne tābhyāṃ saṃvādas tadaviruddhārthā so 'syāstīti tat tathoktam /

"In accordance with the two pramāṇas": the two pramāṇas are perception and inference; accordance with these means having meaning not contradictory to them—thus it is called that.

matam iti /

"Matam" [means] "found to be."

tadviṣaye 'khila iti pramāṇadvayaviṣaye / pramāṇadvayasaṃvādīti sambandhaḥ /

"In all matters therein" [means] in matters within the scope of the two pramāṇas; this connects with [the phrase] "in accordance with the two pramāṇas."

tallakṣaṇasthitetr iti sambuddhalakṣaṇasthiteḥ /

"Having those characteristics" [refers to] having the characteristics of a fully enlightened one.

"abhijñātam abhijñeyaṃ bhāvanīyaṃ ca bhāvitam / prahātavyaṃ ca prahīṇaṃ ca tena buddho nirudhyata //"

"What was to be known has been known, what was to be contemplated has been contemplated, what was to be abandoned has been abandoned—thus one is called a Buddha."

kāmamithyāsamācāraprāṇihiṃsādilakṣaṇāḥ / asabhyāstu kriyā yena vacasā samprakāśitāḥ // tadbhujaṅgapiśācādipraṇītam iti śaṅkyate /

Those [texts] which are characterized by [references to] sensuality, misconduct, killing of living beings, and so forth, and by which uncivilized acts are proclaimed through speech—these are suspected to have been composed by serpent-demons, piśācas, and the like.

tacceṣṭābhiratānāṃ hi tādṛksambhāvyate vacaḥ //

Such words are likely to proceed only from [those] persons who are addicted to such practices.

bhujaṅgo dhūrtaḥ //3620-

[The word] "bhujaṅga" is fraudulent.

yaccoktam yugapacchucyaśucyādītyādi tatrāha yugapad ityādi / yugapacchucyaśucyādisvabhāvānāṃ virodhinām /

As for what was said about the simultaneous [perception of] pure and impure etc., [the author] states about that "yugapad" etc.: [Regarding] mutually contradictory natures like pure and impure etc.

jñānamekadhiyā dṛṣṭaṃ na viruddhā vidā hi te //

They are perceived by a single cognition [and] are indeed not incompatible with knowledge.

yadyapi bhāvāḥ kecit parasparaṃ virodhinaḥ tathāpi te vidā jñānena sahāviruddhā eva / yugapad ekenāpi jñānena viruddhānekārthagrahaṇopalambhāt //

Although some entities are mutually contradictory, nevertheless they are not incompatible with knowledge [itself], because one can observe the apprehension of multiple contradictory objects by a single cognition simultaneously.

etad eva spaṣṭayann āha anyonyaparihāretyādi /

Clarifying this very [point], he states "anyonyaparihāra" etc.

anyonyaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇato 'thavā / ekasmin na saha sthānaṃ virodhas teṣu sambhavet //

There may be incompatibility in those [things] which are characterized by mutual exclusion or which cannot coexist together in one [place].

ekajñānāvabhāsitvaṃ natu teṣāṃ virodhitā /

But there is no incompatibility in their being manifested in a single cognition.

śucyaśucyāhiśikhyādeś cakṣuṣā sakṛdīkṣaṇāt //

Because there is simultaneous perception through the eye of [things like] pure and impure, snake and peacock, etc.

dvividha eva hi bhāvānāṃ virodhaḥ parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā sahānavasthānatā ca /

For incompatibility among entities is indeed of two kinds: the characteristic of being established through mutual exclusion and the inability to coexist together.

tatra ye parasparaparihāreṇa sthitalakṣaṇās teṣām aikyaṃ viruddham /

Those [entities] which exist with mutual exclusion, their unity is incompatible.

na caikavijñānabhāsanādoṣām aikyamekadeśatvaṃ vā prasajyeta /

And [mere] appearance in a single cognition does not lead to [their] unity or co-existence.

tena naikavijñānabhāsitvenaiṣāṃ virodhaḥ /

Therefore there is no contradiction in their appearing in a single cognition.

dṛṣṭaṃ ca viruddhānām api satāmekajñānabhāsanam /

And it is observed that even mutually incompatible entities appear in a single cognition.

yathā śucyaśucinoścakṣurjñānena parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇayor ahermayūrasya ca sahānavasthāyinor yugapad grahaṇam /

For example, the pure and impure [things], which are mutually exclusive, and the snake and peacock, which cannot exist together, are perceived simultaneously through visual cognition.

ādiśabdena chāyātapādīnāṃ grahaṇam /

The word "ādi" [in the previous context] includes [pairs] such as shadow and sunlight and so forth.

sukhaduḥkhādibhede tu yat sakṛnnāsti vedanam / hetvabhāvād asānnidhyāt tajjñeyaṃ na virudhyate //

As for the non-simultaneous cognition in case of pleasure, pain, and similar [experiences], that should be understood [to occur] due to absence of cause [and] non-presence, [but] it is not contradictory.

tajjñeyam iti /

[The phrase] "should be understood" [means the following]:

yat sukhādīnāṃ sakṛdavedanaṃ tat kāraṇābhāvenānutpatter asannihitatvāt tat{natu---} viruddhatvād ityevaṃ jñeyam boddhavyam ity arthaḥ /

That pleasure and such [feelings] are not cognized simultaneously is to be understood [as occurring] due to their non-arising from absence of cause [and] non-presence, not due to [their] being contradictory.

etad uktaṃ bhavati kāraṇavaikalyād asānnidhyaṃ tatra kāraṇaṃ na parasparavirodha iti //

This means that the absence of cause leads to non-presence, which is the reason [for non-simultaneous cognition], not mutual contradiction.

yeṣāṃ ca vāstavo virodho natu śucyaśucyādivat kalpanākṛtas teṣām apyekajñāne bhāsanam astīti darśayati nīlapītetyādi /

[The text] shows that even in the case of those [things] where there is real incompatibility, not merely conceptually constructed like [in the case of] pure and impure, there is appearance in a single cognition, [as in the case of] blue and yellow, etc.

deśaprakṛtibhedepi vīkṣyante yugapadyataḥ // deśaprakṛtibhedena virodhina iti sambandhaḥ /

[Things] are seen simultaneously despite differences of place and nature // The construction is: "[things that are] incompatible due to differences of place and nature."

prakṛtibhedo nīlapītādisvabhāvatvam / yadvā nīlādyupādānakāraṇatvam //

"Difference of nature" means having the essential nature of blue, yellow, etc., or alternatively, being the material cause of blue etc.

yaccoktam bhūtaṃ bhavadbhaviṣyatītyādi tatrāha ekajñānetyādi / ekajñānakṣaṇavyāptaniḥśeṣajñeyamaṇḍalaḥ /

Regarding what was said about past, present and future, etc., [the text] states "in a single cognition" etc.: "[The omniscient one is] one whose sphere of all knowables is pervaded in a single moment of cognition."

prasādhito hi sarvajñaḥ kramo nāśrīyate tataḥ //

For the omniscient one has been established [as such], therefore no sequence is accepted.

atra kecit svayūthyā eva vijñānavādimatam upodbalayantaś codayanti yadi yugapad ekajñānakṣaṇena viśeṣaṃ jñeyamaṇḍalaṃ vyāghāte, tadā bhāvanāni yatnābhāvānāmiyattāparicchedādānantyamabhyupetaṃ bādhyeta /

Here some of our own followers, while supporting the Vijñānavādin view, raise an objection: "If the entire sphere of knowables is comprehended in a single moment of cognition simultaneously, then the accepted infinitude [of things] would be contradicted by the determination of their limited number."

tathā hyekajñānārūḍhād bhāvād anyo bhāvo nāstītyevaṃ paricchidyamānāḥ katham antavanto na bhaveyuḥ /

For when things are being determined thus: "there is no entity other than what is included in a single cognition," how could they not be finite?

ekajñānasamārūḍhānnānyo bhāvo 'sti kaścana / iyanta iti vijñānādantavanta kathaṃ na te iti / tataś ca kramapakṣe yo doṣaḥ sa yugapajjñānapakṣe 'pīti /

"There is no entity whatsoever other than what is included in a single cognition; from the cognition that 'they are this many,' how could they not be finite?" Therefore, the same fault that applies to the successive cognition view would apply to the simultaneous cognition view.

tadetad asāram /

This [argument] is without substance.

yadi tāvan nirākāravijñānavādimatam āśritya codyate, tadā sarvamasaṅgatam /

If this objection is raised based on the view of the Nirākāravijñānavādin [those who hold that cognitions are formless], then everything [in the objection] is irrelevant.

tathā hi yāvat kiñcid vastujñānaṃ sattām anubhavati / tasya sarvasya sattāmātreṇa sarvajñacetasā parichedāt tena tadvyāptam iti vyapadiśyate, natu paṭeneva ghaṭānāṃ deśaparyantatayā vyāpteḥ /

For whenever any object-cognition experiences existence, all of that [object] is comprehended by the Omniscient consciousness merely through [its] existence, and is therefore said to be pervaded by it, not in the way that cloth pervades jars by occupying [their] spatial limits.

na caikena jñānena paricchinnānītyetāvatā vastūnām ātmasvabhāvahāniḥ /

And the mere fact that things are comprehended by a single cognition does not [cause] the loss of [their] inherent nature.

yena tānyekajñānaparicchedavaśād anantatvamātmasvabhāvaṃ jahyuḥ /

By which they would abandon [their] inherent nature of endlessness due to being comprehended by a single cognition.

nahi nīlapītādayo bhāvā bahavo yugapaccitrās taraṇādiṣvekajñānakṣaṇāvasīyamānatanavo 'nekatvaṃ jahati /

For many entities like blue, yellow, etc., appearing simultaneously in paintings and such, though apprehended in a single moment of cognition, do not abandon [their] multiplicity.

nāpi parasparamanvāviśanti /

Nor do they mutually interpenetrate one another.

apitu yathaiva santi tathaiva jñānena paricchidyante / nānyena rūpeṇa /

Rather, they are comprehended by cognition exactly as they are, not in any other form.

tadvat sattvabaloko 'pi yathaiva sattāmanubhavati tathaiva sarvajñacetasā gṛhyate /

Similarly, the world of beings too is grasped by the Omniscient consciousness exactly as it experiences existence.

aparyantaś ca dikṣu vidikṣu sattvādiloko 'vasthita ityaparyantayā tasya grahaṇaṃ natu paryantavartitayeti kuto 'ntavattvaprasaṅgaḥ /

And since the world of beings and so forth exists without limit in [all] directions and intermediate directions, its apprehension is [also] without limit, not as something limited—so how could the consequence of [it] having limits arise?

syād etat sakalagrahaṇābhyupagame kathaṃ paryantagrahaṇaṃ na syād iti /

One might object: "If the apprehension of the whole is accepted, how could there not be an apprehension of [its] limits?"

naitad asti /

This is not so.

ko hy atra pratibandho yatra sākalyagrahaṇaṃ tatrāvaśyaṃ paryantagrahaṇam iti

Where is there any [such] restriction that "wherever there is apprehension of entirety, there must necessarily be apprehension of limits"?

tathā hi yāvantas te santi bhāvās teṣāṃ madhye naiko 'pi sarvajñajñānāviditasvarūpaḥ sattām anubhavati

Indeed, among all existing things, not even one experiences existence without having its nature known by the omniscient one's cognition.

api tu sarva eva sarvajñacetasā viditasvarūpā evodayante vyayante ca naiko 'pi parityakta ity ayaṃ sakalagrahaṇasyārthaḥ

Rather, all [things] arise and perish only with their natures known by the omniscient consciousness, not even one being left out - this is the meaning of "grasping everything."

iyam eva ca teṣām ekajñānena vyāptiḥ

And this is precisely their pervasion by a single cognition.

yac coktam ekajñānārūḍhād bhāvād anyo nāstīty evaṃ paricchedāt katham antavanto na bhaveyur iti tad apy asamyak

What has been said - "how could [things] not be limited, since they are delimited by [the fact] that nothing exists apart from what is included in a single cognition?" - that too is incorrect.

na hi nirākārajñānavādipakṣe jñānātmani bhāvānām ārohaṇam asti

For in the view of those who maintain cognition is formless, there is no [actual] inclusion of things within the nature of cognition.

api tu sattāmātreṇa tena nivedyante

Rather, they are merely indicated by it as existing.

nāpi bhāvānāṃ jñānāparicchedyasvabhāvatayānantatvam abhyupetam yena jñāyamānatayā teṣām antavattvaṃ prasajyeta

Nor has the endlessness of things been accepted on account of their having a nature not comprehensible by cognition, by which their being cognized would result in their being limited.

kintu deśavitānāparyantatayānanto bhājanalokaḥ

Rather, the receptacle-world is endless due to the limitlessness of spatial extension.

sattvalokas tu saṅkhyānāparyantatayāpi

And the world of beings [is endless] also due to the limitlessness of enumeration.

na ca deśāvatiṣṭhambhāya paryantatve sati grāhyavirodhaḥ kaścid yenāgrāhyatā bhavet

And there is no contradiction between being apprehensible and being limitless with respect to spatial extension, due to which there would be non-apprehensibility.

yadi paryantatayā na saṃgṛhṇāti kathaṃ sarvajñaḥ syād iti ced ata eva

If [one asks] "if he does not grasp [things] as limited, how can he be omniscient?" - [the answer is] for this very reason:

yata evāsau paryantatayā na gṛhṇāti tata eva sarvajño bhavati

Precisely because he does not grasp [things] as limited, for that very reason he is omniscient.

anyathānantaṃ vastvantavattvena gṛhṇan bhrānto bhavet /

[If one were] otherwise apprehending unlimited things as having limits, [one] would be deluded.