sarahwei/cyber_MITRE_tactic_CTI_dataset_v16

text stringlengths 23 517	label stringclasses 31 values
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `dir c:\\` to search for files.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors stroed payloads in Windows CLFS transactional logs.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation CuckooBees, attackers used a signed kernel rootkit to establish additional persistence.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net user` command to gather account information.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net group` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to `rundll32.exe` to allow it to blend in with other Windows system files.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net share` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net accounts` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `fsutil fsinfo drives` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `tasklist` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net view` and `ping` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: `SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.`	['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors leveraged a custom tool to dump OS credentials and used following commands: `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.hiv`, `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.hiv`, and `reg save HKLM\\SECURITY security.hiv`, to dump SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.	['TA0006:Credential Access']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `systeminfo` command to gather details about a compromised system.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `ipconfig`, `nbtstat`, `tracert`, `route print`, and `cat /etc/hosts` commands.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net session`, `net use`, and `netstat` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `query user` and `whoami` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net start` command as part of their initial reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net time` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.	['TA0007:Discovery']
For Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors obtained publicly-available JSP code that was used to deploy a webshell onto a compromised server.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file using `wscript` and wrote the decoded output to a text file.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled HTTP and HTTPS listeners.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors generated a web shell within a vulnerable Enterprise Resource Planning Web Application Server as a persistence mechanism.	['TA0003:Persistence']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used batch scripts to perform reconnaissance.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors modified the `IKEEXT` and `PrintNotify` Windows services for persistence.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group archived victim's data into a RAR file.	['TA0009:Collection']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group performed brute force attacks against administrator accounts.	['TA0006:Credential Access']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their own malware to evade detection.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their malware and the dbxcli utility.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used code signing certificates issued by Sectigo RSA for some of its malware and tools.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used malicious Trojans and DLL files to exfiltrate data from an infected host.	['TA0009:Collection']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that used the `IsDebuggerPresent` call to detect debuggers.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group queried compromised victim's active directory servers to obtain the list of employees including administrator accounts.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group registered a domain name identical to that of a compromised company as part of their BEC effort.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group encrypted malware such as DRATzarus with XOR and DLL files with base64.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.	['TA0010:Exfiltration']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used a custom build of open-source command-line dbxcli to exfiltrate stolen data to Dropbox.	['TA0010:Exfiltration']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group removed all previously delivered files from a compromised computer.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted word searches within documents on a compromised host in search of security and financial matters.	['TA0007:Discovery']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted extensive reconnaissance research on potential targets.	['TA0043:Reconnaissance']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.	['TA0043:Reconnaissance']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted Windows servers running Internet Information Systems to install C2 components.	['TA0003:Persistence']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements.	['TA0043:Reconnaissance']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group impersonated HR hiring personnel through LinkedIn messages and conducted interviews with victims in order to deceive them into downloading malware.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group downloaded multistage malware and tools onto a compromised host.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted internal spearphishing from within a compromised organization.	['TA0008:Lateral Movement']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured victims into executing malicious documents that contained "dream job" descriptions from defense, aerospace, and other sectors.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured users into executing a malicious link to disclose private account information or provide initial access.	['TA0002:Execution']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group developed custom tools such as Sumarta, DBLL Dropper, Torisma, and DRATzarus for their operations.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group disguised malicious template files as JPEG files to avoid detection.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used Windows API `ObtainUserAgentString` to obtain the victim's User-Agent and used the value to connect to their C2 server.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used PowerShell commands to explore the environment of compromised victims.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group placed LNK files into the victims' startup folder for persistence.	['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used `regsvr32` to execute malware.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed malware with `C:\\windows\system32\rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\ThumbNail\thumbnail.db"`, `CtrlPanel S-6-81-3811-75432205-060098-6872 0 0 905`.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.	['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group acquired servers to host their malicious tools.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised servers to host their malicious tools.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used LinkedIn to identify and target employees within a chosen organization.	['TA0043:Reconnaissance']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for their targeting efforts.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent emails with malicious attachments to gain unauthorized access to targets' computers.	['TA0001:Initial Access']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent malicious OneDrive links with fictitious job offer advertisements via email.	['TA0001:Initial Access']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent victims spearphishing messages via LinkedIn concerning fictitious jobs.	['TA0001:Initial Access']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used an AES key to communicate with their C2 server.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group deployed malware designed not to run on computers set to Korean, Japanese, or Chinese in Windows language preferences.	['TA0007:Discovery']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used DOCX files to retrieve a malicious document template/DOTM file.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that collected `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFileTime` data to detect sandbox or VMware services.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0007:Discovery']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group obtained tools such as Wake-On-Lan, Responder, ChromePass, and dbxcli.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used compromised servers to host malware.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used multiple servers to host malicious tools.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed a VBA written malicious macro after victims download malicious DOTM files; Lazarus Group also used Visual Basic macro code to extract a double Base64 encoded DLL implant.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group uses HTTP and HTTPS to contact actor-controlled C2 servers.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group launched malicious DLL files, created new folders, and renamed folders with the use of the Windows command shell.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used WMIC to executed a remote XSL script.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used a remote XSL script to download a Base64-encoded DLL custom downloader.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dust Storm, attackers used VBS code to decode payloads.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established domains as part of their operational infrastructure.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used a watering hole attack on a popular software reseller to exploit the then-zero-day Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-0322.	['TA0001:Initial Access']
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used dynamic DNS domains from a variety of free providers, including No-IP, Oray, and 3322.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.	['TA0042:Resource Development']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors encoded some payloads with a single-byte XOR, both skipping the key itself and zeroing in an attempt to avoid exposing the key; other payloads were Base64-encoded.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2011-0611, Microsoft Windows Help vulnerability CVE-2010-1885, and several Internet Explorer vulnerabilities, including CVE-2011-1255, CVE-2012-1889, and CVE-2014-0322.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used JavaScript code.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on potential victims to open a malicious Microsoft Word document sent via email.	['TA0002:Execution']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on a victim clicking on a malicious link sent via email.	['TA0002:Execution']
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors executed JavaScript code via `mshta.exe`.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors deployed a file called `DeployJava.js` to fingerprint installed software on a victim system prior to exploit delivery.	['TA0007:Discovery']
For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used UPX to pack some payloads.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails that contained a malicious Microsoft Word document.	['TA0001:Initial Access']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious link.	['TA0001:Initial Access']
During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Visual Basic scripts.	['TA0002:Execution']
For Operation Ghost, APT29 used social media platforms to hide communications to C2 servers.	['TA0011:Command and Control']
For Operation Ghost, APT29 used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks.	['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']
For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered domains for use in C2 including some crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains.	['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `dir c:\\` to search for files.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors stroed payloads in Windows CLFS transactional logs.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation CuckooBees, attackers used a signed kernel rootkit to establish additional persistence.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net user` command to gather account information.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net group` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors renamed a malicious executable to `rundll32.exe` to allow it to blend in with other Windows system files.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net share` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net accounts` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `fsutil fsinfo drives` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `tasklist` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net view` and `ping` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used scheduled tasks to execute batch scripts for lateral movement with the following command: `SCHTASKS /Create /S <IP Address> /U <Username> /p <Password> /SC ONCE /TN test /TR <Path to a Batch File> /ST <Time> /RU SYSTEM.`

['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors leveraged a custom tool to dump OS credentials and used following commands: `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.hiv`, `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.hiv`, and `reg save HKLM\\SECURITY security.hiv`, to dump SAM, SYSTEM and SECURITY hives.

['TA0006:Credential Access']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `systeminfo` command to gather details about a compromised system.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used `ipconfig`, `nbtstat`, `tracert`, `route print`, and `cat /etc/hosts` commands.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net session`, `net use`, and `netstat` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `query user` and `whoami` commands as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net start` command as part of their initial reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used the `net time` command as part of their advanced reconnaissance.

['TA0007:Discovery']

For Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors obtained publicly-available JSP code that was used to deploy a webshell onto a compromised server.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors executed an encoded VBScript file using `wscript` and wrote the decoded output to a text file.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors enabled HTTP and HTTPS listeners.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors generated a web shell within a vulnerable Enterprise Resource Planning Web Application Server as a persistence mechanism.

['TA0003:Persistence']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors used batch scripts to perform reconnaissance.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation CuckooBees, the threat actors modified the `IKEEXT` and `PrintNotify` Windows services for persistence.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group archived victim's data into a RAR file.

['TA0009:Collection']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group performed brute force attacks against administrator accounts.

['TA0006:Credential Access']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their own malware to evade detection.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group digitally signed their malware and the dbxcli utility.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used code signing certificates issued by Sectigo RSA for some of its malware and tools.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used malicious Trojans and DLL files to exfiltrate data from an infected host.

['TA0009:Collection']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that used the `IsDebuggerPresent` call to detect debuggers.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group queried compromised victim's active directory servers to obtain the list of employees including administrator accounts.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group registered a domain name identical to that of a compromised company as part of their BEC effort.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised domains in Italy and other countries for their C2 infrastructure.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake email accounts to correspond with fake LinkedIn personas; Lazarus Group also established email accounts to match those of the victim as part of their BEC attempt.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group encrypted malware such as DRATzarus with XOR and DLL files with base64.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group exfiltrated data from a compromised host to actor-controlled C2 servers.

['TA0010:Exfiltration']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used a custom build of open-source command-line dbxcli to exfiltrate stolen data to Dropbox.

['TA0010:Exfiltration']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group removed all previously delivered files from a compromised computer.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted word searches within documents on a compromised host in search of security and financial matters.

['TA0007:Discovery']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted extensive reconnaissance research on potential targets.

['TA0043:Reconnaissance']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group gathered victim organization information to identify specific targets.

['TA0043:Reconnaissance']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted Windows servers running Internet Information Systems to install C2 components.

['TA0003:Persistence']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group targeted specific individuals within an organization with tailored job vacancy announcements.

['TA0043:Reconnaissance']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group impersonated HR hiring personnel through LinkedIn messages and conducted interviews with victims in order to deceive them into downloading malware.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group downloaded multistage malware and tools onto a compromised host.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group conducted internal spearphishing from within a compromised organization.

['TA0008:Lateral Movement']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured victims into executing malicious documents that contained "dream job" descriptions from defense, aerospace, and other sectors.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group lured users into executing a malicious link to disclose private account information or provide initial access.

['TA0002:Execution']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group developed custom tools such as Sumarta, DBLL Dropper, Torisma, and DRATzarus for their operations.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group disguised malicious template files as JPEG files to avoid detection.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used Windows API `ObtainUserAgentString` to obtain the victim's User-Agent and used the value to connect to their C2 server.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used PowerShell commands to explore the environment of compromised victims.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group placed LNK files into the victims' startup folder for persistence.

['TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used `regsvr32` to execute malware.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed malware with `C:\\windows\system32\rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\ThumbNail\thumbnail.db"`, `CtrlPanel S-6-81-3811-75432205-060098-6872 0 0 905`.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created scheduled tasks to set a periodic execution of a remote XSL script.

['TA0002:Execution', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group acquired servers to host their malicious tools.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group compromised servers to host their malicious tools.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used LinkedIn to identify and target employees within a chosen organization.

['TA0043:Reconnaissance']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group created fake LinkedIn accounts for their targeting efforts.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group packed malicious .db files with Themida to evade detection.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent emails with malicious attachments to gain unauthorized access to targets' computers.

['TA0001:Initial Access']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent malicious OneDrive links with fictitious job offer advertisements via email.

['TA0001:Initial Access']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group sent victims spearphishing messages via LinkedIn concerning fictitious jobs.

['TA0001:Initial Access']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used an AES key to communicate with their C2 server.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that conducted a variety of system checks to detect sandboxes or VMware services.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group deployed malware designed not to run on computers set to Korean, Japanese, or Chinese in Windows language preferences.

['TA0007:Discovery']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used DOCX files to retrieve a malicious document template/DOTM file.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used tools that collected `GetTickCount` and `GetSystemTimeAsFileTime` data to detect sandbox or VMware services.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0007:Discovery']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group obtained tools such as Wake-On-Lan, Responder, ChromePass, and dbxcli.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used compromised servers to host malware.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

For Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used multiple servers to host malicious tools.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group executed a VBA written malicious macro after victims download malicious DOTM files; Lazarus Group also used Visual Basic macro code to extract a double Base64 encoded DLL implant.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group uses HTTP and HTTPS to contact actor-controlled C2 servers.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used file hosting services like DropBox and OneDrive.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group launched malicious DLL files, created new folders, and renamed folders with the use of the Windows command shell.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used WMIC to executed a remote XSL script.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dream Job, Lazarus Group used a remote XSL script to download a Base64-encoded DLL custom downloader.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dust Storm, attackers used VBS code to decode payloads.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established domains as part of their operational infrastructure.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used a watering hole attack on a popular software reseller to exploit the then-zero-day Internet Explorer vulnerability CVE-2014-0322.

['TA0001:Initial Access']

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used dynamic DNS domains from a variety of free providers, including No-IP, Oray, and 3322.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors established email addresses to register domains for their operations.

['TA0042:Resource Development']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors encoded some payloads with a single-byte XOR, both skipping the key itself and zeroing in an attempt to avoid exposing the key; other payloads were Base64-encoded.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors exploited Adobe Flash vulnerability CVE-2011-0611, Microsoft Windows Help vulnerability CVE-2010-1885, and several Internet Explorer vulnerabilities, including CVE-2011-1255, CVE-2012-1889, and CVE-2014-0322.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used JavaScript code.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on potential victims to open a malicious Microsoft Word document sent via email.

['TA0002:Execution']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors relied on a victim clicking on a malicious link sent via email.

['TA0002:Execution']

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors disguised some executables as JPG files.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors executed JavaScript code via `mshta.exe`.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors deployed a file called `DeployJava.js` to fingerprint installed software on a victim system prior to exploit delivery.

['TA0007:Discovery']

For Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used UPX to pack some payloads.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails that contained a malicious Microsoft Word document.

['TA0001:Initial Access']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors sent spearphishing emails containing a malicious link.

['TA0001:Initial Access']

During Operation Dust Storm, the threat actors used Visual Basic scripts.

['TA0002:Execution']

For Operation Ghost, APT29 used social media platforms to hide communications to C2 servers.

['TA0011:Command and Control']

For Operation Ghost, APT29 used stolen administrator credentials for lateral movement on compromised networks.

['TA0005:Defense Evasion', 'TA0001:Initial Access', 'TA0003:Persistence', 'TA0004:Privilege Escalation']

For Operation Ghost, APT29 registered domains for use in C2 including some crafted to appear as existing legitimate domains.

['TA0042:Resource Development']